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Systems as a senior SW staff engineer, he designed and implemented the 
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ROM webserver, and Baseline Privacy security in DOCSIS 1.x compliant 
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In 1989 I walked into the Distributed Systems Laboratory as an 
undergraduate in the Electrical Engineering department at University of 
Pennsylvania and it seemed as if I didn’t leave that lab until I received a 
doctorate 6 years later. Combining compute and communications has 
been a professional passion ever since as I’ve lead a range of initiatives at 
Intel Corporation in protecting video and audio content, bring networks 
and digital technologies into the home, securing compute infrastructure, 
and preparing for a new generation of distributed applications popularly 
referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT).
IoT’s connection and computerization is a pervasive trend 
transforming everything we do and the infrastructure which supports 
us. From smart cities and homes to Industry 4.0, enterprises, critical 
infrastructure, healthcare, retail, and wearables, vast flows of data, 
increasingly processed using machine learning algorithms, are altering our 
existence. This unprecedented scale, pervasiveness, and interconnectivity 
also creates an environment where the security and integrity of these 
applications becomes a paramount concern. One only has to look to the 
headlines where attacks on critical infrastructure such as power generation 
and distribution, vulnerabilities in our automobiles, and malware in the 
devices such as webcams, smartphones, and PCs which we bring into our 
homes, highlight our collective vulnerability. Given the extensive attack 
surfaces being created and the asymmetry between attackers needing to 
find a single vulnerability to exploit while defenders have to find and close 
all vulnerabilities, IoT creates an unmatched set of security challenges.
During my journey, I’ve had the pleasure of working with many experts 
in their respective fields. These authors are the best when it comes to 
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offering practical guidance in addressing the IoT Security challenges. This 
timely book will build your knowledge about the IoT security challenges 
and remedies from the ground up, starting with the fundamental security 
building blocks and extending into available IoT frameworks and specific 
vertical applications. Please join us in the critical mission of securing IoT 








The Internet of Things (IoT) is a general term describing any device used 
to collect data from the world around us and then share that data across 
the Internet where the data can be intelligently processed to provide 
information and services. This definition can be extended to an industrial 
closed loop control system where data is acquired, coalesced with related 
data, transmitted to an intelligent station, analyzed, and then acted upon 
to influence the environment.
The technology consulting firm Gartner, Inc. forecasts that 20.4 billion 
connected things will be in use worldwide by 2020. The total spending 
on endpoints and services will reach nearly $3 trillion in 2020.1 They also 
forecast that worldwide spending on IoT security2 is expected to reach $3.1 
billion by 2021. In a similar study, IDC Forecasts Worldwide Technology 
Spending on the Internet of Things will experience a compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR) of 13.6% over the 2017–2022 forecast period and reach 
$1.2 trillion in 2022.3
The authors believe that IoT is a ripe field for not just securing the IoT 
devices but also for innovations in secure system design, secure building 
block technologies, and secure hardware and software development 








The IoT ecosystem is at an inflection point, and Intel has developed 
a roadmap of products and services which comprehend this growth and 
enables customers to participate in the IoT ecosystem transformation 
from a collection of disjointed, vertically integrated suppliers of embedded 
technologies into an ecosystem of interoperable and flexible building 
block technologies. This transformation has three evolutionary phases:
Phase 1: Connect previously unconnected devices 
through a multitude of interfaces and gateways 
eventually converging on the Cloud.
Phase 2: Make devices smarter and more secure 
where the connected devices are empowered to 
make more important decisions and become more 
aware of their environment and context, while 
security is resiliently maintained.
Phase 3: Increase the degree of autonomous 
operation while maintaining security where the 
smart devices require less dependence on back-end 
services – to dictate policies and to make decisions, 
becoming devices that can dynamically join or leave 
a network, can resiliently recover from failures, 
proactively update system software, and even learn 
to optimize operational efficiency.
Up through calendar year 2018, the industry, largely, has experienced a 
transition to Phase 1. We’re now seeing dramatic shifts toward Phases 2 and 
3 throughout the industry. We anticipate the future will be all about making 
IoT systems secure as a prerequisite to paving the way for a smarter and 
more autonomous IoT. Some may argue that IoT isn’t a new phenomenon, 
and some say it’s revolutionizing the compute domain where compute 
happens from Edge networks to cloud services. Our perspective is that IoT is 
actually both evolutionary and revolutionary – IoT will advance and reshape 
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the existing (brownfield) infrastructure while at the same time revolutionize 
and create new (greenfield) markets, processes, and ecosystems. IoT will 
disrupt some businesses, transform others, and create entirely new ones. 
That is both evolutionary and revolutionary!
In this expanding world of IoT, security becomes critical since the 
attack surface expands in intricate and profound ways when connecting 
billions of new and previously unconnected devices. Connecting 
devices that have not historically been part of the Internet world is a 
bit like throwing the innocent to the wolves. Security is a vital part of 
the IoT transformation to connectedness. The data4 from the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) pertaining to “CVSS5 Severity Distribution 
Over Time” shows that during 2016–2018, the number of vulnerabilities 
with medium severity tripled (3359 vs. 8912) and those with high severity 
doubled (2469 vs. 4317). During the same period, the total number 
of vulnerabilities almost tripled. A search6 for IoT in the NVD from 
2016 to 2018 resulted in 89 hits with several critical and high severity 
vulnerabilities in IIoT gateways and in other IoT devices. Therefore it is 
not enough to simply connect these devices; the imperative is that these 
devices authenticate mutually and authorize services all while protecting 
the confidentiality, integrity, and privacy of the data they collect and share 
between elements of the system. It is critical to have end-to-end security 
including each element along the data and control paths from sensor and 
actuator, to edge and gateway, all the way to the Cloud, protecting both the 
device and their associated data, interfaces, and software. Edge devices 
range from the lowest-power MCU-based devices to Intel Atom, all the way 
up to high-performance Intel Core/Xeon-based platforms.
4 https://nvd.nist.gov/general/visualizations/
vulnerability-visualizations/cvss-severity-distribution-over-time






It is important to understand that the anatomy of IoT hacks is radically 
different from typical consumer or enterprise computing. Consider the 
example of a hypothetical shutdown of the electrical grid via a domestic, 
Wi-Fi-connected oven and a ransomware attack that encrypts the firmware 
in a connected oven rendering it unusable. In both cases the oven 
becomes inoperable. The difference is in how the device owner needs 
to respond to the outage. A systemic outage of the power grid marshals 
resources to address the issue fairly quickly as the impact is more broadly 
felt. This outage will garner attention from government and private sector 
professionals because of its broad indiscriminate impact. Consumers 
could overcome the outage by resorting to local power generation sources 
to keep appliances, lights, and local networks running. Conversely, a 
localized malware compromise of a single oven requires the home owner 
themselves to be the first to respond and diagnose. If the malware is 
virulent, and noticed by network operators, the home network may be 
quarantined to prevent further spreading. The home network owner may 
be required to prove to network operators that the home network is free 
from malware before being reconnected. This is a significant burden 
to most appliance owners – a burden many do not have the skills to 
adequately carry. The IoT phenomenon brings an important paradigm 
shift where the focus of our attention turns from tactile devices like a 
smartphone to a network-of-networks and a system-of-systems where 
the misbehavior of a few devices may have systemic consequences. And 
at times those consequences may be broadly felt, while at other times fall 
fully on an unsuspecting and unprepared few.
Nevertheless, the IoT paradigm shift doesn’t seem to fully persuade 
security practitioners to carefully regard the security design of every 
connected device. Some even ask: What is so unique about IoT that it 
requires unique security knowledge or expertise? How is it different from 
say PCs and servers? What devices qualify as purely or only IoT things? 
Any CPU spanning from MCU class to Atom to Core to Xeon to Xeon-SP 
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can be a “thing” that is connected to the Internet. So what’s unique? From 
our perspective, the challenge in IoT can be framed as follows:
• The Device Lifecycle is unique since IoT devices often 
have a much longer replacement cycle than PCs and 
smartphones (sometimes up to 30 years). Few of us 
are still using their 10-year-old PC, but many of us can 
identify components in our offices, public buildings, 
transportation systems, HVAC systems, water treatment 
systems, and factories that may be much older. Long 
replacement cycles imply embedded systems with 
security vulnerabilities have embedded attack vectors.
• Security objectives and robustness rules vary greatly 
across multiple verticals/domains. Here are a few 
examples: AutoSAR and the numerous standards 
impacting the automotive domain – Automotive 
E-safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications 
(EVITA)/Secure Hardware Extension (SHE)/
AUTomotive Open System Architecture, Retail Payment 
Card Industry (PCI), Medical Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), naming 
only a few.
• Multiple Operating Systems must be considered in IoT 
systems to address diverse operational requirements. 
Some examples include Linux-Yocto, Wind River Linux, 
Android, Windows IoT/Enterprise/Client, VxWorks, 
QNX, and many other proprietary implementations. 
Interoperability and consistency in service operations, 
system update capabilities, and driver support are only 
a few of the obstacles encountered in supporting such a 




• System on Chip (SoC) and CPU with embedded 
security capabilities and features can vary significantly 
across vendors’ MCU products and even within the 
same vendors’ products including Intel Atom, Core, 
Xeon, and Xeon-SP architectures, making design of 
end-to-end services and security more challenging.
• There are multiple pre-OS boot loaders and platform 
initialization software, for example, Firmware Support 
Package (FSP) + Coreboot, Intel Slim Bootloader, UEFI, 
Legacy BIOS, Deep Embedded, and other types of 
firmware that are used across the various IoT segments, 
all of which complicate IoT platform design and field 
support. Inadequate field update mechanism would 
result in attacks on initialization software implying that 
attackers are able to load and configure malware.
• The stakeholders are many and scattered – 
independent BIOS/boot loader vendors, board 
vendors, independent maker community design and 
integration shops, OEM/ODM, tiered SW/HW System 
Integrators, and Middleware providers. Producing a 
coalesced platform with consistent and interoperable 
features and services in such a diverse ecosystem is 
formidable. This implies security processes such as 
incident response, forensics, compliance, and system 
design must maintain healthy ecosystem interactions 
to prevent security issues from falling into the “cracks.”
• Hypervisors are a critical part of the security equation 
since they provide needed isolation and protection. 
Some of these include Wind River Virtualization Profile, 
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Xen, VMWare, RTS, and ACRN. However, hypervisors 
also add system complexity as they impact operating 
systems, device drivers, and platform firmware.
• Managing these devices on heterogeneous networks 
is a huge challenge that requires a cradle-to-grave 
lifecycle approach; this includes provisioning, 
commissioning, decommissioning, software update, 
and other operational management tasks. Safety 
and regulatory aspects of security are also inherently 
present.
Security is not just a single step but instead a journey since what is 
secured this minute may not be secure the next minute and also because 
security has to be comprehended in all phases of the IoT device lifecycle. 
This book aims to diverge from a generic discussion of technologies 
presented by existing literature. It instead strives to inform readers of the 
methodology and intuition associated with implementing secure systems 
that were designed to be secure and presents focused insights gathered 
from the authors’ years of experience in the security domain.
While this book represents a snapshot in time, the IoT ecosystem is 
not stationary. The anatomy of threats is dynamic, and more applications 
are being designed and deployed every day. The National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) mining reveals that the threats are consistently moving 
down the stack, and they are now at the firmware and hardware level. 
This makes constant improvement through security by design critical, 
and security design cannot start with the application developer, but 
must begin at the silicon design and manufacturing phase and continue 
through platform development, software design, system installation, and 
sustaining operations. This is where a partnership with Intel begins to pay 
out enormous benefits that continue long into the system lifecycle.
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Design of IoT devices cannot consider only their own security. 
IoT devices that are designed for security must still interoperate with 
other devices and systems that may not be built with the same security 
measures. Interoperability requires commonly accepted standards and 
regulations that help ensure behavior of the singleton as well as a system of 
devices is consistent from vendor to vendor and from product to product. 
More standards are being created and regulations are being enacted to 
address many of the IoT security concerns, including protecting the user’s 
data, identity, and other valuable assets.
Managing risk in an IoT environment is inherently a formidable task. 
As Mike Crews, Director of Architecture in Intel Corporation’s Internet 
of Things Group (IoTG) – a staunch believer in Security – opines, “Every 
vertical domain – whether it is Retail, or Industrial, or Digital Surveillance 
System – is just one ‘Jeep Hack’ incident7 away from encountering the 
potential risks in not deploying and managing the security lifecycle of the 
IoT Devices.” His opinion is vertical domain business owners have to be 
well informed, feel responsible, and must judiciously invest in securing 
their own assets as well as the assets of their customers.
The authors believe there are three principles that support security 
by design which we have interwoven throughout this book. They are by 
no means trivial to achieve in real systems, and instead require a lot of 
commitment from all participants in the IoT ecosystem. The principles to 
evaluate features that are secure by design include
• Simple to Implement by leveraging relevant standard 
Application Programming Interface (API), frameworks, 





• Seamless to Deploy by leveraging relevant standard 
and scalable provisioning tools and associated 
collateral to deploy IoT devices in the field
• Easy to Manage by leveraging the standard 
management technologies, tools, and associated 
collateral to manage the IoT device lifecycle
After reading this book, we anticipate readers will be empowered 
with the knowledge and tools needed to recognize security trade-offs 
in IoT system design and software architecture and to identify the 
relevant hardware building block ingredients that underpin secure IoT 
deployments. We believe the solutions presented here provide reasonable 
security trade-offs and follow the secure by design principles. The chapters 
of this book aim to enlighten the reader’s understanding to address the 
following:
• Chapter 1: How the IoT ecosystem differs from the PC 
and data center ecosystem and how those differences 
impact security.
• Chapter 2: What are IoT frameworks and how design 
choices in different frameworks affect security, 
interoperability, and usability trade-offs.
• Chapter 3: What are the relevant hardware security 
features and building block technologies – as the 
authors believe, hardware security is the last line of 
defense.
• Chapter 4: How to approach building secure firmware, 




• Chapter 5: Which security properties affect IoT 
connectivity and what impact do they have on network 
and system designs given the IoT paradigm shift toward 
Network of Networks (NoN) and system of systems.
• Chapter 6: What other requirements affecting IoT 
verticals are relevant to security and why security is not 
a simple blanket but instead must be designed from the 
beginning with a foundational layer common across all 
verticals and then built up using vertical-specific stack 
components and application services.  We also discuss 
key standards impacting some of the IoT verticals.
From this book, readers will gather an overview of the different security 
building blocks available in Intel Architecture (IA)–based IoT platforms. 
Readers will also be able to understand the threat pyramid, secure boot, 
chain of trust, and the SW stack leading up to defense in depth. Readers 
will also be able to comprehend the connectivity interfaces with security 
implications and IoT verticals with their unique security requirements and 
associated standards and regulations.
We invite you to join us on our journey demystifying IoT security!
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In this chapter we relate several iconic attacks on cyber-physical IoT 
systems to illustrate the clever ways attackers are able to achieve their 
objectives. The physicality of cyber-physical systems and resource 
limitations of constrained IoT devices present new challenges, both for 
attackers and systems designers. This chapter explores security trade-off 
consequences resulting from design decisions aimed at reducing device 
cost. We advocate more enlightened perspectives that consider the value 
of the device in terms of the broader network and system value. The 
security front line often is a constrained device requiring world-class 
security capabilities such as hardware underpinnings for cryptography, 
integrity protection, storage, and attestation. Devices that don’t provide 
the basic building blocks of security are the weak links in the system – 
which systems designers aim to quarantine.
2
 The BadUSB Thumb Drive
In 2014 Karsten Nohl and Jacob Lell presented proof-of-concept 
malicious software at Black Hat USA 20141 that demonstrated how USB 
is fundamentally broken. The malware infects USB firmware rather than 
simply placing malicious applications on the storage area. USB firmware 
is trusted by most every USB controller to behave properly, as defined by 
the USB Consortium specifications.2 However, as long as USB firmware 
works within the framework defined by the standard, malware can 
cause the USB controller to give the USB firmware unintended access to 
the host computer. This is unfortunate as the lack of attention given to 
security implies a potential for exploits that includes key-logging, privilege 
escalation, data exfiltration, identity and access misdirection, session 
hijacking, and denial-of-service.
Karsten and Jacob not only published their findings but also published 
the malware on an open source repository known as GitHub.3 This 
means virtually anyone can construct their own USB attack device and 
even improve upon the original design. There have even been “how-to” 
publications4 that step the reader through the process, making it easier 
than ever for even those without prior knowledge of USB architecture and 
implementation to successfully build an attack device.
Subsequently, the “maker community”5 has picked up on BadUSB 
by creating a business around hardware platforms that have BadUSB 
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“maker” platform named Arduino.7 Using MalDuino as a development 
platform, it is possible for attackers to integrate other interesting malware 
designed to further infiltrate the victim computer or network. Often an 
attacker exploits a vulnerability in order to stage an attack on another 
vulnerability. Attack lethality can be amplified by linking several exploits 
that expose larger attack surfaces and allow the attacker to marshal more 
resources for the next attack. An attack that began as a compromise of 
something without network connectivity may morph into a compromise 
of resources with network connectivity – that broadens the attacker’s reach 
and lethality.
 Air-Gap Security
Some of the most secure networks rely on “air-gap” security as a way 
to prevent the spread of malware through interconnected networks. 
Air-gap is an isolation technique that ensures there are no wired or 
wireless connections between a highly sensitive network and one that 
is commonly accessible to everyone, such as the Internet. The security 
principle behind air-gapping is to establish physical isolation such 
that in order to move information back and forth between the secure 
network and other networks, there needs to be a mechanical system in 
place – euphemistically termed a “sneaker-net.” The idea is that only 
trustworthy people would have physical access to the air-gap and would 
follow appropriate security practices and procedures that ensure sensitive 
networks do not fall victim to the many attack scenarios found on public 
networks.
However, air-gaps rely on the use of electronic media to “sneaker-net” 
information to and from air-gapped networks. This often involves the use 
of USB connected peripherals. The assumption is that a device that isn’t 
7 www.arduino.cc
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capable of sending or receiving electromagnetic emanations is safe to cross 
an air-gap. The fallacy of this assumption, of course, is they are not safe as 
evidenced by BadUSB.
Air-gap security has a significant usability downside in that it is 
costly to deploy, doesn’t scale well, and isn’t forward looking. The next 
generation of industrial IoT looks to other network security mechanisms 
such as VLANs that segment networks that isolate manufacturing 
equipment behind routers, static/dynamic whitelisting, and zoning/
quarantining using network firewalls.
The lesson learned by air-gap security is that attention to usability 
cannot be ignored. Security mechanisms must be designed with all 
other system requirements taken into consideration to find the security 
mechanisms that optimize trade-offs.
 Stuxnet
“Stuxnet”8 is the name given to a malware found to have successfully 
infiltrated a top security nuclear research facility in Iran in June 2010. 
The Natanz uranium enrichment facility employed air-gap security 
mechanisms due to the safety critical aspect of the uranium enrichment 
process. Furthermore, uranium enrichment processes rely on SCADA 
(Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition) systems that are commonly 
used for industrial control because of their ability to precisely control 
physical machinery and remain resilient in the face of physical system 
failures, but also incorporate popular information messaging protocols 
such as MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport), AMQP (Advanced 
Message Queuing Protocol), and DDS (Data Distribution Service).
8 www2.cs.arizona.edu/~collberg/Teaching/466-566/2012/Resources/
presentations/2012/topic9-final/report.pdf
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SCADA systems may use programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and 
a variety of other sensors and actuators that can be customized to suit the 
needs of the particular mechanical operations in a plant or factory. PLCs 
often have USB interfaces for uploading the control logic executed by the 
PLC, but also support serial bus interfaces and protocols such as Modbus 
or 4-20mA current loops that transfer information reliably and with less 
wiring and setup. Unfortunately, these techniques did not anticipate 
security or are simply incapable of stopping attackers who have physical 
access.
Stuxnet employed a variety of techniques, some seemingly designed 
as alternative attack strategies in case some other strategy failed to pan 
out. Among them included a strategy to propagate the Stuxnet malware 
using Internet “Futbol”–themed web sites. Ultimately, Stuxnet found a 
way to program USB thumb drives that were used to update PLCs used for 
uranium enrichment centrifuges.
Stuxnet ultimately was able to cause physical damage to centrifuges 
by working within the tolerance specifications of the control system, but 
stealthily controlling the centrifuges to spin faster than usual for longer 
than usual or to adjust the rate of acceleration and deceleration in ways 
that exceeded the mechanical designer’s expected use case scenarios.
Although there still remains controversy over who created Stuxnet 
and whether it was targeting Iranian nuclear enrichment or not, statistics 
gathered by Symantec9 suggest there were unintended consequences in 
the form of compromise to “friendly” or untargeted installations. While 
the majority of infections, 58.85%, occurred in Iran, the remaining 41.15% 
affected other countries; 8.31% occurred in India, 18.22% in Indonesia, and 
1.56% in the United States. 13.05% occurred in other parts of the world.
Stuxnet is interesting because it demonstrates the possibility for 
information systems to cross over to operational systems in such a way that 
physical systems, infrastructure, the environment, and ultimately human 
9 “W32.StuxNet”. Symantec. 17 September 2010. Retrieved 2 March 2011.
Chapter 1  ConCeptualizing the SeCure internet of thingS
6
life can be harmed using only commonly available inexpensive electronics 
and software.
It marks the fusion of Information Technology (IT) with Operational 
Technology (OT). The acronym Internet of Things (IoT) takes on an 
additional and apropos meaning of Informational and Operational 
Technology (IOT).
 Designing Safe and Secure Cyber-Physical 
Systems
The preceding attack scenarios suggest we need to revisit past assumptions 
that electronic equipment is “secure” because of physical and air-gap 
isolation is incorrect. The presence of electronic “things” may be sufficient 
for some form of “networking” to be implemented involving the exchange of 
electronic things and therefore the exchange of malware that can transform 
to take advantage of different attack vectors. A more enlightened view of 
IoT may be the idea that the interconnection of all networks – including the 
exchange of physical things containing information – is the Internet.
Applying this view of the Internet, there are two additional layers to 
classes of computers10 that historically fit into three categories: (1) cloud 
servers largely composed of mainframes and super computers; (2) mini 
computers such as workstations and department or team servers; (3) 
microcomputers such as PCs, laptops, tablets, and smartphones.
IoT more commonly refers to a fourth layer consisting of smart cars, 
drones, wearable computing, and pervasive computing. However, a fifth 
layer consists of everything else that is electronic including USB thumb 
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The layering of technology has many non-security related benefits, but 
technology layers can present new security challenges. The interaction 
between layers is often not well understood or clearly specified. This can 
result in exploitable security weaknesses. Security analysis and design 
scope should therefore be expanded to include these other layers. Another 
aspect of security analysis is to determine the “attack surface”13 – the 
environment or sum of all points where an unauthorized user can try to 
extract information or inject control not anticipated by system designers. 
A basic tenant of security design is to keep attack surface small to limit the 
potential for unanticipated interactions.
The attack surface of IoT can be viewed as a pyramid (Figure 1-1) 
where the number of possible interactions is a function of the number of 
possible “things.” Although cloud servers process large workloads, there 
are only a few cloud servers in terms of possible points of interaction. 
Cloud servers expose commonly used web interfaces that do largely a 
small set of things, but in large volumes.
The IoT pyramid also illustrates the importance of defense in depth 
as nodes at opposite ends of the pyramid tend to be separated by routers, 
gateways, and other networking equipment that can be repurposed as 
security enforcement. Network segmentation reduces the effective attack 
surface by artificially isolating IoT nodes.
Intel predicts there will be 200 billion “objects” by the year 2020.14 
An object is anything that is “smart” – that is anything that has a 
microcontroller of some kind. If we consider relative population of 
objects across a five-layer IoT pyramid, the number of objects is roughly 
exponentially larger in the layer below and the layer above is exponentially 
smaller. A simple calculation showing exponential distribution across five 
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the second layer, 3.6B objects at the third layer, 13.4B objects at the fourth 
layer, and an amazing 179B objects at the fifth layer.
Amazon had around 2M cloud servers and 1M customers in 2014.15 
Alibaba had 765,000 customers in June 2017.16 Microsoft, IBM, Google, and 
others also have cloud service offerings that contribute to an estimate in 







































Figure 1-1. Internet of Things pyramid
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In 2015, it was estimated there were 2.6B smartphones17 and predicted 
to be 6.1B by 2020. There were about 2B PCs and laptops in 2014.18 Our 
simple calculation suggests there would be 3.6B objects at layer 3 – off by a 
factor of 1.5 or 2, but still in the ballpark.
Even with conservative estimates, these account for only 10B of the 
200B forecasted. If layer 4 accounts for 15B objects, that leaves 175B 
objects unaccounted for at layers 1–4. These estimates suggest, by far, that 
layer 5 represents the largest attack surface. That suggests there will be 
many more “Stuxnet”-like attack scenarios going forward. It also suggests 
mitigation of these attacks will be countered by additional security 
capabilities being applied to layer 4 and layer 5 objects.
Security capabilities often are required across a spectrum of 
technologies ranging from hardware to system software to application 
layers. IoT security also embraces network security and distributed 
computing security techniques. The potential exists to substantially 
increase the overall cost and complexity of security functionality for IoT 
systems. As security professionals anticipate the role security should play 
given an Internet of 200B connected things, security interoperability and 
standards are increasingly needed at layers 4 and 5 of the IoT pyramid. 
This includes the need for hardware-roots-of-trust (specially hardened 
components in hardware that resist many common vulnerabilities), 
common networking layers, and common IoT framework and object 
models. Consolidation of technology choices has a desirable consequence 
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 Constrained Computing and Moore’s Law
In 1965 Gordon Moore made a prediction that computing would dramatically 
increase in power, and decrease in relative cost, at an exponential pace.19 The 
computing industry perspective historically has been one that continually 
looks for “power-hungry” applications that can soak up the predicted CPU 
cycles. Ironically, that pursuit has led the computing industry to push the 
IoT pyramid higher and wider, but only recently has realized a frontier in 
the form of many (billions) chips that are power constrained. In constrained 
computing environment, the application that runs on a chip is quite small 
and functionally is relatively simple. The path to realizing Moore’s Law is 
through the number of chips – increasing in number exponentially.
Rather than consolidating more workloads on increasingly more 
powerful computers, constrained computing is about distributing 
workloads across hundreds, thousands, and even millions of nodes. 
Distributed applications are described more in terms of conceptual notions 
of computing such as “pervasive,” “mobile,” “intelligent,” “autonomous,” 
“perceptual,” “virtual,” “emotional,” and “augmented.” These adjectives 
describe properties of computation that are realized in large part due to 
distributed computing that bridges the five layers of the IoT pyramid.
Constrained computing dynamics optimizes the computing 
environment to fit specialized functions. The function is unique to sensor/
actuator capability. Hence, enhancing a distributed application may be 
realized by adding constrained nodes as well as by adding more powerful 
nodes or by moving compute-intensive operations to edge servers.
These dynamics aim to provide more flexibility at the lower layers 
of the technology stack by using, for example, virtualized PLCs where 
manufacturing equipment can be consolidated into more powerful 
gateways running multiple, redundant servers that are less expensive to 
19 www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/silicon-innovations/moores-law-
technology.html
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operate than deployments of multiple less powerful devices. Non-mission 
critical sensing over wireless technologies is an important trend where 
the cost driver is low-power sensing solutions (sometimes retrofitted 
with brownfield sensors and actuators) designed to operate without 
replacement over many years. Deployment models such as this don’t 
anticipate having extra watts for security processing.
Security however follows a counterintuitive cost model (Figure 1- 2)  
where the motivation is to make nodes more powerful – so they can 
perform security processing that applies security consistently across all 
nodes. Workload consolidation, data consolidation, and redundancy 
result in the deployment of additional nodes or more powerful nodes – all 
requiring consistently strong security capabilities and hardening.
In the Stuxnet scenario, attackers were able to connect USB thumb 
drives to air-gapped process control networks because the USB thumb 
drive didn’t have strong cryptography and authentication protections built 
into the IO control subsystem. Such sophisticated security operations 
are often determined to be “too costly” to justify bills-of-material cost 
constraints typically expected in “mass market” products.
Security functionality overhead for layer 1–3 systems typically is 
expected to be 10–15% of the total system cost. These environments 
are often very capable of supporting a common set of security features, 
algorithms, and operations such that the goal of having a network of 
equivalently protected computers is achieved. However, when moving 
compute into constrained environments, even with the dynamics of Moore’s 
Law, computing power remains constrained. As such, the percentage 
of overall functionality that is security related vs. non- security related 
increases. Our estimates suggest that as much as 60% of a constrained 
environment computer could be focused on performing security-related 
computation, leaving 40% for application-specific computing. In other 
words, the “tinification” (the process of removing unused functionality 
not needed by purpose-built embedded systems) of an application to fit 
into constrained environments results in the need to preserve more of 
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the security functionality than the non-security functionality. This leads 
business decision makers to question the viability of profits in constrained 
environments. Often these trade-off decisions lead to justification for 
weaker security, lack of firmware update capability, and no support for 
hardware root-of-trust architectures. These economic dynamics have 
led leading security thinkers to suggest the only resolution is through 
regulation.20 However, regulation aimed at even the most insignificant of IoT 
platforms would affect over 170B things – 85% of everything! If regulation 
happens to have inefficiencies, those inefficiencies would be multiplied 




















Figure 1-2. Nonlinear “tinification” of security vs. other functionality
Chapter 1  ConCeptualizing the SeCure internet of thingS
13
 Trusted IoT Networks and the Network Edge
The Internet of Things is a new term to describe an old concept – 
connected embedded computing. For as long as there has been electronic 
control, there has been connected embedded computing. Every dimension 
of process control and automation is characterized by a flavor of 
connected embedded control technology.21 In most cases, process control 
networks were connected using wires. This is no different a phenomenon 
for IP networks that first began as Ethernet22 cable. More recently wireless 
communications dominate applications where mobility or deployment 
considerations make using wires infeasible. Nevertheless, the array of 
wireless networking standards23 has evolved to take the place of wired 
equivalents. However, convergence toward a single network protocol 
remains a promise of IoT which anticipates that IPv6 (Internet Protocol)24 
will become the foundation of IoT networks – and by extension the entire 
Internet. Nevertheless, there are non-IP protocols that sometimes are 
included under the umbrella of the IoT buzz word such as Bluetooth25 
and Zigbee.26 Although these are not technically IP, there are strategies to 
encapsulate IP over non-IP networks using 6LoWPAN27 to support larger 
payloads, compression, and framing that otherwise would not be feasible. 
IPv6 encapsulation is currently supported with Bluetooth Low Energy 
(BLE) 5, IEEE 802.15.4, and ZigBee.
The interesting security challenge for encapsulated or bridged 
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not possible since security applied within one suite of IoT network 
technology must be mapped, in the clear, to an Internet-based protocol 
suite. This creates the need for a security appliance, such as a firewall, that 
maps not only distributed application data but also security semantics 
and operations. We show a simple security appliance example here. 
Subsequent chapters provide additional insights into network partitioning, 
monitoring, and responses facilitated by security appliances.
IoT networks are in a constant state of flux forming and re-forming 
coalitions of devices needed to implement a variety of distributed 
applications. We use the term “onboarding” to refer to this dynamic. 






















Figure 1-3. Negotiating trust with IoT devices
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“untrusted,” while devices already part of the coalition are considered 
“trusted.” Membership in the coalition involves trust negotiation where 
the device presents evidence of trustworthiness; for example, the device 
may be equipped with a “root-of-trust” hardened environment containing 
a manufacturer embedded attestation key. The root-of-trust is designed to 
meet a set of security features and assurances as a basis for trust. Secure 
key storage and secure cryptographic operations are important capabilities 
of a root-of-trust that can be used to implement attestation.
Attestation protocols (Figure 1-4) allow the root-of-trust to prove to a 
verifier that it is capable of protecting secrets, identities, and data. When 
an untrusted device is onboarded into a coalition, it first attests to its 
level of trustworthiness. This allows the attestation verifier to determine 
if the desired coalition is appropriate or if some other coalition is more 
appropriate. For example, a coalition of medical devices might expect 
all coalition member devices to have been approved by a quality control 
agency and receive a statement of approval that could be included with the 
attestation exchange at onboarding. If omitted, the verifier might conclude 
the device hasn’t been vetted by the agency and recommend it join a 
coalition of personal health fitness devices (that don’t require agency 
vetting).
The attestation verifier is a process that operates at a border 
that separates trusted and untrusted. In practice, these borders are 
nondescript. They may not align with geographic, topologic, social, or 
political boundaries. Likewise, such boundary criteria could also be 
asserted as part of attestation (if combined with additional contextual 
information), making enforcement of such bounding criteria eminently 
possible.
Attestation is a form of operational integrity checking that can be 
pervasive. IoT nodes should respond to changes that might invalidate 
recent checks and respond proactively by updating integrity profiles and 
rechecking. If an attack is successful, the attestation check can detect it and 
respond appropriately.
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IoT can therefore be thought of as a connectivity graph where certain 
nodes are simultaneously connected to multiple other coalitions of 
connected nodes. The connectivity graph reveals relative importance 
of certain nodes but also relative security and safety risk as more 
highly connected nodes represent a greater potential for doing harm if 
compromised or malfunctioning.
Attestation therefore can be thought of as a fundamental capability for 
anything that is connected. It provides a first-order filter that categorizes 
IoT devices according to the risk they bring to the established coalition. If 
we consider all ventures as being composed of a collection of IoT devices, 
whether they be Smartdust or whether they are cloud servers, the value of 
the venture is collectively held by the coalition. The introduction of a new 
IoT device that may have the potential to nullify that value creates the basis 
for risk-based management approach that relies primarily on attestation and 







May I join your network?
Can you be trusted?
Yes, here is proof




Figure 1-4. Attestation protocol
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An IoT root-of-trust (Figure 1-5) can be constructed in a variety of ways 
and can vary dramatically in terms of implementation and deployment 
costs. However, all root-of-trust designs have several minimum capabilities. 
First the IoT device is partitioned into trusted and traditional functionality. 
Traditional functionality is everything that isn’t essential to satisfying coalition 
onboarding requirements. An IoT device that can’t satisfy onboarding is 
simply an embedded or stand-alone device. It isn’t a “connected” device – at 
least not a trusted connected device. Trusted functionality is everything else 




















Figure 1-5. Root-of-trust architecture
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Trusted computing is defined by TechTarget28 as “Trusted computing is a 
broad term that refers to technologies and proposals for resolving computer 
security problems through hardware enhancements and associated software 
modifications.” Wikipedia29 defines a trusted system as “… a system that is 
relied upon to a specified extent to enforce a specified security policy. This is 
equivalent to saying that a trusted system is one whose failure would break a 
security policy (if a policy exists that the trusted system is trusted to enforce).”
The most essential elements of a trusted system are its trusted 
computing base (TCB). The TCB of a computer system is the set of all 
hardware, firmware, and/or software components that are critical to its 
security, in the sense that bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside the TCB 
might jeopardize the security properties of the entire system.
Some devices have a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for 
executing trusted application code. The TCB and TEE cooperate to 
ensure embedded security functionality can be accessed from within the 
TEE without a significant security risk. Bugs and vulnerability in these 
components jeopardize the security properties of the device. The TEE 
may be effective at detecting, preventing, or countering security events 
occurring in other parts of the system. It is therefore extremely important 
that every IoT device have a trustworthy TCB!
The authors suggest every TCB for IoT should contain the following:
 (A) Attestation key: An asymmetric key supplied by 
the device manufacturer that establishes device 
origin authenticity. The Enhanced Privacy Identifier 
(EPID)30 can be used to attest device origin without 
28 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/trusted-computing
29 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trusted_system
30 Proceedings: WPES ‘07 Proceedings of the 2007 ACM workshop on Privacy in 
electronic society, pp 21-30, Alexandria, Virginia, USA – October 29, 2007, ACM 
New York, NY, USA ©2007, ISBN: 978-1-59593-883-1 doi> 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1314333.1314337
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introducing a trackable identifier that violates 
privacy.
 (B) Attestation functionality: Trusted code that 
implements attestation and attestation verification 
logic.
 (C) Encryption keys: Symmetric and asymmetric keys 
used to protect device-device and device-human 
interactions that may occur in the context of a 
coalition.
 (D) Secure communication: Trusted code that 
implements cryptographic algorithms used 
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of 
information exchanged between devices and TCB 
peers. It contains support for key management 
protocols such as Kerberos,31 PKI,32 and Fluffy.33
 (E) Authentication keys: Symmetric and asymmetric 
keys used to authenticate the originators of 
messages exchanged device-device and device-
human, also in the context of a coalition.
 (F) Authentication functionality: Trusted code that 
implements identity and authentication primitives 
including support for distributed authentication 
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 (G) Secure storage: The ability to store keys, integrity 
measurements (cryptographic hash), whitelists, 
settings, and contextual information that if modified 
or deleted could result in failure of the TCB to 
correctly apply a security objective.
 (H) Contextual awareness functionality: Trusted code 
that can encrypt and authenticate stored data 
securely even if the attacker has physical access to 
the storage resource. The ability to sense and collect 
security relevant context such as time, location, 
biometrics, and other context.
 (I) Trusted execution environment functionality: 
Trusted code that correctly implements the TEE 
environment such that the TEE firmware can be 
updated securely and computing interfaces into the 
TEE are resistant to attack.
These security “building blocks” provide the core set of hardened 
functionalities that enables an IoT device to establish itself as a trustworthy 
node suitable for inclusion in one or more coalition groups of IoT devices. 
Once a member of a coalition group, a distributed application can be 
deployed securely.
 Conclusion
The Internet of Things can be described as a dynamic set of distributed 
computing coalition groups that come into existence seemingly on their 
own, without a presumption of central control or orchestration. Coalition 
groups may just as easily disappear, but IoT networks persist as a set of 
protocols, data structures, and capabilities that enable these dynamics.  
A secure IoT network is essential to a sustainable and automated distributed 
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computing on a massive scale where the tiniest of computing nodes needs 
to support a set of security capabilities that is common to all other nodes 
in the Internet including the largest cloud servers. Coalitions of devices 
will work together to manage risk and to preserve the value inherent in 
the distributed computing venture by vetting coalition memberships. 
Failure to enforce membership integrity places at risk the value of the 
coalition. These economic dynamics, once properly understood, motivate 
proper investment in security capabilities, even among the simplest of 
IoT devices. This leads to a rethinking for conventional practices that 
assume security functionality should be less than 15–10% of total system 
cost. Rather, we think an enlightened approach considers the value of 
the network is greater than the sum of its constrained endpoints. The 
cost of security is weighed against the larger value where the percentage 
investment in security technology, standards, and business practices is 
aligned. Such a perspective will make it more feasible for most relevant IoT 
security technology to exist at the right layers of the IoT pyramid.
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The complexity of things – the things within things – just seems 
to be endless. I mean nothing is easy, nothing is simple.
—Alice Munro1
 Introduction
In Chapter 1 we explored device cost dynamics when security is built-in 
from the beginning. Either the cost of the device increases or the ratio 
of device resources attributed to non-security-related functionality 
decreases. However, ignoring security results in the IoT device 
becoming the “weak link.” This chapter surveys IoT frameworks. We 
categorized them according to a consumer, industrial, or manageability 
focus though many seek broader relevance. IoT frameworks hide a 
lot of underlying complexity as the industry wrestles with embracing 
newer Internet protocols while maintaining backward compatibility. A 
plethora of standards setting groups have come to the rescue offering 
1 www.brainyquote.com/quotes/alice_munro_176434
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insightful perspectives on framework design to accommodate broader 
interoperability goals. But this may be too much of a good thing as 
framework interoperability has become yet another interoperability 
challenge. Framework designs often emphasize differing objectives, 
interoperability, adaptability, performance, and manageability. We offer 
an idealized framework that focuses on security to add contrast to what 
the industry already has considered. This chapter is lengthy relative 
to the other chapters in part because there are many IoT framework 
standards available and each takes a different perspective. Each has 
merit but ultimately the IoT ecosystem is likely to reduce the number of 
viable frameworks. We nevertheless encourage continued IoT framework 
evolution that removes unnecessary complexity and places security by 
design at the center.
 Historical Background to IoT
Before the “Internet of Things” became a commonly used term, embedded 
control networks used for real-time distributed control were known as 
process automation protocols, also referred to as fieldbuses. Fieldbuses 
are commonly used to implement SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition) networks, building automation, industrial process control, 
and manufacturing control networks. These systems tend to be extremely 
complex and difficult to manage, especially over time as the number 
of system endpoints grows and the usages demanded of these systems 
increase. SCADA systems often involve connecting programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controllers, 
sensors, actuators, and supervisory management consoles, all connected 
through fieldbus protocols. But fieldbus technology isn’t limited to a single 
protocol or even a small number of protocols. There have been more than 
a hundred fieldbus protocols entering industrial automation markets 
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in the last 20 years. The IEC-61158-12 and related standards describing 
fieldbus technologies contain over 18 families of fieldbus protocols. Some 
of these include CAN bus, BACnet, EtherCAT, Modbus, MTConnect, 
LonTalk, and ProfiNet. Wikipedia also has a fairly complete listing.3 The 
Complexity can skyrocket when multiple fieldbus protocols are used 
to create an interconnected system. Then, with the birth of IoT, these 
fieldbus protocols are required to interconnect with Internet protocols, 
in some cases by replacing a fieldbus layer with an IP layer, which adds 
further complexity. When IoT systems are built to integrate with existing 
systems, based on fieldbus protocols, IoT systems are sometimes referred 
to as brownfield IoT because they represent use cases, ecosystems, and 
solutions that existed before the introduction of Internet technologies. 
Looking forward, industrial process automation and control, building 
automation, electrical grid automation, and automobile automation 
might continue using brownfield IoT nomenclature even though Internet 
technology integration is taking place.
Nevertheless, existing brownfield systems are highly proprietary and 
vertically integrated solutions, while Internet protocols historically have 
been more open and layered and support a richer ecosystem of vendors 
and value-added suppliers. Reducing fragmentation of brownfield 
networks through IT/OT convergence is a key motivation for IoT. Possibly 
it is this openness and richness of the Internet that drives the OT industry 
toward an “Internet of Things.” Additionally, with respect to security, IT 
priorities have focused on CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), 
in that order, while OT has prioritized availability and integrity above 
confidentiality. The tension between CIA trade-offs is an important 
consideration as the IT and OT come closer together.
2 IEC 61158-1:2019 “Industrial communication networks - Fieldbus specifications -  
Part 1: Overview and guidance for the IEC 61158 and IEC 61784 series”, 
International Standard, Ed. 2.0, 2019-04-10. Available at: https://webstore.iec.
ch/publication/59890
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_automation_protocols
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Instead of using existing system as the starting point, the Internet of 
Things can bring a fresh perspective. Extending Internet connectivity 
beyond desktops, laptops, smartphones, data centers, cloud computing, 
and enterprise computing to agricultural, industrial, energy, health, 
transportation, public sector, and critical infrastructure seems a 
reasonable context for understanding the momentum behind the Internet 
of Things (IoT) evolution. The use of IoT technology to implement a 
completely new IoT system spawns unique applications for operational 
automation; building such a system with wholly new technology and 
protocols is sometimes referred to as greenfield IoT technology. Some 
examples may include drone control, self-driving cars, smart cities, supply 
chain automation, and machine learning. Greenfield IoT is riding the 
Internet wave of less-proprietary, lower-cost, and increasingly ubiquitous 
network technology that revolutionized PC, data center, and mobile 
device networks in the 1990s and 2000s. IoT may also benefit from the 
wave of microprocessor, memory, power, and storage innovations in 
mobile computing that results in lower-cost but highly capable computing 
platforms.
Whether the system is a brownfield system tying existing industrial 
or manufacturing automation control system with Internet technology 
or a greenfield system using completely new protocols and devices, both 
instances of IoT systems bring a level of intricacy that necessitates some 
abstractions to improve application development efficiency and to make 
management of these systems feasible.
But it isn’t just the protocols that generate complexity in IoT systems. 
Industrial IoT systems may have multiple layers of networks connected 
through gateways. IoT systems may best be categorized as a system of 
systems. As security practitioners contemplating the prospect of securing a 
complex system of systems, we must take every opportunity to ask whether 
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the complexity is justified because we, like other security practitioners, 
believe complexity is the enemy of security.4
 IoT Ecosystem
The IoT ecosystem is extremely complicated, fragmented, and evolving. It 
evolves at different rates depending on many factors, one of which is the 
replacement cycle for a given solution or industry. The replacement cycle 
for business PCs is 3–5 years, smartphone replacement is 1–3 years. Contrast 
this with building automation where an HVAC system replacement cycle is 
15–20 years or nuclear power generation facilities that must replace failing 
parts with identical replacement parts – leaving no room for the introduction 
of innovative or more secure technologies. These refresh rates either speed 
adoption of new technologies or restrict, even inhibit, the adoption of 
technologies that might improve operations, reduce costs, or even protect lives.
Due to the many differences in various sectors of the IoT ecosystem 
(e.g., health, public, transportation, industrial, energy), the sectors appear 
to embrace Internet technology differently – in silos (refer to Figure 2-1). 
However, the market forces keeping the silos defined are due in part to the 
technical requirements unique to the usages and applications that drive 
internal market cohesion. Brownfield solutions may have benefitted from 
proprietary or vertically integrated solutions, aided by these cohesive 
market forces, long replacement cycles, and costly specialized hardware 
components. But that is unlikely to persist as IoT innovations continue 
to find technology adjacencies that spill over silo barriers causing 
technological disruptive innovation. Generally, this is a good thing. 
However, these disruptive forces breaking down the proprietary silos 
also brings new challenges that impacts security in the form of increased 
complexity, new business models and unanticipated interactions.  
4 Tom Gillis, Contributor, Network World, “Complexity is the enemy of security,” 
Aug 8, 2016. www.networkworld.com/article/3103474/security/complexity-
is-the-enemy-of-security.html
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
28
Just as the changes in Internet protocols brought more complexity to PC 
networks in the 1990’s, Internet of Things technologies promise more 
complexity (at least initially) for industrial, control and automation systems.
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We consider the following application as adjacent to the Internet of Things but not part of it: Car sharing, ePayment
For more information, go to www.iot-analytics.com  IoT-analytics.com 2014. All rights reserved.
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Figure 2-1. IoT market segmentation by industry/application5
The IoT ecosystem (referring to Figure 2-2) can be understood in terms 
of concentric rings of technology used to connect distributed physical 
and logical components. The technology within a particular ecosystem is 
specialized for that ecosystem, its business models, as well as the producers 
and consumers in that market. Ecosystem-specific components are 
specialized for different aspects of an ecosystem’s distributed applications, 
resulting in unique devices that coordinate sensing, actuation, control, 
data collection, data aggregation, data analysis, risk management, and 
operations. IoT system components may be distributed because of 
physicality of sensing and actuating, or due to efficiency requirements that 
result in specialized computation. A potential unifying factor in all this is an 
interoperable, low-cost networking capability that makes distributed IoT 
possible. But satisfying the myriad needs canvasing multiple IoT segments 
using a single IoT technology seems improbable if not impossible.
5 IoT Analytics, Knud Lasse Lueth, “IoT market segments – Biggest opportunities 
in industrial manufacturing,” Oct 31, 2014. https://iot-analytics.com/
iot-market-segments-analysis/
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 Connectivity Technology
Network and connectivity are nevertheless of paramount importance. IoT 
systems must enable connections over short-, medium-, and long-range 
distances. IoT solutions often must satisfy a wide range of transmission 
quality requirements that may also need optimizations for low latency, 
isochronous, asynchronous, store-and-forward, mobility, or streaming. 
IoT systems must consider environmental disturbances such as radio 
interference or emissions from other electronic equipment, low-power 
conditions, congestion, and resource starvation scenarios. Guaranteed 
service levels also add to the mix of requirements.
Additionally, trade-off decisions impact safety, reliability, resiliency, 
security, and availability. A variety of network technologies have emerged 
to address the multifaceted needs of IoT such as Zigbee, Industrial 
Ethernet, LoRa, LPWAN, Modbus, and TSN – to name a few. Some are 
highly specialized to a specific application context such as the Control Area 
Networks (CAN), which uniquely addresses the safety critical automated 
braking systems found in many automobiles. Fieldbus protocols, such as 
Modbus, use a synchronized communications bus to ensure each PLC 
(programmable logic controller) receives the messages directed at it.
While others are more general purpose such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 5G, 
and Ethernet that accommodates information networks, streaming media, 
as well as control network applications. Industrial Ethernet operating 
at very high data rates can accommodate industrial real-time control 
requirements by ensuring network utilization remains below about 10%. 
Chapter 5 will dive deeper into details of different connectivity interfaces 
and considerations facing consumer and industrial IoT.
 Messaging Technology
IoT frameworks are exposed to IoT applications using a data model 
abstraction. The framework data model describes a view of the network 
where nodes appear as flat or nested data structures, and updates to 
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data values may result in actuation of various controllable elements. The 
data model abstraction allows the applications to focus on capturing 
semantic richness and less on moving data from node to node. Data are 
represented as structured markup that easily maps to messaging transport 
technologies.
Messaging technology determines how messages flow between 
network nodes. It also facilitates the building of IoT systems that collect 
data from various nodes using disparate protocols at the expense of 
creating additional complexity in the messaging layer. Simple messaging 
is request-response based such as REST (Representational State Transfer). 
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) and CoAP (Constrained Application 
Protocol) follow the REST methodology. Publish-subscribe messaging 
allows multiple nodes to register for notifications when a change is 
detected in a variable on a peer node. MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry 
Transport) is a popular example of a publish-subscribe messaging system. 
Broadcast and multicast can make publish-subscribe more efficient, which 
may be used in some IP-based networks. Different protocols are useful 
in different environments, and the whole communication stack even 
down to the availability of broadcast at the network physical layer must be 
considered when developing services in an IoT system. This complexity 
is difficult for the system designer but becomes overwhelming to the IoT 
developer. This complexity becomes most evident when designing an IoT 
platform, especially when designing an IoT platform intended to service 
multiple ecosystems. Platforms manage this complexity through the use of 
IoT frameworks.
 Platform Technology
IoT platforms host applications, resources, and data useful to an IoT 
distributed application. Platforms are specialized to the type of work 
each performs. Constrained IoT platforms may optimize for connectivity, 
latency, and small footprint, while less constrained platforms at the OT 
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network edge may optimize for device offload and bridging across control 
domains. Cloud platforms optimize for compute, scalability, capacity, and 
analytics. IoT frameworks are used in platforms because they facilitate 
interoperability and connectivity by combining appropriate networking, 
protocol, and platform ingredients in ways that allow application 














































Figure 2-2. IoT ecosystem
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 Elements of an IoT System
This section describes the elements of an IoT system focusing on 
device architecture, network architecture (an interconnected collection 
of devices), system management architecture, and lastly framework 
architecture.
 IoT Device
The term “device” can be confusing because it means different things 
in different contexts. When viewed from a manufacturing perspective, 
the device is a physical component consisting of hardware, firmware, 
and system software. It may also be preloaded with application software 
compiled into a single image that is embedded into persistent memory.
When viewed from a network management perspective, a device 
is a node that has a network address and could be part of a collection 
of interconnected devices. There could be multiple network endpoint 
addresses per physical device. Furthermore, given multiple network 
interfaces, the same physical device could appear as multiple nodes to 
other devices.
When viewed from an IoT framework perspective, a device is a logical 
context that exposes message passing interfaces. Interfaces are used to 
exchange data that is structured according to an interface definition. 
The actual data structure as viewed from within the framework may 
differ depending on the network protocols, message passing technology, 
or system usage. A logical device may have multiple interfaces to 
the network giving the impression to peer nodes there are multiple 
physical devices. This can be confusing if network address is the only 
way to disambiguate IoT devices. IoT frameworks expose a logical IoT 
device whose identity is independent of the underlying connectivity 
layer. However, security challenges can arise when a single networking 
interface exposes shared data or control surfaces with multiple logical 
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devices. This creates an opportunity for an attacker to exfiltrate data, 
perform side- channel analysis, or maliciously control logical devices. 
Consequently, the security design should incorporate endpoint 
protection technology deeper into the system – at the logical device level.
When viewed from an application perspective, the IoT framework 
data abstractions can make it difficult for application code to tell when a 
physical device boundary is crossed. A single application may interact with 
multiple IoT framework “devices” not knowing if they are geographically 
local or remote. This is relevant to security practitioners because device 
physicality is often what defines a security boundary. Obscured security 
boundaries make it more difficult for applications to effectively apply 
security protections.
To avoid confusion, the authors try to provide clarifying context 
whenever “device” terminology is used.
 IoT Device Architectural Goals
Unlike smartphones, PCs, laptops, and servers, the device bill of materials 
(BOM) for constrained IoT devices is often under significant cost pressure. 
In addition to the expected processing requirements, IoT devices often 
must accommodate hostile operating conditions that include extreme 
temperatures, vibration, humidity, and ultraviolet radiation. Meeting BOM 
constraints implies every ingredient is scrutinized to identify the minimum 
viable hardware, firmware, and software configuration while still satisfying 
product requirements. Part substitutions may be made over the course 
of a product’s lifetime to lower production costs.6 The IoT supply chain 
competes to be the low-cost supplier, and device vendors want to foster 
this competition to drive component costs even lower. Common interfaces 
facilitate interoperability and the integration of specialized hardware with 
6 Vendors often qualify multiple suppliers for hardware components that perform 
essentially the same function but allow production lines to keep producing if one 
supplier’s supply chain happen to be disrupted.
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general purpose hardware, sensor, accelerator, and Field Programmable 
Gate Array (FPGA) processor integration traditionally is done by a device 
manufacturer, but increasingly, specialized functionality is exposed to the 
network as a service. Software layers create logical devices that may be 
dynamically defined. Software defined devices offers greater flexibility for 
tailoring IoT solutions that meet customer need. Securing software defined 
devices requires a trusted execution environment that creates trustworthy 
hardware isolation and exposes security roots of trust to the soft device.
Interoperability
Architecting a device to be interoperable with other devices or infrastructure 
already, or soon to be, on the market is of paramount importance for IoT, 
especially given the enormity of different devices in large IoT systems. Web-
based validation suites allow device vendors to verify their products will 
interoperate with a wide variety of other vendors’ products, which would 
be too numerous to exhaustively validate using direct interactions from 
device to device. Testing for interoperability with an actual device that has 
not completed development or is not yet released to market is simply not 
possible. However, web validation suites allow testing for interoperability 
with standard protocols and frameworks, ensuring compatibility with peer 
IoT devices that have not yet completed development.
Nevertheless, interoperability gaps are likely to exist. For example, data 
models developed by competing standards may have syntactic differences 
even though semantics are similar. Standard protocols may not fully 
interoperate if certification testing is missing or is not comprehensive. 
Simulation tools that virtually deploy customer-specific configurations can 
be helpful. Simulations help expose interoperability gaps in specifications 
and validation suites relating to software behavior and data definitions. 
Trial deployments and test beds are another technique for finding gaps. 
This helps find hardware-dependent incompatibilities. Trial deployments 
go live once the gaps can be corrected. Test beds can be used for 
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
35
longer-term evolution of products with sequenced rollout of increasing 
capabilities and features while ensuring that interoperability or backward 
compatibility problems do not creep in.
It is prudent for IoT system designs to anticipate having to work 
around incompatibilities and building specific features into their design 
to compensate for such issues. Postdeployment reconfigurable layers 
between applications and embedded components give systems architects 
the ability to make corrections during simulation and trial deployment. 
Less constrained devices such as hub controllers, bridges, and gateways 
more easily accommodate reconfigurable layers as they often support a 
wider variety of network interfaces and have more computing resources 
and storage to draw upon. Nevertheless, reconfigurability comes with a 
security cost. Malware might more easily exploit reconfigurability features 
that compromise embedded system components.
Security
Security consists of both functionality and assurance disciplines. Security 
functionality typically deals with secure boot, secure key storage, and 
cryptographic algorithm acceleration, while security assurance typically 
deals with ensuring security functions work the way they are intended. 
Trusted computing technology combines security functionality with security 
assurance mechanisms so that security compromise isn’t catastrophic. 
Trusted computing components are called upon to perform recovery steps. 
All devices contain some set of trusted functionalities, upon which all other 
parts of the system assume is trustworthy and has not been compromised; 
this is called the root of trust for the device. The root of trust is normally 
involved in the secure booting of the device, holding the device’s identity 
credentials, and presenting cryptographic evidence of device claims, called 
attestation. Depending on the device, the quality of the root-of-trust may vary.
In less constrained environments, a root-of-trust could be a security 
subsystem such as a Trusted Computing Group (TCG) Trusted Platform 
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Module (TPM) or a secure storage module such as Replay Protected 
Memory Block (RPMB). It could be a secure coprocessor such as ARM 
TrustZone or a security mode of a CPU such as Intel Software Guard 
Extensions (SGX). All other software and hardware components depend 
on the root-of- trust components in some way for their security.
Typically, less constrained systems make use of multiple roots-of-trust 
and multiple trusted execution environments. For example, trusted boot 
may rely on a root-of-trust for measurement in the form of a boot ROM 
that computes an integrity value for software images loaded during boot- 
up. These integrity values are stored in another root-of-trust for storage 
that protects them until they’re queried by a remote device that verifies 
boot integrity. The remote device expects to receive an attestation report 
that is signed by a trustworthy signing key protected by a root-of-trust for 
reporting. The TPM is an example of a discrete processor that combines 
roots-of-trust for storage and reporting.
Roots-of-trust can protect application code while it executes using 
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology such as Intel SGX. 
Application developers partition application functionality according to the 
functions that are security relevant and those that aren’t. Less constrained 
environments allow multiple TEE instances. Managing and deploying 
multiple trusted environments and roots of trust adds cost and complexity.
In more constrained devices, these costs may be too high. Instead, 
devices must be designed with layered trusted computing. The Trusted 
Computing Group (TCG) proposed an approach for secure constrained 
device boot, secure device identity creation, and device attestation 
(Figure 2-3) that doesn’t depend on a security coprocessor called Device 
Identity Composition Engine (DICE).
Using a DICE strategy, the root-of-trust elements are those that operate 
first when the device is reset or when it resumes from a nonoperational 
state. The DICE architecture defines a Unique Device Secret (UDS) 
that is a circuit that produces a unique number when the platform 
undergoes power reset. The UDS circuit reads low-level device firmware 
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that is used to boot and possibly operate the device once booted. 
Firmware is cryptographically hashed with the UDS that is then fed into 
a cryptographic key generation circuit to produce a device identifier. 
Cryptographic hash is a one-way function that ensures input data can’t be 
discovered by analyzing the output value. If a different firmware image is 
hashed, it will produce a different hash output value. This will cause the 
key generation circuit to produce a different device identifier than what 
results from the first firmware image. If the device identity changes from 
what the IoT network expects, the changed device identity is no longer 
trusted and must be revetted and onboarded into the network.
The device identifier is unique to the UDS secret and the firmware 
installed. The secret is immutable because it is hardware. If the firmware 
is updated, a different device identity key is generated. A controller, 
bridge, gateway, or other IoT nodes can determine if firmware changes 
because it will no longer recognize the device identifier or be able to 
verify its digital signature. If malware corrupts device firmware then 
resetting the device sill return it to a secure operational state. The UDS and 
DeviceID derivation functionality form a root of trust that is simpler than 
a traditional Trusted Platform Module (TPM), secure co-processor or TEE. 
This is better suited for cost constrained IoT devices, but also benefits TCB 










Figure 2-3. Device Identity Composition Engine
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 IoT Network
When multiple IoT devices are connected together, they form an IoT 
network. However, connectivity alone isn’t very interesting. IoT devices 
should interoperate as a distributed application. One expects IoT nodes 
will cooperate to achieve a common objective. To do this, devices need 
a few basic behaviors: (a) the ability to discover peer nodes, something 
about their function or role and interfaces they support; (b) the ability 
to connect, which may involve authenticating and constructing a secure 
channel or cryptographic association; and (c) the ability to send and 
receive formatted data, parse it, and process it according to application- 
specific semantics.
Core to IoT design is the idea of an hourglass network layering model 
(Figure 2-4) that seeks to simplify the possible choices of network layer 
protocols to Internet Protocols (IPv4 and IPv6) while permitting legacy 
SCADA, fieldbus, and embedded control physical and data link layer 
technologies to remain available either through gateways or through 
encapsulation, such as 6LoWPAN7 (IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal 
Area Networks).
The top half of the hourglass hosts existing and evolving IP transport layer 
technologies, for example, the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)8 
supports an HTTP-like RESTful message exchange without the overhead 
required to support HTTP and TCP. The Datagram Transport Layer Security 
(DTLS)9 applies TLS-like security to CoAP. An impressive array of emerging 
protocols designed for IoT are being developed by the IETF Constrained 
RESTful Environments (CORE)10 working group. DTLS may be appropriate in 
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The framework layer sits atop the hourglass consisting of a dizzying 
mix of technologies that predate IoT or have emerged as a result of it. Most 
interestingly a flurry of new standards organizations has emerged that 
seem to have insightful perspectives on how best to define IoT frameworks. 
The authors believe that much of the IoT ecosystem will coalesce around a 
common set of Internet-based technologies forming an hourglass shape.
 IoT System Management
IoT system management comprehends manageability goals for both IT 
(Information Technology) and OT (Operational Technology). Device 
lifecycle management is common to both IT and OT disciplines covering 






Figure 2-4. IoT network layering
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all phases of operation, including decommissioning and retirement. 
Management services support device lifecycle management. These 
include security services for managing roles, access control policies, 
and cryptographic keys and certificates; software update services for 
distribution and installation of firmware, software, and security patches; 
orchestration services for coordinating distributed application behavior, 
simulation, and for handling graceful failover, resiliency, load balancing, 
and redundancy; and telemetry services report on a variety of operational, 
security, safety, and behavior components of an IoT system that may be 
used further by IoT analytics and business management.
A challenge facing IoT systems is finding a uniform and consistent 
approach to manageability given the deeply fragmented brownfield and 
greenfield IoT solutions. Proprietary and vertically integrated solutions 
often don’t interoperate with horizontal IoT framework approaches, 
and framework manageability is quite often rudimentary lacking deep 
integration.
Lack of a uniform approach to security manageability has potentially 
significant IT and OT impact. For example, application of a security patch 
in an industrial IoT deployment may require multiple security consoles 
with labor-intensive checklists that verify all nodes are patched properly. 
Access control policies may not be consistently expressed across disparate 
IoT systems where role names and syntax may differ, access enforcement 
conventions may differ and be inconsistent, or key management 
capabilities may differ and may lack scalability or equivalent security 
strengths. Security gateways may be considered as a way to address some 
of these issues, but they may require deployment of new trusted nodes 
in situations where trust semantics don’t normally expect or allow a 
universally trusted gateway system. For example, a security gateway node 
that links an industrial process automation network to a business analytics 
server might be located at a base station in a wireless edge environment 
that has limited physical security, but nevertheless must operate with full 
security privileges of both networks.
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 Device Lifecycle
Trust in logical IoT devices is (or should be) tied to trust in the physical 
layer that hosts it. In an enterprise deployment scenario, servers, PCs, 
and even smartphones can undergo a rigorous manual inspection and 
configuration step by trained security professionals. However, the scale 
at which IoT devices are deployed is seldom feasible to apply the same 
rigorous manual processes. Instead, onboarding techniques that require 
minimal or no touch are needed. IoT platforms and devices follow a 
lifecycle (Figure 2-5) that may begin during manufacturing and ends 
when the device is decommissioned or waterfalled to another owner for 
redeployment starting another lifecycle.





Figure 2-5. IoT device/platform lifecycle model
Attackers may target vulnerabilities earlier in the lifecycle in order 
to avoid detection and circumvent mitigation strategies that presume 
manufacturing, supply chain, and onboarding steps are free from 
compromise.
IoT frameworks make assumptions about where along the device 
lifecycle continuum the framework abstraction models begin to apply. 
Early in the lifecycle, only physical devices exist. Even if logical devices 
come into being early in the supply chain, it may still be possible for 
additional logical devices to appear subsequent to initial onboarding or 
may disappear prior to a final decommissioning step. Security of the IoT 
system may depend on how well the IoT framework layer integrates with 
the platform lifecycle.
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Manufacturing
Manufacturing processes are critical toward the establishment of 
hardware-roots-of-trust which is a term used to describe security 
building blocks having to do with establishing platform/device identities, 
protecting cryptographic keys and algorithms, and creating hardened 
execution environments and system bootstrap procedures that resist 
attacks. Features may include hardware random number generation, 
cryptographic algorithms in ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated 
Circuit), FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array) or instructions, hardware 
fuses that seed random number generation, boot ROM, replay protected 
memory, and others.
Supply Chain
Supply chain processes protect platforms and devices as they make their 
way from manufacturers to retailers to customer first deployment. Supply 
chain participants may have physical access to hardware components that 
if replaced by malicious components could result in undetectable attack 
scenarios. Tracking platform and devices through the supply chain may 
involve the use of RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) tags, supply chain 
UUIDs (Universally Unique Identifiers), or cryptographic device identifiers. 
Privacy may become a challenge however as tracking capabilities could be 
misused in ways that violate privacy goals. Privacy requirements need to be 
anticipated as part of supply chain tracking mechanisms.
Deployment
Deployment is concerned with initial power up, customer-specific 
configuration, and establishment of the platform/device owner. 
Then the entity responsible for adding IoT devices to their network is 
sometimes called the “owner” which implies a change of ownership and 
establishment of a “local” identity that differs from a manufacturer or 
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
43
supply chain supplied identity. The owner operates onboarding services 
that facilitate ownership transfer, verification of supply chain provenance, 
attestation of security properties and roots of trust, issuance of credentials, 
security associations, roles, and access control policies. Taking ownership 
of many devices can be challenging given limited human resources and 
large numbers of devices. Zero-touch commissioning is immensely 
important and difficult to get right given the diversity in supply chain and 
given the spectrum of customer security and privacy expectations.
Normal Operation and Monitoring
Normal operation refers to operational states where IoT functions are 
fully enabled and ready for use. Security monitoring ensures devices and 
networks continue to function securely. IoT frameworks may choose 
to hide security monitoring operations from IoT application-level 
abstractions, but they should consider how to fail gracefully when security 
conditions require service disruption.
Manage
IoT devices require periodic management, tuning, and adjustment. Some 
management functions can occur while devices are operating normally. 
For example, addition of security credentials for dynamically added 
devices may not need to interrupt activity with existing devices. Other 
management tasks may require disruption of normal operations. For 
example, an uncalibrated actuator may result in device, process, or system 
failures if asked to operate outside its design constraints. Frameworks 
can facilitate communication of device status and availability to enable 
periodic maintenance without major disruption to peer nodes. This 
management implementation could be in-band (within the OS/FW 
control) and/or out-of-band (outside of OS/FW control).
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Update
Software and firmware updates are arguably a subset of device 
management commonly known as Software Over-the-Air (SOTA) and 
Firmware Over-the-Air (FOTA) updates. Software update management 
must consider trade-offs of propagating large image files over networks 
optimized for small messages that may be latency sensitive. IoT networks 
may have “sleepy” nodes that are not available to receive an update in a 
timely manner.
Nevertheless, software and firmware updates are essential to secure 
operation. It is inevitable that security weaknesses will exist in most 
firmware and software images. Hence, when weaknesses are found, they 
should be fixed quickly to avoid possible exploit.
Decommissioning
Decommissioning is the process of undoing onboarding, commissioning, 
and provisioning that were applied previously. Although it is expected 
that devices and frameworks will anticipate scenarios involving devices 
that don’t go through a decommissioning process to handle it gracefully, 
applying decommissioning steps helps ensure privacy objectives are met 
by removing trackable personally identifiable information (PII) or privacy- 
sensitive information before it falls into other hands. Decommissioning 
also ensures security-sensitive data, credentials, keys, and access tokens 
are removed so they aren’t used to later attack other nodes. Frameworks 
can facilitate decommissioning by orchestrating the nodes removal in a 
coordinated way. Sometimes decommissioning could entail replacing the 
device under consideration with another device consisting of the same 
persona.
Automation of the IoT device lifecycle is an important security 
capability as it helps ensure the device never enters an insecure state and 
minimizes opportunities for attacker exploit by ensuring secure lifecycle 
practices are consistently applied.
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 IoT Framework
An IoT framework is a middleware layer beneath one or more IoT 
applications that presents a network-facing application interface through 
which peer framework nodes interact. Frameworks often support multiple 
communication technologies and message passing techniques. IoT 
frameworks also expose security capabilities including hardware-roots-of-
trust to applications and peer framework nodes.
 IoT Framework Design Goals
IoT frameworks have four primary design goals: (1) reduce development 
time and bring IoT solutions to market sooner; (2) reduce apparent 
complexity of deploying and operating an IoT network; (3) improve 
application portability and interoperability; and (4) improve serviceability, 
reliability, and maintainability. Given the vast range of existing and 
emerging communication technology choices, it is untenable for 
applications to manage the combinations of possible ways to connect. 
Frameworks hide connectivity complexity beneath a higher-level 
message passing abstraction like REST and publish-subscribe. Standards 
organizations help achieve these goals through standardization of the 
framework layer interconnect, message passing interface definition, 
and data definitions leveraged by applications. Standards groups also 
document IoT system design principles, architecture, and interconnect 
options. Standards organizations and industry consortia may assist 
developers by supplying and certifying reference implementations that 
include source code. Reference code helps streamline development by 
providing implementations that pass compliance tests and correctly 
interprets standards specifications. Reference codebases are easier to 
maintain benefiting from a large diverse community of open source 
developers who cooperate by actively developing code and improving the 
codebase.
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Frameworks simplify IoT networks by creating an abstraction of the 
IoT device networks that hides much of the underlying complexity while 
exposing data, interfaces, and functions that facilitate interoperation. All 
it should take to develop an IoT application is to create an application in 
a high-level language such as Node.js that utilizes framework APIs. The 
framework provides a semantically rich description of IoT nodes, objects, 
and interactions that allow IoT network designers to focus only on node 
interaction semantics rather than on the details of connectivity.
Frameworks facilitate improved application portability. This can be 
achieved at different levels. The bottom layer of the framework is operating 
system specific. The top layer of the framework is IoT use case specific 
in that it exposes a data model abstraction that reinforces an IoT usage 
context. Some examples include lighting control, home automation, 
health monitoring, entertainment, process automation, industrial control, 
and autonomous control. IoT applications can be developed once given 
the framework abstraction and can execute on any OS the framework 
is ported to. The details of dissimilar OSs and platforms can be hidden 
where porting of framework code to another OS (source code–level 
compatibility) can happen independently of application development. 
Binary compatible platforms can migrate compiled framework code across 
platforms using the same binary. Platforms that are not binary compatible 
may rely on virtualization to host framework images or may rely on device 
management services that hide the complexity associated with paring and 
installing the right framework with the correct platform.
Frameworks enable interoperable devices in heterogeneous 
environments. Consider a hypothetical scenario where devices are 
running different OSs and HW platforms. These devices could be built 
by different platform vendors using silicon from multiple vendors 
running different OSs such as Windows IoT Embedded and VxWorks 
running different middleware stacks. This is a perfect storm scenario 
for an IoT network deployment where there are too many possible 
combinations of connectivity and message exchange options to expect 
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speedy deployments. IoT frameworks come to the rescue by building the 
connectivity intelligence into the framework – hidden from application 
view and simplified from the device and network management view.
Frameworks also facilitate seamless manageability and serviceability 
by leveraging the framework’s infrastructure to expose platform status 
information through the framework layer in accordance with the 
framework’s data model abstraction. For example, a firmware update 
availability notification may be easily propagated across an IoT network. 
If the framework supports applying a firmware update, either push or 
pull, the firmware update images may be distributed over the air using the 
connectivity solution worked out by the framework.
IoT Data Model and System Abstractions
IoT frameworks define an application layer abstraction so that applications 
interact directly with framework data. For example, a temperature 
sensor might show the current temperature (currTemp) and the average 
temperature over the course of 24 hours (aveTemp). Temperature values 
might be shown in Fahrenheit and Centigrade. Consequently, a data 
model description might be as follows:
{
    "tempSensor" = "/myTempSensor",
    {
        "currTemp"="85",
        "aveTemp"="70",
        "degrees"="Centigrade"
    }
}
Data modeling languages are used to richly describe framework 
objects according to a schema definition. Examples of data modeling 
languages include XML (eXtensible Markup Language), JSON (JavaScript 
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Object Notation), CBOR (Concise Binary Object Representation), and 
YANG (Yet Another Next Generation language) – just to name a few.
Data structures are accessed through well-defined network interfaces. 
For example, CoAP is a REST model interface that uses four methods: 
GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE to interact with framework data. A couple 
RESTful interface definition languages include RAML (Restful API 
Modeling Language) and Swagger.11
A framework node may consist of several objects such as a temperature 
sensor, camera, and light bulb. A deviceId may disambiguate multiple 
instances of a framework node. For example:
{
    "nodeType"="myDeviceType",
    "deviceID"="<UUID>",
    {
        "tempSensor" = "/myTempSensor",
        "ptzCamera" = "/myPtzCamera",
        "lightBulb" = "/myLight"
    }
}
Using these simple but powerful data modeling tools, IoT frameworks 
can describe elaborate IoT systems while hiding much of the network 
complexity that underlies connection establishment, routing, packet 
transmission, network address translation, and so on.
To a certain extent, IoT frameworks can be compared with 
Information-Centric Networking (ICN).12 ICN rethinks the network where 
named information is the centerpiece of network architecture. Rather 
11 https://swagger.io/
12 https://irtf.org/icnrg
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than focusing on nodes, network topology, and protocol layering, ICN 
focuses on end-to-end data interactions. Data doesn’t necessarily reside 
on endpoints but may be cached and replicated anywhere in the network. 
Like ICNs, the upper layer of IoT frameworks presents a data-centric 
view of the network. However, unlike ICNs existing protocol layering is 
retained. Arguably, this adds additional complexity but offers greater 
interoperability. Indeed, an ICN connectivity plugin to an IoT framework is 
a reasonable approach to bridge ICN with legacy networks.
Securing IoT messages must take an end-to-end view so that 
authentication, confidentiality, privacy, and authorization goals may be 
realized. Otherwise, the benefits of hiding complexity beneath an IoT 
framework may instead be hiding security gaps. The IoT application using 
an IoT framework may not be aware when security is managed using 
system layer interfaces. Internet protocols often have a secure alternative 
such as https for http and coaps for coap, where the “s” means security. 
A REST GET message works the same over coaps as it does for coap. The 
main difference is the Transport Layer Security (TLS) binding to the 
REST messaging protocol negotiates a secure session using credentials 
(keys and certificates) that may have been provisioned directly into the 
TLS subsystem without coordination through the framework layer. The 
framework layer may not be aware of the impact to authorization which 
can result in the framework misrepresenting actual security posture to 
IoT applications. IoT frameworks can differ significantly in their design 
and implementation attention to end-to-end security. We hope to 
illustrate this point more profoundly as we walk through a variety of IoT 
frameworks later in this chapter.
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IoT Node
IoT frameworks define a device abstraction that is a logical representation 
of a physical device. This chapter uses the term IoT node to refer to the 
logical abstraction to avoid confusion regarding the physical device. 
Frameworks can create some interesting properties regarding IoT nodes:
• They may expose multiple nodes per framework to 
give the appearance of many nodes having the same IP 
address.
• They may consolidate multiple network addresses 
terminating into a common framework node.
• They may host services and capabilities that are 
dynamic – being created and deleted according to 
RESTful messages.
• They may impose system partitioning semantics such 
as dividing nodes into domains, groups, rooms, or 
some other semantic overlay.
Nevertheless, security semantics must remain true despite the 
framework abstraction. For example, if the node describes the endpoint 
where access is controlled, data is encrypted and decrypted. Then 
protection of the physical endpoint resources should strongly correlate 
with protection of the framework node.
IoT Operations Abstraction
IoT operations consist of several node interactions facilitated by 
frameworks. These include discovery, message exchange, event 
registration, and asynchronous notification. IoT nodes typically are not 
preconfigured to recognize other nodes. They must instead be discovered. 
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Discovery allows other framework nodes to inquire regarding supported 
interfaces and data structures essential to interoperability. Discovery 
can take many forms. For example, multicast and broadcast networking 
supports unsolicited discoveries. Nodes monitoring the broadcast may be 
required to disposition discovery events even if there is no action needed. 
Devices with limited battery capacity may have shorter life expectancies 
if deployed in highly dynamic networks. Alternatively, discovery may 
be accomplished by sending discovery requests to discovery interfaces 
for specific nodes querying the relevant information. This approach 
minimizes unnecessary activity on nodes that wouldn’t otherwise need 
to participate. However, this approach may require multiple “drill down” 
discovery requests before finding the data or interface needed. Passive 
discovery employs directories or less constrained nodes that respond in 
place of other nodes that may disregard all discovery requests while in a 
low-power mode. The directory nodes satisfy the discovery phase so that 
power-constrained nodes only process the functions that they uniquely 
provide.
Discovery conventions:
• Consulting a directory of framework devices to learn 
device identities and how to connect – conceptually 
similar to LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol) commonly used by PCs in IT networks to 
accomplish a similar objective
• Inspecting a schema describing interfaces to learn 
which REST, publish/subscribe, and asynchronous 
notification messages can be used
• Querying the device directly to introspect its current 
state and configuration
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Note an anonymous entity may learn a tremendous amount about 
how an Iot network functions, the type of nodes involved, what work 
they’re capable of performing, and typical interaction patterns simply 
by using available discovery mechanisms. Given a small amount 
of additional information that links actual devices or users to the 
observable network, it may be relatively easy for an attacker to obtain 
or infer knowledge that otherwise is expected to be privacy sensitive.
Message exchange conventions:
• Preparing a message body whose syntax satisfies a 
recognized (standardized) data model schema
• Protecting the message using the appropriate security 
credentials
• Sending the message following the interface definition 
schema for the target node
• Collecting and processing the response message that 
similarly follows these conventions
Event handling conventions:
• Identifying objects and attributes available for 
participating in asynchronous events and conditions to 
be met that result in notifications.
• Preparing and sending a registration/subscription 
message following messaging exchange conventions.
• Maintaining context for processing asynchronous 
notifications.
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• Nodes managing registrations/subscriptions must 
maintain context for secure delivery of the notification 
message(s) potentially involving many subscribers. 
Asynchronous message delivery may involve different 
security associations and context from those used to 
process registrations/subscriptions.
 Connectivity Elements
IoT frameworks facilitate connectivity, gatewaying, and bridging. The 
following briefly summarizes how each is facilitated:
• Connectivity: Framework endpoint abstractions are 
mapped to network layer addresses and protocols 
where framework message exchange abstractions 
map to protocol specifics such as MTU (Maximum 
Transmission Unit) framing, multicasting, 
broadcasting, and packet delivery mechanisms.
• Gatewaying: Framework domain abstractions impose 
operational context for domain-specific filtering 
(hiding) traffic and performance of administrative 
duties.
• Bridging: Due to the proliferation of framework 
solutions, it is often necessary to translate from one 
framework environment to another. Framework 
bridging may have side effects where objects, 
interfaces, or semantics in one environment don’t 
exactly translate to a second.
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 Manageability Elements
IoT frameworks may expose manageability elements through the 
framework object abstraction layer as a way for other framework objects 
and resources to better manage and respond to change resulting from 
management activity. However, this is more the exception than the rule. 
Even among horizontal open standard frameworks, there are many 
examples of device vendors wishing to retain proprietary or exclusive 
control over firmware/software update, onboarding, and cloud access 
capabilities. Nevertheless, frameworks can facilitate updates occurring 
outside the IoT framework by informing other nodes regarding 
pending updates or notifying regarding changes to version information. 
Additionally, IoT frameworks may not allow the framework itself to be 
updated from within an IoT framework context.
 Security Elements
IoT frameworks need to accommodate security by ensuring endpoint 
nodes and their physical equivalents (i.e., device, process, virtual 
machine, enclave) have a secured identity, protected cryptographic keys 
and appropriately provisioned roles, credentials, and access policies. 
Endpoint security capabilities should protect sensitive data that is 
stored, transmitted, or manipulated locally outside of the IoT framework. 
Software and firmware should be protected when transmitted, installed, 
stored, and loaded for execution. Framework processing of encrypted 
data, access control decisions, and identities should be protected within 
an appropriately hardened Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) or 
isolated from non-framework aware services and interfaces. IoT device 
roots of trust should be used to protect device identities and ensure the 
appropriate firmware and software is loaded and executed.
Inherent to distributed systems is added risk associated with a 
dependence on multiple peer nodes that contribute data, processing, 
and administration to an overarching distributed application. Nodes 
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largely trust peer nodes to be in a correct operational state. However, 
this assumption of trust may not be justifiable without taking additional 
precautions to prove and verify the hardware, firmware, software, and 
operational state to peer nodes. Attestation is a security concept that 
addresses this concern but only if it is correctly implemented and 
integrated.
Consider the Cost of Cryptography
IoT systems are inherently distributed. Cryptography is an essential 
security building block technology for distributed systems. Nevertheless, 
cryptography imposes additional overhead in terms of computation, 
memory, storage, network bandwidth, and hardening. Symmetric 
cryptography generally speaking is lighter weight than asymmetric 
cryptography, and asymmetric cryptography is lighter weight than 
certificate-based asymmetric cryptography. IoT devices typically 
are designed with cost targets that may impact device cryptographic 
capabilities. Since these choices also impact interoperability, IoT 
frameworks must anticipate common cryptographic algorithms, key 
sizes, and key management infrastructures. Asymmetric cryptography is 
dominated by at least two algorithms: elliptic curve cryptography13 (ECC) 
and Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA)14 algorithms. ECC has smaller key 
sizes than the RSA. ECC can accomplish the same level of security as RSA 
with key sizes that are 10–15% smaller. Key size is an important factor for 
constrained platforms as such many IoT standards require ECC.
Table 2-1 details some of the trade-offs associated with cryptography.
13 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6090
14 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8017
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
56
Table 2-1. Trade-Offs Associated with the Type of Cryptography Used
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Quantum computers15 present new threats to existing cryptographic 
solutions because they are more effective at solving certain types of 
mathematical problems such as the integer factorization16 problem, the 
discrete logarithmic problem,17 or the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem.18 Current asymmetric cryptography algorithms reduce to one of 
these mathematical problems which are known to be solved by quantum 
computing more easily than traditional computers. Cryptographic 
algorithms are being designed that are thought to be secure against 
quantum computers are called post-quantum safe algorithms and has led 
to a new branch of cryptography study called post-quantum cryptography. 
Since asymmetric cryptography is most threatened by quantum 
computing, post-quantum asymmetric algorithm design is receiving a lot 
of attention currently. In contrast, symmetric key cryptography and hash 
functions are relatively secure against attacks using quantum computers. It 
is believed doubling the key size (e.g., from 128-bits to 256-bits) adequately 
protects against quantum computer attacks on symmetric algorithms.19
It is still too early to tell which quantum-safe algorithms will become 
an industry favorite for IoT given cost, power, and size constraints. 
However, it seems clear that where symmetric cryptography is already 
acceptable for IoT, it should continue to remain acceptable given a 
doubling of key size is the most economical quantum-safe solution. 
Quantum-safe asymmetric algorithms have much larger key size 






19 Daniel J. Bernstein (2010-03-03). ”Grover vs. McEliece” (PDF).
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 Summary IoT Framework Considerations
IoT frameworks came into being as a way to simplify development and 
deployment of IoT networks. The reality is IoT networks are inherently 
complex and, in many cases, necessarily so. IoT frameworks offer 
value because they create a data model abstraction that is simpler than 
applications having to deal with a myriad of message exchange options 
and dissimilar data definition. By allowing applications to focus only on 
the semantics of IoT node behavior and node interactions, interoperability 
improves. By hiding the complexity of connection establishment, 
bridging, gatewaying, and deployment of heterogeneous platforms, 
efficiency optimizations can be applied more uniformly. Although 
frameworks may increase complexity for simple deployment situations, 
they scale as deployments grow resulting in a simpler IoT system overall. 
Frameworks have other advantages, namely, they enable multiple views 
of the IoT system so manageability, resiliency, interoperability, security, 
safety, and usability perspectives can be represented. Complexity in 
any form, however, is a security consideration because vulnerabilities 
and security weaknesses can hide within the corners of complexity. 
Security practitioners should ask whether the framework is more complex 
than needed in order to realize the expected benefits, but also avoid 
workarounds that expose new attack surfaces.
 IoT Framework Architecture
This section explores IoT framework layers in more detail. A following 
section looks at specific framework architectures that may be compared 
and contrasted. The majority of IoT framework architectures define 
three layers: (1) Data Object layer, (2) Node Interaction layer, and (3) 
Connectivity and Hardware Abstraction layer. This section also considers 
the Hardware layer, though it typically isn’t considered part of an IoT 
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framework. However, because security necessarily should have ties to 
hardware, we’ve included a Hardware layer discussion. Security is integral 
to IoT framework layers revealing additional security insights relating to 
each layer (see Figure 2-6). This section explores each framework layer in 
detail with an emphasis on security.
 Data Object Layer
The Data Object layer defines data structures that expose the “nodes” 
and their capabilities using a data definition language such as JSON.20 
One or more nodes may be hosted in the framework where one or more 
applications may interact with framework nodes via a framework API. Data 
objects are a set of attribute encapsulations. Some framework object models 
allow nested encapsulation with unlimited depth. Other frameworks limit 
nesting depth. The outermost encapsulation is the node. Since nodes 
logically correspond to an IoT network endpoint, it is given an identifier, 
NodeID, such as a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) which is easy to 
generate dynamically given framework nodes may be transient. NodeID 
differs from DeviceID in that DeviceID is fixed in hardware. It is created 
during manufacturing and is used to facilitate device onboarding. NodeID 
typically is created in response to successful onboarding. Very constrained 
devices may use the DeviceID as the NodeID if the manufacturer has 
prevented the framework from supporting additional nodes.
The Data Object layer may define security objects such as access 
control lists (ACLs), credentials, and other device status information 
useful to management consoles and other nodes. Exposing security 
objects using the framework object model allows device and security 
management using the IoT framework infrastructure. The framework 
connectivity and interoperability properties make it a desirable ingredient 
for manageability. Security objects may expose values that are specific to a 
20 www.json.org
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node such as credentials, ACLs, and NodeID or may expose values that are 
node independent or shared such as DeviceID, firmware, and hardware 
configuration.
The Security Objects in Figure 2-6 are useful for intranetwork 
and intradomain interactions. More sophisticated internetwork and 
interdomain interactions require an additional security layer that may 
be helpful for gateway operations. The gateway application contains 
control and management logic to present nodes to a peer IoT network 
that shadow actual nodes existing deeper inside the local IoT network. 
Gateway applications might even be used to bridge non-interoperable 
IoT frameworks. A following section explores interdomain security and 
framework gateways in more detail.
 Node Interaction Layer
The Node Interaction layer contains messaging semantics and defines 
interfaces used for peer node interaction. Interface definition languages 
such as RAML and Swagger may be used to create machine- and human- 
readable interface definitions. A framework instance may support one or 
more messaging models, such as REST, publish-subscribe, and MESH. This 
layer ensures messages are formatted correctly, parses message contents, 
performs data consistency checks, and ensures messages are sent, queued, 
resent, or received properly.
Messages may require encryption and integrity protections. This layer 
maintains security associations between the local and peer nodes. Security 
associations identify the nodes, ACLs, privacy policies, and credentials 
(used to authenticate, authorize, and protect message contents). They may 
also define the security context from which to perform various security 
relevant operations such as encryption, decryption, signing, verifying 
signatures, enforcing access control, and so forth. The security context 
defines what is (or should be) the correct way to terminate the data 
exchange with peer nodes.
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There are implementation challenges associated with security 
endpoint definition due to network layering. For example, a TLS or IP 
Security (IPSec) secured channel may be shared across multiple locally 
hosted nodes, implying nodes must use shared credentials, something 
frowned upon by most security practitioners. Alternatively, acceleration 
hardware may offload packet processing which may include offloading 
security operations too.
Ideally, the Security Endpoint Context is the central point of 
enforcement where the flow of data between the Data Object layer and the 
Connectivity layer can be inspected and controlled.
 Platform Abstraction Layer
The Platform Abstraction layer defines the logical connection points 
available to framework nodes. Connection points support the messaging 
models available to the Node Interaction layer regardless of the capabilities 
of the underlying network stack. The Connectivity layer typically supports 
multiple connection points – one for each unique network stack. For 
example, the connection point, Conn-A, has a network stack consisting of 
HTTP, TCP, IP(v4 or v6), and Ethernet (Figure 2-6). A second connection 
point, Conn-B, has a network stack consisting of MQTT, TCP/UDP, IPv6, 
6LoWPAN, and IEEE802.15.4. Connection points may be dynamically 
added or removed on more sophisticated platforms, while constrained 
platforms may embed a single connection point and network stack.
In some cases, the network stack includes message security technology 
such as IPSEC and TLS. The Connectivity layer depends on the Device 
Interaction layer for security associations specific to the node-to-node 
interaction semantics. This potentially divides the security enforcement 
point between the security side and the networking side. Some platforms 
are equipped with isolated execution technology that enables security 
processing within a network stack to be offloaded to a resource-isolated 
environment here referred to as a container. An alternative approach is 
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to move data protection into the Node Interaction layer. For example, 
OSCORE21 defines a standard format for encrypting CoAP payloads 
before being given to the CoAP layer. This approach allows the security 
endpoint to move out of the protocol stack into the Node Interaction layer 
potentially simplifying implementation.
The basic idea is that the security endpoint context, data packets, 
and node-to-node security associations should exist within a suitably 
hardened container as a prerequisite for performing security relevant 
operations. Otherwise, there is opportunity for clever attackers to 
intercept, modify, view, or replace node objects.
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Figure 2-6. IoT framework layers
21 https://core-wg.github.io/oscoap/draft-ietf-core-object-security.html
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 Platform Layer
The Platform layer beneath IoT frameworks can be divided into three 
categories: (1) networking, (2) sensor and actuator, and (3) security. The 
network layer focus is on efficient processing of network packets, quality of 
service, and power optimization. It also addresses network security threats 
related to malicious manipulation of network protocols. A common denial- 
of- service attack might flood the network with unexpectedly high volume 
of discovery packets. Discovery (aka ping) packets may not require prior 
authorization since the goal of discovery often implies finding out which 
credentials are most appropriate to use. Well-known attack mitigation 
techniques often are part of network hardware implementations, allowing 
the mitigation technique to be applied efficiently.
The sensor and actuator focus is on implementation of the main 
processing function of the IoT node which often represents the transition 
from IT to OT as native interactions are applied to the physical world. 
Otherwise, the node would just be manipulating data and couldn’t be 
considered a cyber-physical system. The device driver and API are most 
often proprietary and specific to the vendor and model of the sensor or 
actuator. Vendor-specific behavior multiplied by the already large and 
expanding collection of IoT devices multiplies the complexities associated 
with multivendor interoperability. Hiding this complexity behind a 
common data object model is a primary reason for IoT frameworks.
The security focus is on hardening security-sensitive IoT functions. 
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) technology isolates computing 
resources according to the various system tenants. IoT frameworks allow 
multiple tenants in the form of IoT nodes – nodes that may have different 
identities, security credentials, access policies, and configurations. Even 
in constrained environments where a single node is supported, there are 
security and device management scenarios that require tenant isolation 
for nodes performing administrative duties. The industry has a variety of 
TEE technologies that could be leveraged to harden IoT workloads that 
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include Intel SGX, Intel VT-x (virtualization technology), ARM TrustZone, 
and hardware memory managers that physically partition memory and 
other compute resources.
Secure storage is an essential element in IoT devices in that 
cryptographic keys, trust anchors, access control lists, and other policies 
need to be stored in ways that resist software attacks and ideally resist 
attackers who have physical access to the device. Replay protected 
memory is helpful toward preventing attacks on key exchange protocols, 
memory replacement, firmware update, and timing attacks.
Root-of-trust hardware is essential to the creation and protection of 
device identities that may be used to attest device security properties 
to a peer node and to security boot the device. Crypto acceleration 
hardware may offer additional protections as offloading encryption and 
signing operations may involve the use of a hardened coprocessor or 
ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit). Root-of-trust hardware or 
crypto offload hardware often includes a source of entropy necessary for 
generating encryption keys and trustworthy identifiers.
 Security Challenges with IoT Frameworks
Security challenges are a reoccurring theme as we explore various IoT 
frameworks. Though they may have been designed with a wide range 
of security and privacy requirements, there are a few areas that are 
consistently problematic. IoT framework nodes are the logical endpoints 
in IoT networks, but the network layer context is often out of scope when 
operating at the framework Data Object layer (Figure 2-7).
In IP networks, endpoint nodes are identified by IP addresses, 
and routing logic is expressed in terms of IP addresses. Network layer 
identifiers are insufficient as IoT framework node identifiers. In IoT 
frameworks, nodes are logical and hence may share the same IP address 
but have different node identifiers. Linking encryption keys, authentication 
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credentials, and access control policies to IP address means security will 
not be granular enough and can’t be consistently applied.
Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) and object identifiers such 
as Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) may be used to reference 
the framework’s device nodes. For example, a URI might identify the 
framework context followed by an object identifier that is specific to the 
logical device instance – “href” : “oic://<Base64_encoded_UUID>/oic/d”.
Data Object Layer
Node N1 Node N2 Etc...
Figure 2-7. IoT framework nodes are the logical endpoints in IoT 
networks
The IoT framework node presents a security context where the 
security endpoint is an IP multicast address; using IPSEC implies the 
data protection ends at the network interface card or possibly inside a 
networking driver in an operating system. This leaves data exposed before 
it reaches the IoT framework’s enforcement point where the decision is 
made to which node the data belongs.
A similar concern exists using Transport Layer Security (TLS) where data 
protections end within the operating system or within a network connection 
provider service. Connection services often expose APIs that a variety of 
applications may utilize. If the service isn’t exclusive to the IoT framework, 
it is possible the cryptographic protections intended to terminate within the 
logical IoT device terminate within the service instead. Other applications 
serviced by the connection provider are at risk of becoming targets for attack 
because of the special access unwittingly given to them by the service. Care 
must be taken to ensure data carried over communication channels and 
messaging systems are protected by trusted execution environments that 
correspond to the expected logical device endpoint.
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If data is protected using message-oriented techniques such as 
JSON Web Token (JWT), data protection may be extended into the IoT 
framework data abstraction layer, but there may be secure messaging 
library that is shared by all the logical device instances. A man-in-the- 
middle (MITM) attack could be successful if malware found a way to 
intercept the data after the data protection module is finished but before 
the logical device context is in place.
An IoT framework access path is depicted in Figure 2-6 where in step 
(1) a peer node accesses the IoT device through a Wi-Fi networking stack 
at connection Conn-C. In step (2) the Conn-C access path finds the TLS 
security association and the Security Context-A in the Security Endpoint 
Contexts. In step (3) access to decryption keys, ACLs, and role credentials 
is checked. The Security Context-A is a fulcrum point in the framework 
that uniformly applies an IoT network security policy involving the peer 
nodes and Node-A. Ideally, the security context operations are performed 
in a TEE that resists man-in-the-box attacks. If access is permitted, in 
step (4) the sensor/actuator hardware may be exposed to the peer node 
through Node-A data objects at step (5). Ideally, the entire access path will 
be isolated from the other nodes and operations occurring on the same 
device as the other tenants present security threats from within the device.
 Consumer IoT Framework Standards
In this section, we explore several IoT framework architectures 
highlighting similarities and differences. In some cases, differences exist 
because different frameworks intend to address different requirements 
and use cases. In other cases, significant overlap of features and 
capabilities appears to exist because they address similar requirements but 
do so differently. This is unfortunate because it creates opportunities for 
incompatibilities. Such differences may be benign when used in isolated 
deployments but add significant complexity when interoperability across 
multiple deployments is desired.
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 Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF)
The Open Connectivity Foundation (OCF) was originally formed under 
the name Open Interconnect Consortium (OIC). Broadcom, Intel, and 
Samsung were among the initial founders of OIC and were later joined by 
Electrolux, Microsoft, and Qualcomm. IoTivity is the open source reference 
implementation of both OIC and OCF specifications. The OIC later became 
OCF when the AllSeen Alliance and OIC merged in October of 2016. The 
AllSeen Alliance is discussed in more detail in a following section.
The OCF framework (Figure 2-8) consists of three layers, Transports, 
Core Framework, and Profiles. The transport layer is a plugin interface 
that supports any number of transport plugin modules. Although the 
architecture refers to them as transports, the remaining networking layers 
(network, data link, and physical) are presumed to be provided as well. The 
OCF specifications do not prescribe how the layers are implemented, but the 
IoTivity reference implementation (see https://iotivity.org/downloads) 
may offer guidance. Support for various wired and wireless transports in 
IoTivity continues to grow. At the time of this writing, there was support for 
CoAP (UDP) over IPv4, IPv6, Ethernet, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth LE. At the time 
of this writing, an Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments 
(OSCORE) draft specification22 defines a REST message binding to CoAP and 
HTTP. OSCORE supports connections originating in IoT networks based on 
a UDP transport that terminates in cloud services environments or remote 
access gateways that are based on a TCP transport.
OCF transport plugin module interface is transport agnostic, making 
it possible to define transport plugin modules that implement REST 
(Representational State Transfer) semantics. This implies OCF transport 
plugins could implement message queuing techniques such as MQTT 
(Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) or XMPP (eXtensible Messaging 
and Presence Protocol) without structural modifications to the framework.
22 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-core-object-security/
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The transport interface interaction model roughly follows an object 
lifecycle pattern called CRUDN – Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, 
and Notify. RESTful interaction semantics easily map to a series of 
request-response exchanges for each interaction – for example, Send 
Create_Request message followed by Receive Create_Response message. 
OCF interface semantics are typically defined using RAML23 (RESTful 
API Modeling Language), although there is interest in migrating to 
Swagger24 which complies with the OpenAPI specification. The OpenAPI 
specification25 is an open source community effort aimed at defining 
robust data modeling languages and tools.
Resource Model Resource Model
Security, Identity & Permissions Security, Identity & Permissions
Application
API - Language Mapping API - Language Mapping
Transport Abstraction Transport Abstraction














Figure 2-8. OCF conceptual framework
 OCF Core Framework Layer
The Core Framework lies at the center of the OCF architecture. It defines 
the “resource” abstraction model which is arguably its most fundamental 
building block concept and the characteristic that most distinguishes 




Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
69
tag-value pairs but can have nested sequences as well. Resources are 
typically described using JSON. The OCF resource model approach to 
IoT networking presumes all aspects of the network can be represented 
declaratively, as a set of resource data structures having CRUDN 
interaction semantics. The traditional notion of a network topology 
consisting of nodes having routable IP addresses is hidden behind the 
resource abstraction.
Resources have several built-in properties (tags) that are common to 
all resources such as name, resource type, interface type, and whether or 
not it is discoverable and observable. Resource names are a URI (Universal 
Resource Identifier). Property names and name prefixes that are common 
to all are reserved by the OCF specification.
For example, “rt” refers to the resource type property, “if” refers to 
resource interface type property, “uri” is the resource name property 
if expressed as a URI, and “n” refers to a resource by its friendly name. 
Resource names prefixed with “/oic” are reserved for OCF use.
Additional properties may be appended that further specialize 
the resource. For example, it might define a property representing an 
operational state such as “on-off-state” where the accepted values are 
either ON or OFF. It might have another property “dim-level” with values 
in a range from 0 to 100, representing a light’s brightness level.
This is a JSON schema representation of a simple resource:
"oic.r.switch.binary": {
    "type": "object",
        "properties": {
            "value": {
                "type": "boolean",
                "description": "Status of the switch"
            }
        }
}
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          application/json:
             schema: |
                 { }
The point behind using interface and data modeling languages such 
as JSON and RAML is to enable the use of automated tools for generating 
code, tests, and even human-readable documentation that makes it easier 
to develop applications that not only interoperate but also can be adapted, 
updated, or modified at various operational stages.
The Core Framework layer defines several built-in resources used to 
implement several of the services and capabilities offered by the core layer. 
These include resource discovery, data transmission, data management, 
device management, security, identity, and permissions. Several built-in 
resources are listed in Table 2-2.
Table 2-2. A Few Resources Built into an OCF Core Framework Layer
Resource Name Description Functional Area
/oic/res a resource that lists all discoverable 
resources known to the current network
discovery
/oic/p a resource that reveals details about the 
platform that hosts the oCF device
discovery
/oic/rts a resource that lists the resource type 
information for all discoverable resources
discovery
(continued)
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A JSON representation of the /oic/p resource might appear as follows. 
Note this example includes comments denoted by double slash “//” which 




"pi": "ABCD123...",      //platform identifier UUID
"mnmn": "acme.org",    //platform manufacturer
"mnmo": "widget X",    //platform model number
"mnpv": "v1.0",        //platform version number
}
All properties of the /oic/p resource are read-only to support discovery 
use cases. A device management resource would likely allow update 
so a management console could configure the resource according to 
management goals.
Resource Name Description Functional Area
/oic/ifs a resource that lists the resource 
interface information for all discoverable 
resources
discovery
/oic/mon a resource that reveals observable 
resources
device management
/oic/sec/cred a resource that lists the credentials this 
device has configured
security management
/oic/sec/acl2 a resource that lists the access control 
restrictions for this device
security management
/oic/sec/dots a resource that facilitates device 
onboarding
device and security 
management
Table 2-2. (continued)
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
72
The Core Framework specifications also define helpful building block 
resources that other resource designers may find useful such as Links and 
Collections. Links are a structure for defining a static connection between 
multiple resources. It consists of at least three parts: (1) the Context, (2) the 
Relationship, and (3) the Target and (4) additional parameters.
For example:
{
    "anchor": "/my/room/1",    //the Context
    "rel": "contains",         //the Relation
    "href": "/the/light/1",    //the Target
    "rt": "acme.light",        //the resource type
    "if": "oic.if.a"           //the interface type
}
The Collection resource is a bit like a Link resource only it contains an 








    { "href":"/the/light/1", "rel":"contains", "rt":"acme.
light",    "if":["oic.if.a", "oic.if.baseline"]},
    { "href":"/the/light/2", "rel":"contains", "rt"="mycorp.
light", "if":["oic.if.s" , "oic.if.baseline"]},
    { "href":"/the/fan/1", "rel":"contains", "rt":"hiscorp.fan", 
"if":["oic.if.baseline"]}
    ]
}
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 OCF Profiles Framework Layer
OCF Profiles are libraries of resources containing common functionality 
(e.g., light bulb, pan-tilt-zoom camera). Profiles are grouped according to a 
target deployment context such as consumer, enterprise, industrial, auto, 
education, and health. Profiles are extensible. JSON validation ignores 
content not matching a schema target. OCF makes use of this behavior 
by allowing vendors to customize in any way they choose. We have mixed 
opinions regarding the use of this extensibility mechanism because, 
although it allows for post deployment customization, it also encourages 
the use of non-interoperable profiles.
The OCF data model supports resource introspection. Introspection 
can be used by a client to obtain a machine-readable description of all the 
resources, properties, and interface definition syntax. Introspection may 
be useful for systems that can learn how to interact with resources without 
prior programming.
 The OCF Device Abstraction
OCF uses Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) to identify OCF 
devices. The OCF device is like an OCF resource in that it has nested OCF 
defined Core and Profile resources. Core resources facilitate discovery, 
manageability, security, and connectivity. Profile resources define device 
type–specific data and behavior.
Access to OCF resources is accomplished using URIs. The OCF 
URI contains a device identifier in the form of a UUID followed by a 
reference to its resources. A client interacts with an OCF device by issuing 
a discovery message to identify available OCF server devices. This is 
followed by a RESTful message targeted at the device with interesting 
capabilities. The device’s introspection resource may be used to gain 
additional insight regarding device capabilities and may be used to fine- 
tune subsequent interactions.
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The OCF device abstraction logically defines a security boundary. OCF 
resource accesses follow CRUDN (Create, Retrieve, Update, Delete, Notify) 
interaction semantics that are part of the RESTful interface definition (e.g., 
PUT, GET, POST, DELETE). Access control policies use CRUDN privileges 
that are applied prior to returning resource data.
There can be multiple OCF devices hosted on the same physical 
platform. Logical devices are identified independently of the physical 
platform that hosts them. This means, from the perspective of the OCF 
device, it is not possible to distinguish whether a peer OCF device is 
geographically local or remote.
 OCF Security
OCF security is exposed to devices through OCF resources. This is a 
simple yet powerful idea as all security interactions can be accomplished 
using the OCF framework. OCF security architecture has three main 
aspects: (1) access control, (2) message encryption, and (3) device 
lifecycle management. Access control is applied at the OCF device and 
resource- level granularity. It’s worth noting that access control is not 
applied at the property level (although there are some exceptions). Access 
control list (ACL) policy is configured using the /oic/sec/acl2 resource. 
This resource is an array of ACL entries where each entry may be used to 
match the resource requestor to the requested resources so that an access 
restriction, expressed as CRUDN, can be applied before the requested 
resource is returned to the requestor.
/oic/sec/acl2 {
"aclist2": [
                "subject": ...,
                "resources": [...],
                "permission": CRUDN,
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                "validity": ...,
                "aceid": INTEGER
            ]
}
The subject property is used to match the requestor. There are three 
ways this could be accomplished. One method uses the OCF device ID, 
which is a UUID. If the requesting device authenticates with a credential 
known to the local device, then the requesting device’s ID is known. 
Another method is by role name. A role certificate may be presented at 
any time by the requestor during a session. If a role is asserted, then ACL 
entries that specify a role name could be used to match the requestor. A 
third method is by connection type. OCF connectivity options allow for 
anonymous (unauthenticated) and/or encrypted message payloads. It may 
be appropriate to supply a blanket ACL entry for anonymous requestors 
that is highly restrictive and only lessen restrictions when requestor is 
authenticated. Unencrypted data similarly may require a blanket ACL rule. 
OCF supports a variety of cryptographic algorithms and key types 
including symmetric, raw asymmetric, and certified asymmetric. OCF 
devices must support symmetric keys and related algorithms. Security 
profiles may require support for raw asymmetric keys or keys with 
certificates.
Message encryption is applied by the transport layer (e.g., DTLS 
applied to CoAP messages). The use of TLS (Transport Layer Security) 
implies the endpoint where data is no longer protected by cryptography 
is somewhere in the framework but not necessarily in the OCF device 
context. The use of TLS also implies there are deployment cases where 
the TLS endpoint is actually a gateway, proxy, or firewall or another 
intermediate node that isn’t the originating OCF device. Consequently, 
the use of TLS alone can’t guarantee end-to-end data protection. To 
handle these, one of four options may be tried: the intermediary obtains 
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a copy of the OCF device’s credential, the intermediary presents its own 
OCF credential (masking the true OCF device originating the request), 
the intermediary uses its own credential but supplies a role credential 
that is common to the originating device, or the intermediary remains 
anonymous.
While there may be several ways for an intermediary to establish a 
connection legitimately, the credentials used may not adequately enable 
the original requestor the appropriate access rights. Lack of end-to-end 
message protections can complicate management and deployment of 
proper security controls. Adding this complexity runs counter to the 
philosophy of simplifying apparent complexity while hiding actual 
complexity.
OCF has a device lifecycle management model that incorporates 
device lifecycle state into the device resource model. The /oic/sec/pstat 
resource includes a property named Device Onboarding State or “dos.” 
There are five states:
• RESET: Device transitions to its default state prior to 
onboarding.
• RFOTM: Device transitions to a state ready for 
onboarding into a new network.
• RFPRO: Device transitions to a state ready for 
provisioning resources.
• RFNOP: Device transitions to a state suitable for 
normal operations.
• SRESET: Device transitions to a state subsequent 
to onboarding, but where the device may be 
recommissioned or reconfigured with other options 
normally established only at onboarding.
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The device is guaranteed to be in one of these five states throughout 
its deployment. These states map to elements of an IoT platform lifecycle 
model (see Figure 2-5). For example, a device may be in the RESET state 
during manufacturing and supply chain phases then transition to RFOTM 
in order to enter the deployment phase. It may transition to RFPRO as part 
of onboarding and initial commissioning then transition to RFNOP while 
in normal operation and monitoring phase. Management and update 
phases may or may not require a transition to RFPRO depending on how 
impactful the changes may be to the framework’s resources. Hardware or 
low-level system changes may require transitioning to SRESET in order to 
change resources and properties the framework expects are immutable. 
Decommissioning implies a transition to RESET.
OCF “dos” states can have beneficial security impact because the 
device model at the framework layer enforces restrictions that could 
otherwise be ignored (potentially resulting in security incidents) by other 
resources and applications. For example, the /oic/sec/dots contains a 
property “owned” that is only updatable when the device is onboarded 
into a network for the first time. It is read-only thereafter. If an attacker tries 
to update it in some way to force an ownership change, the device state 
model prevents it.
OCF onboarding accommodates secure supply chains. Owner 
Transfer Methods (OTMs) are secure protocols designed to work with 
platform embedded credentials such as a manufacturer’s certificate. 
OTMs rely on participation from platform vendors to establish platform 
provenance at manufacturing and through the supply chain. A variety of 
OTMs are supported having various levels of provability of supply chain 
provenance. The OTM interface is extensible, allowing improved OTM 
adoption over time.
A security challenge facing OCF frameworks is the binding between 
the lower framework layer to the platform and its security capabilities 
isn’t defined by the specification. Implementers are free to make trade-off 
decisions that likely differ from product to product and vendor to vendor.
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The OCF resource model tolerates complexity in that it supports any 
data structure representable by JSON. OCF standardized structures, Links 
and Collections, can be used to create complex relationships between 
resources enabling, for example, unlimited layers of nested resources that 
are difficult to define meaningful ACL rules. Resources can contain links 
to resources hosted on remote devices resulting in a chain of interactions 
not bounded by an end-to-end ACL policy. Encryption is achieved using 
TLS. TLS endpoints occur in the communication layer resulting in hop- 
by- hop confidentiality protection semantics. Although the OCF resource 
model complexity may be justified, its flexibility shouldn’t reach beyond 
the security mechanisms protecting it.
 AllSeen Alliance/AllJoyn
The AllSeen Alliance began in 2013 as an open source Linux Foundation 
project that defined an IoT framework aimed at consumer class home and 
small office automation use cases. AllJoyn is the open source reference 
implementation that first became available in 2016. AllSeen Alliance 
member companies included Affinegy, Arçelik, Canary, Cisco, Changhong, 
doubleTwist, Electrolux, Fon, Haier, Harman, HTC, LIFX, Liteon, LG, 
Microsoft, Muzzley, Onbiron, Panasonic, Sears, Sharp, Silicon Image, 
Sproutling, Sony, TP-Link, Two Bulls, and Wilocity. The AllSeen Alliance 
merged with the Open Connectivity Foundation in October of 2016. 
IoTivity 1.3 released in June 2017 contained support for an IoTivity to 
AllJoyn bridge.26 AllSeen deployments exist primarily as legacy networks as 
development resources have turned elsewhere.
AllJoyn architecture (Figure 2-9) consists of three classes of node, 
leaf nodes, router nodes, and bridges. Leaf nodes contain application 
code and are primarily responsible for authentication and encryption. 
Router nodes host leaf nodes – no direct application to application 
26 https://iotivity.org/downloads/iotivity-1.3.0
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interaction is permitted unless brokered by a D-Bus (Desktop Bus) 
agent – though application nodes may embed router node functionality 
giving the impression of direct application connectivity. Router nodes are 
responsible for message exchange that includes request-response and 
publish-subscribe support. It handles discovery, advertising, presence, 
and session management. The messaging transport is provided by D-Bus27 
technology. D-Bus is a point-to-point communications protocol built 
on top of IPS (inter-process communication) or through TCP sockets. A 
daemon process monitors bus activity processing messages on behalf of its 
connected applications. D-Bus channels are named using UNIX filesystem 
objects. An application must know which transport protocol to use and an 
appropriate D-Bus name when attempting to connect to a peer leaf node 
known as the “bus address.” D-Bus supports several status and discovery 
commands that may be helpful in determining the health of D-Bus 
daemon processes:
• Org.freedesktop.DBus.Peer is used to determine if a 
peer is alive.
• Org.freedesktop.DBus.Introspectable is used to obtain 
an XML description of the interfaces, methods, and 
signals the device implements.
• Org.freedesktop.DBus.Properties is used to expose 
native properties and attributes of connected devices 
or to simulate them if they don’t exist.
• Org.freedesktop.DBus.ObjectManager is used to query 
subobjects under its path when device objects are 
organized hierarchically.
27 https://cgit.freedesktop.org/dbus/dbus/tree/NEWS?h=dbus-1.12
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AllJoyn leaf node layers (Figure 2-10) consist of the AllJoyn Core 
that handles discovery, security, connection management, and network 
management. The AllJoyn Thin Client is an optimized subset of the AllJoyn 
Core targeting ultra-constrained environments. Message authentication 
and encryption protects the service framework and application data end- 
to- end. However, AllJoyn Thin Client nevertheless requires at least one 
routing node to complete an end-to-end connection.
The AllJoyn Service Framework implements device services. 
Onboarding, control panel, and notification services are common to all 
devices. Application-specific services are added as needed to expose 
device-specific specializations.
The AllJoyn router nodes contain an AllJoyn Core layer that contains 
message routing capabilities. However, routing nodes can be configured 
to protect all D-Bus traffic between cooperating D-Bus daemon processes 
using a common shared key. AllJoyn Management Functions perform 


























Figure 2-9. Example AllJoyn network topology
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
81
maintain context regarding leaf node presence and maintain a session for 
each attached leaf node. Messages involved in publish-subscribe messaging 
may have fan-out semantics requiring platform-level optimization support. 
For example, IP multicast may be an efficient way to deliver the same 
message to multiple recipients. Subscription registrations are maintained 
here as well. Message filtering can be applied by AllJoyn routers where the 
aim is congestion control given requests containing a query string.
AllJoyn bridges perform network and link layer translations when 
AllJoyn nodes are physically separated or when AllJoyn framework-level 
objects are gatewayed to a different IoT framework environment. For 
























Physical Layer Physical Layer
AllJoyn Routing Node
Figure 2-10. AllJoyn leaf and router nodes layering
 AllJoyn Security
AllJoyn security rests with the AllJoyn leaf node and with the application 
layer. Such an approach encourages end-to-end protection of data. 
Effective data-level protection at the application layer requires data 
formatting and encapsulation technology that is part of its data model. 
AllJoyn data objects are described using XML and rely on XML Security28 
for secure encapsulation. Although D-Bus can support security at the IP 
layer, it relies on the application endpoint for end-to-end data protection.
28 www.w3.org/standards/xml/security
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
82
When the Open Connectivity Foundation and the AllSeen Alliance 
merged, they defined a bridging specification that allows OCF and AllJoyn 
devices to interact; however the OCF bridging specifications do not define 
security interoperability.
 Universal Plug and Play
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) was originally designed for consumer 
electronics, mobile devices, home automation, and personal computer 
networks emphasizing zero configuration networking – the idea that 
setting up a service doesn’t require any manual configuration. It includes 
automatic assignment of network addresses, automatic distribution 
of hostnames, and automatic discovery of network services. Although 
UPnP envisioned interoperation with consumer electronics and home 
automation, its first international specification published in 2008 by ISO/
IEC29 before the Internet of Things became a popular buzz word.
The UPnP set of standards has evolved to better support audio/video 
equipment, remote user interfaces, quality of service, and remote access 
from the Web. As recently as 2015, the UPnP Forum published the UPnP 
Device Architecture 2.030 specification that extends into the Web through 
XMPP integration. The IoT Management and Control Architecture31 
published September 10, 2013, addresses more directly home automation 
requirements with the inclusion of sensor management.
29 ”ISO/IEC standard on UPnP device architecture makes networking simple 
and easy.” International Organization for Standardization. 10 December 2008. 
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The UPnP protocol stack (Figure 2-11) may be regarded as IoT 
frameworks, though loosely as UPnP is tightly bound to IP and the network 
services built around IP such as DHCP, DNS, IP multicast, and so on. UPnP 
network topologies parallel that of IP network topologies.
The UPnP Device Architecture layer consists of a discovery service 
named Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) that supports passive 
discovery request-response as well as active service availability notification 
and unsolicited advertisements using local multicast addressing. The 
General Event Notification Architecture (GENA) handles the details of 
registering notification events and sending notification messages when 
events are triggered. The Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) uses 
XML-formatted messages that are delivered using RESTful HTTP request- 
response exchanges. UPnP also supports IP multicast events for simple 










UPnP Vendor Specific Layer
UPnP Forum Standardization Layer
UPnP Device Architecture Layer
TCP / UDP
IPv4 / IPv6
Figure 2-11. UPnP protocol stack
UPnP networks (Figure 2-12) consist of two node types, control points 
and Devices. Devices host Services. Device nesting is supported; the top- 
level Device is known as the Root Device. Devices are conceptual objects 
but are identified using IP addresses. Control points contain code that 
controls devices or otherwise interacts with services.
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UPnP can be divided into six architectural elements: addressing, 
discovery, description, control, event notification, and presentation. 
Architectural elements roughly follow six phases of UPnP service and 
control point interactions:
 I. Addressing : Zero-touch configuration motivated 
the use of DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration 
Protocol) so the device would automatically look 
for a DHCP service to obtain an IP address. If no 
DHCP service was available, the UPnP device 
will autogenerate an IP address. The device can 
automatically obtain a DNS name using DNS 
forwarding. Secure device and control point identity 
was not a major focus.
 II. Discovery: Service discovery automation is 
achieved through proactive “alive” messages that 
are broadcast periodically to listening control 












Figure 2-12. UPnP network nodes consist of control points and 
Devices that host Services
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with filters for the class of interesting service. This 
approach removes the need for statically configured 
services enabling dynamic services (that can go 
online or go offline easily). Control points rely 
on SSDP notifications to keep them appraised of 
service online status. Service name URLs are public 
which could have privacy implications. Secure 
discovery was not a major focus.
 III. Description: Discovery reveals the existence of 
UPnP devices and services, but control points 
may require more context to determine if they 
are relevant to control point applications. Device 
description allows introspection using an XML 
description of the device structure. It includes the 
following information:
• Vendor-specific details include manufacturer 
name, model, version, serial number, and URLs to 
vendor-specific web sites.
• Service details include URLs for control, event 
notification, and service description. Service 
commands and their parameters are detailed.
• Variables that describe Runtime state are described 
in terms of data type, expected range, and event 
characteristics.
 IV. Control: Control point code is expected to identify 
which commands and data objects are supported 
by the service to construct a program sequence 
that uses them to achieve application objectives. 
Command formatting is specified using SOAP 
protocol following the request- response pattern.
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 V. Event Notification: Services built around sensors 
and physical devices may change internal state 
autonomously. Control points seeking to be appraised 
of service and variable state changes can register for 
asynchronous notifications when things change. 
Notification messages are small; if the control 
point needs more information than is available in 
the notification message, it may need to follow the 
notification with a request-response interaction. 
UPnP event notification capability is referred to as the 
General Event Notification Architecture (GENA).
 VI. Presentation: Normally, UPnP nodes operate as 
headless entities. Nevertheless, users may need 
to monitor and control things. UPnP services can 
support web browser user interfaces by returning 
a URL to a web page markup (HTML) that exposes 
service variables and control widgets.
 UPnP Security
Initially, UPnP architecture did not comprehend security. It was thought 
to be addressed in the layers beneath (network) or above (application). 
More recently The IoT Management and Control Architecture32 was added 
which included access control features for sensors was facilitated by roles 
and sensor permissions. Sensor permissions include
• ReadSensor: Control points can issue ReadSensor() 
actions to sensor objects.
• WriteSensor: Control points can issue WriteSensor() 
actions to sensor objects.
32 http://upnp.org/specs/iotmc/UPnP-iotmc-IoTManagementAndControl-
Architecture-Overview-v1.pdf
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• ConnectSensor: Control points can issue 
ConnectSensor() and DisconnectSensor() actions to 
sensor objects.
• CommandSensor: Control points can modify 
IoTManagementAndControl properties in the  
data model (which is a data repository object).
• ViewSensor: Control points can read 
IoTManagementAndControl properties in the  
data model.
UPnP sensor objects expect control point operates with a particular 
role where permissions are assigned based on the set of behaviors each 
role is expected to follow.
UPnP control points must possess one of three UPnP defined roles:
• Admin: Role can read, write, connect, command, or 
view any sensor object.
• Public: Role can read or write specific sensor objects 
(e.g., those supporting the Public role).
• Basic: Role can read or write specific sensor objects 
(e.g., those supporting the Basic role).
A group of sensors form an object that can respond to control point 
accesses. Sensor groups have their own permission classification denoted 
by a sensor command name followed by the group name (e.g., smgt:ReadS
ensor()#[SensorGroupName]). There are four permissions for Read, Write, 
Command, and View. ConnectSensor isn’t supported. Sensors inherit 
the group permissions upon joining the sensor group. Control points 
acquire the “group” access by joining the sensor group as a Control point. 
Interestingly the UPnP specification refers to group permissions as group 
roles.
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UPnP security features are optional to implement, making it difficult to 
force the ecosystem to deploy UPnP with security.
The Open Connectivity Foundation and the UPnP Forum merged in 
2016. They defined a bridging specification that allows OCF and UPnP 
devices to interact; however the OCF bridging specifications do not define 
security interoperability.
 Lightweight Machine 2 Machine (LWM2M)
The Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) defined the Lightweight Machine 2 
Machine (LWM2M)33 specification to address IoT device management. We 
have included it at the end of the section summarizing consumer class IoT 
frameworks, but it could just as easily be classified as an IoT manageability 
framework. However, the Internet Protocol for Smart Objects (IPSO) 
Alliance extended LWM2M such that it can be used to describe a variety 
of consumer class IoT devices referred to as “smart objects” borrowing 
terminology from the LWM2M “object” model. OMA and IPSO Alliance 
merged in March 27, 2018,34 forming new committees within OMA 
organization to continue its evolution as both an IoT manageability 
framework and a general-purpose IoT framework.
 LWM2M Architecture
LWM2M architecture (Figure 2-13) utilizes a LWM2M Server node to host 
device management and other applications that interact with LWM2M 
client nodes hosting one or more LWM2M objects. Servers use RESTful 
CoAP commands (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) to read and update the 
objects. Secure access is achieved using DTLS layer of CoAPs. CoAP and 
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The LWM2M object model (Figure 2-14) is a simple but powerful 
abstraction of IoT devices. The LWM2M client is the managed node and 
corresponds to a sensor/actuator device. LWM2M nodes describe a set of 
network exposed variables called objects. A LWM2M Server may reference 
an object using a URI string that names the object plus its resources. For 
example, a LWM2M URI might appear as “/0/1” where “0” is the object 
identifier and “1” is the resource identifier. Objects contain one or more 
resources, but resources may not contain objects; in other words, nesting 



























Figure 2-13. LWM2M architecture showing client node with objects 
being managed by a Server node hosting device management and 
various web applications
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so was thought to make URIs unnecessarily verbose. Instead objects and 
resources are numeric values. It is possible to have an array of objects of 
the same type using same object identifier. An Object Instance Identifier 
is added between the object ID and the resource ID to qualify the object 
instance. The URI format has the following form:
/ <ObjectID> / <ObjectInstanceID> / 
<ResourceID>
Figure 2-14 shows an example object configuration consisting of two 
objects. The first contains a single object instance with three resources. 
The URI path begins with a leading slash “/” followed by the ObjectID 
referencing the first object (denoted by red arrow). It is followed by a 
second slash then the ResourceID referencing the third resource in the 
first object (denoted by a green arrow). The second object contains two 
instances of Object 2 where each instance consists of six resources. The 
URI path examples have three elements, the middle being the Object 
Instance Identifier (denoted by a blue arrow). One URI path shows an 
Object Instance Identifier with the value 1 that references the first object 
instance and the first resource instance within it. The other URI path 
references the second object instance and the sixth resource within it.
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The LWM2M object model expects IoT devices can be described 
relatively simply. The object model abstraction may hide significant actual 
complexity requiring the object model designer to think carefully about 
which device attributes need to be exposed and how best to map actual 
complexity to a simpler apparent complexity.
The example object in Figure 2-15 reveals six resources. The chart 
describes additional metadata regarding the resource including the type 
of access allowed (read vs. read/update), if it is a multi-instance object, 
the resource data type, the allowable range of data values, and the units in 




















Figure 2-14. LWM2M object model example showing URI references 
to data values
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The object namespace needs to be managed to avoid confusion when 
servers access client objects. The OMA reserved object identifiers 0–1023 
for OMA defined objects. 1024–2047 are reserved for future use. 2048–
10240 are allocated for third-party defined objects. For example, the IPSO 
Alliance object definitions are allocated from this range. 10241–32768 are 
assigned to public entities, vendors, or individuals for proprietary use.
Introspection is not supported except through the use of a separately 
defined introspection service – something that wasn’t defined at the time 
of this writing.
 LWM2M Device Management
LWM2M defines five device management services:
• Bootstrapping: Configures symmetric secrets, raw 
public keys, and certificates clients and service will use 
to establish DTLS sessions. LWM2M Services may be 
configured. Access control lists may also be configured.
• Remote Management: Updates operational settings 
as defined by device profiles. Triggers for controlling 
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The decimal notation of latitude, e.g. -43.5723
[World Geodetic System 1984]
The decimal notation of longitude, e.g. 153.21760
[World Geodetic System 1984]
The decimal notation of Altitude in meters above sea
level.
The accuracy of the position in meters.
The velocity of the device as defined in 3GPP 23.032
GAD specification. This set of values may not be
available if the device is static.
The timestamp of when the location measurement
was performed.
Figure 2-15. Example LWM2M location object
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• Firmware Update: Client nodes report firmware version 
and firmware packages can be installed through the 
firmware update object.
• Fault Management: Device errors can be exposed 
through the fault reporting objects. These may be 
viewed by other nodes querying operational status.
• Reporting: Notification of changing sensor values 
can be configured for multiple recipients. Status of 
the notification can be monitored and configuration 
changes applied when needed.
The LWM2M architecture model reverses client and server roles 
(Figure 2-16) in comparison to other frameworks such as OCF, UPnP, and 
AllJoyn. This seems reasonable since the primary goal of LWM2M is device 
management where the device utilizes management service providers 
that bootstrap and configure the client. LWM2M supports both client- and 
server-initiated bootstrapping. Once the client device is configured, it may 
interact with other IoT nodes as an IoT service such as a sensor or actuator.
It may be reasonable to combine LWM2M for device management with 
a different IoT framework that doesn’t support device management since 
LWM2M can operate alongside it provided the other IoT framework device 
lifecycle states are aligned with the LWM2M device state model.
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 LWM2M Security
LWM2M security has two main components, DTLS secured messages 
and access control lists (ACLs) for LWM2M objects (Figure 2-17). DTLS 
supports shared secrets (symmetric) using cipher suites for preshared 
keys (PSK), raw public keys (asymmetric) using cipher suites that perform 
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange that supports perfect forward 
secrecy (PFS), and certificates (asymmetric) using cipher suites that 
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Figure 2-16. LWM2M example device management lifecycle scenario
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ACL support is achieved using the Bootstrap server to provision access 
control resources to LWM2M clients seeking access to LWM2M servers.  
In the following example, the Bootstrap server provisions the security 
object in Client 1 with the ACL object with read and write access to Server 1 
(e.g., ACL:<Server 1, RW>). It also provisions Client 3 with read and write 



























Figure 2-17. LWM2M access control list configuration
Provisioning credentials to each of the clients to allow the Bootstrap 
server access to their security objects is part of initial device setup, but 
LWM2M doesn’t (at the time of this writing) implement onboarding 
(see the section “Deployment”). The method for establishing trust in the 
Bootstrap server by devices is vendor specific.
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 One Machine to Machine (OneM2M)
Eight global standards organizations [ARIB (Japan), ATIS (United States), 
CCSA (China), ETSI (Europe), TIA (United States), TSDSI (India),  
TTA (Korea), and TTC (Japan)] and six other industry fora, consortia, or 
standards bodies (Broadband Forum, CEN, CENELEC, GlobalPlatform, 
Next Generation M2M Consortium, OMA) collaborated to develop the 
OneM2M standard. The group, known as OneM2M,35 was formed in July 
2012. OneM2M produced the OneM2M technical specification in February 
2016.36
OneM2M is an architecturally complete IoT framework (Figure 2- 18)  
that consists of three basic layers: (1) Application layer, (2) Common 
Services layer, and (3) Network Services layer. An instantiation of a layered 
module is called an entity. An application is therefore an application entity 
(AE), a service is a common services entity (CSE), and a network module 
is a network services entity (NSE). Interfaces facilitate communication 
between entities known as Reference Points. A OneM2M reference point 
uses the nomenclature “Mc-” meaning M2M communication to the entity 
“-” – where the dash is a placeholder for the first letter of the entity name. 
For example, Mca describes a reference point connecting an Application 
Entity and a Common Services Entity. Mcn describes a reference point 
connecting a Network Services Entity to a CSE. Mcc describes a CSE to 
CSE reference point.
35 http://onem2m.org/
36 OneM2M Technical Specification, TS-0001-V1.13.1, Functional Architecture, 
2016- February-29
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Deployment scenarios may have stereotyped nodes, according to 
a logical or functional network topology. For example, Application and 
Common Services entities may cooperate to provide infrastructure 
capabilities such as manageability services, message logging, telemetry, 
and so on. OneM2M refers to these nodes as infrastructure nodes (IN). 
Other nodes may cooperate to implement an application, for example, 
HVAC control, called Application Dedicated Node (ADN) or Application 
Service Node (ASN). Nodes deployed to connect ADNs to INs or other 
ADNs are called middle nodes (MN). Bridging non-OneM2M nodes are 
given the acronym NoDN.
Nodes may contain programs that control resources on other nodes. 
Resources are composed of a set of attributes. Resources can be nested, 
called a child resource.
Nodes are identified with a globally unique identifier that is assigned 
when the node registers with a registration node hosting a registration 






























Figure 2-18. OneM2M node topology architecture
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Entity layers are subdivided into functions. The Common Services 
Entity (Figure 2-19) defines a handful of common services functions (CSF) 
that manage device lifecycle including the following:
• Application and service layer management (ASM): 
The ASM function manages all entities hosted by any 
node excluding NoDN nodes. Management functions 
consist of two categories: (1) configuration functions 
and (2) software management functions. Configuration 
CRUDN functions expose resources used to manage 
entities, while software management functions are 
concerned with managing software and related artifacts 
associated with a software lifecycle.
• Communication management and (message) delivery 
handling: These functions manage delivery, temporary 
storage, and caching of messages. It also manages 
policies related to configuration and tuning of message 
delivery infrastructure.
• Data management and repository handling: These 
functions manage data repositories. They are 
concerned with the collection, aggregation, mediation, 
storage, and preparation for analytics and semantic 
processing.
• Device management: These functions address device 
management capabilities associated with OneM2M 
nodes and can use existing IoT device management 
frameworks such as TR-069 and LWM2M or may define 
new functions. Device management functions translate 
data, protocol, and semantics from one management 
node to another using a Management adapter module. 
Management gateways, proxies, and bridging functions 
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fall within the scope of device management functions. 
Device management functions perform device 
configuration, device diagnostics, monitoring, firmware 
management, and topology management.
• Discovery: Nodes, resources, and attributes can be 
discovered using a discovery CSF. Typically, the invoker 
supplies a query value that selects a subset of available 
possible matches. Filter criteria are expressed in terms 
of identifiers, keywords, location, and other semantic 
information.
• Group management: Nodes can be organized into 
groups. The group management CSF must validate 
group membership and whether the group member 
is capable of performing functions meaningful to the 
group. Groups are used to coordinate publication, 
broadcasts, or multicasts to multiple nodes and to 
define roles for access control.
• Location: The location CSF senses and publishes 
location information for the node. Location coordinates 
can be more than latitude-longitude coordinates but 
require knowledge of location extension semantics.
• Network service exposure: The network service 
exposure, service execution, and triggering (NSSE) 
CSF manages exposure of underlying networks and 
communication layers through Mcn reference points 
and NSE modules.
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• Registration: Entity services must register with a 
registrar CSF in order to make their services available 
for use. The registration CSF supplies a requestor with 
the node identifier where the service can be reached, 
a schedule for when it can be reached, and details for 
accessing the service.
• Security: The security CSF handles identity 
management, access control, authorization, 
authentication, security associations, data 
confidentiality, data integrity, and security system 
management. Access control list subjects can group 
nodes that enforce read or write permissions. 
ACLs are associated with resources, entities, and 
repositories. Access control can be applied to discovery 
resources but requires subject authentication and 
authorization – though an “anonymous” group could 
be defined that corresponds to an ACL entry matching 
unauthenticated subjects.
• Service charging and accounting: The SCA CSF 
manages telemetry generation and collection used to 
charge for services, events, information, and real-time 
credit control.
• Subscription and notification: The subscription CSF 
manages subscription operations and notification 
message delivery to subscribers when the subscription 
condition is met. Subscriptions are registered with 
a resource or group of resources following an access 
control check. Changes to resources are tracked at 
attribute granularity. Changes to subresources are also 
tracked but not attributes of subresources.
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IoT networks are sometimes partitioned into enclaves of subnetworks 
called domains (Figure 2-20) to improve isolation for safety, reliability, 
and security reasons. OneM2M reference point architecture envisages 
network enclaves by allowing multiple AE + CSE + NSE verticals connected 
through peer Mcc and Mca reference points. For example, a fieldbus 
domain may contain a network of closed-loop sensors and actuators 
running at real time or near real time, while an infrastructure domain may 
contain accounting, telemetry, firmware update, and other services based 
on restful client-server interactions. Still another domain may offload 





























Common Services Entity (CSE)
Mcc Reference Point
Mcn Reference Point
Figure 2-19. OneM2M layering with entities and Common Services 
Entity functional modules
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OneM2M device management is built from an open-ended set of 
common services functions that may be tailored toward any number of 
existing industry standard and nonstandard device management solutions 
including TR-069,37 OMA-DM,38 and LWM2M. As such, OneM2M can be 
thought of as a framework of frameworks.
OneM2M architecture allows extremely flexible configuration of 
functional modules and extensibility options. This flexibility may be 
helpful when tailoring a solution for constrained embedded devices 
seeking to minimize resource footprint or when designing gateways, 
bridges, and framework service nodes that are scattered throughout 













Figure 2-20. OneM2M domain architecture allows network enclave 
isolation
37 Broadband Forum Technical Report, “TR-069 CPE WAN Management Protocol,” 
Issue: 1 Amendment 6, Version 1.4, March 2018. www.broadband-forum.org/
technical/download/TR-069.pdf
38 www.openmobilealliance.org/wp/overviews/dm_overview.html
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network latencies, routing, network security, and network management 
overhead may be incurred. Hiding this complexity from system designers 
may have undesirable consequences, while exposing the flexibility (having 
simplified apparent complexity) to applications and users may also have 
undesirable consequences.
 OneM2M Security
OneM2M security design comprehends identity, authentication, 
authorization, access control, data protection, and privacy. That is to say, 
each of these security requirements was considered and addressed to a 
certain extent. However, the test determining adequacy largely depends on 
how completely the industry implements the standard and how effective 
the security mechanisms defined address the threats facing IoT networks.
OneM2M security administration begins with the provisioning of 
master credentials that enables the security CSF functions to be applied. 
Master credentials can be post-provisioned (subsequent to initial 
deployment of a CSE containing security CSFs) or pre-provisioned with 
cooperation from a device manufacturer – though the exact operation of 
onboarding protocols for pre-provisioning is out of scope.
OneM2M framework architecture abstracts away (hides) physical 
(device) boundaries. An Mcc reference point may or may not cross a device 
boundary. The same is true for Mca reference points as well. Intuitively, 
one might conclude that the use of an Mcn reference point does cross 
a physical boundary, but with IP loopback, shared memory, and other 
interprocess communication and overlay network mechanisms, Mcn also 
doesn’t describe physical boundary crossing semantics. This is relevant to 
security because attack points often occur at boundary crossings. Although 
the specification intends security CSF functionality will “protect” security- 
sensitive information, there are a wide variety of hardware and software 
mechanisms to draw from – each having differing security and privacy 
properties.
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 Industrial IoT Framework Standards
The IoT framework standards discussed up to this point primarily address 
consumer grade IoT applications and deployments. That doesn’t mean 
the standards organizations and member companies could not extend 
their architectures to accommodate requirements typically associated with 
industrial IoT. This section considers IoT frameworks that were designed 
specifically to address industrial control system requirements. Industrial 
control systems predate the Internet of Things and even predate the 
Internet. Fieldbus technology is the foundation of process automation, 
building automation, and automated manufacturing. This section 
doesn’t survey the vast expanse of “brownfield” fieldbus technology.39 
Instead, it focuses on Industrial IoT (IIoT) standards that aim to improve 
interoperability through appropriate use of inexpensive, ubiquitous 
Internet technologies and are supported by a rich ecosystem.
Industrial Internet Control Systems (or just Industrial Internet 
Systems – IIS) may be a more appropriate terminology than IoT because 
at their core are complex semiautonomous and fully autonomous process 
automation systems that operate at a level of sophistication that clearly 
goes beyond consumer IoT. They pay close attention to Quality of Service 
(QoS), Quality of Experience (QoE), and safety requirements.
The architectural principles defined by the IIC reference architecture 
serves as a reference point for evaluating the merits and demerits of IIS 
framework solutions. The next section highlights important elements of 
industrial IoT system architecture as defined by the Industrial Internet of 
Things Consortium (IIC). In subsequent sections, we also highlight the 
Open Platform Communications-Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) and Data 
Distribution Services (DDS) open source IIS frameworks.
39 <tbd Reference to industrial control systems>
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 Industrial Internet of Things Consortium (IIC) 
and OpenFog Consortium
The Industrial Internet of Things Consortium (IIC) was formed by AT&T, 
Cisco, IBM, Intel, and General Electric in November of 2016. The IIC 
created a reference architecture40 for IIS that considers common needs 
and challenges pertaining to control systems in energy, healthcare, 
manufacturing, public sector, transportation, and factory automation.
In December 2018, the IIC and OpenFog Consortium agreed to join 
forces under the name IIC.41 The OpenFog Consortium was founded by 
ARM Holdings, Cisco, Dell, Intel, Princeton University, and Microsoft in 
2015. OpenFog Consortium and IIC both focused heavily on industrial IoT 
architecture.
Industrial Internet Systems bring new levels of performance, 
scalability, interoperability, reliability, assurance, and efficiency 
to the forefront. As such, the IIC determined it should produce a 
reference architecture first (and not an IoT framework42 and a reference 
implementation). IIS systems often operate in mission critical 
environments that require real-time or near real-time responses and 
are “smart” through increased integration with higher-level networks 
that include enterprise resource planning, information technology 
administration, analytics, and big data correlation engines.
One aspect of the IIC architecture helps us understand the 
implications of transforming the largely isolated brownfield embedded 
control systems and technology into something that benefits from 





42 Note to reader: The IIC specification refers to sub-architecture sections as 
“frameworks” not to be confused with our usage.
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the Internet economies of scale and its robust ecosystem. Industrial 
embedded control systems have existed before the popular Internet and 
have evolved alongside it for several years. Its evolution into the IIoT seems 
inevitable, but doing so creates a complex problem for interoperability 
given the existing brownfield systems will likely continue for many years.
It is not our objective to deeply explore the IIC reference architecture 
here. However, the reader might appreciate the role of a reference 
architecture when evaluating IoT frameworks as building blocks of IIS 
systems. Different parts of an IIS ecosystem bring different viewpoints 
(Figure 2-21) of the system. The IIC reference architecture explores IIS 
from four viewpoints:
• Business viewpoint: Identifies stakeholders, business 
objectives, values, vision, and related regulatory 
context and comprehends business-oriented concerns.
• Usage viewpoint: Represents the activities, sequences, 
and functionality involving human or logical users. It 
ultimately establishes whether the IIS achieves value 
from the user’s perspective.
• Functional viewpoint: Identifies functional 
components, structures, interfaces, interactions, and 
relationships. It considers trade-offs associated with the 
interests of systems architects, component architects, 
developers, and integrators.
• Implementation viewpoint: Considers challenges 
and implications of functional components, their 
communication, and lifecycle procedures and 
dependencies.
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Although multiple viewpoints exist, security objectives can be frustrated 
if a perspective somehow becomes hidden from the others in the context 
of continuous security monitoring, threat detection, decision making, and 
response management. For example, security return on investment value 
may be weighed against performance or consumer satisfaction value. The 
user benefits of autonomous operation (without users) may be compared to 
perceived and actual benefits of user involvement in setting and evaluating 
security relevant decisions. Security functional viewpoint defines points 
where security-related enforcement and decision making may impact 
other functional goals. The implementation viewpoint applies security 
technologies involving patterns and system components in ways that are 
correctly implemented and easy to maintain and ensure correct operation of 
security functions, algorithms, and hardening.
The IIC functional viewpoint reference architecture (Figure 2- 22) 
recognizes an important understanding of IIS systems having five functional 
domains that must coexist as interoperable subsystems while ensuring 
appropriate isolation mechanisms prevent the goals of each domain from 





Figure 2-21. IIC reference viewpoints
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The business domain functions as a layer on top of operations, 
information, and application domains that interact with the control 
domain. The control domain consists of a separation between cyber 
and physical systems brokered by sensing and actuation functions. User 































































Figure 2-22. IIC functional viewpoint reference architecture showing 
various functional domains
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Quality of Experience objectives. Cross-domain interactions should carry 
the appropriate level of domain-specific context to ensure peer domain 
functions do not, in some way, misinterpret the semantics of command 
interaction, control flow, and data representation as this can result in 
failures and security vulnerabilities.
The IIC implementation viewpoint reference architecture (Figure 2- 23) 
captures an important three-tier network topology structure that recognizes 
an Edge Tier network consisting of sensor, actuator, and controller nodes 
that may share latency, resiliency, and QoS requirements that typically 
are met by Edge-class technologies. These differ from Platform Tier 
technologies used to implement scalable, reliable, available systems 
for data analytics, operations, and data transformation. Similarly, the 
Enterprise Tier consists of technologies tuned for system maintenance, 
management, and system-level controls. Inter-Tier interactions are held 
in check through bridging, gatewaying, and proxying technologies aimed 
at preserving the correct context of the peer Tier when performing control 
operations or when moving data between Tiers.
Figure 2-23. IIC implementation viewpoint reference architecture 
showing a three-tier network
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Multiple viewpoints can be combined to reveal additional insights 
regarding an IIS system. For example, Figure 2-24 shows the functional 
viewpoint architecture overlaid with the implementation viewpoint 
architecture. The Control Domain exists in the Edge Tier which contains 
the Proximity Network consisting of sensors, actuators, controllers, and 
gateways to Platform Tier. The Information and Operations Domains 
exist in the Platform Tier bridging the Access and the Service Networks. 
The Platform Tier contains data service and platform management, data 
distribution, persistence, streaming, aggregation, and transformation. 
The Operations Domain is concerned with provisioning, deployment, 
metadata, monitoring, telemetry, optimization, and access control. The 
Application and Business Domains exist in the Enterprise Tier extending 
the Service Network with business analytics, CRM, DSS, BSS, and so on 
and enterprise applications, APIs, portals, and enterprise rules.
Figure 2-24. Architectural overlay of functional and implementation 
viewpoints
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 Open Platform Communications-Unified 
Architecture (OPC-UA)
Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) is a Microsoft technology aimed 
at office automation largely based on Windows operating systems. The 
Open Platform Communications (OPC) task force extended OLE for 
machine-to-machine control and industrial automation. The task force 
formed the OPC Foundation43 in 1996 to maintain the OPC standard. OPC 
originally was based on Microsoft Windows-only COM/DCOM technology 
which was integrated with the existing OPC communications framework, 
resulting in a unified architecture called OPC-UA.
An industrial IoT network is really a layering of multiple networks 
customized to address a particular aspect of industrial operations. A typical 
IIoT system will consist of a four-layer system of networks (Figure 2- 25). 
The device-level network consists of sensor-actuator devices with real- time 
control of physical world processes, logistics, and mechanics. The protocols 
linking nodes at this layer are typically traditional brownfield technologies 
such as ProfiNet, EtherCAT, and Modbus. These systems are designed to 
operate autonomously taking into consideration safety and reliability.
The control-level network consists of shop floor controllers that 
coordinate the end-to-end flow of the industrial system. The output of one 
shop floor device may be consumed as input to another shop floor device. 
Shop floor controllers orchestrate the hand off the work item, whether 
physical, informational, or both. OPC-UA is a framework for shop floor 
machine control. Controllers host multiple device nodes, run real-time 
or near real-time operating systems, and support both fieldbus and a 
traditional Internet protocol stack based on IP and TCP.
43 www.opcfoundation.org/
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The third level is the Manufacturing Execution System (MES) that 
provides plant-, site-, or factory-level coordination of various shop floor 
networks. This network consists of PCs and servers networked using 
traditional IP networks. The fourth level focuses on Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) functions that filter data from the MES level for deeper 
analytics relating to process improvement, cost optimization, and operational 
efficiency improvement. ERP applications may be hosted in an enterprise 
data center or a cloud hosting environment such as Microsoft Azure.
Figure 2-25. A four-layer system of networks for IIoT with an OPC- 
UA layer
OPC-UA is a device-centric technology that connects sensor, actuator, 
and PLC (programmable logic controller) devices to each other and to a 
larger system of PC and server class platforms. It aims to ensure device- 
level interoperability.
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The basic structure of an OPC-UA network consists of an OPC-Client 
connected to an OPC-Server. The OPC-Server connects to sensor, actuator, 
and PLC devices. The OPC-Client to OPC-Server connection is typically 
based on IP networking. The OPC-Server to control devices is typically 
based on a fieldbus technology.
 OPC-UA Framework Architecture
The OPC-UA design goals aim for platform independence, functional 
equivalence, and data interoperability through information modeling, 
extensibility, and security. Platform independence is achieved by porting 
the OPC-UA framework layer to multiple operating systems (e.g., Microsoft 
Windows, Apple OSX, Android, Linux) and hardware platforms based on 
X86, ARM, PLC, and others. As long as there is a framework instance that 
runs on the OS and hardware of interest, IIoT device interoperability exists.
Functional equivalence is the idea that OPC-UA applications operate 
consistently regardless of which operating system and hardware platform 
was used. There are six areas of functional equivalence defined:
 (1) Discovery: Devices search for peer devices, servers, 
and networks the OPC-UA application needs to 
perform its function. Plug-and-play behavior can 
be supported but requires application involvement 
to anticipate the type of objects and operations 
needed.
 (2) Address space layout: Devices implement a 
hierarchical object model where files and folders 
contain data that can be read/written across the 
network from one node to another.
 (3) Access control: Data objects have access control 
policies that control reading and writing on a per 
node basis.
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 (4) Subscriptions: Client nodes can subscribe to data 
objects monitoring and receiving updates to data 
that changes. Client nodes may specify filtering 
criteria that are applied to monitored data values 
when determining when it is appropriate to notify 
the client.
 (5) Events: Client nodes can receive asynchronous 
responses when data values satisfy a specified 
criterion.
 (6) Methods: Client nodes execute subroutines based 
on server-defined criteria.
Information models define data access semantics. Each information 
model is independent from other information models, meaning each 
model has different access control, state, and quality contexts. The OPC- 
UA framework has several built-in information models (Figure 2-26): Data 
Access (DA), Alarms and Conditions (AC), Historical Access (HA), and 
Programmable state machines (Prog). The Data Access model supports 
live (near real-time) access to sensor data. Each data element has a name 
and value. There is also a timestamp to indicate when the data was read 
and a quality component that determines if the data is valid.
Historical Access (HA) data is not real-time data, and there could be a 
deep history of values stored. SCADA and other systems support devices 
that monitor sensor readings over a longer period of time. HA objects can 
transfer historical data from sensor to framework node easily. Framework 
application may apply analytics to HA data to gain additional insights into 
operations over a period of time.
Alarms and Conditions (AC) data doesn’t have a current value. Rather 
it maintains subscriptions to other data where subscribers may specify 
conditions in which to send notifications and updates. Notifications have a 
timestamp but do not have name and quality attributes.
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Extensibility is achieved through a multilayered information model 
that supports vendor-specific, industry standard data models and native 
OPC-UA defined data models. Companion specifications define what 
information is exchanged, while OPC-UA Information Access layer defines 
how information is exchanged.
 OPC-UA Security
Security is built around two framework layers (Figure 2-27). The session 
layer addresses user authorization, authentication, and access control 
based on role and permissions. The secure channel layer provides 
message encryption and integrity protection when exchanged between 
nodes. It also can be used to authenticate applications that connect 
with the OPC-UA framework. The security channel layer relies on TLS 
(Transport Layer Security) using HTTPS. Though HTTP is also supported. 
OPC-UA relies exclusively on X.509v3 certificates to authenticate and 
authorize users and applications.
Vendor Information Model
(Companion Specifications: FDI, PLCopen, ISA 95, MDIS, ...)
DA HA ProgAC
Industry Srandards Information Models
Information Access
(Data Model and Services)










Figure 2-26. OPC-UA information modeling framework
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Auditing is also supported in OPC-UA security supporting forensic 
investigation.
OPC-UA applications undergo a two-step access process where 
they first access servers and second access data. Authentication policy 
is expressed in terms of server or client identity, while data access is 
expressed in terms of read/write permissions on data objects.
The German government BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der 
Informationstechnik) did an extensive security evaluation of OPC-UA to 
determine if it is safe for using in German industry. Their conclusion was 
that it was designed with a focus on security and does not contain systemic 
security vulnerabilities. This is an important observation because, unlike 
other framework approaches we’ve reviewed, security was integral to the 
framework design.
However, the way in which hardware security capabilities such as secure 
storage, cryptographic algorithm implementation, and trusted execution 
environment enforcement are left as an exercise to implementers. Given 
the platform independence design goal, it is possible if not likely different 





















Figure 2-27. OPC-UA secure communications
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resistance properties. At the time of this writing, OPC-UA did not implement 
attestation mechanisms that describe implementation choices linking 
framework security to hardware and platform security.
 Data Distribution Service (DDS)
The Data Distribution Service44 (DDS) is a connectivity framework 
designed for industrial process control. It is standardized through the 
Object Management Group45 (OMG) founded in 1989. The OMG is an 
industry standards consortium that produces and maintains specifications 
for interoperable, portable, and reusable enterprise applications in 
distributed, heterogeneous environments.
DDS v1.0 was published December 2004. DDS v1.4 was published 
March 2015. Companion specifications relating to security, remote 
procedure call (RPC), and other topics are continually updated. There are 
several proprietary and open source implementations of DDS. OpenDDS46 
is a popular open source implementation.
The primary design goal is summarized as the efficient and robust 
delivery of the right information to the right place at the right time. To 
accomplish this, a data-centric publish-subscribe (DCPS) approach 
was taken. The target applications expect the DCPS framework to be 
high-performance, efficient, and predictable. To accomplish these 
goals, DDS (a) allows middleware to preallocate resources to minimize 
dynamic resource allocations, (b) avoids properties that require the use 
of unbounded or hard-to-predict resources, and (c) minimizes the need 
to make copies of the data. DDS is a strongly typed system, meaning 
the programmer directly manipulates constructs that represent data. 
Interfaces are safer due to rigorous type checking, and execution code is 
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DDS consists of four main entities:
• Domains (Figure 2-28): Define a global context 
in which data, data readers, and data writers have 
ubiquitous access. The domain defines the naming 
scope for identifiers. Cross-domain interactions may 








Figure 2-28. DDS publish-subscribe data model
• Topics (Figure 2-28): Are objects that conceptually fit 
between data writers and data readers. They define 
the context in which publish- subscribe interactions 
may take place. Topic names are unambiguous within 
the domain and contain a type and QoS component 
(Figure 2-29). Type and QoS attributes apply to the 
data referenced via the topic context. QoS attributes 
are themselves DDS Topics. Topics allow expression of 
both functional and nonfunctional information.
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• Data Writers: Correspond to publishers of a publish-
subscribe interaction pattern and must create a Publisher 
instance object in order to accept subscribers or to 
prepare and publish data. Data writers communicate data 
to its publisher to initiate a publication.
• Data Readers: Correspond to the subscribers of a 
publish-subscribe interaction pattern and must create 
a Subscriber instance object in order to register to 
receive publications. Data readers communicate 
interest in a topic to initiate subscription registration.
Quality of Service (QoS) is a fundamental design consideration that is 
intimately integrated into the DDS object model. Each topic may consist 
of multiple data values distinguished by a key value. Different data values 
with the same key value represent successive values for the same data 
instance (e.g., a temperature sensor may maintain a short history of 
temperature values sensed over an interval). Different data values with 
different key values represent different data instances (e.g., multiple 
temperature sensors). QoS and type attributes apply to data instances. 
QoS interactions follow a requested-offered pattern where a data reader 






Figure 2-29. DDS Topics have QoS integration
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The overall flow of a DDS interaction begins with domain participants 
(readers and writers) joining a domain (Figure 2-30). Publishers produce 
data to a data partition object, while subscribers retrieve data from the 
data partition object. Data writers offer a QoS promise on published data 





























Figure 2-30. DDS data interaction flow
The DDS standard defines the set of possible QoS policies. These 
include the following QoS types:
• USER_DATA: Allows the application to attach 
additional information to the data object so that remote 
entities can obtain additional context that relates to 
application-specific purposes. This aids in refining 
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discovery queries and allows selection of appropriate 
security credentials or enforcement of application- 
specific security policies.
• TOPIC_DATA: Allows the application to attach 
additional information to the topic object to facilitate 
discovery for application-specific purposes.
• GROUP_DATA: Allows the application to attach 
additional information to the Publisher or Subscriber 
entity so that application-specific policies may regulate 
the way data reader listeners and data writer listeners 
behave.
• DURABILITY: Allows data to be read or written even 
when there are no current subscribers or publishers. 
Multiple degrees of data volatility can be defined.
• DURABILITY_SERVICE: Allows configuration of a 
service that implements durability attributes.
• PRESENTATION: Controls the scope of access given 
various data interdependencies. Coherent_access 
controls whether the service will preserve groupings of 
changes made by a publisher. Ordered_access controls 
whether the service will preserve the order of changes. 
Access_scope controls the scope of access in terms of 
data instance, topic, or group.
• DEADLINE: Controls the interval in which a topic 
is expected to be updated. Publishers must supply 
updates within the deadline interval, and subscribers 
can set a timer to check for most recent updates based 
on the interval.
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• LATENCY_BUDGET: Allows applications to specify 
the urgency of the message by specifying a latency 
duration.
• OWNERSHIP: Controls how data writer objects 
interact with published data. Shared access means 
multiple writers can update the data item. Exclusive 
access means only one writer can update it. SHARED- 
EXCLUSIVE means multiple updaters coordinate their 
updates.
• LIVELINESS: Controls mechanisms for determining if 
network entities are still “alive.”
• TIME_BASED_FILTER: Allows data readers to see at 
most one change to a topic at a minimum periodicity.
• PARTITION: Allows a logical partition inside a 
“physical” partition. Physical partitioning may have 
safety and security benefits, while logical partitions 
may have performance benefits.
• RELIABILITY: Allows reliability to be defined in 
terms of levels, BEST_EFFORT being the lowest and 
RELIABLE being the highest.
• TRANSPORT_PRIORITY: Allows alignment with 
transport layer QoS capabilities.
• LIFESPAN: Allows specification of when a data value 
becomes stale.
• DESTINATION_ORDER: Controls how each subscriber 
resolves the final value of the data instance when 
written by multiple writers.
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• HISTORY: Controls when data instance changes before 
it is communicated to data readers. KEEP_LAST means 
the server keeps the most recent update. KEEP_ALL 
means the server will attempt to deliver all instances of 
changed data.
• RESOURCE_LIMITS: Controls how many resources can 
be applied to achieve quality of service objectives.
• ENTITY_FACTORY: Controls the flexibility of nodes in 
their ability to replicate or produce additional entity 
instances.
• DATA_LIFECYCLE: Controls how persistent or 
temporal data are relative to the availability of either 
the data writer or data reader.
DDS QoS design is one of its features that most distinguishes it from 
other IoT and IIoT frameworks. QoS mechanisms have both safety and 
security implications in that they improve data integrity – goals common 
to both disciplines. QoS mechanisms must be implemented in ways that 
ensure the integrity of the QoS system. Otherwise, the expected quality 
of service is suspect. Hence, trustworthy implementation of the DDS 
framework is essential to realizing the QoS richness anticipated by its 
designers.
 DDS Framework Architecture
The DDS framework layering (Figure 2-31) consists of several layers 
beginning with an IP network layer. TCP and UDP transports make up 
the next layer followed by the DDS Wire Protocol for Real-Time Publish- 
Subscribe (DDSI-RTPS) layer. The DDS layer defines the data model 
abstractions described earlier. The DDS framework defines several 
vertically integrated technologies for security, remote procedure call 
(RPC), and extensions to its data typing system.
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Implied by the DDS layering architecture is a Device System layer 
that implements the IoT device capabilities including native security 
and manageability capabilities. These capabilities depend on a Device 
Hardware layer that must have ties to the actual sensor, actuator, security, 
or other hardware features. The Device System layer exposes native device 
capabilities to the DDS framework through available interfaces. Different 
DDS framework implementations may make different implementation 
choices regarding how to best integrate the framework with a specific 
device.
The DDS specification helps isolate platform-specific elements of 
DDS from platform-independent elements by specifying a platform- 
independent model (PIM) and a platform-specific model (PSM) of DDS 
structures. The PSM definition ensures porting efforts result in minimal 
impact to the semantics and operation of the PIM while still allowing 



































Figure 2-31. DDS framework layering
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The PIMs and DDS layer ensure DDS applications can expect a 
consistent environment for sharing information that is strongly typed and 
syntactically interoperable. A summary of DDS application properties is as 
follows:
• Applications can autonomously and asynchronously 
read and write data that is decoupled spatially and 
temporally.
• DDS data is loosely coupled due to virtualized data 
spaces that are designed for scalability, fault tolerance, 
and heterogeneity.
• As with all distributed systems, the data model must 
consider a data consistency model. DDS defines data 
spaces that tolerate inconsistent data but eventually 
becomes consistent. Data readers will eventually see a 
write but may not observe it at the same time.
• DDS discovery model isolates discovery from network 
topology and connectivity details so that applications 
may focus on data objects that are most relevant to 
application objectives.
• The DDS data model allows location transparency 
since topics, data readers, and data writers are 
conceptually separated from the underlying physical 
devices and network nodes. Integration across Cloud, 
enterprise, plant and mission control, shop floor, or 
device networks doesn’t require redefinition of data 
syntax and semantics.
• DDS data spaces (aka domains) are decentralized. A 
DDS system may host multiple data spaces that involve 
readers and writers from any data space. There is no 
central point of failure.
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• Connectivity among DDS entities is adaptive, 
meaning connections can be established and torn 
down dynamically. The underlying communications 
infrastructure can optimize for the most efficient data 
sharing approach.
DDS domains have global data space (Figure 2-32), meaning topics 
are visible to all data writers and readers that are members of the same 
domain. Data writers and readers may be members of multiple domains 
simultaneously to allow interaction with topics from different domains. It 
is even possible to construct a domain broker that gives the illusion of the 
same topic appearing in separate domains.
DDS domain interactions can become rather complex. This complexity 
may be especially appreciated when an access control policy is needed 
that places restrictions on various data writer and data reader interactions 
that span multiple domains.









































Figure 2-32. DDS Global Data Space example
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 DDS Security
DDS security consists of three main elements (Figure 2-33): (1) RTPS 
messages with security enveloping structures, (2) token-based security 
context, and (3) pluggable security modules.
Security Enveloping
Security is closely integrated into the DDS data model. Cleartext DDS data 
messages are encapsulated within DDS enveloping structures that support 
encryption, integrity, authorization, and authentication. The RTPS system 
uses the security enveloping structures as its main messaging structure 
so that the real-time publish-subscribe optimizations are preserved even 




























Figure 2-33. RTPS message encoding/decoding with secure 
encapsulation
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A cleartext RTPS message consists of an RTPS header and one 
or more RTPS submessages each containing a serialized payload. To 
prepare a cleartext message for delivery over an unsecure channel, the 
cleartext message must be transformed into a secure RTPS message. 
Figure 2-32 illustrates the transformation. Integrity-protected RTPS 
submessages are wrapped by a secure body and have a secure prefix and 
secure postfix component. The prefix defines the integrity protection 
mechanism, security context, and algorithms. The secure postfix contains 
a hash or signature of the secure body. If the RTPS submessage requires 
confidentiality protection, the serialized payload of the submessage is 
encrypted, forming a CryptoContent element consisting of a CryptoHeader 
and CryptoFooter. The CryptoHeader defines the encryption method, 
security context, and algorithms. The CryptoFooter contains the ciphertext 
version of the serialized payload. All the RTPS submessages belonging 
to the RTPS message are bound together using another layer of security 
enveloping consisting of SecureRTPSPrefix, SecureRTPSPostFix, and 
SecureBody elements. The second layer of security enveloping ensures 
submessages can’t be omitted, appended, or substituted by an attacker.
Security Tokens
All of the privileges obtainable by DDS entities are described using a security 
token data structure. There are tokens that facilitate secure discovery, 
participant permissions, and secure message exchange. Security tokens 
allow exchange of security information using the DDS messaging capability.
• Discovery tokens: Facilitate establishment of 
security contexts for subsequent secure interactions. 
The IdentityToken contains summary information 
of a domain participant in a manner that can be 
externalized and propagated using DDS discovery. 
The IdentityStatusToken contains authentication 
information of a domain participant in a manner that 
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can be externalized and propagated securely. The 
PermissionsToken contains summary information on 
the permissions for a domain participant in a manner 
that can be externalized and propagated over DDS 
discovery.
• Permissions tokens: The PermissionsCredentialToken 
encodes the permissions and access information 
for a domain participant in a manner that can be 
externalized and sent over a network. It is used by the 
access control plugin which manages domain access 
and specific reader-writer interactions.
• Message tokens: The CryptoToken contains all the 
information necessary to construct a set of keys to be 
used to encrypt and/or sign plain text transforming 
it into ciphertext or to reverse those operations. The 
MessageToken is a superclass of several message tokens 
used to maintain security context when multiple 
message exchanges are required such as authentication 
and key exchange protocols.
Security Plugin Modules
The DDS framework takes a modular approach to security so that 
platform-specific capabilities can be exposed to and utilized by DDS 
entities. There are five pluggable security modules (Figure 2-34): (1) 
authentication, (2) access control, (3) cryptography, (4) logging, and (5) 
data tagging.
• Authentication plugin: The principal joining a DDS 
domain must authenticate to a domain controller, and 
peer DDS participants may be required to perform 
mutual authentication and establish shared secrets.
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• Access control plugin: Decides whether a principal is 
allowed to perform a protected operation.
• Cryptography plugin: Generates keys and performs 
key exchange, encryption, and decryption operations. 
Computes digests and verifies message authentication 
codes. Signs and verifies signatures on messages.
• Logging plugin: Logs all security relevant events.















































Figure 2-34. DDS security plugin module architecture
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
131
DDS security offers a comprehensive well-integrated security solution 
that aligns well with DDS design philosophy focusing on data and 
publisher-subscriber interactions. Security is modular, enabling platform- 
specific services and hardware to be effectively utilized and incorporated.
DDS quality of service parameters though originally designed to 
meet industrial safety requirements may also help achieve security 
objectives. The OWNERSHIP and PARTITION QoS parameters capture 
expected data sharing and partitioning semantics. Security mechanisms 
used for data isolation and protection may be useful toward meeting 
these quality expectations. LIFESPAN and HISTORY properties describe 
data persistence characteristics that inform regarding object reuse 
requirements and which data may require stronger confidentiality and 
integrity protection.
However, DDS goals toward heterogeneous operation make 
assumptions regarding the quality and condition of security plugins. 
An attacker might easily compromise the plugin or spoof the plugin 
interface allowing an attack plugin to take control. Peer nodes are not 
easily able to detect such attacks. For example, DDS doesn’t appear to 
support attestation protocols that would query a peer principal’s security 
subsystem to provide proof of device provenance and integrity of the 
system firmware, software, plugins, and DDS framework layers.
 Framework Gateways
This chapter has focused almost exclusively on open standard IoT 
framework solutions, some of which have been omitted here for brevity. 
There are tens if not hundreds of brownfield frameworks with varying 
degrees of openness and standardization, but many are specific to 
an industry vertical. Cloud-connected IoT is another category of IoT 
framework integration mostly ignored here as well. Although many 
of the open standard frameworks claim interoperability with cloud 











environments, the IoT cloud ecosystem largely takes a walled-garden 
approach.47 Most have a proprietary IoT framework or support both 
a proprietary and open framework solutions with integration to their 
proprietary cloud back end. Some of these include Amazon Web Services 
(AWS) IoT, Apple Homekit,48 Bosch IoT Suite, Cisco IoT Cloud Connect, 
General Electric Predix, Google Cloud, IBM Watson Cloud, Microsoft 
Azure, Oracle IoT Cloud, Salesforce IoT, Samsung ARTIK Cloud Services,49 
and SAP IoT Platform. Dell’s EdgeX Foundry50 takes a slightly different 
approach enabling services at the edge, where edge refers to both the 
edge of the IoT network and the edge of the cloud hosting environments. 
The ecosystem that traditionally supplies the pipe between IoT device 
and Cloud is interested in moving up the IoT stack to add more value. IoT 
framework technologies help enable that mobility.
The IoT framework standards organizations seem to understand 
that a multitude of “standard” IoT frameworks hinders one of the main 
motivations for IoT frameworks – interoperability! Industry efforts to 
consolidate frameworks have taken place already. The AllSeen Alliance and 
UPnP Forum have merged with the Open Connectivity Foundation. The 
OpenFog Consortium joined forces with the IIC and the IPSO Alliance was 
acquired by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) to form OMA SpecWorks.51 
Collaborations between framework standards organizations also help 
resolve interoperability challenges. For example, the OCF is thought to be 
working on an OCF52 to OneM2M bridge53 (aka framework gateway).  
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
133
But these efforts are solutions to an interoperability problem created 
by the industry’s eager response to an IoT interoperability problem. 
Ironically, the “success” of IoT seems to have created a more complex 
environment for IoT interoperability as both standard and proprietary 
“connectivity” frameworks and toolkits proliferate. Framework gateways 
naturally come to the rescue, but at what cost to usability, manageability, 
and security?
 Framework Gateway Architecture
This section outlines several approaches for gatewaying (aka bridging) 
IoT frameworks, considers security implications of each, and suggests an 
idealized architecture for secure IoT framework gateways.
 Type I Framework Gateway
A type I framework gateway (Figure 2-35) combines unmodified 
framework gateways using a common framework gateway application. 
The application performs all necessary object model translations and 
data structure mappings to achieve interoperability. The application (i.e., 
developer) must have intimate understanding of data object syntax and 
semantics for both (all?) sides of the translation. Some objects in a first 
IoT network may not have a suitable corresponding counterpart (sensor, 
actuator, controller) in the other IoT network for the applications to 
simply “wire” them together. Instead, it must create an abstraction that 
approximates an object that is recognizable and considered to be a safe 
alternative interaction. For example, a dimmable light bulb in Network A 
may support 10 levels of brightness, while a dimmer control in Network 
B supports 100 levels of control. The gateway application provides the 
mapping function that divides by 10 in one direction and multiplies by 
10 in the other direction. In some cases, there may not be a reasonable 
mapping, and the gateway application developer may take some other 
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approach such as exposing the devices to a console interface so that a user 
can resolve any mapping conflicts or ambiguities. Polyglot54 is an example 
technology that aids in the development of type I IoT framework gateway 
applications.
 Type II Framework Gateway
A type II framework gateway (Figure 2-35) expects the network 
Connectivity, Node Interaction, and Data Object layers are dissimilar, 
but there is a Data Object layer mapping object that relates Framework 
A objects with Framework B objects. A gateway application supplies 
administrative control such as installing, updating, and monitoring an 
object translation component that exists within the Data Object layer. 
Typically, designers of each interoperating framework must collaborate 
to identify semantically similar but syntactically dissimilar elements 
and their mapping functions. The design collaboration may reveal 
disconnected design semantics as well that may be clarified in related 
gateway-specific specifications or may result in specification revisions 
that clarify ambiguities. For example, one framework might expect all 
objects to be discoverable through its hosting endpoint device, while 
another framework might expect discovery is handled using a dedicated 
discovery service. The object translation layer defines the framework- 
specific discovery conventions so that endpoint devices can function 
unmodified. This might involve having the gateway device advertising 
itself as a discovery service operating on behalf of devices represented in 
a foreign network. The OCF-AllJoyn bridging specification55 is an example 
type II framework gateway that supports bidirectional bridging and device 
54 https://github.com/UniversalDevicesInc/polyglot-v2
55 https://openconnectivity.org/specs/OCF_Bridging_Specification_v1.3.0.pdf
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interactions within a common operational domain. See the“Security 





















Figure 2-35. Layering architecture for type I and type II framework 
gateways
 Type III Framework Gateway
A type III framework gateway (Figure 2-36) anticipates a common data object 
layer is in place. However, because the lower layers are dissimilar, not all 
data objects will be common. Therefore a data object translation capability 
is also required. The Connectivity and Node Interaction layers are dissimilar, 
but there is a message translation model that relates the interface definition 
model for Framework A to the interface definition model for Framework B. 
An example message translation operation might relate publish-subscribe 
messages defined by Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT)56 to 
the publish-subscribe model defined by eXtensible Messaging and Presence 
56 MQTT Version 3.1.1. Edited by Andrew Banks and Rahul Gupta. 29 September 
2014. OASIS Standard. Latest version: http://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/
mqtt/v3.1.1/mqtt-v3.1.1.html
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Protocol (XMPP).57 Another example mapping technology is the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) OSCORE58 specification that maps HTTP 
message security to CoAP messages and vice versa.
A traditional framework may not be regarded as a type III gateway 
depending on the set of protocols and message types the framework 
supports. If a framework includes support for both HTTP and CoAP, for 
example, then mapping between may be a normal IoT framework function. 
However, given Framework A support for only HTTP and Framework B 
support for only CoAP, the type III gateway translation comes into play.





























Object Translation Fw-A Objects
Fw-B Objects
Message Translation
Type III Gateway Type IV Gateway
Figure 2-36. Layering architecture for type III and type IV framework 
gateways
57 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 6120, March 2011. https://xmpp.
org/rfcs/rfc6120.html
58 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) “draft-ietf-core-object-
security-15,” Expires March 4, 2019. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/
draft-ietf-core-object-security/
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 Type IV Framework Gateway
The fourth framework gateway class, type IV, considers the case where 
Framework A is a superset of Framework B. The superset and subset 
frameworks remain unmodified, but applications may interact with 
devices from either framework seamlessly. The gateway function 
exists when Framework A objects are exposed to Framework B and 
when Framework A peers are different from Framework B peers. 
Though subtle, this is a system boundary crossing that requires 
security controls. An example of this scenario is OneM2M where 
LWM2M supplies the device management capabilities for a OneM2M 
framework. Nevertheless, LWM2M also may stand alone as an 
independent IoT framework. The type IV framework gateway has an 
object model where the Framework A object model is flexible enough 
to encompass the Framework B object model. Likewise, the interface 
definitions in the Node Interaction layer have a superset-subset 
relationship, and the connectivity layers are similarly encompassing. 
The gateway function may be provided as an application of the 
framework or may have embedded mapping operations. The OCF 
framework resource naming specification allows resources to be 
identified using a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)59 of arbitrary 
nesting depth. A LWM2M object identifier is a URI that is constrained 
to two layers of nesting, and object names are numeric. The LWM2M 
namespace fits within the OCF namespace; hence an OCF to LWM2M 
gateway function could be implemented.
59 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), RFC 3986, January 2005. https://
tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
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 Security Considerations for Framework 
Gateways
Framework gateways may facilitate interdomain interactions in addition 
to facilitating interoperability between dissimilar IoT frameworks. 
Security at the framework gateway should address at least two important 
security questions: (1) Does the gateway bridge network domains and to 
what extent is the gateway trusted to perform these duties? (2) Where in 
the framework layering do authentication, authorization, integrity, and 
confidentiality protections begin and end for a given message transiting 
the gateway?
The Industrial IoT Consortium (IIC) describes brownfield-greenfield 
security integration in terms of security gateways (Figure 2-37). In this 
model, the gateway occupies both an interoperability and a security 
function. Legacy IoT endpoints may enjoy intra-brownfield interactions 
(often without native security), but when protocol directs interaction 
with the Secure Endpoints, the Security Gateway must augment legacy 
messages with message protections. This entails encrypting or signing 
messages before the Secure Gateway forwards Legacy Endpoint messages 
to Secure Endpoints. It may also require authenticating Secure Endpoints 
before allowing them to access Legacy Endpoints.
The Security Gateway function ensures crossing a network domain 
doesn’t weaken security. Security gateways may be expected to perform 
the following security operations:
• Authenticate endpoints to the gateway and gateway to 
the endpoints.
• Authenticate endpoints from a foreign domain to 
endpoints in the local domain. This may require 
creation of a virtual endpoint on the gateway device if 
interior endpoints can’t support the needed security 
capabilities.
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• Integrity and confidentiality protect messages passing 
through the gateway. The gateway may need to decrypt 
then re-encrypt using native domain’s recognized 
security associations, security algorithms, and 
protocols. On rare occasion domains have all these 
security elements in common.
• Authorize access to objects in a local domain by 
endpoints from a peer domain.
• Inspect and log activity between the domains.
• Establish endpoint credentials in the peer network 
environment. Different domains may have dissimilar 
security services for authentication, authorization, 
and key management. The gateway may be required 
to host security services on behalf of a local domain so 
that a peer domain can utilize its chosen set of security 
services.
• Perform data structure translation and protocol 
mapping functions previously described. Modification 
to data objects and protocol message that are integrity 
and confidentiality protected necessarily implies the 
gateway is authorized and trusted to perform these 
transformations.
In general, the gateway is expected to be one of the most trusted nodes 
in the network. Since it connects multiple domains, it likely needs to be the 
most trustworthy node across all the connected domains.
To achieve the preceding security goals, a Security Object layer 
(Figure 2-40) is needed in addition to the framework’s Data Object layer. 
The Security Object layer must be common to all domains that connect 
through the framework gateway; otherwise, there is little confidence that 
security for the domains is correct.
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
140
 Security Endpoints Within the Gateway
When a message enters a framework gateway, it arrives with security 
protections specific to its native network. Those protections terminate 
somewhere within the framework gateway where it is assumed the 
gateway will preserve the security properties throughout until the 
message emerges on another network where the destination network’s 
native protections are applied. The framework gateway must satisfy 
authentication, authorization, integrity, and confidentiality protections in 
a manner that is consistent with both source and destination networks as 
the message transits through the gateway. The place where the network’s 
native protection mechanism ends or begins is referred to as a security 
endpoint. The place where confidentiality protection (i.e., encryption) 
ends (or begins) is the confidentiality endpoint. The place where network 
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physical & L2/L3 security
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Figure 2-37. Framework gateway as a secure endpoint/proxy to 
unsecure legacy endpoints
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so forth. The various framework gateway types have different semantics 
and make different assumptions about security endpoint termination and 
origination. This section highlights some of these differences.
Security Endpoints in Type I Gateways
The security endpoints in a type I gateway (denoted by up arrow and down 
arrow in Figure 2-38) could in theory terminate at or near the application 
interface since the gateway translation and mapping functions are applied 
at the application level. Given a scenario where security protections are 
applied directly to framework objects rather than to protocols or interfaces, 
the data confidentiality and integrity protections may persist until the 
last possible moment before the framework hands off the data to the 
application.
Most IoT frameworks require security endpoint termination within 
the framework layers or in protocol layers beneath so that the framework 
data objects can be manipulated. This implies the data will be unprotected 
through some portion of framework layering before handing off to the 
Gateway Translation Application and again in the reverse flow. The 
security expectation for type I gateways is the framework architecture 
must strictly isolate resources belonging to Framework A from resources 
belonging to Framework B. Attacks originating from Framework A should 
be ineffective at compromising Framework B resources without first 
compromising the gateway or the Framework Translation Application. 
This simplifying assumption can be quite powerful because there are few 
if any exceptional cases. Exceptional cases have a tendency to expose 
security weaknesses that lead to exploits.
Note that within each framework context, native network operations 
may require authentication endpoints for network packet delivery that 
terminate within the framework. This differs from security endpoints 
associated with application layer message confidentiality and integrity 
protection.
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Security Endpoints in Type II Gateways
A type II gateway requires translation at the Data Object layer implying 
security endpoints must exist at the base of the Data Object layer or below. 
The gateway application largely doesn’t participate except to provide 
administrative oversight; hence there isn’t an expectation the Gateway 
App should be privy to object data.
Framework A resources at the Interaction and Connectivity layers 
are strictly isolated from Framework B. However, because the object 
translation logic is shared across Network A and Network B, the Data 
Object layer, compromise of this layer implies access to both A and B 
networks. The authors feel the Data Object layer should be a third isolation 
environment where access to Framework A or Framework B isolation 
environment doesn’t imply, automatically, access to the Data Object layer 
isolation environment. Rather, the respective isolation environments 
should have well-understood interfaces and semantics for crossing 
environment boundaries. Object translation steps necessarily invoke 
environment boundary-crossing primitives.
Note that in cases where framework design choices result in a security 
endpoint terminating in the connectivity or interaction layer, for example, 
if Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used for confidentiality. The isolation 
environment must preserve confidentiality of data as it passes between the 
various isolation environment boundaries.
Gateway Management App
Gateway Translation App



















Figure 2-38. Security considerations of type I and type II gateways
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Security Endpoints in Type III Gateways
A type III gateway (Figure 2-39) requires message protocol translation at 
the Node Interaction layer and may require object translation at the Data 
Object layer. Managing security endpoints that terminate at different 
layers can be tricky. If confidentiality endpoint occurs within the Data 
Object layer, then message translation can proceed in the Node Interaction 
layer since message payloads are opaque at this layer. Nevertheless, an 
authentication or authorization endpoint is required at this layer that 
authorizes a boundary crossing, for example, from Framework A to 
Framework B.
However, if A and B disagree on data object format, then the payload 
transits to the Data Object layer for object translation before it is 
repackaged into a Framework B message body. The Data Object layer must 
correctly apply confidentiality endpoint processing, possibly resulting in 
application of a Framework B–specific confidentiality endpoint before 
transitioning back to the Node Interaction layer. All of this security context 
must be preserved and must resist confused deputy attacks.
Isolation of respective connectivity layer environments from Node 
Interaction and Data Object environments seems reasonable from a 
security isolation perspective but appears concerning from a performance 
optimization perspective.
Security Endpoints in Type IV Gateways
A type IV gateway (Figure 2-39) expects data objects, interfaces, message 
formats, and network connectivity are a subset of the first framework. 
Therefore, data object, interface, and message translation might not 
even be needed. If it is needed, it occurs on the context of the superset 
framework, meaning the security endpoints that are valid for the subset 
framework are also valid for the superset framework. This is a nice 
simplifying assumption that allows for flexible isolation strategies. The 
point where the security endpoint begins can largely be configurable.
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One important consideration is whether or not interaction with 
Framework B allows access of superset data objects not normally part 
of subset objects by Framework B. Given this scenario, the boundary 
crossing occurs at the line where superset and subset objects intersect. 
Gateway isolation mechanisms should allow separation of resources 
along these lines. Success or failure at applying the isolation mechanism 
falls largely along two vectors: (a) the degree of modularity found in the 
implementation of the frameworks and (b) the level of granularity with 
which the isolation mechanism is able to conscribe resources.
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Figure 2-39. Security considerations of type III and type IV gateways
Security Framework Gateway Architecture
This section describes an idealized security framework gateway 
architecture (Figure 2-40) that more easily would support the security, 
isolation, performance, and flexibility requirements needed to facilitate 
framework gateway challenges. The meaning of an idealized architecture 
is it attempts to describe IoT framework architecture where security 
is central to the design and integrated from the start. It may serve as a 
guidepost from which to better evaluate security hardware and software 
solutions presented in subsequent chapters.
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A prominent feature in our idealized framework architecture is the 
addition of the Security Object layer containing commonly understood 
and specified security objects and data model representations. In our 
experience, many IoT framework architectures cite industry standards 
such as X.509, TLS, and COSE in response to questions of security 
interoperability. However, they do not capture the semantics of what it 
means to be secure. There have been attempts at defining security policy 
languages such as XACML and SAML, but these, or something similar, 







































Figure 2-40. Idealized security framework gateway
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Secure execution is another component to our idealized architecture. 
Secure execution is a hardware-supported mode of execution enterable 
when a security endpoint in the framework is required to perform security- 
related functions and exits upon completion. Since a security endpoint 
could exist at any framework layer, secure execution can be entered at 
any framework layer. Framework data are in cleartext while in the secure 
environment and ideally, confidentiality and integrity protected while 
outside the environment.
Framework context is maintained across ingress and egress transitions 
so that layer crossings can be recognized as these may correspond to 
network boundary crossings in a gatewaying usage context. The Security 
Object layer use of the Secure Execution resource preserves its isolation 
properties with respect to the other layers. Data passing between 
framework layers, which have layer isolation requirements, relies on 
the Secure Execution environment technology to enforce isolation 
requirements, these include decryption upon ingress, tenant-specific 
resource isolation while in the SE environment and encryption upon egress.
Although the authors are not aware of a secure execution technology 
that fully implements the idealized framework architecture, there are 
a few technologies that come close. For example, Intel Software Guard 
Extensions (SGX), ARM TrustZone, and virtualization have compelling 
potential. Chapter 3 explains in greater detail various Intel hardware 
security features and how they apply to IoT.
 Summary
IoT frameworks occupy an important position in IoT system design as 
an effective strategy for empowering IoT application developers to more 
easily construct rich distributed IoT applications. Many of the connectivity 
challenges resulting from fragmented brownfield systems are hidden 
behind IoT frameworks. IoT applications simply expect the dissimilarities 
Chapter 2  Iot Frameworks and ComplexIty
147
in machine control networks, process control systems, manufacturing 
execution systems, and cloud integration are conveniently “simplified” for 
all intents and purposes.
Nevertheless, the IoT ecosystem hasn’t settled on a single IoT 
framework technology that satisfies every industry and meets every need. 
Neither is there consensus over standardization of open IoT frameworks 
as there are multiple framework standards efforts. New and existing 
proprietary approaches also seem to have gained ground as the size 
of IoT grows. The recent proliferation of IoT frameworks, toolkits, and 
middleware combined with existing brownfield IoT suggests greater 
challenges to come for interoperable applications in a heterogeneous 
distributed world of IoT.
IoT framework standards organizations seem to recognize these 
challenges and have responded by merging organizations and standards. 
They have developed gatewaying and bridging technologies that let 
framework application interoperate through dissimilar frameworks. 
Noted mergers include OCF, AllJoyn, UPnP, IPSO, OMA, IIC, and OCF. 
There is continued interest in framework gateway interoperability 
among remaining frameworks, but it isn’t clear that the industry needs 
to converge to a single or even a small number of frameworks as security, 
safety, reliability, and other factors may in fact motivate keeping some 
parts of IoT systems separated.
Framework gateways are positioned on the edges of IoT networks 
addressing interoperability needs but also should be considered the most 
trusted security control points since crossing organizational domains often 
coincides with translating from one IoT network protocol to another.
This section highlighted several IoT frameworks showing how 
various IoT system integration and interoperation requirements may 
be addressed. We considered challenges facing framework application 
interoperation in an environment of multiple frameworks. The industry’s 
eager embrace of IoT frameworks has led to the need for framework 
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gateways that reassert the desire for interoperability, but also for security. 
We further consider ways to secure framework gateways looking at various 
approaches and trade-offs.
In summary, frameworks appear to offer significant value for enabling 
interoperable IoT applications by hiding much of the complexity of 
multiple connectivity technologies, messaging solutions that incorporate 
multiple hundreds or thousands of nodes, and data schemas that present 
consistent, declarative, and vendor-neutral expressions of IoT objects. 
We’ve shown that frameworks are great tools to manage IoT device 
complexity, but the security robustness or hardening can only be achieved 
by leveraging the underlying HW security capabilities dealt with in detail 
in Chapter 3 and are exposed via API and different framework and protocol 
layers by the SW as detailed in Chapter 4. The external interactions that an 
IoT device experiences during the lifecycle depend upon the stimulus from 
myriad connectivity interfaces, and this is dealt with in detail in Chapter 5.
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Every distraction is a possibility, Every downfall is an 
opportunity.
—Ria Cheruvu
Historically, the attacks on platforms have been transitioning from 
application-level software (SW) to user mode SW to kernel mode SW to 
firmware (FW) and now hardware (HW). The frequency of HW- and FW-
level vulnerabilities increased substantially from 2003 to 2019 and therefore 
reinforces a concrete need for HW-based security to harden the platform. 
This is evident from the data cataloged in the National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) organized as CVEs; more information about NVD can 
be found at https://nvd.nist.gov/. The Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) is a list of entries with the information that identifies a 
unique vulnerability or an exposure and is used in many cybersecurity 
products and services including the NVD; more information about CVE 
can be found at https://cve.mitre.org/. The NVD has been mined to 
derive the statistics and visualizations with pertinent search terms such 
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as Firmware and Hardware. It is evident from Figure 3-1 (a) that the 
firmware-related CVEs have increased significantly and 2017–2018 saw the 
biggest jump when the hacker community started attacking the FW on the 
platforms. Similarly Figure 3-1 (b) shows that during the same time period, 
the HW-related CVEs also hit a peak. Please note that all these CVEs need 
to be investigated carefully for the impacted areas within a platform. But the 










Total Matches By Year (Snapshot from April 2019)
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Year
2012 2014 2016 2018
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 20192001 2003
Keyword (text search): Firmware
























Figure 3-1. (a) Firmware vulnerability trend chart1
1 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/statistics?form_type=Advanced& 
results_type=statistics&query=Firmware&search_type=all
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This chapter describes the technologies involved in securing an IoT 
device anchored to a Hardware Root of Trust (HWRoT) and ultimately 
booting into a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Security in an IoT 
environment generally involves four areas of focus:
• Protecting the device
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Figure 3-1. (b) Hardware vulnerability trend chart2
2 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/statistics?form_type=Advanced& 
results_type=statistics&query=Hardware&search_type=all
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• Protecting the data
• Managing the security at runtime
Each of these areas are worthy of detailed explanation in itself. This 
chapter delves into the rich set of security and privacy technologies 
Intel has available in their product lines and how they may be used to 
implement secure IoT systems. Intel’s discrete CPU-PCH or System-on-
Chip (SoC) products have two classes of security features; one class of 
features are implemented in the CPU as New Instructions (NI) with some 
examples being AES-NI, SHA-NI, and so on. The second class of security 
features are implemented in the isolated security engines with examples 
including Converged Security and Manageability Engine (CSME).
Note please note that by the time this book is published, some 
new security features may be released by intel, and therefore please 
refer to intel web site or contact the relevant oem/odms for latest 
information.
 Background and Terminology
Before the actual security capabilities can be described, it is important to 
understand the terminology, the threat pyramid, the relevance of end-
to-end security, and Intel Security Essentials for leveraging built-in HW 
security technologies.
 Assets, Threats, and Threat Pyramid
Security design begins with the process of identifying a set of assets 
that are to be protected and classifying these assets according to the 
different levels of protection based on strategic or other pertinent value 
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vectors. A real-life scenario of protecting assets in our home would be 
to protect our house keys (hang on wall), wallets (place in an enclosed 
cabinet), passports, and jewelry (in a safe in the master bedroom). For 
IoT deployments, security is also determined by the return on investment 
(ROI). Figure 3-2 depicts the relationship between them.
• Assets (A): Anything valuable to us that is worth 
protecting. What assets are we protecting? It is 
pertinent to classify the assets and prioritize. Example 
asset profile = {physical devices, internal fuses, keys, 
content, data at rest/in transit, etc.}
• Threats (T): What are we protecting against? Become 
aware of threat surfaces, the areas of exposure to 
threats.
• Vulnerabilities (V): What are the known weaknesses in 
the system that can be exploited?
• Mitigation: How are we going to protect?
• Robustness rules: Specific to assets/threats. 
Documented conditions/criteria for protecting specific 
assets against specific threats.
• Threat modeling: A process to evaluate the threat 
scenarios considering the vulnerabilities for specific 
assets. This process is iterative and is expected to be 
done whenever the bill of materials (BOM) list in a 
platform changes.
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 Inverted Threat Pyramid
The threat pyramid shown in Figure 3-3 depicts the surfaces/layers 
vulnerable to cyberattacks (both physical and remote) in an IoT device. 
The volume of attacks is high at the top and requires fewer resources, 
whereas the volume of attacks at the bottom is lower and requires a high 
amount of resources. In other words, the attack surfaces have varying 













Figure 3-2. Relationship between assets, vulnerabilities, and threats
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The rectangle outlines the IA value additions where the related 
security IP capabilities exemplify the assets that can be used to protect 
customer’s assets. The effort to create exploits at the top of the inverted 
pyramid is low, and the ROI on the compromised assets is also low. Due 
to this low effort, the number of exploits is also significantly higher. As we 
traverse down the inverted pyramid, the effort it takes to create exploits 
increases significantly along with the cost, and thereby the number of 
exploits is typically lower and targeted in nature. The bottom six layers 
could be qualified as HW, and side-channel attacks plus physical attacks 
are relevant. The discussion of such side-channel and physical attacks is 
outside the scope of this book.
 Sample IoT Device Lifecycle
The IoT device lifecycle pertaining to security is complicated with security 
involved in every phase of an IoT device lifecycle (Figure 3-4). During the 
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Figure 3-3. Attack pyramid
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build. The provisioning/configuring phases would require tools that 
scale across different CPU families and involve assigning a persona to the 
IoT device. The deployment phase should be flexible for seamless and 
potential anonymity. The connectivity should comply with the relevant 
security standards and specifications. The management of these devices 
must be secure and seamless. The retirement or decommissioning phase is 
equally critical for an IoT device due to the integration of different assets/
secrets from multiple vendors in the system. For a detailed supply chain 
interactions during the lifecycle, refer to the Secure Device Onboarding 
technology.3
IoT devices have different security needs as they go through their 
lifecycle (on average it is many years significantly more than traditional 
PCs). Security is pivotal to enable IoT devices and sustain those on the 
market. Each stage of the device lifecycle has its specific requirements, 
starting from providing what is needed for onboarding a device during 
the start of its life to security management functions that secure runtime 
operations. Intel has a critical role with enabling design-in the best 
practice HW security model with solutions and ecosystem relationships. 
Intel targets to enable security capabilities and solutions for each phase 
working with the ecosystem. Security is not one-off, it evolves along the 
lifecycle with each stage having unique needs. Best practices are required 
to secure the entire lifecycle.
3 www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/internet-of-things/secure-device-
onboard.html
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Figure 3-4. IoT device lifecycle
 End-to-End (E2E) Security
While security pertaining to an IoT device is important, a practical IoT 
deployment warrants scaling security across an E2E spectrum starting with 
edge/Things connected to Network and then fog or Cloud. The typical E2E 
security involves edge/Things ➤ Gateway/Network ➤ Fog ➤ Cloud. Refer 
to Figure 3-5.
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Assets exist at different stages and often cross trust boundaries.
A typical flow (for a sensing application) is explained with 
confidentiality (encryption/decryption) and integrity (sign/verify) 
attributes:
 1. The device securely identifies with the Gateway/
Cloud (could be one time or periodic depending 
upon the policy enforcement).
 2. The device has/interfaces to sensors (smart/dumb) 
and actuators, collects the data, and controls the 
sensors and drives the actuators.
 3. Device may run some local analytics and optionally 
store the data encrypted.
 4. Device encrypts or signs (or both) (depending on 
the policy) the data and sends it to Gateway.
 5. Gateway decrypts/authenticates the data.
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Figure 3-5. Typical E2E security components
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 7. Gateway encrypts/signs and sends the data to fog/
Cloud.
 8. The instances on fog/Cloud decrypt/authenticate 
the data.
 9. Cloud applications run analytics.
 10. Cloud applications encrypt/sign and store the data 
in databases.
 Security Essentials
Security Essentials is an Intel brand initiative that defines a set of 
foundational security capabilities that Intel processors and Systems on 
Chips (SoCs) will support in order to establish a secure baseline upon 
which the ecosystem can build rich, secure usage models (see Figure 3-6). 
Security Essentials establishes a set of capabilities along with technology 
options for implementing each of the targeted capabilities. This allows 
us to project a common security posture across all supported platforms, 
establish a baseline for security that the industry can rely upon, and 
promote reuse and consistency in Intel-based security solutions. Intel 
provides training, collateral, technology summits, and Technology 
Alignment Programs with customers and ecosystem partners. In 
some cases, Intel partners with Independent BIOS Vendors (IBVs) and 
Independent boot loader vendors to enable the ecosystem with fast, 
secure, and functionally safe boot loader solutions.
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Security Essentials focuses on four buckets of capabilities: Device 
Identity, Protected Boot, Protected Storage, and trusted execution 
environment. These are later explained briefly.
 Device Identity
A hardware identity refers to an immutable, unique identity for a platform. 
The identity has to be somehow inseparable from the platform. A hardware 
embedded cryptographic key, also referred to as a Hardware Root of 
Trust, can be an effective device identifier. The Trusted Computing Group 
(TCG) defines hardware-roots-of-trust as part of the Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM) specification. All TPM vendors are required to implement a 
hardware root of trust for storage. Intel® Platform Trust Technology (PTT) 
implements TPM functionality using a security engine integrated in many 
of its SoC products.
The IEEE community defines a device identity specification, IEEE 
802.1AR, that has been adopted by the TCG. This means TPM-based device 
identity complies with interoperable and industry-accepted approach for 
secure device identity.
A software (SW) identity refers to a cryptographic fingerprint (SWFP) 
that describes important software that may execute on a platform. The 
SWFP can be reliably verified given a whitelist of SWFP values known to 
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Figure 3-6. Trusted secure foundation
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be legitimate. SWFP is an important aspect of securely booting a platform 
where the goal of secure boot is to detect malicious changes to software 
images before they are loaded into memory.
The TCG defines methods for securely booting a platform where 
the SWFP of each software image loaded into memory is measured (aka 
cryptographically hashed) into a Platform Configuration Register (PCR), 
which is securely stored by a TPM. PCR measurements are available for 
comparison with whitelist values during the boot process and are available 
for attestation after the platform boots. Attestation is a protocol for 
proving to a peer platform that it booted a particular way. The attestation 
verifier might also use the whitelist to verify a peer platform node booted 
satisfactorily.
An IoT system that enforces a common and attested secure boot policy 
is a way to establish trust in a distributed set of IoT nodes. Distributed trust 
is an important component to establishing a secure IoT network.
 Protected Boot
This capability defends against sophisticated bootkits and rootkits which 
have been demonstrated that reside in very early boot code and are able 
to launch a variety of attacks on the system. These attacks materialize 
without the knowledge of OS and thereby are invincible to be detected by 
the anti-malware entities. The TCG defines an architectural requirement 
for secure platform boot by defining a root-of-trust-for-measurement 
(RTM) where the platform must provide a secure platform reset and initial 
boot executive that is implemented in hardware, but TCG stopped short of 
defining a particular implementation.
The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) forum defines an 
interface where the UEFI BIOS boot image can be integrity verified by the 
RTM before it can execute, thereby ensuring the remainder of the BIOS boot 
process can be performed according to TCG defined secure boot principles.
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Intel® TXT (Trusted Execution Technology) anticipates scenarios 
where a hard power reset, as a way to return to a trusted environment, is 
infeasible. Instead, Intel® TXT transitions the CPU to a secure operational 
mode using an IA instruction, then proceeds to boot a hypervisor or OS 
without invoking BIOS.
Intel Boot Guard is the hardware-based root of trust for system boot 
process. It provides an architectural enforcement of OEM boot policies and 
a protected initial measurement & verification of first OEM component. 
OEM boot policy is provided in FPF programmed by the OEM.
 Protected Storage
The Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA) defines storage 
security as
Technical controls, which may include integrity, confidentiality 
and availability controls that protect storage resources and 
data from unauthorized users and uses.
Protected storage is a fundamental security capability required to 
support many other security capabilities. The Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM) implements secure storage primitives for several types of security 
objects including cryptographic keys, configuration registers, and whitelist 
values. Protected storage encompasses the following properties:
• Data confidentiality: Unauthorized entities cannot read 
the data.
• Data integrity: Unauthorized entities cannot modify 
the data or unauthorized data modification can be 
detected.
• Anti-replay protection: Unauthorized entities cannot 
replay/reuse stale data to storage.
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Intel® Platform Trust Technology (PTT) is an implementation of 
the TCG Trusted Platform Module specification in a SoC that relies on 
hardware isolation of flash and other memory to prevent access outside 
of the TCG defined interfaces. Intel® QuickAssist Technology (QAT) is a 
hardware data encryption accelerator that also implements key storage 
protections. A common approach for building secure storage for data that 
exceeds the capacity of hardened secure storage resources calls for bulk 
data encryptions that allow ciphertexts to be stored on traditional storage 
media, but where encryption keys are stored in hardware. It is common 
to build a hierarchy of data encryption keys so that different access and 
lifecycle controls can be applied to different data. In some cases the key 
hierarchy itself is too large to fit into hardware-protected storage; therefore 
intermediate keys may be used to encrypt data encryption keys and so on 
until the top most keys of the hierarchy can be stored in hardware.
 Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
In general, a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) refers to an execution 
environment that is isolated from the normal general-purpose execution 
environment. For example, the core CPU is a general-purpose execution 
environment, and a security coprocessor is an isolated environment. 
Trusted execution environments may include HW/SW/FW that establishes 
an isolated environment. By carefully controlling the infrastructure that 
produces the HW/FW/SW that implements it, the TEE can have strong 
guarantees regarding safe and reliable execution of TEE workloads. 
Typically workloads that involve the use of cryptographic keys to ensure 
confidentiality and integrity protection of data as it is transformed to and 
from ciphertext are performed using a TEE.
There are several TEE technologies available across a variety of 
architectures. ARM® TrustZone creates an isolated execution environment 
within the ARM core. Intel® Software Guard Extensions (SGX) takes a 
similar approach and allows multiple instances of trusted execution 
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environments for different applications and tenants. Intel® Converged 
Security and Manageability Engine (CSME) is a security coprocessor that 
is integrated into Intel chipsets. The CSME can be used to offload security-
sensitive operations to shield them from possible attacks from the normal 
CPU environment. Intel® TXT allows trusted execution using CPU cache 
lines as RAM to minimize dependencies on external resources. It can be 
used for general-purpose TEE operations when cache coherency isn’t 
needed. Intel® Virtualization Technology (VT) suite offers another form 
of TEE where a trusted hypervisor creates execution environments with 
distinct thread, memory, interrupt, and IO contexts. Virtualization allows 
full OS and application images to run which may be counterproductive 
to security due to increased attack surface of a large OS and application 
framework. Therefore, it may yet be appropriate to employ some other TEE 
capability in concert with virtualization.
 Built-In Security
Built-in security features are essential to protect, detect, and correct the 
security issues in a platform. These features depicted in Figure 3-7 enable 
to protect the identity and data assets on the platforms from attacks, 
detect when attacks are launched, and then aid in deploying the corrective 
measures to make the platforms resilient.
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The identity is based on HW and possesses immutable properties 
and simplified access. The data asset protection includes data at rest and 
in transit. The detection mechanisms constitute anti-malware FW/SW 
components to find the malware and then pipeline into deploying the 
corrective measures via FW and/or SW over the air updates. Intel’s value 
proposition includes three layers of ingredients as shown in Figure 3-8.
Build-in Silicon Security
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Figure 3-7. HW solution pillars for user problems
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Figure 3-8. Security value propositions
Chapter 3  Base platform seCurity hardware Building BloCks
166
At the bottom layer, the Intel Architecture allows leveraging built-in 
security features to build the platforms at the middle layer and, at the top 
layer, create ecosystems enriched with deployment of best-in-class security 
software solutions. These solutions at the top layer enable the protection, 
detection, and corrections in both consumer and enterprise class solutions. 
Intel security assets and solutions enable building and deploying an end-to-
end system of systems as depicted later. The end-to-end system starts with 
edge devices or things on the left possessing minimal compute capacity and 
less robust security features; these edge devices are connected to Gateways/
Network, to fog, and then connected to the cloud back ends.
The scalable strategy as shown in Figure 3-9 is to provide a minimally 
viable set of security capabilities that scale from low compute MCUs to 
atom class to Core and to Xeon server, microserver class products. Across 
the product lines, the four groups of security technologies are available in 
different capacities for implementing security features. The device identity 
based on HW is key for an IoT device, and protected boot ensures that only 
well-known FW/SW is being executed and protected storage ensures the 
storage of secrets and/or data securely. The trusted execution environment 
allows execution of code at runtime in an isolated and protected 
environment immune from SW and HW attacks.
t h i n g s
Consistent HW security “capabilities” implemented across products
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Figure 3-9. Consistent HW security capabilities
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 Base Platform Security Features Overview
Let’s review the security features present in the base platform profiles 
of IA CPU/SOC at a very high level. As alluded to in previous sections, 
the security features are implemented in CPU and on dedicated security 
engines as shown in Figure 3-10.
CPU
Dedicated Security Engine:
•     ME for Core products
•     TXE for Atom products
•     SPS for Xeon products
Figure 3-10. CPU and dedicated security engines
Intel CPUs come standard with a suite of cryptographic operations 
that can be performed on the main CPU. Secure, protected encryption 
starts with a random number seed, typically provided by a pseudorandom 
number generator within the client. Intel® Secure Key provides a clean 
source of random numbers through generation in hardware, out of sight 
of malware. Intel® SGX provides TEE with smallest TCB within the CPU 
boundaries for application to utilize.
 CPU Hosted Crypto Implementations
These features include CPU new instructions for encryption/decryption, 
sign/verify, and random number generation: AES-NI, SHA-NI, SHA1 and 
SHA256, RDRAND, RDSEED, ECC. This section describes the Security 
features/primitives New Instructions (NI) as supported in the Intel CPUs 
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(as opposed to in an isolated security engine IP block). CPU crypto 
capabilities are supported by the CPU and the fabric. In the following 
sections, we will learn how the hardware-enhanced security strengthens 
Anti-Malware Defenses via the OS Guard (SMAP, SMEP), performing 
encryption/decryption, sign/verify, and random number generation. 
CPU security features and accelerators are available to trusted execution 
environments implemented by the CPU as well including Intel® SGX, 
Intel® VT, and Intel® TXT.
 Malware Protection (OS Guard)
Intel CPU/SoCs expose HW features for OS to defend the platform against 
malware attacks. The particular and effective features include CPU new 
instructions to enable Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention (SMEP) and 
Supervisor Mode Access Prevention (SMAP). The SMEP feature prevents 
the code executing in privileged mode (ring 0) from executing code in 
application mode (ring 3). SMAP is a CPU-based mechanism for user-
mode address-space protection and prevents supervisor accesses to data 
on user pages.
 OS Guard (SMEP)
SMEP when enabled prevents a specific (important) privilege escalation 
attack vector which is supervisor mode execution from user pages. The 
OS can set CR4.SMEP to enable this feature, and no changes are required 
to applications or other OS software. However, there might be some 
compatibility issues with third-party ring 0 software. The changes in VMM 
are limited to supporting/virtualizing CR4.SMEP bit and corresponding 
CPUID bit. It is important to note the non-objectives so that platform-level 
protections can be deployed appropriately. SMEP doesn’t prevent “all” 
privilege escalation attack vectors, nor does it prevent a specific class of 
vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow).
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 OS Guard (SMAP)
SMAP extends the protection that previously was provided by SMEP and 
was developed with the Linux community, supported on kernel 3.12+ 
and KVM version 3.15+. The support depends on OS or VMM being used, 
and the CR4.SMAP has to be set to enable the feature. SMAP is analogous 
to SMEP (supervisor mode execution prevention) for data. There are 
legitimate instances where the OS needs to access user pages, and SMAP 
does provide support for those situations. Code executing in ring 0 
(supervisor mode) is prevented from accessing the data in ring 3 (user 
mode). When/if CR4.SMAP = 1, CPU generates Page Fault (#PF) for the 
following accesses: accesses to data (not instruction fetch), data is on user-
accessible page (U/S bit is 1 in all relevant paging structure entries), access 
is made with supervisor privilege which normally means CPU Privilege 
Level (CPL) < 3, applies also to supervisor accesses made with CPL = 3 
(e.g., loads from GDT on segment loads). The resulting #PF establishes 
error code in the normal way.
 Encryption/Decryption Using AES-NI
AES is a symmetric encryption standard that’s widely used in the following 
use cases: full disk encryption, data in transit encryption, and enterprise 
application–specific security. All the modern compilers support the AES 
HW accelerators, and developers can also use via C/C++ intrinsics. Intel® 
Advanced Encryption Standard New Instructions (Intel® AES-NI) is a set 
of seven new instructions in the Intel® processor series. Four instructions 
accelerate encryption and decryption. Two instructions improve key 
generation and matrix manipulation. The seventh aids in carry-less 
multiplication. By implementing some complex and costly substeps of the 
AES algorithm in hardware, Intel AES-NI and PCLMULQDQ accelerate 
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execution of the AES-based encryption. The result is faster, more secure 
encryption, which makes the use of encryption feasible in new use-cases. 
Some of the properties are outlined here:
• Improve the compute efficiency of cryptographic 
algorithms.
• Vector AES is a promotion of AES-NI to vector form, 
enables two (256-bit) or four (512-bit) lanes, and 
increases AES throughput of cores.
• FIPS197 compliant.
• Compilers, libraries, and emulator platforms are all 
available now.
• AESENC, AESENCLAST, AESDEC, AESDECLAST.
• AES Encrypt Round, AES Encrypt Last Round, AES 
Decrypt Round, AES Decrypt Last Round.
• Instructions have both register-register and register-
memory variants.
• AESIMC and AESKEYGENASSIST: Assist with AES Key 
Expansion, AES Inverse Mix Columns, and AES Key 
Generation Assist.
The platform support for AES can be determined by inspecting cpuinfo 
output and openssl commands as shown in the following:
$ grep -o aes /proc/cpuinfo
To verify the proper cipher order, use the following command:
"openssl ciphers -v"
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See the following list that shows AES at the top of the list:
Openssl speed aes-256-cbc
Openssl speed –engine aesni –evp aes-256-cbc
http://ask.xmodulo.com/check-aes-ni-enabled-openssl.html
openssl  speed –elapsed aes-128-cbc
openssl  speed –elapsed –evp aes-128-cbc
 https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/improving-openssl-
performance
 Sign/Verify Using Intel® SHA Extensions
The Intel® SHA Extensions are a family of seven Streaming SIMD 
Extensions (SSE)–based instructions that are used together to accelerate 
the performance of processing SHA-1 and SHA-256 on Intel® Architecture 
processors (Figure 3-11). Given the growing importance of SHA in our 
everyday computing devices, the new instructions are designed to provide 
a needed boost of performance to hashing a single buffer of data. Using the 
SHA Extensions, the Intel® SHA Extensions can be implemented using direct 
assembly or through C/C++ intrinsics. The 16-byte aligned 128-bit memory 
location form of the second source operand for each instruction is defined to 
make the decoding of the instructions easier. The memory form is not really 
intended to be used in the implementation of SHA using the extensions 
since unnecessary overhead may be incurred. Availability of the Intel® SHA 
Extensions on a particular processor can be determined by checking the 
SHA CPUID bit in CPUID (EAX=07H, ECX=0):EBX.SHA [bit 29].
• New instructions in CPU to encrypt/decrypt data.
• The Intel® SHA Extensions are comprised of four SHA-1 
and three SHA-256 instructions.
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• There are two message schedule helper instructions 
each, a rounds instruction each, and an extra rounds-
related helper for SHA-1.




SHA1RNDS4 xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r) imm8 OF 3A CC /r ib
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r) NA
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r) NA
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r)
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r)
NA
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r) NA
xmm (rw) xmm/m128 (r) NA
<xmm0>
(implicit)
OF 38 C8 /r
OF 38 C9 /r
OF 38 CB /r
OF 38 CC /r
OF 38 CD /r







Op 2 Op 3 Opcode
Figure 3-11. SHA instruction family
The availability of the SHA Extensions in a platform can be detected 
using the code in Listing 3-1. It is always a good idea to check the available 
HW crypto capabilities before leveraging them.
Listing 3-1. Detecting the SHA Extensions
int CheckForIntelShaExtensions() {
    int a, b, c, d;
    // Look for CPUID.7.0.EBX[29]
    // EAX = 7, ECX = 0
    a = 7;
    c = 0;
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    asm volatile ("cpuid"
    Intel® SHA Extensions: New Instructions Supporting the
    Secure Hash Algorithm on Intel® Architecture Processors
    14
    :"=a"(a), "=b"(b), "=c"(c), "=d"(d)
    :"a"(a), "c"(c)
    );
    // Intel® SHA Extensions feature bit is EBX[29]
    return ((b >> 29) & 1);
}
 Intel® Data Protection Technology with Secure Key 
(DRNG)
This section explains about the usage of Digital Random Number 
Generator (DRNG) with the new instructions supported in IA CPUs. For 
any IoT device, the ability to generate high-quality cryptographic keys 
is crucial. Two such instructions RDRAND and RDSEED are explained 
along with the method to determine the support and the associated 
programming usage. Intel® Secure Key constitutes the Intel® 64 and IA-32  
Architectures instructions RDRAND and RDSEED and the underlying 
Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG) hardware implementation. 
High-quality keys for cryptographic protocols can be generated using 
the RDRAND instruction, and the RDSEED instruction is provided for 
seeding software-based pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs). 
RDRAND retrieves a hardware-generated random value from the NIST 
SP800-90A compliant Digital Random Bit Generator (DRGB) and stores 
it in the destination register given as an argument to the instruction. The 
size of the random value (16-, 32-, or 64-bits) is determined by the size 
of the register given. The carry flag (CF) must be checked to determine 
whether a random value was available at the time of instruction execution. 
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RDRAND is available to both OS modes: system (ring 0) or application 
(ring 3) software running on the platform. There are no hardware ring 
requirements that restrict access based on process privilege level. As such, 
RDRAND may be invoked as part of an operating system or hypervisor 
system library, a shared software library, or directly by an application. 
Before using the RDRAND or RDSEED instructions, an application or 
library should first determine whether the underlying platform supports 
the instruction and hence includes the underlying DRNG feature. This 
can be done using the CPUID instruction. In general, CPUID is used to 
return processor identification and feature information stored in the 
EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX registers. For detailed information on CPUID, 
refer to References CPUID A and B. To be specific, support for RDRAND 
can be determined by examining bit 30 of the ECX register returned by 
CPUID, and support for RDSEED can be determined by examining bit 
31 of the EBX register. A bit value of 1 indicates processor support for 
the instruction, while a value of 0 indicates no processor support. The 
Intel Digital Random Number Generator (DRNG) is a high-quality, high-
performance, HW-based random number generator.
• It supports NIST SP 800-90 A, B, and C compliant 
functionality and is FIPS 140-2 Level 2 certifiable.
• It generates random numbers at a rate of 1 byte per 
clock.
• It is available early in the system boot/OS load process.
Both RDRAND and RDSEED return random numbers that are 
compliant to the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
standards on random number generators (Figure 3-12).
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As depicted in Figure 3-13, the RDRAND instruction is handled 
by microcode on each core. This includes an RNG microcode module 
that handles interactions with the DRNG hardware module on the 
processor chip. The entropy source (ES) produces random bits from a 
nondeterministic hardware process. HW AES in CBC-MAC mode distills 
the entropy into high-quality nondeterministic random numbers. The 
deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) is seeded from the conditioner.
Instruction
RDRAND SP 800-90A
SP 800-90B & C (drafts)
Cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
generator
Non-deterministic random bit generatorRDSEED
Source NIST Compliance

























Figure 3-13. Random number generator inside the chip
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The availability of RDRAND and RDSEED can be detected using the 
following register bit decoding (Table 3-1).
More information can be found at: https://software.intel.com/
en-us/articles/intel-digital-random-number-generator-drng-
software-implementation-guide
Table 3-1. Feature Information Returned in the ECX Register
Leaf Register Bit Mnemonic Description
1 eCX 30 rdrand a value of 1 indicates that processor 
supports the rdrand instruction
7 eBX 18 rdseed a value of 1 indicates that processor 
supports the rdseed instruction
With the information from Table 3-1 and by leveraging the code in 
Listing 3-2, the availability of RDRAND and RDSEED can be detected in a 
platform.
Listing 3-2. Detecting DRNG Support
/* These are bits that are OR'd together */





    static int drng_features= -1;
    /* So we don't call cpuid multiple times for
     * the same information */
    if ( drng_features == -1 ) {
        drng_features= DRNG_NO_SUPPORT;
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        if ( _is_intel_cpu() ) {
            cpuid_t info;
            cpuid(&info, 1, 0);
            if ( (info.ecx & 0x40000000) == 0x40000000 ) {
                drng_features|= DRNG_HAS_RDRAND;
            }
            cpuid(&info, 7, 0);
            if ( (info.ebx & 0x40000) == 0x40000 ) {
                drng_features|= DRNG_HAS_RDSEED;
            }
        }
    }
    return drng_features;
}
One of the advantages of security hardening and acceleration 
capabilities applied to the core architecture is that performance 
enhancements derived from core silicon manufacturing process 
improvements also apply to security features. In many cases, this approach 
ensures security features’ manufacturing costs scale with the other core 
features.
 Converged Security and Manageability Engine 
(CSME)
This describes the Converged Security Engine capabilities including the 
silicon, FW, and SW ingredients. This is similar to a security coprocessor 
which has its own ROM, RAM, instruction set, and an isolated execution 
environment. Refer to a simplified architecture diagram in Figure 3-14. An 
excellent deep dive can be found in the book Platform Embedded Security 
Technology Revealed (www.apress.com/9781430265719).
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Features are implemented in the isolated security execution engine 
or equivalent to a security coprocessor. CSME is an embedded subsystem 
in Platform Controller Hub (PCH). It is a mini SoC within the PCH and 
contains a small processor, SRAM, crypto blocks, and I/O’s. CSME serves 
three main platform roles: chipset (secure initialization/survivability), 
security (boot/runtime protection and enable trusted execution of 
platform applications), and manageability (optional extensions for out-of-
band network management).
CSME supports the following:
• Crypto operations, boot, DAL, manageability (AMT, in 
above atom).
• The CSME supports crypto operations, HW Root of 
Trust–based secure boot (verified and measured), 





Figure 3-14. CSME block diagram
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• Content Protection: PAVP, Digital Rights Management 
(DRM)-Widevine, PlayReady, and Adobe Access. The 
CSME supports multiple DRMs for protecting the 
premium audio/video content by encrypting and/or 
digital watermarking.
• Secure Debug: DFX, JTAG lock. The CSME supports 
secure debug and manages access to DFX register 
space by allowing locking and unlocking of JTAG 
interface through which ICE emulators could be 
plugged in for debugging during pre/postproduction 
and to debug the field return parts.
• Identity Protection Technology: The CSME also 
supports protecting user’s identity via multifactor 
authentication, biometrics, iris, and others.
 Secure/Verified, Measured Boot and Boot Guard
Protecting the boot flow is critical to ensure that the device is not running 
compromised code whether it is the FW on the flash components or SW 
running from the mass storage device. Secure/verified boot is a process 
where a device authenticates the different FW/SW ingredients in the 
boot chain and establishes a chain of trust. Measured boot is a process 
where the device authenticates to a network for admission. To implement 
measured boot, the device stores the hash values of the boot chain 
ingredients, and SW entities collect these values and transmit them to a 
server for attestation.
Chapter 3  Base platform seCurity hardware Building BloCks
180
 Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
The TXT is prominent in the server and microserver domain where a 
comprehensive security strategy is employed including a Measured 
Launch Environment (MLE) and instrumented OS. More about this will be 
discussed in the “Runtime Protection – Ever Vigilant” section.
 Platform Trust Technology (PTT)
PTT is a FW implementation of the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and complies with the TPM 2.0 
specification. This FW is executed on the CSME or CSE on atom platforms. 
This feature is the most important for an IoT device which has board-level 
constraints imposed by BOM cost and real estate. PTT is essential for 
measured boot and attestation mechanisms.
 Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID)
The EPID allows a device to possess an immutable “privacy preserving 
platform identifier” – in many use cases, it isn’t required that the particular 
instance of the CPU be known, only that the platform is of a particular class 
or origin. In these situations, trust can be established without sacrificing 
privacy. Through this immutable identity, more secrets can be provisioned 
in the field during the course of the IoT device lifecycle including 
anonymous identification for provisioning of secrets, premium content, 
DRMs, and operation.
 Memory Encryption Technologies
In future processors, Intel plans to introduce two new in-memory data 
protection capabilities including Total Memory Encryption (TME) and 
Multi-Key TME, or MKTME. TME technology encrypts the platform’s 
entire memory with a single key.
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 TME
When enabled via BIOS configuration, this will help ensure that all 
memory accessed from the Intel CPU is encrypted, including customer 
credentials, encryption keys, and other IP or personal information on the 
external memory bus.
 MKTME
The second new technology extends TME to support multiple encryption 
keys (Multi-Key TME, or MKTME) and provides the ability to specify 
the use of a specific key for a page of memory. This architecture allows 
either CPU-generated keys or tenant-provided keys, giving full flexibility 
to customers. This means virtual machines (VMs) and containers can 
be cryptographically isolated from each other in memory with separate 
encryption keys, a big plus in multitenant cloud environments. VMs and 
containers can also be pooled to share an individual key, further extending 
scale and flexibility. This includes support for both standard DRAM and 
NVRAM. Refer to the following for more information.[4, 5]
 Dynamic Application Loader (DAL)
DAL technology allows building, deploying, and managing the lifecycle 
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 Software Guard Extensions (SGX) – IA CPU 
Instructions
SGX constitutes a new set of CPU instructions, kernel/user mode drivers 
and Runtime environment, and API/SDK. This framework allows 
developers to build the trusted parts of the application code into enclaves. 
The inherent assumption is that the partition of the application into 
trusted and untrusted domains is already done prior to implementing 
SGX. SGX can be used to seal legitimate software inside an enclave to 
protect from attacks by the malware, irrespective of the privilege levels 
whether it is ring 0 or ring 3.
 Identity Crisis
With the projected 50 billion IoT devices on the network, wouldn’t it be 
ultracritical to ensure that a device is talking to the right device at the other 
end? A masqueraded device can do lot of damage. A method to prevent this 
is to implement a device identity that’s immutable and use this identity to 
attest and provision initial secrets and additional secrets in the field during 
the course of the device’s life. The same phenomenon applies to human 
identity as well. It is vital to realize that a masqueraded device is substantially 
hard to detect and quarantine. Intel Identity Protection Technology (IPT) 
uses Dynamic Application Loader (DAL) to implement mechanisms to 
protect the user identity via multifactor authentication and others.
The device identity (ID) decision tree can be used to select the right 
ID for a particular implementation. As shown in Figure 3-15, a security 
architect/engineer can decide the right identity based on the platform 
requirements and use cases. If an identity is required but mutable 
(changeable), a SW identity may suffice, but immutable identity requires 
identity to be in HW. If this identity now has to be anonymous, select EPID, 
else the identity as supported in PTT/TPM may be adequate. The EPID’s 
cryptographic properties are briefly explained in the following section.
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 Enhanced Privacy Identifier (EPID)
The EPID is a novel technology that addresses all aspects of the active 
anonymity problem: authentication, anonymity, and revocation. Intel® 
Enhanced Privacy ID (Intel® EPID) provides an immutable hardware 
root of trust, enabling IoT networks to confidently identify devices and to 
secure their communications.
 Anonymity
Intel EPID also offers sophisticated privacy capabilities that enable 
anonymous communication to safeguard networks and customers’ 
data. EPID is an anonymous digital signature scheme with the following 
attributes (Figure 3-16): a private key for signing and a single group public 
key for verifying signature of multiple keys. EPID is an open standard: ISO/
IEC 20008/20009 and TCG Mature Technology, shipping since 2008, 2.4B 
keys since 2008.
Is identity required? Immutability required?









Figure 3-15. Device identity decision tree
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As depicted in the figure, the PKI is a system with a public-private key 
pair, whereas the EPID is a system with one public key associated with 
many private keys formed into a group. In both cases, the private keys are 
provisioned into the devices, and the public keys are available to the back-
end servers for authentication/admission.
 PTT/TPM
The Endorsement Key (EK) supported in the Intel® PTT or discrete Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) serves as a direct identity for IoT devices. An 
Endorsement Key is a special purpose TPM-resident RSA key that is never 











Millions of Private Keys
Figure 3-16. PKI system vs. EPID
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terms of specific security attributes, to a TPM. The primary use of an EK 
certificate is to authenticate device identity during Attestation Identity Key 
(AIK) certificate issuance.
 Device Boot Integrity – Trust But Verify
Imagine the IoT device booting an image that’s not the original from boot 
storage. In this circumstance, any protections that you deploy at higher 
layers wouldn’t be adequate to protect the device. Once the immutable 
identity is ensured as explained in the previous section, it becomes vital to 
follow through by booting securely. The boot loaders such as BIOS, UEFI, 
coreboot, and FSP can be classified into pre-OS boot loaders and will be 
referred as such. Let’s unravel the ∗boot chaos with many terms employed 
in the industry today:
• Trusted Boot: Definition varies according to industry. 
Used to characterize a trusted system with a chain of 
trust.
• Secure Boot: HWRoT based. Authenticates starting with 
the first instruction executed on host (Core/Xeon/Atom).
• UEFI Secure Boot: UEFI Boot manager ensures device 
boots only signed FW and OS loaders. UEFI Driver 
signing and protocol extensions. This is also known as 
BIOS as Root of Trust.
• Windows Secure Boot: Leverages UEFI Secure Boot to 
continue into Windows OS, a Windows certification 
requirement.
• Direct Boot: An OS image such as Linux bzImage is 
loaded from stage 2 of the pre-OS boot loader.
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• Verified Boot: Cryptographically verifies the Initial Boot 
Block of the pre-OS boot loader or UEFI or BIOS using 
boot policy key. A verified boot using Intel Boot Guard 
is shown in Figure 3-17.
• Immutable Root-of-Trust exists in the hardware.
• Root-of-Trust protects the initial boot process.
• It uses cryptographic keys to authenticate and validate 
the integrity of the Initial Boot Block (IBB).
• IBB maintains a secure boot chain by passing control 
to the next stage boot image after authentication and 
integrity verification.
• The final stage boot image passes control to the OS 
after authentication.
• Measured Boot: Measures the Initial Boot Block (IBB) 
and subsequent stages into platform storage such as 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) or firmware-based 
TPM or secure storage.
Root of Trust
Intel BootGuard UEFI Secure Boot Or Other Mechanism
IBB OBB OS/Apps
verifyverifyverify
Figure 3-17. Verified boot flow with Boot Guard
The following terms will be useful to understand the following 
sequence that describes the process of Measured Boot using Boot Guard as 
shown in Figure 3-18:
• Hashing algorithms typically employed include Hash_
alg = SHA1, SHA256, SHA384, SM3.
• Extending: It is a process of updating a PCR with a hash.
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• PCR: Platform Configuration Register hosted 
inside PTT/TPM. The PCR 0–7 are used for pre-OS 
environment, and PCR 8–15 are used for OS and 
beyond. Refer to the TCG TPM specification for 
recommended PCR allocations.
• The new PCR value can be computed with PCR_new = 
Hash_alg(PCR_old || Hash_alg(data_new)).
• Logging: Keeps a log of all measurements in an ACPI table.
• ACM: Intel Authenticated Code Module, integrated 
in the BIOS/UEFI/boot loader for authenticating and 
measuring the IBB.
 1. Upon power ON, CSME starts by computing the hash 
of ACM, and the hash of the ACM is stored in PCR 0.
 2. The ACM computes the hash of IBB and extends it 
into PCR 0.
 3. The IBB computes the hash of OEM Boot Block 
(OBB) aka the second stage pre-OS boot loader and 
extends the hash into PCR 0 and stores the hash of 
Platform Config Data into PCR 1.
 4. The OBB computes the hash of OS loader and stores 
the corresponding hash into PCR 4. It stores the 
hash of Firmware Boot Policy in PCR 7.
 5. The OS loader computes the hash of OS kernel and 
stores the hash into PCR 8.
 6. The OS kernel can compute the hash of the user 
mode drivers/libraries and applications and extend 
the respective hashes into PCR 8-15 to meet the 
platform chain of trust requirements.
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 Secure Boot Mechanisms
The stack below describes the lowest layer to be the HW layer, and above 
that is the firmware layer which includes the modules required to handle 
the HW IP blocks and Digital Rights Management. Above that is the 
boot loader/UEFI used to initialize the CPU and chipset. The optional 
hypervisor supports the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) functionality. 





PCR 0 : BtGuard Policy, ACM, IBB
PCR 0 : CSME, OBB
PCR 1 : Platform Config Data
PCR 4 : OS Loader
PCR 7 : Firmware Secure BP
PCR [0-7] : Separator bet’n Firmware/OS
PCR 8 : OS Kernel








Figure 3-18. Measured Boot sequence
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Above that layer are the middleware/frameworks and applications. This 
diagram (Figure 3-19) also illustrates the security goal that trust begins 
at the lowest layers and must be extended into the layers above – and 
that doing so requires conscious techniques to get it right. If/when those 
techniques fail, the stack recovers by falling back to lower layers.
The stack includes booting into application TEEs and the need to 
distinguish security-sensitive function and workloads that should be 
separated from “traditional” function and workloads. We can refer to 
the TEE and lower layers as the trusted computing base upon which the 
rest of the stack depends. The stack also supports networking and the 
idea that lower layers implementing the TCB can be linked (in an IoT 
use case) so that a Distributed TCB (DTCB) can be formed that supports 
distributed trusted workloads such as key management/migration, device 

















Figure 3-19. Describes the boot flow on a core along with the chain 
of trust and signing implications
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 Secure Boot Terminology Overview
Secure Boot Types: With the Field Programmable Fuse (One Time 
Programmable) profile options within the SoC, you can configure the 
device in an unsecured boot where the boot ingredients in stages are 
assumed to be trusted and no authentication is performed, referred to in 
Figure 3-20.
• Verified Boot: Boot policies are enforced during 
the boot process. Starting with the Root of Trust for 
verification, the currently executing module verifies 
the next module against a policy. The boot process 
is stopped if secure boot guarantee is violated. It is 
important to note that this only provides assurance that 
the boot policy was enforced.
• Measured Boot: Integrity measurement is placed 
into the TPM. Starting with the Root of Trust for 
measurement, the currently executing module places 
the integrity measurement of the next module into 
the TPM. Computer is not stopped if secure boot 
guarantee is violated and provable to remote systems 
via attestation.
• Secure Boot: A boot process which implements either 
Verified Boot, Measured Boot, or both. Verified Boot 
is often referred to as Secure Boot; Measured Boot is 
often referred to as Trusted Boot (also refers to TBoot 
sometimes).
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IOT devices are inherently vulnerable to physical attacks primarily due 
to their ability to connect to billions of devices. A first step in building a 
robust device is to ensure that the very first component of the boot loader 
is authenticated. This is implemented by a method known as secure boot 
which is based on a hardware root of trust in a platform. The immutable 
code running on on-die ROM in an isolated environment on a security 
engine forms an anchor. This ROM code loads the stage 1 of the boot 
loader into security engine’s SRAM and cryptographically authenticates 
the image before executing it on the host CPU. The secure boot method 
on Intel Architecture is explained in detail including the HW and 
























Verifies against Manifest during / after boot.
•  Local Attestation: TPM Enforces Policy
•  Remote Attestation: TPM Key signs





Figure 3-20. Types of boot
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 Overview of BIOS/UEFI Secure Boot Using Boot 
Guard Version 1.0 (BtG)
The verified boot flow using FSP+coreboot leveraging the Intel Boot Guard 
version 1.0 on Skylake platform is shown in Figure 3-21. The terms are 
explained followed by the sequence.
IPF: Infield Programmable Fuses also known as Field Programmable 
Fuses (FPF) represent storage inside the CPU/SoC for policy configuration 
and are One Time Programmable (OTP). The provisioning tools are 
provided by Intel for programming these fuses in the manufacturing flow.
Platform Power Sequence: Includes starting boot sequence for power 
rail stabilization.
Authenticated Code Module (ACM): Intel provided FW module loaded 
from flash, authenticated and executed in CPU’s cache as RAM (CAR).
























ACM FW authenticates the public key
ACM FW authenticates the IBB
Core Boot Stage-1 authenticates the Core Boot Stage-2
Stage-2 authenticates the Stage-3
Stage-3 authenticates OS Loader via UEFI key store or Mok List
OS Loader authenticates the Kernel via UEFI key store or Mok List





































Reference Flow:  Core Boot + FSP + UEFI + Windows
Boot Policy
Figure 3-21. FSP/coreboot-based verified boot on Skylake using Boot 
Guard 1.0
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The sequence is outlined here:
• ACM authenticates Core Boot Stage-1.
• Core Boot Stage-1: Authenticates Core Boot Stage-2 
using the BPM.
• Core Boot Stage-2: Authenticates Core Boot Stage-3 
using the OEM Manifest.
• Core Boot Stage-3: Authenticates OS Loader (Windows 
or Grub/ELILO or others).
• OS Loader (Linux or Windows or RTOS): Authenticates 
kernel image.
• Kernel: Authenticates the user mode and applications.
Refer to this link for starting with coreboot: www.coreboot.org/Lesson1
Firmware Support Package (FSP) is provided by Intel for initializing 
Intel silicon, designed for integration into a boot loader of the developer's 
choice. FSP source code can be leveraged for ideas and references for 
implementing verified and measured boot using Intel Boot Guard and 
PTT/TPM; more information can be found at: https://firmware.intel.
com/learn/fsp/about-intel-fsp
 Data Protection – Securing Keys, Data at 
Rest and in Transit
At rest: Storing data/secrets/content securely on the storage and whole 
disk encryption is the most popular example. This also is a very important 
problem. If a malware or even a legitimate application can access the 
secrets that it’s not authorized, it causes an unstable device. Certain 
regulations such as General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandate 
protecting the privacy of the data both at rest and in transit. For more 
information on encryption-related protection of data, refer to  
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https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/
data- protection- factsheet-sme-obligations_en.pdf. Section (83) calls 
for encryption for confidentiality in: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=EN
Article 6, 4 (e) also calls for encryption or pseudonymization 
of personal data which ensures reidentifying only with additional 
information. This is in contrast to anonymity where the anonymized data 
can no longer be reidentified.
Runtime protection problem: How do we protect the data and the 
code from each other in the system during Runtime? TEEs are an excellent 
method for this. Examples include SGX.
It is useful to think about theft threats and the idea that attackers 
are able to perform brute force crypto hacking as they have access to all 
the encrypted data and wrapped keys and so on. Encrypting using AES 
before storing the data on a disk makes it harder for attackers to reverse 
engineer and steal the secrets. An example use case for this is the Windows 
BitLocker technology which implements the whole disk encryption with 
strong passwords. There are increased threats due to persistent memory 
technologies supported by Optane and 3D Xpoint. These are persistent 
storage technologies making them subject to theft threats. Memory 
encryption is a mitigation where any/all data that goes out of the CPU/SOC 
on bus is encrypted whether it’s destined for DRAM or SSD. The encryption 
technologies such as AES XTS 265 and secure boot existing in Optane + 3D 
Xpoint can be utilized to protect assets concerning flash- based memory.
 Intel Platform Trust Technology (PTT)
Intel® PTT is a implementation of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 
2.0 specification in firmware. CSME/TXE Engine is used as cryptographic 
processor for TPM implementation. SPI flash (TXE/CSME filesystem) is 
used as secure storage. PTT currently implements only mandatory and 
recommended TPM 2.0 commands mentioned in MSFT “signal and profile 
document.”
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As shown in Figure 3-22, the PTT includes random number generator, 
encryption/decryption, sign/verify, secure key generation, secure key/data 



















Figure 3-22. PTT components
 Windows PTT Architecture
On Windows as shown in Figure 3-23, the host SW components include the 
Trusted Base Services (TBS), the TPM.sys kernel mode driver, and ACPI 
which interact with PTT FW through Memory Mapped IO (MMIO)–based 
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PTT interface. The PTT interface in turn calls into the TXE or CSME. The 
SPI storage is used as the secure storage where the keys and other secrets 
are stored encrypted and signed to ensure confidentiality and integrity. 
The CSME contains internal crypto engines and SRAM and uses SPI flash 
to store the keys in an encrypted format.
Pre-OS environment (BIOS/UEFI/coreboot) implements the following:
• Selects between available PTT/TPMs
• Enables/disables PTT/TPM
• Issues TPM clear (PPI)

















Figure 3-23. Windows PTT stack
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 Linux PTT Software Stack
As shown in Figure 3-24, in Linux OS stack, a PTT-based application 
has multiple mechanisms to interact with PTT including PKCS #11 and 
Feature API, and an expert application developer can directly interact with 
System API.
• TPM Device Driver (TDD) handles physical data 
transmission in ring 0/kernel mode.
• TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI) handles 
marshalling and unmarshalling of full TPM commands.
• System API (SAPI) enables creation and handling of 
TPM objects, sessions, and policies.
• Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI) enables management of the 
created objects, sessions, and policies.
• Feature API (FAPI) designed to capture 80% of 
common use cases combining operations with profile 
definitions.
• TAB controls access to the TPM in multiple application 
scenarios.
• RM manages the limited TPM resident memory.
• PKCS #11 – WIP on TPM 2.0.
TPM through SAPI specifications and implementations are mature, 
while ESAPI and FAPI implementations are still developing.
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 Runtime Protection – Ever Vigilant
Most of the IoT devices spend their life in this phase where the device is 
functional and performing its intended persona. This phase is critical for 
devices that are “always on.” The assets to be protected include data, code, 
and identity. Once the chain of trust is stable (secure booted), to maintain 
the stable chain of trust, every bit and byte must be authenticated before 
admitting into the system on every supported interface (USB, serial, BT/
Wi-Fi). This objective can be achieved with high robustness level using 
a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The technologies available for 
implementing Runtime protections include Intel VT, SGX, CSME, and TXT.
 Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT)
Virtualization abstracts hardware that allows multiple workloads to share 
a common set of resources. On shared virtualized hardware, a variety of 
workloads can colocate while maintaining full isolation from each other, 



























Figure 3-24. Linux PTT stack
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CPU virtualization features enable abstraction of the full prowess 
of Intel® CPU to a virtual machine (VM). All software in the VM can run 
without any performance or compatibility hit, as if it was running natively 
on a dedicated CPU. Live migration from one Intel® CPU generation to 
another, as well as nested virtualization, is possible.
Memory virtualization features allow abstraction, isolation, and 
monitoring of memory on a per virtual machine (VM) basis. These features 
may also make live migration of VMs possible, add to fault tolerance, and 
enhance security. Example features include direct memory access (DMA) 
remapping and extended page tables (EPT), including their extensions: 
accessed and dirty bits and fast switching of EPT contexts.
I/O virtualization features facilitate offloading of multicore packet 
processing to network adapters as well as direct assignment of virtual 
machines to virtual functions, including disk I/O. Examples include 
Virtual Machine Device Queues (VMDQ), Single Root I/O Virtualization 
(SR-IOV, also a PCI-SIG standard), and Intel® Data Direct I/O Technology 
enhancements (Intel® DDIO).
Graphics Virtualization Technology (Intel® GVT) allows VMs to have 
full and/or shared assignment of the graphics processing units (GPU) 
as well as the video transcode accelerator engines integrated in Intel 
System-on-Chip products. It enables usages such as workstation remoting, 
desktop-as-a-service, media streaming, and online gaming.
Virtualization of security and network functions enables 
transformation of traditional network and security workloads into 
compute. Virtual functions can be deployed on standard high-volume 
servers anywhere in the data center, network nodes, or Cloud and smartly 
colocated with business workloads. Examples of Intel® technologies 
making it happen include Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK), Intel® 
QuickAssist Technology, and Hyperscan.
Intel® Virtualization Technology for Connectivity (Intel® VT-c) is a key 
feature of many Intel® Ethernet Controllers. With I/O virtualization and 
Quality of Service (QoS) features designed directly into the controller’s 
Chapter 3  Base platform seCurity hardware Building BloCks
200
silicon, Intel VT-c enables I/O virtualization that transitions the traditional 
physical network models used in data centers to more efficient virtualized 
models by providing port partitioning, multiple Rx/Tx queues, and on- 
controller QoS functionality that can be used in both virtual and nonvirtual 
server deployments.
As shown in Figure 3-25, the isolation capability enabled by VT 
technology is being utilized to create an architecture with a Trusted 
Execution Environment (TEE). The TEE is implemented as a secure VM 
with privileged execution and access to resources; examples include 
Microsoft VSM and Trusty (https://source.android.com/security/
trusty/).
Virtualization and VM Isolation components include Intel® VTx (CPU), 










Figure 3-25. TEE using virtualization environment
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TEE OS: Thin OS running alongside rich OS. Examples are Microsoft 
VSM, Android Trusty, and so on.
Rich OS: Regular OS that executes non-security-sensitive workloads. 
Examples are Microsoft Windows, Linux, Android, and so on.
Trusted computing base (TCB): VMM + TEE OS + TEE App.
Isolated execution: VMs are isolated from each other by the VMM.
Trusted Input/Output: Can be implemented by assigning I/O 
Controllers to different VMs.
 Software Guard Extensions (SGX)
This section explains the usage of Software Guard Extensions (SGX) for 
implementing a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) with the new 
instructions supported in IA CPUs. For any IoT device, the ability to 
execute code that handles secrets/assets in a protected environment is 
crucial. SGX leverages the partitioning of code into trusted and untrusted 
domains which interact with each other via well-defined SGX instructions.
How does SGX work as shown in Figure 3-26? The following model 
describes the interactions between the application and the SGX enclave.
 1. Application is built with trusted and untrusted parts.
 2. Application runs and creates enclave which is 
placed in trusted memory.
 3. Trusted function is called; code running inside 
enclave sees data in clear; external access to data is 
denied.
 4. Trusted function returns; enclave data remains in 
trusted memory.
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It is important to understand the software development model for the 
benefit of the developers (Figure 3-27):
• Sensitive code and data are partitioned into an 
“enclave” module which is a shared object (.so).
• Define the enclave interface and use tools to generate 
stubs/proxies.
• SGX Libraries provide APIs (C/C++) to encapsulate 
heavy-lifting implementation.
• Use a familiar toolchain to build and debug.
Application
Privileged System Code










Figure 3-26. SGX in action
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For further details, please refer to SGX web portal at: https://
software.intel.com/en-us/sgx
 Intel CSE/CSME – DAL
Intel Converged Security Engine in CSE/CSME is a dedicated engine 
for security and provides a HW root of trust for the platform. Dynamic 





















Figure 3-27. SGX SW development model
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environment and is in production use since 2011 (Sandy Bridge) and 
exists in almost every Intel-based platform. It extends the CSE FW 
by dynamically loading signed CSE applications at Runtime. It allows 
faster deployment of FW applications by decoupling the application 
development from the platform development lifecycle. The FW 
applications are stored on host filesystem, thus avoiding flash size 
considerations. DAL enables binary-level portability for applications and 
is based on a virtual machine; DAL applications are written in the Java 
programming language. Refer to Figure 3-28.
Open to malware and
rooting/jailbreaking
Rich OS Secure OS
HW Secure Resources




























Figure 3-28. DAL architecture
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 Isolation from Rich Execution Environment
All the trusted applications (TAs) run in an isolated environment as 
supported by DAL and with the following attributes:
• TAs run in separate Java-like VM environment.
• TA-to-TA snooping is prevented using sandboxing.
• DAL prevents TA direct access to resources of other TAs.
 Authenticity and Security
The DAL applications or TAs are subjected to the following robustness rules:
• DAL allows installation of signed and encrypted DAL 
TA in the CSE (security coprocessor).
• The TA can use the secure services, that is, secure 
storage to access SPI flash.
• Intel or OEM signed TAs can be installed.
 Portability
The TAs have the binary-level portability subjected to the following scope:
• DAL is based on a virtual machine; DAL applications 
are written in Java.
• DAL enables binary-level portability for FW 
applications across the OS and HW platform.
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Following are sample applications where DAL is deployed:
• Intel® Identity Protection Technology (Intel® IPT).
• Identity protection and e-payment: OTP (one-
time password), PTD (protected trusted display), 
PKI (public key infrastructure), NFC (near field 
communication).
• Intel® PKI (PEAT) for IT market: Symantec 
Managed PKI, Intel IT.
• McAfee (Intel Security): MFAb (Multifactor 
Authentication for Business), True Key – using IPT.
• Intel® Security Assist (ISA): A self-updater service 
which recommends security products to end users.
• China UnionPay (CUP): Implementing a Tap and Pay 
e-Commerce solution.
• Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX): The 
“Secure Enclaves” technology consumes CSME 
platform services using DAL.
• IOT Retail SmartPOS (Point Of Sale): Based on Atom 
platforms with Android.
 Intel Trusted Execution Technology (TXT)
Intel® Trusted Execution Technology (Intel® TXT) provides hardware- 
based security technologies to help build a solid foundation for security. 
Built into Intel’s silicon, these technologies address the increasing and 
evolving security threats across physical and virtual infrastructures by 
complementing Runtime protections such as antivirus software. Intel 
TXT also can play a role in meeting government and industry regulations 
and data protection standards by providing a hardware-based method of 
verification useful in compliance efforts.
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As shown in Figure 3-29, Intel® TXT capable processors and 
chipsets allow establishing of the “root of trust” and “Measured Launch 
Environment” (MLE) to support trust decisions; within the computing 
platform, a MLE is needed. A “root-of-trust” is also needed which 
should be established first at the silicon level and then extended to the 
entire solution stack. The technology draws upon a rich set of security/
virtualization features embedded into the IA processors and also 













































1. SYSTEM POWERS ON AND INTEL TXT
VERIFIES SYSTEM BIOS, CRITICAL
FIRMWARE AND THEN HYPERVISOR
3. OS AND APPLICATIONS ARE
LAUNCHED, PLATFORM
TRUST STATUS ATTESTABLE
www.intel.com/txt3. POLICY ACTION ENFORCED, UNTRUSTEDSTATUS ATTESTABLE
2. HYPERVISOR MEASURE
DOES NOT MATCH
2. HYPERVISOR MEASURE MATCHES
Figure 3-29. TXT flow
Figure 3-30 depicts the critical enabling requirements for the 
technology in server implementations. Intel TXT is specifically designed 
to harden platforms from the emerging threats of hypervisor attacks, 
BIOS, or other firmware attacks, malicious rootkit installations, or other 
software-based attacks. It increases protection by allowing greater control 
of the launch stack through a Measured Launch Environment (MLE) and 
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enabling isolation in the boot process. More specifically, it extends the 
Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) environment of Intel® Virtualization 
Technology (Intel® VT), permitting a verifiably secure installation, launch, 
and use of a hypervisor or operating system (OS).
A chain-of-trust built on top of Intel® TXT
Intel Kernel
Guard Tech
Intel-generated project that is useful for extending integrity
verification solutions into runtime environments.
Intel contributes optimizations to these widely used libraries for
performing cryptographic processing.
Intel-maintained project that is widely used to OS or VMM
infrastructures capable of trusted boot.
Intel-maintained project (internally known as Intel CIT 2.0) which can
be used to remotely verify platform’s trust status & create trust pools
Intel-developed solution used to verify run time integrity of workload
Intel-developed tool that can be used to remotely activate and
configure Intel TXT on multi-vendor server platforms
Enabled in Intel Silicon, BIOS & Platform – to establish a chain-
















Figure 3-30. TXT chain of trust
Intel TXT gives IT and security organizations important enhancements 
to help ensure more secure platforms; greater application, data, or virtual 
machine (VM) isolation; and improved security or compliance audit 
capabilities. Not only can it help reduce support and remediation costs, 
but it can also provide a foundation for more advanced solutions as 
security needs change to support increasingly virtualized or “multitenant” 
shared data center resources.
 Threats Mitigated
Intel assets as described earlier can be leveraged to improve the robustness 
and to defend against both zero-day and other attacks. Refer to Figure  3- 31.
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 Zero-Day Attacks
Attacks that are designed to exploit a previously unknown vulnerability are 
referred to as zero-day attacks.6 These attacks are harder to detect in time 
to minimize the damaging impact.
IoT applications: The impact of a compromise due to zero-day  
attacks can be minimized by handling all the high-value assets/secrets in 
a protected Runtime environment such as a TEE. DAL, SGX, and Trusty 
provide such defenses. Examples include remote car control in the jeep 
scenario and Ukraine power grid.
• Mitigation: Intel® Security Essentials, Intel Stratix® 
FPGA, protected boot, and attested software 
measurements can be implemented to mitigate the 
risks resulting from the preceding zero-day attacks. 
These solutions also enable a simplified TEE-based IP 
protection for ecosystem.
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Figure 3-31. Mitigation of IoT threats
6 https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/zero-day-attack
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 Other Attacks
Other high impacting attacks include the distributed denial of service 
(DDOS), network attacks, and attacks on cloud infrastructures which hold 
rich troves of data.
Device Endpoint and Edge Management: The DDOS/key/password 
examples include CCTV Hijack and Mirai botnet.
• Mitigation: Intel® Secure Device Onboard can be 
deployed to mitigate the risks resulting from the 
preceding attacks. This is accomplished by not 
shipping devices with default credentials and 
instead use EPID identity designed-in for privacy 
preserving provisioning model to eliminate human 
misconfiguration with automated onboarding.
Network: Sniffers and man-in-the-middle examples include Tornado 
Siren Hijack, WPA CRACK, and Heart Bleed.
• Mitigation: Intel® Security Essentials API, Intel® 
Platform Trust Technology, Intel® Software Guard 
Extensions. Simplified HW secured key management 
and provisioning APIs. HW secured SSL transport APIs. 
PTT or TEE protected data and key storage.
Data Center and Cloud: Anonymity Proxy and ransomware examples 
include Infotainment VIN Online service app, Reaper, Thermostats, and 
WannaCry.
• Mitigation: Wind River Helix Device Cloud. Automated 
Over-the-Air (OTA) updates for firmware and software, 
provisioning, credential management, suspend, 
decommission, and firewall policy update to isolate/
quarantine.
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 Conclusion
Security is not a blanket and requires pragmatic approach. It needs 
understanding of the assets to be protected against a set of threats in a 
system consisting of a set of vulnerabilities. Intel has a lot of HW security 
assets which can be leveraged to boot an IoT device securely and continue 
building on the chain of trust tethered to a HWRoT. Intel has security 
features residing in the CPU and PCH. The device identity, boot integrity, 
data protection, and Runtime protection are the four fundamental buckets 
of capabilities for securely booting into a TEE with a relevant TCB and later 
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CHAPTER 4
IoT Software Security 
Building Blocks
Oleg Selajev from Oracle Labs is famous on Twitter for saying, “The ‘S’ in 
the IoT stands for security.”1 Oleg does not spell poorly; instead, he was 
bemoaning the sad state of affairs in IoT security. Despite the truth in 
Oleg’s statement, security does not have to be absent in IoT.
Chapter 3 took a comprehensive look at the hardware security 
offerings in the Intel Architecture. Putting these hardware features 
to use in an IoT platform requires software. This chapter looks at the 
software components used to secure IoT systems and how those software 
components make use of the underlying hardware security features 
described in Chapter 3.
In this chapter we define a software stack, building on top of the 
hardware all the way up to the IoT applications, and describe how to 
put the “S” back into IoT. As a way to guide our exploration of software 
security in IoT, the opening section introduces a generic architectural 
model that graphically depicts software components of a secure IoT 
device or gateway. A more detailed section is then dedicated to each 




features as well as how those features contribute to the overall IoT device 
security. Our architectural model is a generalization of IoT devices, and 
no generalization is ever perfect; as Alexandre Dumas once said, “All 
generalizations are dangerous, even this one.”2 Therefore, in Chapter 6, we 
look at some actual Intel and open source software products and compare 
them with our generic model.
Due to the breadth of the software topic, this chapter is the longest 
in the book. For this reason, we have organized the sections so that 
they do not need to be consumed in a linear fashion, although they 
do build on one another. Figure 4-1 provides a map of the sections, 
and the topics covered in each one, including the security concerns 
discussed. The reader is encouraged to review the figure to find topics 
that are most relevant or interesting to them. Throughout the chapter, 
we provide forward and backward references to other sections that may 
contain additional relevant information, making navigation to the most 
interesting information a bit easier.
2 Alexandre Dumas, quote, www.brainyquote.com/quotes/alexandre_dumas_136868




Execution Separation - Processes & Threads
Memory Separation - Memory Attributes & Memory Domains
Programming Error Protections - Stack Protections
Privilege Levels - User & Supervisor Privileges
Update Consistency - Packages, RPMs, Snaps & Bundles
Wind River Pulsar Linux
Ubuntu IoT Core Linux
Intel® Clear Linux
HYPERVISORS Extended Application Containment - Virtualization
Access Controlled Secrets Protection - RPMB
Intel® ACRN
SOFTWARE SEPARATION & CONTAINMENT
Extended Application Containment - Containers & TEE’s
Kata Containers
Android Trusty
Intel® Software Guard Extensions
NETWORK STACK &  SECURITY MANAGEMENT
End-to-End Security - Message & Packet Encryption, TLS, IPSec
Network Restrictions - Firewall, IP Tables & TCP Dump
Intel Data Plane Development Kit
(DPDK)
DEVICE MANAGEMENT
System Control & Authorization - SSH and Sys Admin AuthorizationsMesh CentralWind River Helix
SYSTEM UPDATE SERVICE
System Repair & Recovery - TCB Recovery
Secure RPMs / WUS
Intel® Turtle Creek
LANGUAGE FRAMEWORKS
Software Services - Application Availability to HW Security










Device Provisioning - Secure Authorization of Any Device to Any Cloud
Platform Integrity - Device Health & Platform Software Identification
Network Defense - Network Firewalls & Configuration
Attack Detection - Network packet logging
System Authorization - File System Privileges
Secure Device Onboarding (SDO)
TPM2 Software Stack (TSS)
TCP Wrappers
Snort & Suricata
McAfee® Embedded Control (MEC)
Figure 4-1. Section outline and security topics
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 Understanding the Fundamentals of Our 
Architectural Model
Before we explore the details of IoT software security building blocks, let 
us take a quick tour through our architectural model to establish a context 
for each of the building block components and how they fit together to 
create an IoT device. Our architectural model is shown in Figure 4-2 and 
is divided in four quadrants, where each quadrant contains software 
for a different purpose. Vertically, the figure is divided into platform 
software, which is the software that creates the platform environment, 
and application software, which is the software that creates the platform 
behaviors of the system. Horizontally, the figure is divided between the 
management plane, which handles management of the system, and the 











































Figure 4-2. Generic IoT stack diagram
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Beginning at the bottom is the hardware covered in Chapter 3. All 
hardware is implied by this element, including the processor, memory 
subsystems, flash and other storage, security coprocessors, wired and 
wireless communication hardware, or anything else physically connected 
to the processing unit and its motherboard. This chapter does not cover 
any of these elements, but refers back to the content in Chapter 3 where 
appropriate.
Directly above the hardware is the operating system/hypervisor 
element which is the system software in direct control of the hardware and 
may be a commercial or open source operating system, or it may be an 
hypervisor that creates one or more virtual hardware devices for the rest of 
the software to operate within.
The software containment element is optional, but if provided on 
the system includes technologies like containers and Trusted Execution 
Environments (TEE). This level of additional containment improves 
security by reducing privileges and controlling unintended interactions 
between applications. Both containers and virtualization with hypervisors 
provide containment. We devote a bit of time to discuss the differences 
and benefits of each.
Figure 4-2 also shows two components that are not covered 
individually, but will be interspersed among the other platform software 
components: the filesystem and the network drivers. These are shown 
in the diagram to aid in understanding the connection between the 
application part of the stack and the platform software.
Moving up from the platform software to the application software, we 
look at the management plane. The management plane software is made 
up of security management, device management, and the system update 
service. It also includes the network stack.
The network stack is most often included in the system software or 
part of the operating system. However, for our purposes, including it in 
the operating system obscures it and diminishes its importance to IoT 
systems. The network stack deserves its own separate treatment because it 
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actually enables a system to communicate with other devices, turning that 
system into an Internet of Things device. Additionally, the network stack is 
the entry point for the majority of attacks on IoT systems. It straddles both 
the application/data plane and the management plane, because it is used 
extensively by both. It includes communication protocols and network 
interfaces. The network stack subsection covers software elements needed 
to secure the network stack, like firewalls and intrusion detection systems 
(IDS). Chapter 6 is dedicated to covering the network protocols themselves.
Security management is the management software that performs 
security relevant management operations and used when exercising 
security management procedures and controls. The functionality in 
security management includes device identity and attestation, key 
distribution and certificate management, access control policy, logging 
rules, configuring and querying the system update service, and policy for 
network security, firewalls, virus scanners, and host intrusion detection 
software. Oftentimes these features are included as part of the actual 
software that performs device management. In our treatment, security 
management is separate from other management features to highlight 
adherence to the least privilege principle.3 Security management features 
should require a higher level of privilege and additional authentication for 
an administrator to activate.
The device management element includes all the management 
features that are not part of security management. This includes querying 
and managing the state of the device, rebooting/restarting the platform, 
examining and downloading log files (but not deleting log files or stopping 
logs from being generated, as this is a security management function), 
starting and stopping and restarting applications, configuring applications, 
managing databases, and configuring message queues and software 
orchestration settings.
3 Saltzer and Schroeder. The Protection of Information in Computer Systems. 1975. 
This paper defines several foundational security design principles which are 
referred to throughout this chapter.
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The system update service is the last component of the management 
plane. While this element is controlled by the security management 
element (or the device management element in some platforms), it is 
typically composed of platform and operating system–specific elements 
in order to update more than just the application software and execution 
containers on the system. Updates to system and device firmware, boot 
loaders, and BIOS normally require special software and services to 
properly coordinate the version dependencies and be able to set the 
platform into the state where such components can be updated. The 
system privilege to update firmware and trusted software on the device 
must be strictly separated from everyday management functions.
The application/data plane contains the software that creates the 
actual behavior of the IoT device. This includes language frameworks, 
message orchestration, databases, and the applications themselves. Our 
discussion of these elements is limited, because we focus only on the parts 
of these elements that leverage hardware security features.
The language frameworks contain libraries and services used by 
application software. Examples of these include the Android framework in 
Java, Node.js libraries, and the Sails framework in JavaScript.
Message orchestration enables applications on the same platform to 
communicate, but more importantly enables machine-to-machine (M2M) 
communications over the network. Protocols like MQTT, message queue, 
and publisher-subscriber frameworks (pub-sub) like Kafka fall into the 
message orchestration bucket.
Databases are an important part of IoT systems, as they allow the data 
that is generated, manipulated, and consumed by IoT systems to be stored, 
collated, and massaged. There are multiple different types of database 
systems, including SQL and NoSQL. The types of operations possible 
on data and the security and privacy of that data are dependent on the 
database chosen.
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The last element of Figure 4-2 is the applications themselves. This chapter 
is not able to cover all types of applications due to the broad diversity of 
IoT. However, in Chapter 6, several IoT use cases are explored, including a more 
detailed discussion of the security interactions and trade-offs between the 
platform and the software that is required to compose a working IoT system.
The next sections will look at each of these IoT software components in 
varying detail, and in each primary component section, we will introduce 
security topics relevant to that component.
 Operating Systems
When considering software security in any platform, the first consideration 
should be the operating system. The operating system traditionally is the 
lowest, most base level of software on any system. It controls what hardware 
is activated and limits what other software can do. The operating system 
provides the baseline feature set for all the other software on the platform. If 
the operating system does not provide some basic feature, or does not allow 
other software to control or access some aspect of the system (hardware or 
software), then no other part of the platform can make up for that gap. If a 
particular security feature is missing from the operating system, then the 
rest of the software on the platform is likely exposed to significantly more 
threats. In this section, we take a look at some basic features of operating 
systems and discuss what security capabilities the operating system should 
be contributing to the security of the platform. The following is a basic list of 
security services that an operating system should provide:
• Execution Separation: Provides structures and 
mechanisms to separate different execution units of 
programs, so that their execution does not interfere 
with other executing programs; this separation 
includes processes, threads, interrupt service routines 
(ISRs), and critical sections.
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• Memory Separation: Provides mechanisms to separate 
the different types of memory used by executing 
programs; this type of separation normally includes 
process memory, thread-only stacks, shared memory, 
and memory mapped I/O.
• Privilege Levels: Provide structures to separate 
executing programs into different privilege levels; 
this separation includes task identifiers for executing 
programs, user and group identities to own executing 
programs, and administrator vs. user privilege levels.
• System authorization: Provides structures and 
mechanisms to assign rights to objects and verify the 
privilege level of execution units against those rights; 
this includes setting the default privilege level assigned 
to programs and then enforcing those privileges when 
programs access system resources, by either permitting 
or restricting certain operations. This system 
authorization mechanism allows the implementation 
of the least privilege principle.3 In systems with human 
users, this extends to authentication of users and 
assignment of privileges to programs under the user’s 
control.
• Programming Error Protections: Provide structures 
and mechanisms to stop errors in executing programs 
from enabling attackers to manipulate those errors and 
take over the platform; these typically include stack 
overflow protection, detection and prevention of heap 
corruption, and restriction on control flow redirection. 
All these mistakes result in software attacks that 
allow a hacker to inject arbitrary code and take over a 
platform. Control flow protections include protection 
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from Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-
Oriented Programming (JOP) (see sidebar for detailed 
explanation[4, 5]).
• Access-Controlled Secrets storage: Provides 
mechanisms to store program secrets and prevent 
those secrets from being accessed by unauthorized 
users or programs, including the administrator; the 
system normally provides this through a hardware- 
backed secure storage.
WHAT IS ROP/JOP?
return-oriented programming (rop) and Jump-oriented programming (Jop) 
are two techniques used by attackers to create exploit code without having to 
download large binaries to the target platform. Buffer overruns have been used 
since the Morris Internet worm to inject code onto a platform and cause that 
code to execute.
however, various countermeasures, including dep (data execution prevention) 
and aSlr (address Space layout randomization), as well as network defenses 
that detect and prevent downloads of large binary data, have made such 
attacks more difficult. Instead of downloading new code, attackers use rop 
and Jop techniques to reuse code already on the target platform, allowing 
attackers to construct their attack code on the fly. Since most software 
today includes shared libraries, the attacker leverages this to find gadgets in 
software and libraries already existing on the platform and strings the gadgets 
together into attack code.
4 Jonathan Pincus and Brandon Baker. Beyond stack smashing: Recent advances in 
exploiting buffer overruns. Security & Privacy, IEEE, 2(4):20–27, 2004.
5 N. Carlini and D. Wagner. ROP is still dangerous: Breaking modern defenses. In 
USENIX Security Symposium, 2014.
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gadgets are very small segments of code in existing libraries that perform 
meaningful subfunctions, like moving data into a register or setting up for a 
system call. gadgets either end in a return statement or a jump statement, 
allowing the attacker to string multiple gadgets together to craft a new control 
flow, that, overall with many gadgets, accomplishes their evil task. rop uses 
return statements, while Jop uses jump statements. Both are effectively the 
same attack.
Choosing an operating system for an IoT platform is primarily about 
choosing the one with the best services that also executes reliably on the 
chosen platform hardware. The capabilities provided by the underlying 
hardware often affect what the operating system is capable of providing. 
Some operating systems are designed for servers, or even specifically for 
cloud deployments, while others are designed to be used in the smallest 
IoT devices. Small devices typically do not have the computing power or 
hardware features necessary for an advance operating system to execute. 
Operating systems designed for low-power processors typically do not 
have a rich set of services, because the power and performance budget 
available on the processor just will not support it. CPUs in constrained 
devices might not have a full memory management unit (MMU) with 
advanced features like total memory encryption (TME) or memory 
integrity technology. These types of features are common in server 
CPUs. Without these hardware capabilities, the operating system is left 
to provide best-effort security services. In coming to a final decision on 
what operating system to use for an IoT system, it is also important to 
evaluate the threats to the operating system and what countermeasures 
the operating system provides to neutralize those threats. You can then 
determine if the hardware chosen for your device is powerful enough to 
resist the attacks the device is likely to encounter.
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 Threats to Operating Systems
Operating systems run at the highest privilege level, with access to 
nearly everything on a platform. A successful attack on an operating 
system can garner the attacker complete control of the platform, 
often with privileged access to other platforms on the same network. 
Table 4-1 shows the products (not just operating systems) with the most 
number of distinct reported vulnerabilities, with data accumulated 
from 1999 through 2018. As this table shows, there are a large 
number of different attacks on operating systems. In fact, operating 
systems make up more than half of the top 50 products with the most 
vulnerabilities. Although there are numerous types of attacks, it is 
possible to organize operating system threats into threat classes, all of 
which execute in similar patterns.
6 www.cvedetails.com/top-50-products.php. Retrieved 9 September 2018.
Table 4-1. Products with Highest Reported Number of Vulnerabilities 
over a 20-Year Period
Product Name Vendor Name Product Type Number of Vulnerabilities
1 linux kernel linux os 2124
2 Mac os X apple os 2084
3 android google os 1925
4 firefox Mozilla application 1741
5 debian linux debian os 1670
6 Chrome google application 1546
7 Iphone os apple os 1495
8 ubuntu linux Canonical os 1123
9 windows Server 2008 Microsoft os 1110
10 flash player adobe application 1060
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Attacks typically follow a common pattern, called a cyber kill chain®, 
shown in Figure 4-3, where an attacker executes a series of steps to 
compromise a target. The attacker begins by observing the target (Step 1), 
and then deciding how to attack the system, by fashioning some type of 
weaponized code (Step 2).
The weaponized software might be a program that runs from a web 
server or a crafted response packet in a protocol. The attacker delivers 
the attack in Step 3, which might entail a spear-fishing email, or hijacking 
a network connection, or injecting spoofed packets for a protocol. The 
actual attack occurs in Steps 4 and 5, and those steps can be iterative, 
where the attacker pivots from one compromised application or piece 
of software and uses that as a base to attack another piece of software or 
system service. Each pivot intends to increase the attacker’s control of the 
platform or penetrate deeper into the network in order to gain complete 
control of the platform and the entire system.
With the background of the cyber kill chain in mind, we will review 
different classes of attacks on an operating system and describe how 
these attacks demonstrate an attacker pivoting progressively deeper into a 
system, as one attack builds on another. The following five items represent 
the common attack pattern used in Step 4, exploitation:
• Fault Injection: A fault injection creates or forces 
an execution fault in a process or thread; part of the 
responsibility for this threat rests on the applications 
themselves, but because fault injection is the first 
step to overcoming the operating system itself, the OS 
must take some responsibility to protect against the 
vulnerabilities that create this threat. The operating 
system uses containment to prevent these types 
of threats from growing into greater threats to the 
platform, but usually allows the fault to stop the 
execution of the attacked process or thread. From our 
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
226
basic list of security services, the operating system uses 
programming error protections, including control 
flow protections and stack smashing protections, to 
mitigate this threat.
Figure 4-3. Cyber kill chain7
• Arbitrary Code Execution: Arbitrary code execution 
is the injection of an attacker’s code into a process 
or thread on the platform, causing the injected code 
to run in place of the existing process or thread, 
effectively taking on that process or thread’s identity 
7 Cyber Kill Chain Diagram, www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/capabilities/
cyber/cyber-kill-chain.html
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and authorizations. Arbitrary code execution 
clearly violates execution separation by allowing 
unauthorized code to corrupt an execution unit, but 
also violates the memory separation guarantee of an 
operating system, by allowing what should be data 
to corrupt the code executed by the platform. If fault 
injection succeeds, either because the application 
mitigations were not effective or the operating system 
did not provide any protections against fault injection, 
then the typical escalation of a fault injection is 
arbitrary code execution. An attacker places code into 
the data used to trigger the fault and constructs the 
fault injection to force execution of, or redirection to, 
the injected code as part of the fault. Buffer overflows 
and heap corruption are common mechanisms used by 
attackers to create arbitrary code execution exploits.
• Breech of Containment: Breech of containment is 
code in one execution unit observing or interfering 
with the code or data in another execution unit. Once 
an attacker has achieved arbitrary code execution, 
the next step is to leverage that power to extract 
data or further corrupt other execution flows within 
the platform. Side-channel attacks are a common 
mechanism used by attackers to extract data and 
observe program execution. Side channels are so 
dangerous because they allow a lower-privileged 
execution unit to observe a higher-privileged 
execution unit, potentially extracting secrets like 
passwords and cryptographic keys from those other 
execution units. These attacks violate memory 
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separation by allowing one program to view or infer 
data from another program; oftentimes, the way a 
program breeches the memory separation is through 
attacks on the execution separation. A common 
example of this execution separation breech is 
speculative branch prediction, although there are 
other examples as well.
• Escalation of Privilege: Escalation of privilege is 
overcoming the operating system’s authorization 
mechanisms or code that is able to assume a level 
of privilege in the operating system that should not 
have been allowed. After breeching containment 
and extracting secrets from other execution units, 
an attacker can leverage those secrets to assume a 
higher privilege level. In some cases, it is possible for 
the attacker to inject a fault into the operating system 
itself and force it to grant a privilege that should not 
have been given to the attacker’s code unit. In both 
cases, the attacker has escalated the privileges that the 
operating system grants to the attacker’s process. This 
escalation violates the expected behavior of the system 
authorization mechanisms.
• Rootkit: A rootkit is malware that penetrates into 
the operating system itself and subsumes some of 
its operations. Following arbitrary code injection, 
an attacker can chain subsequent arbitrary code 
injections, containment breeches, and/or escalation 
of privilege attacks to eventually inject the attacker’s 
code into the operating system itself. In some cases, 
the attack is a simple one-two chain; in other cases, 
it may be a series of more complex actions. If the 
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attacker can then modify the operating system 
code on disk or in flash, the attacker can remain 
permanently on the system. Once an attacker has 
achieved this level of penetration into the system, 
it is often extremely difficult to remove the attacker 
from the system without a complete rebuild of both 
the software and firmware on the device. With rootkit 
access, an adversary can normally overcome even the 
access-controlled secrets protections provided by 
the platform, making all secrets and execution units 
on the device manipulable by the attacker. A rootkit 
can actually change the behavior of the operating 
system, by modifying access control decisions, hiding 
execution units, and reducing or removing memory 
protections between different execution units through 
changes to page table allocations.
As this list illustrates, one of the most basic threats to a computing 
system is code and data corruption. The cyber kill chain outlines the 
attacker’s steps to take over a system, which usually involve a chain of 
attacks escalating an attacker’s position from injecting code into a single 
application, to interfering with another running application, to eventually 
changing the entire operating system’s behavior. The importance of code 
and data corruption protections cannot be overstated. Extrapolating from 
Turing’s theory of computation, given enough time, modifications to code 
can result in serious consequences, as has been demonstrated by various 
academic papers on ROP and JOP.8
8 Minh Tran, Mark Etheridge, Tyler Bletsch, Xuxian Jiang, Vincent Freeh, and Peng 
Ning. On the expressiveness of return-into-libc attacks. In Recent Advances in 
Intrusion Detection, pages 121–141. Springer, 2011.
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
230
In the following sections, we examine several operating systems 
used in IoT systems and discuss the security features available in those 
products. Rather than repetitively inspect the same features on several 
operating systems, we select different security topics on each operating 
system to inspect in depth. However, for each operating system, we provide 
a summary to review their protections, the mitigations they have chosen, 
and their shortcomings.
 Zephyr: Real-Time Operating System for Devices
The Zephyr operating system is an open source OS designed for 
constrained devices running on microcontroller units (MCUs) or in other 
minimalistic environments. Zephyr runs on many different chips and 
architectures, including Intel® x86, ARM® Cortex-M, Tensilica® Xtensa, and 
others. Many IoT devices at the edge utilize these small processors with 
limited memory. The Zephyr documentation can be found at http://
docs.zephyrproject.org/.
In this section, we want to focus on the basic operating system 
responsibilities of containment and privilege. Since an RTOS is severely 
limited in what it can provide, these most basic features comprise almost 
all of what an RTOS can offer. Since Zephyr may not be familiar to most 
readers, it is an interesting OS to explore, and Zephyr’s simplicity makes 
it easy to highlight the limits of these protections and where usages can 
go wrong.
Zephyr, like most real-time operating systems (RTOS), is built as 
a single monolithic binary image; this means that both the operating 
system and the applications are compiled into one binary that is run on 
the platform. But unlike most other RTOS systems that were designed 
purely for size and performance requirements, Zephyr’s documentation 
states that during design, careful thought was put into the security of 
the operating system. Figure 4-4 shows the Zephyr operating system 
decomposed into application code, OS services, and the kernel. The next 
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few subsections will review how Zephyr operates and compare the security 
architecture9 against the security properties that an operating system 
should exhibit. Zephyr version 1.12.0, which is the most current version as 
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Figure 4-4. Zephyr system architecture10
 Zephyr Execution Separation
Even though the Zephyr OS and the applications are built into a single 
binary, the OS still provides execution separation. In Zephyr, the primary 
execution unit is a thread. An application is composed of multiple threads 
that run forever in an endless loop. The application is defined and built 
9 http://docs.zephyrproject.org/security/security-overview.html
10 Zephyr System Architecture Diagram, http://docs.zephyrproject.org/
security/security-overview.html
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at compile time using CMake and make; the system’s threads are defined at 
compile time or can be created dynamically at Runtime. Each thread is 
separated from other threads in time and space.
The Zephyr OS separates threads in time through scheduling, and 
the OS saves and restores thread state automatically when threads are 
put to sleep. Scheduling of threads is organized through a hierarchy of 
priorities, allowing more important threads to preempt lower-priority 
threads, ensuring that the most important jobs are completed without 
interruption. Each thread is scheduled by the OS according to its priority. 
The highest-priority threads are cooperative threads whose priority is set to 
a negative number. Cooperative threads run until completion or until they 
voluntarily yield the processor using k_yield(). Preemptive threads have a 
positive priority value and are given a certain amount of time to run or are 
preempted when they perform an action that makes them not ready to run, 
like waiting on a semaphore or reading from a device or file. Cooperative 
threads must cooperate with the system and yield back to the OS so other 
things can run; if they misbehave, they can starve a system and force 
even higher-priority threads (threads with a numerically lower priority 
value) from running. Cooperative threads should only be used for high- 
priority tasks that cannot be interrupted. If a cooperative thread has a long 
operation to execute, it should break up the long operation into smaller 
pieces with a call to k_yield() at a convenient point. k_yield() returns 
back to the operating system, and the cooperative thread gets rescheduled 
if there is a higher-priority thread with something more important to do. If 
there is no higher-priority thread waiting, k_yield() just returns back to 
the thread and the long operation can continue.
Zephyr provides other refinements to the scheduling policy, including
• k_sched_lock() and k_sched_unlock() to define 
critical sections in preemptive threads, temporarily 
preventing them from being preempted.
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• k_busy_wait () which prevents a cooperative thread 
from being preempted when it performs some type 
of wait action that would make it unready and would 
normally cause it to be preempted.
• CONFIG_METAIRQ_PRIORITIES which is a configuration 
setting to define the numerically lowest cooperative 
thread priorities, making them act like IRQs and 
actually preempt other cooperative threads.
• Threads can change their thread priority, or another 
thread’s priority, to a higher priority level (lower 
number numerically), even changing it from a 
preemptive thread to a cooperative or Meta-IRQ 
thread, if they are executing with privileges.
In addition to thread execution priorities used to enforce time 
separation of threads, Zephyr assigns a thread privilege to each thread. 
There are only two privileges, supervisory and user. By default, threads 
are assigned the supervisory privilege. This gives threads the ability to see 
all devices and access all of memory. A thread can drop its supervisory 
privilege and become a user-privileged thread by calling k_thread_user_
mode_enter(), but once becoming a user-privileged thread, it cannot 
regain its supervisory privileges. Threads can temporarily perform an 
operation at the user privilege by spawning a new thread to perform the 
task and setting that new thread’s privilege to the user privilege level.
Operating all or many threads at the supervisory privilege level is 
dangerous, since all of memory is exposed to those threads, even sensitive 
memory used by the kernel. User-privilege threads should be used as often 
as possible because Zephyr provides memory separation for user-privilege 
threads. Memory separation for user-privileged threads is discussed in the 
next section.
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Since all of Zephyr’s applications and libraries are enumerated at 
compile time, and there is no dynamic loading of applications or dynamic 
linking of libraries or other code, Zephyr reduces the attack surface created 
by interfering applications and library code conflicts.
Why does all this matter for security? Creating threads at the right 
privilege level is important for a system to remain stable in the face of 
an attack. If all threads are running at the supervisory privilege level, 
an attacker only has to find a single thread that it can attack via a buffer 
overflow and then gain control of the whole system. An attacker with 
control over a supervisory thread can see all memory, halt other threads, 
or modify stack values to create gadgets for ROP and JOP attacks, allowing 
the attacker to create their own programs with new, potentially destructive, 
functionality.
But even if user-privileged threads are enabled, if the right 
segmentation of memory partitions is not performed, user threads will be 
able to corrupt each other’s memory partitions.
If user threads are enabled and restrictive memory partitioning is used, 
this will severely limit the types of attacks a remote adversary can perform. 
This is especially true if the threads that access the network and perform 
the bulk of the work on the system are user threads. But even if an attacker 
cannot gain access to an administrative thread, if they can take over a high 
enough privileged user thread, then by using k_sched_lock(), the attacker 
can starve out other threads. This situation can be mitigated by using the 
system’s watchdog timer or even creating your own watchdog thread at the 
Meta-IRQ level to monitor and correct misbehaving threads. A detailed 
discussion of this is found later in the “Security Management” section.
 Zephyr Memory Separation
In Zephyr, all threads have their own stack region, and their state is 
swapped out when they are removed from the running state. This provides 
basic (space) separation between threads. However, this protection does 
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nothing to stop a misbehaving supervisory thread which has access to all 
of memory; and recall that by default all threads are given supervisory 
privileges. This means that thoughtful, security-aware design is required to 
build a secure system with Zephyr.
Zephyr provides user threads to address this problem of too much 
privilege. Zephyr allows threads to be created as user-privilege threads, 
or allows threads to drop their supervisory privilege and become user 
threads. Memory access afforded to user-privilege threads is restricted. 
User-privilege threads are granted access to a specific set of memory 
locations by assigning a thread to a memory domain. A memory domain 
contains one or more memory partitions. A memory partition is a 
contiguous segment of memory with defined access rights (i.e., read, 
write, execute). Thus, a memory partition can be defined as read-only, 
and another memory partition can be defined as read-write. Both these 
memory partitions can be added to the same memory domain, and one 
or more user threads can be assigned to the memory domain. All threads 
assigned to a memory domain have the same access to that memory. A 
thread can belong to more than one memory domain. Memory domains 
can be created at compile time or created dynamically at Runtime.
For x86, the definitions for memory domain rights are found in the 
Zephyr source tree at arch/x86/include/mmustructs.h. x86 allows 
partitions to be defined as read-only, read-write, read-execute, and even 
the dangerous read-write-execute. And partitions can be defined to restrict 
access to user threads, but if a permission is granted to a user thread for a 
particular memory partition, then privileged threads also have the same 
access to that memory partition. It is important, then, to structure your 
applications with as few supervisory threads as possible. This follows the 
least privilege principle.
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 Zephyr Privilege Levels and System Authorization
As we already discussed, Zephyr defines two privilege levels: user and 
supervisor. The previous section discussed the impact privilege levels have 
on memory access. This section reviews how the privilege levels affect 
access to logical structures, devices, and files.
Zephyr allows for the construction of various logical structures, 
including FIFOs, LIFOs, mailboxes, and message queues. These logical 
structures allow different threads to communicate and share data. All 
these structures are mapped to memory addresses. This means that access 
to these structures can be restricted to only certain user threads, but any 
supervisory thread can access these structures as long as they know the 
address.
Physical devices, such as USB ports, SPI controllers, I2C interfaces, 
Ethernet ports, and GPIOs, are controlled by device drivers. Device drivers 
are accessible via APIs and are not restricted. Any thread merely links to 
the appropriate header file (i.e., i2c.h) and then can access the device. 
Zephyr does not implement any restrictions or authorization for device 
access.
Zephyr supports several different filesystems, including Newtron Flash 
File System (NFFS), FATFS support, and FCB (Flash Circular Buffer). The 
FATFS is an open source implementation of the well-known File Allocation 
Table (FAT) filesystem from the old PC DOS. The implementation supports 
creation of a filesystem in RAM, on MMC flash, or through a USB drive. 
No file permissions are supported on FAT, but read-only, hidden, and 
system file attributes are supported.
The Newtron Flash File System (NFFS) is a minimal filesystem for flash 
devices and provides no protections or attributes for files. The source code 
for Newtron can be found at http://github.com/apache/mynewt-nffs.
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Since Zephyr does not implement any user or persistent thread 
identity, no authorization mechanisms are found in the logical structures, 
device drivers, or for the filesystem. This can represent a security problem 
if a thread is taken over by an attacker and manipulated to perform 
malicious actions, since the thread can be modified via arbitrary code 
injection to access resources it normally would not access, and the 
operating system enforces few limitations.
 Zephyr Programming Error Protections
Zephyr does implement several safeguards to protect threads from being 
taken over by remote attackers. These safeguards include stack protections 
and memory protections. The previous sections have discussed the 
memory protections; this section reviews the stack protections.
Programming errors can create vulnerabilities in software that allow 
untrusted input to overrun or underrun buffers, writing this untrusted 
data into memory. Specially crafted inputs can result in buffer overruns 
or underruns that rewrite elements on the stack, or rewrite code pages 
in RAM, allowing an attacker to change a thread’s flow or the code that 
it executes. Zephyr implements stack protection to detect overruns on 
the stack, and then halt a thread to prevent it from executing from a 
modified stack.
Other protections, like Intel’s® Control-Flow Enforcement Technology 
that protects against ROP and JOP, are not yet implemented in Zephyr, but 
may be added in the future.
 Zephyr’s Other Security Features
While Zephyr does not directly provide secure storage, it does provide a 
few other security additions, including a cryptographic library and API for 
security modules and TEEs.
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Zephyr includes an embedded cryptographic library written by Intel, 
called TinyCrypt. This can be found in the Zephyr source tree at ext/lib/
crypto. TinyCrypt includes basic cryptographic functions including
• AES symmetric encryption using CBC, CTR, CMAC, 
and CCM modes11
• Elliptic curve asymmetric cryptography using Diffie-
Hellman (DH) or the Digital Signature Standard (DSA)
• HMAC and direct use of the hash function, SHA2- 256
Zephyr also includes the latest mbedTLS from ARM, which includes 
TLS v1.2 (Transport Layer Security) and many more cryptographic 
functions. Details on mbedTLS can be found on the web site http://tls.
mbed.org.
Zephyr also includes an API to access a hardware random number 
generator, based on the processor on the particular board that is being 
used. This allows access to true hardware entropy if the hardware supports 
it. If there is no hardware entropy source, an interface to a pseudo entropy 
function is provided (see /ext/lib/crypto/mbedtls/library/entropy_poll.c).
Currently, the APIs for hardware crypto, Trusted Platform Modules 
(TPMs) and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), are very limited. 
Future versions of Zephyr are planning to implement APIs for these 
devices.
11 CBC = Cipher Block Chaining, CTR = Counter mode, see https://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38a/final
CMAC = Cipher-based Message Authentication Code, see https://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/detail/sp/800-38b/final
CCM = Counter with CBC for Message authentication, see https://nvlpubs.
nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-38c.pdf
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 Zephyr Summary
Table 4-2 includes a summary of Zephyr compared with our operating 
system security requirements.






a Zephyr provides all the standard separation 
capabilities of a standard operating system, with 
flexible application of those structures to address 
real-time concerns.
Memory Separation C although some memory separation is provided, the 
ability of supervisory threads to see all of memory 
is a major weakness. Memory domains provide 
reasonable protections especially for the class of 
processors used by Zephyr.
Levels of Privilege B two levels of privilege are common in systems 
today and even in popular operating systems, 
like Microsoft windows, which has access to 
multiple different rings, but makes use of only 
two ring levels. there are however examples of 
extra protections – special supervisory modes and 
tees – that are currently lacking in Zephyr and thus 
warrant a slightly lower grade.
System 
authorization
d without any real system authorization, Zephyr 
leaves a significant gap for attacked threads 
to misbehave. while this is normal in MCus, 
improvement is required.
(continued)
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While Zephyr provides some basic security features, like memory 
regions, and separate threads with stack protections, and user and 
privilege modes, Zephyr is limited in the services and protections that 
are available due to its focus as a minimalistic RTOS. But, even in other 
more powerful operating systems, similar process and thread structures 
are used, leading to similar attacks and pitfalls, so Zephyr is instructive to 
analyze. Our security lessons from Zephyr are applicable to all platforms 
and operating systems. Threads can be attacked and therefore should run 
at the lowest privilege possible. Privileges can be abused, maliciously or 
unintentionally, and therefore guards should be in place to check proper 
behavior of the system. Memory subsystems and filesystems can be 
exploited to leak or corrupt data; therefore, cryptographic protections such 
as encryption and integrity protection should be used. As we explore other 
software on our generalized IoT system, we will highlight how a defense 








C Basic stack protection is the new normal. Control 
flow protection is the bar set by the industry today, 
which is lacking in Zephyr.
Access-Controlled 
Secrets storage
f with the combination of no filesystem authorizations 
and no special secrets storage, Zephyr leaves a 
system vulnerable to any attacked thread. Systems 
with secrets should use a Secure element or tpM to 
protect secrets, but this requires custom additions 
to Zephyr’s device support.
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
241
 Linux Operating Systems
Linux is a common operating system used for both cloud and IoT instances. 
It is feature rich and comes in many different distributions (distros) that 
enhance or embellish one capability or another. The security properties of 
Linux are well known, and there are complete tomes that do an excellent 
job of covering this topic,12 so this section will not repeat that material here. 
Instead, this section looks at the concept of enhanced containment, but 
we do so from the perspective of an interesting IoT problem – updating the 
operating system and application software on a platform. The Linux distros 
covered here include Wind River Pulsar, Ubuntu IoT Core, and Clear Linux.
It is important to understand the update problem before progressing 
into the details of the distros. The update problem encountered in operating 
systems is one of both synchronization and access. Synchronization 
between different software elements of a system, and between the software 
and hardware of the platform, is required. An update to a system can destroy 
this synchronization. Access relates to the permissions and capability to 
update all parts of the system, including the operating system kernel, the 
boot software, and all types of firmware on the device.
A bad software update creates an incompatibility between two 
different software components on your device or an incompatibility 
between the software and the hardware of your device. An update 
problem is observed when two or more software components interfere 
with one another. The result of any of these conflicts can be a slowdown 
in operation, the failure of one or more services, a computer shutdown 
during operation (i.e., a crash), or even a failure to boot the device. It is 
not uncommon for some Linux updates to cause a failure to boot after a 
kernel update, which then requires a rebuild of the boot device in order 
to remedy the situation. A good software update requires synchronization 
between the hardware and all the software on the platform.
12 Multiple Linux topic books by Apress, www.apress.com/us/open-source/linux
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The word all introduces the other part of the update problem: Access. 
We defer the access issue until the section on secure updates, but it is 
important to understand the complexity of the update problem here 
and realize that the distributions we discuss now do not solve the whole 
problem. The access problem is caused by some updatable software on 
a device that resides in one or more difficult to reach hardware storage 
areas, normally referred to as firmware. The operating system itself may 
not be able to reach all these firmware locations. The device may need to 
be placed into a special operating mode, or an update must be submitted 
at a particular time during the boot process for the firmware update to be 
successful. This special access required to update firmware may be difficult 
or impossible to do without human intervention. If some part of the 
device’s regular software is updated, and it depends on a newer version of 
firmware that is not present on the device, the instability of a bad software 
update may be the result.
If an operating system update causes an IoT platform to fail to reboot, 
or to crash so often that a new update cannot be pushed to the device, 
this requires a human being to go out to the device and repair or replace 
it. This physical maintenance drives up the cost for IoT deployments, 
resulting in an erosion or destruction13 of the return on investment (ROI) 
for the IoT system. Driving operational costs down to preserve ROI 
requires the elimination of such physical interactions.
All three of the distributions covered in this section attempt to address 
the software update problem for IoT but do so in different ways. As we 
review these different solutions, we find the commonality is all about 
containment and finding ways to isolate the inconsistent dependencies.
13 Destruction of the ROI can occur when many devices are impacted by a bad 
system update, either simultaneously or repeatedly over time. The cost of “rolling 
a truck” to repair devices can drive operational costs to completely consume any 
profit or efficiency gained by the IoT system.
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 Pulsar: Wind River Linux
Wind River provides various different operating systems for embedded 
sectors, including IoT. VxWorks14 is a family of products representing their 
RTOS offerings. Pulsar15 is Wind River’s small, high-performance Linux 
distribution designed for manageability and IoT.
Pulsar is a binary distribution of Linux based on the Yocto Project. 
A primary focus of Pulsar is to provide a regular cadence of updates for 
the packages that are included in Pulsar, including the kernel. As shown 
in Figure 4-5, Pulsar is a container-based Linux, allowing the download 
of different features and functionality as containers. However, within the 
containers, updates are managed in a traditional manner using software 
packages.
Packaged and Tailored for Selected Hardware





























Figure 4-5. Pulsar Linux architecture and service updates16
14 Wind River VxWorks, www.windriver.com/products/vxworks/
15 Wind River Pulsar, www.windriver.com/products/operating-systems/pulsar/
16 From www.windriver.com/products/product-overviews/
Pulsar-Linux-Product-Overview/
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Using containers as a separation capability reduces destructive 
interactions between applications and makes the whole platform more 
stable. Additionally, by using containers, there is greater security in the 
platform as a whole, since the containers have a reduced privilege on the 
platform, making an attack on an application in a container less likely to 
leak out and affect the whole device. Pulsar can update whole applications 
on the device seamlessly by just replacing a container.
Wind River addresses the issue of stable updates by providing an 
update service over a secure channel, where the updates themselves 
are comprised of RPMs (Red Hat Package Manager), a common Linux 
update mechanism. All RPMs are signed with a Wind River RSA17 private 
key, ensuring the RPMs are genuine and not modified from what Wind 
River intended. All updates on Wind River’s package repository have gone 
through extensive testing to ensure they are stable on the Pulsar-supported 
platforms. Constant reviews of the published Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) databases, and the open source mailing lists, ensure the 
latest defects and issues are addressed in the quarterly updates.
Wind River Linux includes the following features, discussed elsewhere 
in the chapter:
• Wind River Helix Device management system
• Mosquitto MQTT
• OCF and IoTivity (See Chapter 2 Consumer IoT 
Framework Standards)
• UEFI or MOK Secure Boot (See Chapter 3, Device Boot 
Integrity - Trust But Verify)
• Support for Trusted Platform Module (TPM)  
(See Chapter 3, PTT/TPM)
17 RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm that 
uses a private key to digitally sign data and a separate public key that anyone can 
use to verify the signature.
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Pulsar includes the following other technologies that improve the 
security on the device:
• Virtual private network (VPN) provided by the open 
source StrongSwan IPSec/L2TP/PPTP project.
• STIG scripts: System lockdown scripts are included in 
Pulsar to configure the system for secure deployment, 
using the US government’s Security Technical 
Implementation Guide (STIG)18 scripts.
CONTAINERS
Containers are a type of software separation technology that allows one or 
more applications, and their dependent libraries, packages, and services, to 
run in an operating system created namespace.
In an operating system, certain resources are organized into namespaces. 
for example, all the users are in a namespace; this means you can have only 
one user named root and one user named dave (users are actually based on 
numeric identifiers, but the concept still holds). If there are two users both 
named dave, they would be the same user. likewise, the same namespace 
concept exists with devices, file paths, and certain logical resources, like 
network ports and process identifiers.
Inside a container, the operating system gives the container its own 
namespace for certain types of resources. So one container can open port 
443 for a web server to listen to incoming traffic, and a different container 
can also open port 443, and there would be no conflict. outside the container, 
some type of mapping must be done to disambiguate the two network traffic 
flows (see the “Containers” section for details). In our example with the user 
identities, two containers can both have the user dave, and they would not 
18 STIG Home, https://iase.disa.mil/stigs/Pages/index.aspx
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be associated to the same user; thus there would be no conflict between 
the containers and no privilege leakages or access overlap between the 
applications in the containers.
Containers also use another kernel feature called cgroups. Cgroups create a 
kernel structure that limits the amount of memory and Cpu processing that 
is available to processes within a cgroup. this can be used to ensure the 
processes in a cgroup do not starve out other groups. this ensures that all 
containers get a fair amount of processing time, and one container cannot hog 
the Cpu and prevent applications in other containers from executing.
different containerization engines package these features in different ways 
to allow an environment to be created and managed that provides usable 
software separation for applications. these are all referred to generally as 
containers, but different containerization engines may have slightly different 
properties and controls.
 Ubuntu IoT Core
Ubuntu is a popular Debian Linux distribution that includes desktop, 
server, and cloud versions. Ubuntu IoT Core is a new distribution that 
is headless, meaning that it does not include the elements an operating 
system normally provides for a screen, keyboard, and mouse – there is no 
user interface. Ubuntu IoT Core is intended to be used on devices that do 
not have buttons; they are intended to be turned on, and the device just 
does its thing, whatever that is.
Ubuntu IoT Core runs differently from the normal Ubuntu 
distributions. It uses a construct called a snap. Everything in Ubuntu 
Core is a snap, even the kernel. Developers create snaps that contain all 
the dependencies for their application or service. Users download snaps 
from the snap store and can add in (snap in) any snap they want to their 
system. Each snap is separated from the others in Ubuntu IoT Core, using 
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similar separation constructs as containers! One difference however is 
that snaps are transactional and can be rolled back easily if there is a 
problem. Thus, trying out a snap leaves no artifacts on the system, and a 













Figure 4-6. Ubuntu IoT Core snap architecture
A snap is actually a filesystem (the SquashFS filesystem) along with 
a YAML file that contains the snap’s metadata. A snap is completely 
relocatable and does not depend on having specific libraries or 
configurations in a particular directory, like the /etc directory. The snap 
must carry all its dependent libraries with it in the SquashFS, kind of 
like a TAR or ZIP file with everything it needs packaged up inside it. The 
code for the snap in SquashFS filesystem is read-only, but once the snap 
is installed, a writeable section of the filesystem is created. When a snap 
is installed, it can be granted permissions to access things outside its 
filesystem, like the network or devices. If the system does not grant those 
permissions, then the install fails. In this way, a snap is similar to an app in 
the Android operating system.
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Ubuntu IoT Core is claimed to be more reliable and more secure. 
Snaps are signed with cryptographic keys, just like Pulsar’s RPMs, but 
snaps manage their own dependencies and are separated from other 
applications. Ubuntu IoT Core creates isolation between applications 
(snaps) using AppArmor and Seccomp.
AppArmor19 is a security model built into the Linux kernel as part of 
the Linux Security Modules (LSM) framework. Other models supported 
by LSM include SELinux, Smack, TOMOYO Linux, and Yama. AppArmor 
allows the definition of security profiles that restrict the behavior of 
applications, and access to files (inodes), based upon a set of mandatory 
access control (MAC) policies. AppArmor comes installed with various 
preconfigured profiles to protect the system and applications, but these 
are modifiable by an administrator. Applications that do not have a policy 
defined execute in an unconfined manner (no special MAC restrictions). 
Policies reside in /etc/apparmor/ and user-specific profiles are defined in 
${HOME}/.apparmor/.
Seccomp20 is a Linux kernel mode used to limit the kernel system 
calls available to a process. Seccomp is short for secure computing 
and reduces the attack surface that the Linux kernel exposes through 
system calls. Seccomp was originally designed to expose only a certain 
set of kernel APIs available, but Seccomp 2 added filtering, allowing 
more flexible definitions of what kernel APIs are allowed to be used by 
a process. Seccomp is effective in restricting the actions an attacker can 
perform through injected code attacks, because a call to a restricted 
system call sends the SIGKILL to the process, terminating the offending 
program.
The combination of AppArmor and Seccomp allows Ubuntu 
to restrict the allowable actions of installed snaps. The inherent 
restrictions of a snap simplify the policy for these security tools, which 
19 https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/wikis/home/
20 www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt
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can be complex. Additionally, the filters that restrict the snap’s actions 
actually document how the snap is supposed to behave, and what the 
app can and cannot do, which acts as a type of disclosure to the system 
administrator. In conclusion, the containerization of snaps includes a 
separate filesystem, special permissions with AppArmor and Seccomp, 
and documented interfaces to connect to other applications and 
services on the platform through the snapd service.21 Using these strong 
security protections, and the ability to rollback misbehaving snaps, 
Ubuntu IoT Core provides a secure and stable operating system for IoT 
deployments.
 Intel® Clear Linux
Clear Linux22 addresses the operating system update problem by 
allowing frequent updates to the operating system, reducing the time a 
platform lacks the most recent updates, and preventing incompatible 
updates from being downloaded and installed on a system. Clear 
Linux is designed for a Linux distribution maintainer and provides 
tools allowing the maintainer to directly consume upstream projects, 
add them to their distribution, and maintain the distribution on an 
update server that keeps all the connected systems updated. It is easy 
to see the value of Clear Linux to an IoT deployment that is using a 
customized Linux kernel.
21 https://tutorials.ubuntu.com/tutorial/advanced-snap-usage#1
22 Clear Linux, https://clearlinux.org/
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Clear Linux manages all the applications and software on the 
system using bundles instead of packages. Packages are hard to manage 
because of all the dependencies, and oftentimes different packages have 
dependencies on different versions of other packages. When two different 
packages are installed, and each requires different versions of another 
dependent package, installing both of those packages creates contention. 
Either one package will be able to use the newer (or older) version of the 









































































Figure 4-7. Clear Linux deployment chain
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contention by putting applications and services into containers, which 
separates the dependencies from each other; Ubuntu uses a similar 
approach with snaps. Clear Linux removes the contention with bundles, 
which is just a different containment mechanism. A bundle removes 
the outside dependencies and includes all the software needed for an 
application.
In Clear Linux, the operating system is completely made up of bundles. 
When one bundle is updated, it creates a completely new version of the 
OS. This new OS version is built and tested as a whole – there is no extra 
package to be added later. For the distributor, this makes updating simpler 
and guarantees that the OS update will work and will not brick the system. 
It is also the reason that updates need to be easier and happen more 
frequently.
Just making updates come faster is not really a solution. Updating an 
entire operating system every week could kill a system, not to mention 
bog down the network. Clear Linux solves this problem by including tools 
to allow updates to be smaller. Rather than an update requiring a full 
reinstall, the update can be a binary diff between versions. This is critical 
for IoT deployments, because sending down a new kernel that is multiple 
megabytes in size is just not practical over certain network connections.
 Linux Summary
Linux supports strong security capabilities in both the kernel and the 
application space. Although we did not cover all of Linux’s security 
features, Table 4-3 provides a summary of the operating system security 
features of Linux for comparison with Zephyr in our previous section.
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Execution Separation a all linux distributions discussed here support 
the standard separation capabilities (process, 
threads, ISrs) of operating systems.
Memory Separation a linux utilizes the hardware memory 
management unit (MMu) to provide paged 
memory separation for all processes, with 
read-write-execute permissions. unlike Zephyr, 
even a process running as root is restricted.
Levels of Privilege a linux, like Microsoft windows, has access 
to multiple privilege rings, but makes use of 
only two ring levels. linux also supports other 
special supervisory modes and tees; for details 
see the section on containment.
System authorization a linux provides authorization for structures 
using a common user-group-other identity 
structure with read-write-execute privilege 
bits. extensions for other security models 
through the linux Security Modules (lSM) and 
other frameworks, like apparmor and Seccomp 
covered in the ubuntu section, are readily 
available and integrated into the linux kernel.
(continued)
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In this section, our discussion focused on the update features provided 
in different Linux distributions and how the distros are solving the problem 
of interfering applications and overly complex dependencies. These 
solutions used different forms of containment to solve the update problem. 
Clear Linux solves the problem by creating a new package format for 
updates called a bundle and then uses a series of tools to ensure the different 
bundles create a stable system. If an instability is found, a new update is easy 
to create by correcting a bundle. System updates are made less burdensome 







B Basic stack protection is provided in the linux 
kernel since version 3.1423 and is turned 
on automatically in version 4.1624 – strong 
stack protections are also an option. Control 
flow protection is not yet fully upstreamed in 




C linux does not directly provide standard 
features for secrets storage, but support for 
the trusted platform Module (tpM), Secure 
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Pulsar and Ubuntu take a different approach and use advanced 
features of Linux to construct special containment for applications and 
even parts of the operating system itself (in the case of Ubuntu, anyway). 
These containment features are used to create Linux containers, which we 
look at in a bit more detail in a future section.
We also noted that even with these features, the problem of access 
required to update firmware on the platform is not solved by this 
approach, and additional capabilities are needed. We look at solutions to 
the access problem in the section on secure software updates.
 Hypervisors and Virtualization
Virtualization is a generic term applied to several techniques that increase 
resource sharing and hardware utilization in a computer system. Modern 
operating systems like Linux provide virtualized memory, where more 
memory appears to be available than is actually physically present. Parts 
of memory used by idle processes are stored on disk, freeing more physical 
memory for the currently running process; short delays are incurred when 
the idle process becomes active and the operating system reloads physical 
memory with the contents from disk. Although some delays are incurred, 
they are outweighed by the benefit of having more physical memory 
available to the running process.
Platform virtualization works in much the same way, allowing multiple 
operating systems to run simultaneously on a single computer. Memory 
is virtualized, as well as the processor, storage, graphics, and other I/O 
devices on the platform. A small control program, called a hypervisor or 
Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), manages the virtualized hardware and 
mediates between the different virtual machines (VMs). Figure 4-8 shows 
a generic virtualized system. Each VM runs a guest operating system 
and application software that are logically separated from each other by 
hardware and software controls managed by the hypervisor.
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There are actually two different types of hypervisors. Figure 4-8 
depicts a Type 1 hypervisor or native hypervisor that runs directly on 
the hardware. Type 1 hypervisors are typically more performant and can 
utilize the hardware better, because they have complete control of the 
hardware. VMWare, Xen (for Linux), and Hyper-V (Microsoft) are examples 
of Type 1 hypervisors.
There are also Type 2 hypervisors, which run on top of an existing 
operating system. This allows a regular OS to run virtual machines too. 
VirtualBox by Oracle is a Type 2 hypervisor that runs on Linux. KVM is a 
Red Hat hypervisor that runs as part of the Linux kernel; some regard it is 
Type 2 hypervisor since other things can run on the Linux OS, but Red Hat 
claims it is a Type 1 hypervisor since it has direct control of the hardware 
through the kernel. Either way, it is a pretty good hypervisor. There is a 
question that frequently comes up relating hypervisors to containers. The 
question is: Which is better, containerization or virtualization? We discuss 
this later in the “Software Separation and Containment” section. For now, 
we focus on virtualization.
How does virtualization work? In Intel Architecture, virtualization 
is supported by the Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) mode. This 
mode defines two privilege levels, one for the hypervisor, called VMX 


















Figure 4-8. Generic virtualization architecture
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As one might guess, the VMX root operations mode is more privileged. 
The hypervisor, operating in VMX root operations mode, initializes 
certain control registers in the processor to establish limits on the VMs. 
The hypervisor releases the VMs to execute by performing a VM-Enter 
instruction. The VMs are then executing in the restricted VMX non-root 
operations mode. When the VMs execute an instruction or perform an 
operation that is restricted by the hypervisor, a VM exit is performed by the 
processor, returning control to the hypervisor. The hypervisor can either 
perform the operation on behalf of the VM in a safe manner, or it can reject 
the operation and return some type of exception to the VM; in extreme 
cases, the hypervisor can even terminate the offending VM entirely.
The exact details of virtualized processor state are beyond the scope 
of this book. However, the curious may elect to read the Intel 64 and 
IA-32 Architectures Software Developer’s Manual Volume 3. Chapters 23 
through 33 cover VMX mode. These chapters discuss the virtual machine 
control structure (VMCS) that contains the state used by the processor to 
implement virtualization and discusses all the elements of the controlled 
state, including
• Virtual processor state, including control registers, 
debug registers, base registers, and segments
• Bit flags controlling what events cause a VM exit, for 
example, interrupts, use of IO ports, and so on
• Bit flags indicating how a VM’s state is saved when a 
VM exit is performed
• Bit flags indicating how a VM’s state is restored on VM 
entry
• Indicators for VMX aborts (the reason a VM abnormally 
exited into the hypervisor)
• Indicators for VMX exits (the reason for a normal return 
to the hypervisor)
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
257
There is also another distinction among hypervisors. In the discussion 
earlier, we described virtualization as though the operating systems in 
the virtual machines were no different than an operating system on a 
platform that is not virtualized. When the operating systems in the VMs 
are not aware they are being virtualized, this is called full virtualization. 
In some systems, or with some applications, it is very difficult to fully 
virtualize the system. This may be because there are complex devices 
that need to be shared between the virtual machines, or it may be that an 
application has very stringent performance requirements. In these cases, 
it is counterproductive to perform full virtualization – the cost to do so 
would outweigh the benefits. In these cases, the hypervisor implements a 
para-virtualized strategy, where the operating system, device drivers, and 
perhaps even the applications themselves are aware that they are being 
virtualized and are modified in order to behave better in the virtualized 
environment. Para-virtualization is accomplished by configuring VMX in 
a way that allows the VMs themselves to perform certain operations, for 
example, the ability to directly interface with certain IO ports. The VMCS 
allows the hypervisor to give some VMs more control than other VMs. 
However, the VMs must cooperate with the hypervisor and are trusted to 
cooperate in a trustworthy fashion. Intel’s ACRN hypervisor is an example 
of a para-virtualized hypervisor, which we will discuss in more detail after 
we review the security threats to virtualization and hypervisors.
 Threats to Hypervisors
Just like operating systems, the threats to hypervisors are numerous and 
dangerous. A successful attack on a hypervisor can lead to an attacker 
acquiring complete control over the platform and every virtual machine 
running on it. NIST-SP-800-125A Revision 126 outlines the baseline set of 
26 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-
125Ar1.pdf
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security functions a hypervisor should perform. These hypervisor security 
functions have similarities to the security services that we defined for 
operating systems. But because this specification limits itself to virtualization 
of servers, and specifically does not address embedded systems, we use the 
NIST set of functions as a baseline. In our list that follows, the first five items 
are from NIST and are roughly equivalent to the security services we defined 
for operating system; protection from programming errors is a sixth security 
service we add to NIST’s list. We then add three additional security services 
that are unique to IoT instances and not considered by NIST’s analysis. The 
set of security services for IoT hypervisors are
• VM Process Isolation (i.e., Execution Separation and 
Memory Separation): Each VM’s execution should be 
separated from all other VMs’ execution using multiple 
logical processor structures; a fault in one VM should 
not affect other VMs.
• Device Mediation and Access Control (i.e., Levels of 
Privilege and Access-Controlled Secrets Storage): 
Hypervisors provide methods for VMs to share access 
to devices through various methods, including giving 
VMs direct access to hardware, para- virtualization of 
the device, or device emulation within the hypervisor. 
Access to the devices must be controlled to prevent 
effects from one VM leaking over to other VMs. This 
includes controlling direct memory access (DMA) 
devices to protect both memory read and write. If 
the platform offers secrets storage, the hypervisor 
should provide access to such storage in a manner that 
prevents other VMs from interfering with each other’s 
usage, or from viewing, modifying, or using the secrets 
in that secure storage location (see Chapter 3, section 
on “Intel Virtualization Technology (Intel VT)”).
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• Prevent Abuses by Guest VMs through their 
Direct Execution of Commands (i.e., System 
Authorization): As we stated earlier, para-virtualized 
systems allow VMs to cooperate with the hypervisor; 
the hypervisors in these systems execute commands 
sent from the VMs. The hypervisor’s execution of 
commands from one VM should not affect another 
VM and should not compromise the security of the 
hypervisor or its data structures.
• VM Lifecycle Management: VM management includes 
creating, starting, stopping, and pausing VMs, as 
well as checkpointing (snapshotting) their state. This 
includes monitoring the state of VMs and various 
tools for migrating data or VM snapshots between 
physical machines. The management of VMs is 
typically performed through add-ons to the hypervisor 
or through a special management VM. These 
management services must not allow leakage of data or 
control across VMs.
• Management of Hypervisor Platform: The 
configuration of the hypervisor and the platform itself 
must be managed, including configuring devices, 
virtual networking, storage, and any VM policies. This 
management must include proper authentication of 
management requests and restriction of management 
actions to only authorized entities.
• Protection from Programming Errors: This is the 
leftover security service from our operating system 
list, but has a little different perspective when viewed 
from the virtualization perspective. The hypervisor 
must set appropriate VM aborts when a VM violates 
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restrictions on memory separation or corruption of VM 
control structures; stack smashing and heap smashing 
that occur from programming errors in one VM should 
not compromise the hypervisor or other VMs. These 
protections become much more difficult with a  para- 
virtualized hypervisor because certain structures and 
interfaces on the hypervisor are accessible to the VMs.
• Real-Time Guarantees: In embedded systems and IoT, 
control loops require real-time guarantees and many 
devices operate with real-time restrictions on read/
write operations that if violated result in data being 
lost. In a virtualized system, the hypervisor itself must 
provide these real-time guarantees in coordination 
with the VMs and their operating systems. 
• Deep Power Management: In embedded systems 
and IoT, power usage is a critical parameter. Whether 
the power envelope is restricted due to battery life 
and energy harvesting limitations or the power/
heat trade-off in an industrial environment limits 
equipment’s power budget, management of energy 
usage is essential. Due to real-time guarantees and 
the management of physical devices or equipment, 
the management of power goes far beyond what is 
normally provided in a data center or server cloud 
instance. Power management cannot be left to the 
individual guest operating systems or VMs, because 
they do not have the platform view. The hypervisor, 
in conjunction with the VMs and guest OSes, must 
manage the platform constraints appropriately to 
prevent power spikes or violations of the equipment’s 
defined heat envelope.
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• Protection from External Devices: In embedded 
systems and IoT, virtualized systems are inevitably 
connected to other devices and sensors, usually in a 
very direct way. Because these devices can be attacked 
and PWNED27 by an adversary, protection of the 
virtualized system from compromised devices is critical 
to protecting a virtualized IoT system. It should be 
noted that this goes beyond the normal protections a 
cloud server is required to enforce to protect REST APIs 
and network connections, which the IoT virtualized 
system must also do. The external IoT devices are 
normally connected to a low-level driver, an emulated 
or virtual bus implementation, or some other higher- 
privileged software component that must implement 
some type of intrusion and attack detection-prevention 
mechanism.
When examining the preceding list of necessary protections and 
the general operation of hypervisors described earlier, several threat 
vectors immediately come to the surface that are likely vulnerabilities in 
hypervisors:
• Size and complexity of the hypervisor code: The 
more complex and larger code size of a hypervisor, 
the more likely the hypervisor includes critical 
vulnerabilities, because adverse code interactions and 
defects are harder to find in larger code bases.
27 PWNED is the Internet slang for “owning” a device or computer system; it comes 
from “mistyping” the “o” in the word “own” with a letter “p,” ostensibly because 
hackers are bad typists perhaps. Its meaning goes beyond attacking and implies 
complete ownership of the attacked device such that the device is absconded 
to do whatever the attacker wishes – the device becomes part of the attacker’s 
zombie or botnet army.
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• Attack surface of the guest VMs: Since the VMs 
represent the manipulable interface to attackers, they 
represent the primary point of attack to virtualized 
systems. The more network services exposed by a 
VM, the more third-party code that is not written 
with a security mindset, and the larger the number 
of unprotected IoT devices connected to virtualized 
system, the higher the risk of vulnerabilities that can 
expose the hypervisor to attack.
• Hypervisor add-ons that have vulnerabilities: Some 
hypervisors have minimal services but allow add-ons 
or plugin modules that provide additional services, like 
management and configuration. These add-ons can 
include additional vulnerabilities.
• Device driver virtualizations that have 
vulnerabilities: Device drivers require special versions 
that provide virtualization features, which may react 
differently with different hypervisors or may operate 
differently on different hardware. These differences 
may create vulnerabilities an attacker can leverage.
Like operating systems, hypervisors are susceptible to similar classes of 
attacks. A recent survey paper28 looked at reported common vulnerabilities 
from a reputable CVE database for the top four hypervisors. Figure 4-9 
shows the types of vulnerabilities and the number of such vulnerabilities 
by product. The purpose of this table here is to highlight the most common 
attacks on hypervisors and to highlight that all hypervisors have been 
successfully attacked. The data should not be interpreted numerically 
28 Litchfield, Alan., Shahzad, Abid. A systematic Review of Vulnerabilities in 
Hypervisors and Their Detection. 23rd Americas Conference on Information 
Systems. Boston. 2017.
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to identify which hypervisor is more secure due to a lower number of 
attacks. The paper notes that although VMWare had the highest number 
of vulnerabilities over the study period (from 1999 to 2015), it was also the 
only established hypervisor product in the market for the first 8 years of the 
study period, making such rankings of hypervisor security inappropriate. 
The following list briefly reviews the most prevalent classes of attacks listed 
in Figure 4-9, describing the security principles violated:
• Denial of Service: A DoS attack causes a VM to halt 
or create such a serious VM abort that the hypervisor 
refuses to allow the VM to continue to operate. A more 
serious DoS could affect a device on the platform, 
preventing all VMs from accessing the device until 
the platform is rebooted, violating Device Mediation. 
A DoS attack on a virtualized hardware device 
represents a violation of execution separation. 
Another type of DoS attack consumes resources, 
like network socket handles, resulting in other VMs 
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Figure 4-9. Most common attacks on hypervisors – 16-year period
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• Stack Overflow and Arbitrary Code Execution: 
Stack smashing, heap smashing, and use-after-free 
vulnerabilities allow an attacker to execute their own 
code on the platform. This type of attack can allow 
escalation of code’s rights, allowing it to become a 
privileged user. In para-virtualized environments, this 
can cause the VM to misbehave and violate the trust 
the hypervisor places in the VM, causing an execution 
or memory separation violation (Prevent Abuses from 
Direct Execution of Commands from Guest VMs).
• Gain Information: An out-of-bounds read vulnerability 
allows a VM to access memory outside of its logical 
memory space. These vulnerabilities are common with 
virtualized drivers and VM tools. A gain information 
vulnerability represents a violation of memory 
separation.
• Gain Privileges: Gain privilege attacks are usually 
executed through add-ons, like tools and plugins. An 
example is the CVE-2017-4943 that allowed a showlog 
plugin to gain root-level privilege of the platform 
management VM that controls network settings, system 
updates, health monitoring, and device management. 
Becoming root on a para-virtualized system is 
tantamount to a compromise of the hypervisor itself, 
since root on a para-virtualized VM allows the attacker 
to easily violate the implicit para-virtualized cooperation 
agreement (Management of Hypervisor Platform).
Many of the attacks outlined are serious, but do not directly violate a 
fully virtualized system; the hypervisor can properly trap and stop attacks 
that directly violate the virtual machine’s configuration. However, when 
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the hypervisor and VMs are operating in a para-virtualized manner, 
privilege escalations in the VM and process and memory violations even 
within the VM’s logical memory space can escalate to a violation of the 
para-virtualization agreements. An attacker, operating as root within a 
para-virtualized VM, can disrupt device drivers and other critical parts of 
the VM’s operating system that have direct access to the platform hardware 
as part of the para-virtualization contract. In the next section, we look at 
ACRN, a para-virtualized hypervisor, and explore some of the strengths 
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Figure 4-10. ACRN architecture diagram
 Intel® ACRN
ACRN is a BSD open source hypervisor reference platform, built by Intel 
for the automotive industry, available at https://projectacrn.github.io. 
It is specifically designed to be a flexible and lightweight hypervisor and 
designed for real-time and safety-critical IoT deployments.
As shown in Figure 4-10, ACRN is a para-virtualized architecture 
where the guest operating systems must know they are being virtualized 
and cooperate with the hypervisor. A para-virtualized solution is required 
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in the automotive world due to the nature of some devices in the system. 
This model enables a more performant implementation and cleaner 
virtualization of these devices using virtio drivers. Notice the Service 
Virtual Machine (VM) in the top left of Figure 4-10. The Service VM 
performs some critical virtualization services for the hypervisor to avoid 
the performance penalty of full virtualization. However, support for device 
interrupts is provided directly in the hypervisor by virtualizing the PIC 
and APIC for each VM. The critical element of the Service VM is the set of 
ACRN Device Model (DM) applications that mediate between VMs and 
devices for certain operations. For example, USB and IOC (I/O Controller) 
devices are emulated in the Service VM due to their complexity, and the 
GPU is mediated by the Service VM since emulation will not provide the 
performance boost for which the GPU is often used. Because of these 
elevated privileges, the Service VM is a critical security element in the 
trusted computing base (TCB) of the ACRN platform. If not carefully 
limited, the Service VM can easily take on too much and become a security 
threat due to violation of the least privilege principle. As the number and 
complexity of the Device Models grow, the likelihood of implementation 
errors that can be leveraged by an attacker grows (see the list of common 
attack patterns discussed in the “Threats to Operating Systems” section). If 
an attacker is able to successfully attack a DM, the attacker is likely to inject 
other code inside the Service VM, having access to many other privileges 
than just the compromised DM. This is an architectural trade-off between 
necessary performance and security risk. The risk can be managed by 
ensuring every DM or other software component added to the Service VM 
is carefully verified and undergoes penetration testing to ensure there are 
no security weaknesses in those modules.
For security features, ACRN supports secure boot, a Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE), and secure storage in a Replay Protected Memory 
Block (RPMB) in flash. Figure 4-11 shows the secure boot flow for ACRN 
when using the Slim Bootloader (SBL). The TEE and RPMB are shown in 
Figures 4-13 and 4-14, respectively.
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Secure boot on Intel devices starts in the Converged Security Engine 
(CSE), which is the common root of trust for verification for Intel platforms 
(see Chapter 3, section “Intel CSE/CSME – DAL”). The CSE verifies a digital 
signature on the SBL; the digital signature is usually produced using the 
RSA algorithm and is commonly 2048-bits or 3072-bits in length. The 
public key is part of the SBL image, but this key is verified by the CSE using 
a hash of that public key kept in fuses. The fuses prevent the key from 
being modified in the image itself.
The SBL verifies the next stage of the platform, which includes the 
ACRN hypervisor and Service Operating System (SOS) kernel, which 
are included as a single image. The SOS kernel runs in the Service VM 
as VM’s operating system. The SOS Kernel loads and verifies a Device 














Figure 4-11. ACRN secure boot flow
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a virtual Slim Bootloader (vSBL) for each User VM. The SOS uses dm- 
verity29 to check the validity of the DM App and the vSBL. The vSBL then 
is responsible to boot the User VM; in the case of Android, this uses the 























Figure 4-12. ACRN connectivity to automotive CAN bus
One of the key features in ACRN is support for real-time and 
automotive use cases. This creates extremely stringent requirements on 
the hypervisor and the VMs for real-time operations and connectivity. 
Because all VMs might require access to the CAN30 bus, an I/O Controller 
is emulated in the Service OS that serializes data onto a physical serial 
29 DM-Verity, or Device Mapper Verity, was designed for Chrome OS and also 
used by Android. DM-Verity is built into the Linux kernel and uses the kernel 
cryptographic APIs to provide transparent integrity verification for block devices. 
See the Git Repository for more details at https://git.kernel.org/pub/
scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/device-
mapper/verity.txt
30 CAN bus, Controller Area Network, is a type of local bus system developed by 
Bosch for automotive systems to connect controllers and subsystems together. 
www.canbus.us/
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bus connected to the vehicle CAN bus (Figure 4-12). In order to protect 
the vehicle, the Service OS implements a firewall in each VM’s Device 
Model application. This filter restricts the type and content of messages 
that a particular VM can place on the vehicle’s CAN bus. For example, the 
Android OS that implements the vehicle infotainment features is restricted 
from sending messages to critical ECU components for vehicle braking 
or engine control. Likewise, other VMs that render cockpit controls are 
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Figure 4-13. ACRN trusted execution environment
ACRN supports the ARM TrustZone TEE implemented in Trusty in the 
Android OS. As shown in Figure 4-13, the ACRN hypervisor implements 
the separation of unsecure memory (in the normal world or regular 
operating system) from the secure world purely in software through 
encrypted page tables (EPTs). The CPUs are also virtualized and maintain 
the NS (not-secure) bit used in ARM to switch between two different 
contexts in the vCPU. It should be noted that the secure world can see all 
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of memory, but the normal world is restricted to see only a subset. Just 
like we discussed in the Zephyr OS, the ability of privileged users to see all 
of memory makes processes and threads in the secure world potentially 
more dangerous. It should also be noted that the Service OS also acts like 
a privileged secure process with access to additional parts of memory in 
order to support the virtualized devices.
The last security feature in ACRN that we examine is the Replay 
Protected Memory Block (RPMB). RPMB is a feature of some flash 
devices that allows an encryption key to be used to protect data, using 
both confidentiality and integrity, in a reserved flash block. The data is 
also replay protected preventing rollback attacks where an old piece of 
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Figure 4-14. ACRN secure storage support through RPMB
The encryption key for the RPMB is held by a trusted entity in the 
platform. In Intel platforms, this trusted entity is the CSE, and the CSE 
shares this key with a single device driver on the platform and then locks 
access to the key so no other program can gain access to the key. If the key 
is overshared, then security of the platform diminishes. During the boot 
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
271
process, the Slim Bootloader (SBL) reads the platform seed (pSEED) from 
the CSE and passes the pSEED on to the ACRN hypervisor. Since ACRN 
must support multiple virtual machines, and all these VMs must not be 
allowed to see the other VMs’ data or be able to spoof another VM’s data 
reads or writes, ACRN cannot directly share the pSEED with the VMs. 
ACRN uses a NIST-approved key derivation function (HKDF-256) to derive 
new secrets from the pSEED, called vSEEDs for virtual seeds, and passes 
a unique vSEED to each VM. Each VM then chooses which device driver 
or process will take ownership of the vSEED. For example, in Android, the 
vSEED is given to Trusty since it is the TEE for that VM. Figure 4-14 shows 
how the seeds are then used to implement RPMB. ACRN provides the real 
RPMB key to the DM applications in the Service OS. The derived keys are 
used by each of the User VMs to protect their RPMB data; the transactions 
for each of the User VMs do not go to the RPMB flash or the ACRN 
hypervisor, but instead are routed to the Service OS. The DM App in the 
SOS for the particular VM verifies and decrypts the data it received from its 
corresponding VM and then re-encrypts the data with actual RPMB key. 
Each VM has access to a small part of the RPMB and can only write to its 
own section. This separation is enforced by the RPMB driver in the SOS 
and the ACRN hypervisor.
It is clear from Figure 4-14 and the preceding description that the Service 
OS must be trusted, since it is possible for the DM Application to forge data 
or delete RPMB data as if they were the User VM. Careful review of the 
applications in the Service OS is required to ensure no security vulnerabilities 
are present, and only trusted applications are allowed to run in the SOS.
 Real-Time and Power Management Guarantees 
in ACRN
In its current rendition, ACRN provides basic real-time and power 
management controls. ACRN maps a physical core into the guest OS for 
both real-time and power management. This means that the guest OS 
has direct control of the core and can reflect any of the operating system’s 
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real-time characteristics to the applications in its VM. A real-time Linux 
kernel, for example, would run just as effectively in ACRN as on its own 
hardware. Since the physical cores are mapped into the VM, the hypervisor 
also allows the guest operating system in the VM control over that core’s 
C-state, optimizing the core’s power consumption during idle modes. The 
P-state, controlling the package voltage-frequency setting, is coordinated 
with the VM. ACRN manages the S-state, which is reflected from the 
User OS VMs, to the Service OS, and finally the hypervisor, in an ordered 
fashion. Future versions of ACRN are planning for further power and 
real-time management controls covering devices and real-time quality of 
service.
 ACRN Summary
ACRN supports some strong security services, with RPMB secure storage 
and TrustZone TEE being two of the most significant. Many of the design 
and security trade-offs made in ACRN are a result of the performance 
requirements for automotive and IoT deployments and the need to 
interface with complex devices, such as the I/O Controller emulation in 
the Service OS for connection with the vehicle bus. Table 4-4 provides a 
summary of the hypervisor system security features for comparison with 
other systems.
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VM Process Isolation 
(Execution Separation)
B Because aCrn is a para-virtualized 
hypervisor, and both the Service oS and 
parts of the hypervisor are accessible to 
guest VMs, the execution separation is 
not complete. this cannot be improved, 
however, due to the need for emulated 
busses and para- virtualization of certain 
devices.
VM Process Isolation 
(Memory Separation)
B user oSs have access to both the Service 
oS and the aCrn hypervisor through some 
limited apIs. this necessarily means that 
some memory buffers and locations are 
shared, with some firewalling in place. 
errors or defects in this sharing, especially 
if the uses of additional add-ons are 
integrated, can compromise the system.
Device Mediation  
(Levels of Privilege)
B device Mediation is done in the Service 
oS, per VM, using the device Model 
application.
(continued)






Execution of Commands 
from Guest VMs
C aCrn provides separation of commands, 
mostly through the Service oS and the 
device Model. however, certain hypercalls 
go through the hypervisor itself as 
shown in figures 4-10 and 4-13. Similar 
hypercalls are used for uSB virtualization. 
this creates a disparity in where access 
controls need to be reviewed, and makes 
it harder to ensure all guest commands 
are properly mediated in every case; this 
represents a violation of the least common 
mechanism security design principle.3
VM Lifecycle C aCrn provides a VM manager (figure 4-10) 
in the Service oS; however the 
implementation is very slim. this is 
appropriate for the automotive space, 
but for generalized Iot, and especially 
for industrial usages which require 
sophisticated orchestration, the 
management features require significant 
add- ons. Because this is performed in 
the same VM as the mediation of the 












- no specific controls; however the linux oS 
and android oS, for which the hypervisor 
was designed, provide these advanced 
controls. aCrn depends on these services 





a aCrn’s entire design focuses on meeting 
real-time requirements for automotive, 
including providing optimized device 
drivers and virtualized access to power 




a aCrn provides a Service VM that mediates 
all external access points and utilizes 
VM-specific filters in the device Model 




B aCrn provides both a tee and rpMB 
secure storage. the lower grading is 
a result of the implementations being 
primarily in software, not hardware.
Table 4-4. (continued)
In this section, our discussion focused on the unique features and 
architecture of para-virtualized hypervisors. We introduced the use of 
secure storage through the RPMB and additional containment through the 
use of a TEE. TEEs are discussed in more detail in the section “Software 
Separation and Containment.” The design trade-offs for the hypervisor and 
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TEE led to potential vulnerability in the TEE due to lack of full memory 
separation – a similar problem was found in the Zephyr OS. These and 
other design trade-offs lead to some weaknesses in the system, but overall, 
the combination of hardware security features for VM separation and 
secure storage provides superior protection for the targeted IoT vertical. 
 Software Separation and Containment
Containment is a critical concept in security. Whether it is keeping the 
“bad guys” out, or protecting secrets, or just segregating high privilege 
operations from low privilege ones, separation and containment 
are paramount to safe operations. Even with the process and thread 
separation provided by the operating system, and the hardware-assisted 
virtual machine isolation, additional separation capabilities always seem 
to be useful to applications and IoT systems. In this section, we look at 
two different types of extended application containment capabilities: 
containers and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). We have touched 
on both of these topics already, but in this section, we unpack them to a 
deeper level.
 Containment Security Principles
The principles that apply to extended application containment are the 
same principles we talked about for operating systems, which includes
• Execution Separation
• Memory Separation
The difference between applying these principles here and applying 
them to operating systems is the particular mechanisms used to provide 
the separation. The preference is for hardware separation as it is more 
secure. Containment through hardware separation might be provided 
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using a completely different processor (see the “Trusty TEE Security 
Summary” section), or a different mode of the current processor (see the 
section on Virtualization or SGX later). Memory separation might include 
a completely different cache of memory (as in SGX and Trusty), or merely 
using some extra virtualization controls (the approach used in hypervisors 
or containers). In both cases, there are trade-offs to be made, based on the 
threats that are being addressed.
 Threats to Extended Application Containment
The threats to extended application containment typically come  
from privileged attackers. These attacks can come from a privileged 
user or might be from an unprivileged user that performs a privilege 
escalation attack to acquire higher privileges. In both cases, the 
application containment intends to remove the possibility, or reduce 
the efficacy, of attacks by privileged users (e.g., root or admin user 
accounts).
• Memory Disclosure from Privileged User: A 
privileged user leverages their access to all memory 
pages in order to read data from any application.
• Memory Tampering from Privileged User: A 
privileged user leverages their access to all memory 
pages in order to write, overwrite, or corrupt data for 
any application; they may also include making memory 
pages unavailable to an application.
• Data Leakage through Side Channels: A privileged 
user leverages their access to data caches to perform 
timing attacks allowing them to determine contents of 
application memory.
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• Execution Interference from Privileged User: A 
privileged user leverages their ability to schedule tasks 
or run tasks that have higher priority and starve or 
interrupt other applications during a critical operation.
• Execution Leakage through Side Channels: A 
privileged user leverages their ability to schedule tasks 
and uses speculative execution or timing operations to 
determine code branches executed during operation.31
Application containment techniques provide defenses against these 
attacks to varying degrees. Full separation32 is the only complete solution, 
but this increases costs and adds complexity to management and control 
of sensitive applications. The use of different containment techniques is 
a trade-off between absolute security and ease of use and utility of the 
solution. In each containment example discussed later, we highlight the 
different levels of hardware usage that improve the solution’s security level.
 Containers
Containers are a software mechanism to increase the separation between 
applications. In the “Linux Section”, we discuss how Wind River Pulsar 
uses container to improve the stability of their operating system updates; 
because services and components execute within containers with 
enhanced separation between applications, the applications are less 
31 For a discussion of the L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) speculative execution attack 
and its specific effect on ACRN, see https://projectacrn.github.io/latest/
developer-guides/l1tf.html
32 Full separation means using a completely different processor with completely 
different memory and devices for sensitive operations.
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likely to interfere with each other, increasing system stability. Ubuntu 
IoT Core uses a similar construct to containers, which they call snaps. 
Containers and snaps utilize software techniques in the operating system 
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Figure 4-15. Containers and hypervisor comparison
In Figure 4-15, we show the relationship between a container software 
stack and a virtual machine (VM) software stack. What is evident from 
the diagram is the VM stack contains more layers of software due to the 
operating system in each VM.
The strength of a VM solution is the hardware separation between 
the different VMs; however, setting up the VMs and getting the operating 
systems booted in each VM takes more time. The strength of the container 
solution is faster startup time for each container and lower overhead of 
execution; the weakness in containerization is the reliance on software 
separation in the container engine and the underlying operating system. 
A best-in-class solution would be a hybrid that provides the hardware 
security of virtual machines with the speed of deployment and startup for 
containers. Kata Containers provides such a solution.
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 Kata Containers
Kata Containers is an open source project managed by the OpenStack 
Foundation, which includes technology from an Intel open source project 
called Clear Containers. Clear Containers is related to the Intel Clear Linux 
project discussed earlier in the chapter. In actuality, Kata Containers are 
really lightweight virtual machines designed to be managed like containers. 
The benefit of Kata Containers over regular containers is the increased 
security from the hardware-enforced separation provided by the hypervisor. 
This discussion of Kata Containers is based on the 1.2.0 release.33
Kata Containers uses the KVM hypervisor and works seamlessly with 
Kubernetes, Docker, and OpenStack. Other hypervisor support is being 
built and may even be available as you are reading this. Kata Containers is 
comprised of six different components, as shown in Figure 4-16.




























Figure 4-16. Kata Containers architecture
33 Kata Containers, https://katacontainers.io and https://github.com/
kata-containers/documentation
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• The Runtime, called the kata-runtime, handles 
all the Open Container Initiative (OCI) commands 
used to create and configure a container. It also starts 
the Shim instances. The kata-runtime utilizes the 
virtcontainers34 project to perform the heavy lifting in 
a platform agnostic way. Whenever an OCI command 
is run on a container, the Runtime creates a new Shim 
to connect the container engine to the container.
• The Shim, called the kata-shim, is an interface 
between the container engine (like Docker, Kubernetes, 
or OpenStack) and the created container inside the 
virtual machine. The container engine has a process 
(called the Reaper) that monitors the container, 
manages the container, and reaps the container when 
it dies or must be killed. Because Kata Containers are 
inside a virtual machine, the Reaper cannot actually 
access the container, due to the hardware separation 
in place by the VM. The Shim pretends to be the 
container, so the container engine can connect to it for 
management, and the Shim communicates with the 
actual container using an agent. The Shim links the 
standard input and output flows and any Linux signals 
from the container back to the container engine, so the 
container engine can receive them and process them 
appropriately.
• The Agent (kata-agent) is part of the minimal Clear 
Linux OS image and runs inside the VM; it provides 
communication outside the VM to the kata-runtime 
and kata-shim. The Agent creates a container sandbox 
34 https://github.com/containers/virtcontainers
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based on a set of namespaces for a container to run 
inside. The namespaces include UTC, IPC, network, 
and PID35 namespaces. The Agent can support multiple 
containers running inside a VM (called a pod); however 
using Docker, only one container per pod is supported.
• The Hypervisor provides virtualization and is a 
combination of KVM with QEMU. As shown in 
Figure 4- 17, QEMU is the Virtual Machine Manager 
(VMM) and creates the virtual machine for the 
container to run in, populates it with the virtualized 
kernel, and emulates virtualized devices for the 
VM. KVM is used to control the VM, and all VM 
exits return directly back to KVM. The hypervisor 
provides a virtual socket (VSOCK) or a serial port to 
communicate with the Shim or Runtime. The serial 
port is the default, but for Linux kernels beyond v4.8, 
VSOCK is available. If a serial port is used, gRPC runs 
over Yamux on the serial port.
35 See http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/namespaces.7.html, IPC = 
interprocess communication and message queues namespace, PID = process 
identifier namespace, UTS = hostname and Network Information Service (NIS) 
domain name service.
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• The Proxy is a multiplexer for the hypervisor if a 
serial port is used to connect between the Runtime 
or Shim and the hypervisor. Multiple connections are 
required because the kata-agent can communicate 
with multiple different kata-runtime instances and 
kata-shims; each instance opens its own remote 
procedure call to the Agent using gRPC, and the Agent 
connects these to the appropriate container process 
in the VM. The Proxy is not needed if a VSOCK is used 
to connect between the Runtime and the hypervisor, 
since gRPC can run directly over a virtual socket and 
























Figure 4-17. Kata Containers hypervisor architecture36
36 https://github.com/kata-containers/documentation/blob/master/
architecture.md
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communication streams. In this case, the gRPC 
connections from the kata-runtime feed directly to the 
hypervisor over a VSOCK, and the Proxy disappears 
from the architecture diagram in Figure 4-16.
• The kernel is the operating system that runs the 
container inside the virtual machine. The kernel is 
a highly optimized kernel from Clear Linux with a 
minimal memory footprint and includes only the 
services needed to run the container workload. QEMU 
virtualizes or emulates everything else. The smaller 
Linux kernel reduces the attack surface presented to 
the container, further increasing security.























Figure 4-18. Networking with Kata Containers
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WHAT IS QEMU?
Software engineering can solve any problem using another layer of 
abstraction…except for the problem of having too many abstraction layers. 
QeMu is a special abstraction layer that solves several difficulties with 
virtualization.
recall that kVM is a type 2 hypervisor and part of the linux kernel. But, kVM 
uses all the hardware features of VMX, so it is as fast and secure as a type 
1 hypervisor. kata Containers combines QeMu with kVM for further speed 
improvements.
QeMu is a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that runs on top of an operating 
system host, like linux. QeMu is also an emulator that does binary translation 
and can even run programs compiled for different Cpus or oSs on that host. 
So, QeMu is really good at emulation.
In kata Containers, QeMu quickly boots virtual machines (VMs) for kVM 
by using emulation. a special version of QeMu provides highly optimized 
emulators to speed boot time and reduce interpretation of aCpI interfaces. 
other emulators provide the root filesystem as a persistent memory device. 
QeMu also provides hot-plugging devices, during the launch process, allowing 
devices and virtual Cpus to be added to the VM only when needed.
all this speeds the construction of VMs and makes kata Containers execute 
really fast.
Connecting containers to a network is accomplished with a virtual 
network created by the container engine on the host. The container engine 
connects this virtual network to the real network, using appropriate filters, 
including a network address filter (NAT). Docker connects the containers 
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to this network using a virtual Ethernet (veth) device. However, virtual 
machines normally use a TAP37 device. The problem in Kata Containers is 
that all devices are emulated through QEMU, and QEMU does not support 
veth interfaces. The solution implemented in Kata Containers requires  
the kata-runtime to bridge between the TAP device in QEMU and the host 
virtual network created by the container engine. Figure 4-18 shows this 
configuration graphically, with the traffic from the Docker virtual network 
running through the TAP device emulated by QEMU and then into the 
container in the VM.
Figure 4-19 shows the series of interactions between the Kata 
Containers components to create a container in a virtual machine. The 
virtcontainers library as part of the kata-runtime essentially does all the 
work to create the VM, start the Proxy, create the container sandbox that 
the container will run in, and then create the container, and finally start 
the kata-shim to communicate with the container.
Once the container is created, it can be started and used with the 
start message. In Kata Containers, the start message does not create 
the container as it does with most container engines. The container 
was already created with the create command, as shown in Figure 4-19. 
Instead, start just forwards the start message to the kata-agent, and the 
kata-agent starts the container’s primary process.
37 A TAP device copies all traffic from the network into the device, just like a “tap” 
on a phone line.
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
287
 Kata Containers Summary
With Kata Containers, you can have security and performance. Virtual 
machines utilize hardware separation to provide increased containment 
between containers while creatively using different software abstractions 
to maintain the same software APIs to start up and control the containers 
themselves. As we saw with ACRN, there are areas of attack that could 
breech the system, including the QEMU virtualized drivers, and the Kata 
Shim and Runtime. Table 4-5 outlines the analysis of the Kata Containers 











ReadStdout()  (blocking call)
ReadStderr()  (blocking call)
WaitProcess()  (blocking call)
createNetwork()
Execute PreStart Hooks








kata-runtime virtcontainers hypervisor proxy agent shim
Docker kata-runtime virtcontainers hypervisor proxy agent shim
Figure 4-19. Kata Containers create command
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
288




Memory Disclosure by 
Privileged User
B Most privileged attackers are restricted from 
viewing or tampering the VM memory. QeMu 
and the kVM, including their virtualized 
devices, remain as potential privileged 
attackers on the VM memory. platforms 
with multi-key total memory encryption 
(MktMe) can provide protection but should 
include integrity as well as encryption. See 
the following article for attacks on encrypted 
memory: https://arxiv.org/ftp/
arxiv/papers/1712/1712.05090.pdf





C Most privileged attackers are restricted 
from viewing or tampering with workloads 
in the VM. QeMu and the kVM, including 
their virtualized devices, remain as potential 
privileged attackers on the VM execution, 
though this is expected and cannot be 
avoided. however, the kata Shim and 
runtime provide targets for privileged 
attackers to subvert workloads running 
in the VMs, and these processes are not 
protected.
(continued)






Data Leakage via Side 
Channels
C Side channels are most concerning for 
VMs and container systems, as there may 
be applications of different trust levels 
running inside different containers or VMs. 
updates to the linux kernel and microcode 
patches for the serious side-channel CVes 
are available. there continue to be security 
patches for kVM and QeMu, as late as 
october 30, 2018.




for red hat kvm-qemu patches.
Execution Information 
Leakage via Side 
Channels
C execution leakage is similar to memory 
leakage and requires multi-key total 
memory encryption (MktMe) for protection 
but must also include integrity protection as 
well as encryption. Inference of execution 
is still possible under MktMe if page loads 
and misses are observable by the attacker. 
Just as we see in SgX, the operating system 
kernel remains as a potential attacker here.
(continued)
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 Trusted Execution Environments
Even with the protections afforded to applications by containers and 
virtual machines, some applications are so sensitive that they require 
even greater separation protections. Examples of such applications 
include payment applications that deal with credit card transactions 
or authentication applications that deal with fingerprints or other 
biometrics. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are application 
execution containers that are separate from the operating system and 
other applications on the platform and provide enhanced memory 
and execution separation characteristics. TEEs provide containment 
guarantees that prevent even the administrator or root from interfering 
with or peeking at the secrets of an application. This section looks at two 
such TEEs, Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) and Android Trusty.
 Software Guard Extensions
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) is a ring 3 TEE, meaning that SGX is 
directly accessible to applications, and applications running in SGX 





Trusted I/O - trusted I/o is not supported in kata 
Containers.
Application Flexibility a any application can build into kata 
Containers, and the support of many devices 
through virtual device drivers improves the 
level of support and flexibility of the kata 
Containers solution.
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platform. SGX creates a TEE from a special memory cache and a secure 
mode of the CPU, removing the entire operating system from the trusted 
computing base (TCB); this means that unlike other TEEs, SGX does not 
even depend on secure boot to instantiate a trusted environment. For 
applications to use SGX however, the operating system must support 
access to the SGX instructions and the SGX memory cache. Support for 
SGX is available for Microsoft Windows and many Linux distributions, 
including Ubuntu Desktop. SGX has not been ported to Ubuntu IoT Core.
An application running SGX is called an enclave, and an SGX enclave 
is actually part of an application. An enclave is built like a dynamically 
loadable library (DLL) or shared object library (SO), to use Linux 
terminology. The enclave is loaded by an application and, from the 
operating system perspective, the enclave is an extension of the process 
space of the application that loaded it. There are three primary differences 
between a regular application and an enclave:
• The way the enclave memory is treated
• The way the enclave memory is loaded
• The way the enclave is executed
Memory for an enclave comes from a special pool of memory called 
the Enclave Page Cache (EPC). EPC memory is encrypted by the processor 
and is only accessible in SGX mode. Regular applications, or even the 
operating system, that try to access EPC memory see only encrypted junk. 
Only when an enclave is executing can the CPU provide the decryption key 
so the memory page contents can be viewed. Likewise writes to the EPC 
pages are also restricted. These guarantees are part of what makes SGX 
mode a TEE. Platforms must allocate memory into the EPC, thus making 
that memory unavailable for regular applications; a new feature of SGX is 
the dynamic allocation of pages to the EPC, but this is not supported on all 
processors yet.
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The second thing that makes SGX mode a TEE is the special 
way that code and data are loaded into an enclave. When a regular 
application asks the operating system for an enclave to be created, 
it provides the DLL (or SO) that contains the enclave’s code. That 
code must be signed. We will discuss how the code is signed and with 
what key in a moment. SGX includes a special loader that verifies the 
signature on the enclave as it is loading its code and data into EPC 
memory. If the signature indicates the enclave code is authentic, then 
the loader activates the enclave and the application can use the enclave 
functions. If the signature indicates the enclave has been tampered 
with or is not signed with an authorized key, then the load of the 
enclave fails. All code and initial data pages loaded into an enclave are 
verified as authentic, which indicates that the authorized party that 
signed that code also trusts that code. This makes the code running 
inside SGX trustworthy and another attribute of SGX as a TEE.
The final thing that makes SGX mode a TEE is the fact that it is 
a special mode of the CPU, and this creates execution separation 
between regular applications and enclaves. The execution of enclave 
code within SGX is separate from execution inside the operating system 
and the execution in applications. There have been side-channel 
attacks on SGX, just as there have been on other execution modes. This 
is a result of some shared micro-architectural state and shared cache 
state; there is also a dependency from SGX on the operating system to 
load and manage memory pages which creates another type of side 
channel. Changes to the CPU microcode have addressed the attacks 
that are known, and further changes are being made to hyperthreading 
mode to address additional issues. We talk more about this in the 
section on threats later.
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Creating code that can be run as an enclave requires a special key. 
This is because the enclave code must be verified by the SGX launcher 
when the enclave is loaded. The SGX launcher uses a key set by the BIOS 
during boot to verify enclave programs. If an enclave is signed using a key 
which itself is signed by the SGX launcher key in BIOS, then the enclave 
is trusted. By default, the BIOS includes an Intel key. Intel will sign an 
enclave developer’s key after they submit a formal request and fill out 
some paperwork. This means that any developer with such a key could run 
enclave code on any platform with an Intel processor. Intel realizes this 
should be a bit more controlled, so they allow the owner of the platform 
to change the key in the BIOS to a key of their own. This means that the 
platform owner can change the behavior of the SGX launcher to approve 
only enclaves that they themselves trust; this is done by changing that 
BIOS key.
SGX is a powerful mode on Intel processors that provides a trusted 
execution environment to applications. This gives applications the ability 
to put their most sensitive code inside a trusted execution container and 
keep the operation of that code, and any secrets that the code uses, away 
from other applications and even the operating system.
 SGX Security Summary
Table 4-6 provides a summary of the SGX system security features for 
comparison with other systems.
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Table 4-6. SGX TEE Security Summary
TEE Security Principles Grade Comments
Memory Disclosure by 
Privileged User
a SgX uses a separate memory cache that is 
encrypted by the Cpu and is separated from 
the operating system and other applications.
Memory Tampering by 
Privileged User
a SgX mode prevents access to memory 
pages in the epC unless an SgX application 
is executing, which locks out other 
applications and the operating system from 
tampering with the memory. page attributes 
are set and locked at page set up time 
when the enclave is loaded.
Execution Interference  
by Privileged User
B the operating system still controls the 
page tables, including allocation of pages 
and page eviction; a misbehaving oS can 
perform a doS on an enclave and perform 
some side-channel attacks using the 
enclave’s usage of pages. protection of 
secrets within an SgX enclave still requires 
the use of constant-time programming 
constructs and careful use of pages and 
cache to avoid such side-channel attacks.
(continued)
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Table 4-6. (continued)
TEE Security Principles Grade Comments
Data Leakage via Side 
Channels
C research on SgX side channels, including 
l1 terminal fault, have been reported. 
these are a result of microarchitectural 
side channels in the Cpu itself. Cpu patches 
are effective in mitigating most of these 
attacks, other than hyperthreading- based 
attacks.38 other options including forcing 





Leakage via Side 
Channels
B
Trusted I/O - trusted I/o is not supported in SgX.
Application Flexibility a any application can contain enclave code 
which can be loaded into SgX. Commercial 
development of enclaves requires a key 
from Intel, or the platform must be set up 
with a special SgX launcher key.
 Android Trusty
The Trusty TEE39 is an offering from Google that includes an operating 
system, a set of drivers for Android to communicate with Trusty, and APIs for 
applications to use applications running in Trusty. Trusty is an interesting 
TEE that has some very different properties as compared with Intel SGX.
38 https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/
default/files/336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf
39 Google. “Trusty TEE.” https://source.android.com/security/trusty
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The first primary difference is Trusty is designed to operate on a 
completely separate processor from the main processor running the 
untrusted operating system. Trusty uses its own memory management 
unit (MMU) and provides virtualized memory for all the trusted apps 
running in Trusty. All the applications must be single threaded, though 
multithreaded applications may be provided in a future update.
The next significant difference with Trusty is that it can have access 
to devices, platform keys, and other resources and give access to those 
resources to Trusty applications. Since SGX runs in ring 3, it does not have 
privileged access to devices and does not currently have a trusted I/O 
mechanism.
The last difference in Trusty is that trusted applications are compiled 
into Trusty and run as an event-driven server. Applications cannot be 
added dynamically into Trusty – they must be designed and built into the 
Trusty kernel. And each trusted application running in Trusty is accessible 
to any application in the untrusted operating system; Trusty applications 
are not bound to a particular process in the untrusted processor.
 Trusty TEE Security Summary
Trusty is an interesting TEE that provides significant trust for platform 
developers, but it does not expose the capability for end users to create 
their own trusted applications.
Table 4-7 provides a summary of the Trusty TEE security features for 
comparison with other systems.
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Table 4-7. Trusty TEE Security Summary
TEE Security Principles Grade Comments
Memory Disclosure by 
Privileged User
a Because trusty uses a physically 
separate memory from the untrusted 
operating system and its own MMu, 
disclosure and tampering are avoided. 
the drawback is the additional hw cost 
for this separation.
Memory Tampering by 
Privileged User
a
Data Leakage via Side 
Channels
a
Execution Interference by 
Privileged User
a Because trusty uses a physically 
separate processor (or physical core) 
from the untrusted operating system and 
its own MMu, disclosure and tampering 
are avoided. the drawback is the 
additional hw cost for this separation.
Execution Information 
Leakage via Side Channels
a
Trusted I/O B trusted devices are built into the system 
and allocated when trusty software is 
compiled.
Application Flexibility d only the applications built into the trusty 
software are available – no dynamic 
loading of software applications or 
services is possible.
 Containment Summary
In this section, we reviewed different types of application containment, 
ranging from software-only containment using containers, hardware- 
assisted containment with virtual machines, hardware TEE with encrypted 
memory and special processor state with SGX, and full hardware 
separation TEE with Trusty. The more hardware used in the containment 
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solution, the greater the level of security provided by the solution. 
However, there is a balance to be had, as we saw with Trusty, because 
software is more flexible than hardware. A full hardware solution, while 
more secure, creates limitations to what can be accomplished and what 
usage models applications can execute.
 Network Stack and Security Management
This section signals the shift in our chapter from platform software 
to the management plane. Networking and connectivity are vital to 
an IoT system, and therefore the entirety of Chapter 5 is devoted to 
this subject. We leave the discussion of the network technologies and 
protocol stacks, including the threats, to that future chapter. However, 
before we leave the networking topic completely, we want to cover an 
important software library for network packet processing, the DPDK,  
as well as a few software packages that make security management 
easier.
 Intel Data Plane Development Kit
The Data Plane Development Kit (DPDK) is a set of software libraries 
and device drivers that make constructing software networking stacks 
with advanced features very easy and very performant. We talk about 
the DPDK because it is a useful component to speed the development 
of end-to-end security features and in the implementation of network 
security policies to enforce network restrictions. This library exposes 
the features and capabilities of network cards into ring 3, enabling better 
performance when processing packets at high speed. This is important 
for edge devices implementing industrial control loops, because the 
DPDK allows software to reliably receive and send packets within a 
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minimum number of CPU cycles. The Linux Foundation40 provides a 
downloadable version of the DPDK, and Intel contributes specialized 
features and drivers that directly leverage Intel silicon performance. 
The DPDK boosts packet processing throughput and provides multicore 
support, facilitates processing of packets in user space (ring 3) to avoid 
costly transitions between user and kernel space, and enables direct 
access to devices for high-speed IO.
The latest DPDK version is 18.05 and supports the following features:
• Support for multiple NIC cards, including virtualized 
drivers
• Support for cryptographic operations in cryptodev 
library
• Support for event handling in the eventdev library
• Baseband wireless in the bbdev library
• Data compression support in the compressdev library 
(new in DPDK 18.05)
Figure 4-20 shows the architecture of the DPDK library.
40 https://www.dpdk.org/ and documentation is available online at http://fast.
dpdk.org/doc/pdf-guides/
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The DPDK is very comprehensive and supports multiple hardware 
capabilities across Intel, AMD, ARM, NXP, and other hardware 
manufacturers. In keeping with our theme in this chapter, let us review 
the security capabilities and the Intel-specific hardware features that are 
supported through the DPDK.
The DPDK supports standard modes for the Advanced Encryption 
Algorithm (AES), including Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, Electronic 
Code Book (ECB) mode, Counter (CTR) mode,11 and a special mode used 















Figure 4-20. The Intel DPDK library structure
41 XTS is actually considered a tweak cipher, a modification of the underlying 
cipher using parameters. XTS stands for XEX-based tweaked-codebook 
mode with ciphertext stealing. XEX is a tweak cipher mode, which stands for 
XOR-Encrypt-XOR, which was designed by Phillip Rogaway, 2004, “Efficient 
Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements to Modes OCB and 
PMAC,” http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf
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with the standard key sizes, 128-bits, 192-bits, and 256-bits. DPDK also 
supported DOCSIS encryption and DES and 3DES.42
In addition to encryption, the DPDK supports hashing algorithms 
using the SHA243 algorithms, SHA2-256, SHA2-384, and SHA2-512. The 
older SHA1 algorithm is also supported, but should only be used for 
interoperability reasons; the use of SHA2-256 should be the minimum 
requirement for IoT systems.
The DPDK supports the Intel SHA-NI and AES-NI instructions (see 
Chapter 3, section “CPU hosted Crypto implementations”), providing 
access to hardware acceleration of these algorithms. In addition, AES- 
GCM, the Galois Counter Mode of AES, is further enhanced by combining 
the AES-NI instruction with carryless multiplication instructions to speed 
performance of the Galois integrity tag calculation.44
The DPDK provides compatibility with other software and hardware 
implementations of cryptography, even providing a full software 
implementation using the OpenSSL open source cryptographic library. 
Using these different plugins for the DPDK cryptodev library, a fully 
portable application can be built that makes use of the best hardware 
features the platform has to offer. The use of the DPDK allows applications 
42 DES, Data Encryption Standard, and 3DES, Triple Data Encryption Standard, 
are older modes included only for interoperability. It is strongly recommended 
to avoid use of these modes unless they are required for interoperability. In IoT 
systems, there is no good reason to use such modes.
43 SHA, Secure Hash Algorithm, are algorithms defined in the NIST Secure Hash 
Standard (SHS) for cryptographic hash algorithms. The older version SHA1 
is deprecated for most uses today. The SHA2 family of algorithms, https://






Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
302
direct access to the best cryptographic acceleration hardware of the Intel 
platform, and compatibility to other platform’s cryptographic accelerators 
as well.
 Security Management
Security management is the combination of active processes and 
executed procedures during installation, configuration, operation, and 
decommissioning of systems that preserves the confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability of those system and network resources for the approved 
mission(s) of the organization. This chapter focuses on software, not 
processes and procedures. However, there are software tools and agents 
that directly aid the security management process. We look at a few of 
those here, just for completeness in our discussion.
 Secure Device Onboarding
The very first issue requiring a solution in an IoT system is device 
provisioning or how to provision devices so they can connect to the 
correct back-end cloud system or device management system. A common 
solution is to preprovision devices during manufacturing to connect 
to a specific cloud agent. Microsoft Azure Sphere uses this approach. 
While it works, that solution locks the device into a specific cloud, and 
the approach can have impacts on high-speed manufacturing. A better 
approach is to provide flexible and secure onboarding for any device to 
any cloud system. Intel’s Secure Device Onboard (SDO45) provides this 
security capability using an EPID46 device identity key. Figure 4-21 shows 
the provisioning lifecycle of a device, from manufacturing to installation. 
This can be any device from a gateway or server down to a smart sensor.
45 https://software.intel.com/en-us/secure-device-onboard
46 See the discussion of Intel’s Enhanced Privacy ID (EPID) in Chapter 3.

























Figure 4-21. Intel’s Secure Device Onboard preserves device privacy 
and provisions “Any Device to Any Cloud”
SDO utilizes a few hardware security features to construct this high- 
level service, including
• The platform’s root of trust containing an identity key; 
an EPID group signature key is the preferred identity 
key, since it provides privacy for the device installation, 
but an RSA or ECDSA key may also be used.
• The Intel SDO Client firmware executing inside a TEE; 
SDO currently uses the CSME discussed in Chapter 3 
for its TEE, but SGX or Trusty are alternative TEEs for 
SDO.
• Secure storage on the device to hold the manufacturer’s 
public key, a GUID, and an ownership credential.
During manufacturing, a digital record of the device is created, which 
is referred to as the ownership credential. The ownership credential 
includes the device’s unique identifier (GUID) and the owner’s public 
key; the owner credential is signed by a private key belonging to the 
manufacturer and includes an integrity checksum to prevent modification 
or forgery of the ownership credential. The manufacturer endorses the 
ownership credential by digitally signing it with the manufacturer’s private 
key when the device is sold. This endorsement can be repeated in the 
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supply chain, allowing a deferred binding between the credentials stored 
in the device and those of the device management service (e.g., running 
within a particular AWS account) who will control the device in operation.
When the device is installed (Step 1 in Figure 4-21), the device contacts 
Intel’s Secure Device Onboard Rendezvous server and is connected with the 
device management service which was specified by the device’s owner. As a 
precursor to the device install step, the preferred device management server 
must have been registered with the SDO Rendezvous service by the device 
owner using the ownership credentials. The SDO protocol between the 
device and Rendezvous server validates the ownership credential, as well 
as the authenticity of the device and the Rendezvous server to each other. 
At the end of the SDO protocol, the device is forwarded to the proper device 
management service to complete provisioning (Step 2 in Figure 4- 21),  
allowing the device management service to install a management agent on 
the device. SDO prevents unauthorized entities from taking control of the 
device and gives the end customer flexibility to provision the device to any 
management service or cloud back end. The device management service 
can then update the device with new software and link the device to the 
preferred back-end cloud system (Steps 3 and 4 in Figure 4-21). Intel SDO 
can also be reactivated by the device owner at any time, allowing the device 
to be reprovisioned or for device resale.
Intel Secure Device Onboarding solves the first problem an IoT device 
encounters – how to securely connect to the right back-end service for 
management and operations. Using hardware security elements inherent 
in the platform, SDO provides a low-cost and flexible solution with high 
security.
 Platform Integrity
Once a device is provisioned, maintaining the integrity of the platform 
software is vital to keeping an IoT system operating. Platform integrity 
means ensuring that a device has booted the platform software intended 
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by the system and that the platform firmware, boot loader, and operating 
system have not been corrupted. Device management software can query 
the platform’s integrity state and determine if something needs to be 
updated or remediated. But, some software element must reside on the 
device to calculate the platform integrity and then communicate it up to 
the device management software in a meaningful way.
In Chapter 3, we discuss protected boot technologies included in 
Intel platforms, including PTT47 and TPMs. These hardware elements 
use software in the operating system, boot loader, and BIOS to measure 
the platform during boot. These measurements are stored in hardware- 
protected storage in PTT or the TPM. The software to access these 
measurements is included in the trusted services stack (TSS) that was 
written according to the Trusted Computing Group’s (TCG) specification 
for TPM2. As shown in Figure 4-22, this software stack is comprehensive 
and, besides platform integrity measurement, includes features for other 
TPM operations including encryption, key generation, secure storage, 
and attestation. The application-level APIs are all provided in the System 
API (SAPI)48 or the Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI)49 and are defined by the TCG; 
the FAPI is still under development. The Feature API (FAPI) would be the 
easiest to use and abstracts many details of the TPM from the application, 
while the SAPI provides near-transparent use of the TPM commands and 
responses.
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 Network Defense
IoT systems are all about communication, and without some type of 
defensive measures, these IoT devices would be easy targets for network 
attackers. Common network defense capabilities including firewalls and 
intrusion defense software are important to add to any IoT device. Some 
devices are so small and so resource constrained that no attempt is even 
made to add any network protections. However, there are tools that can 
provide some reasonable protections and should be considered.
The first step of network defense, of course, is to limit the applications 
and services that open ports to listen for connections. In fact, if your IoT 
device is so resource constrained that you are considering putting no 
network defenses on the device, then there should be no listening services 
either – only outgoing connections. But because firewalling is the most 
basic defense, a program that intercepts the incoming network traffic to 
check for anomalies is important and should be considered.
On Linux distributions, the recommended program for network defense 
is TCP Wrappers. This program can be called from inetd or configured into 
the hosts.allow and hosts.deny configurations. TCP Wrappers allows the 
system to be configured to allow or deny connections based on the network 
TCG TPM2 SOFTWARE STACK: DESIGN
System API (SAPI)
•   1:1 mapping to
TPM2 commands
•   No file I/O
•   No crypto
•   No heap
Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI)
•   Provides Cryptographic
functions for sessions
•   Requires heap / does
memory allocations
•   Additional utility functions











TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI)
TPM Access Broker (TAB) & Resource Manager (RM)
TPM Device Driver
•   No implementation yet
•   File IO
•   Must be able to do retries
•   Context based state
•   Must support static linking
•   Spec in draft form
TPM Command Transmission Interface (TCTI)
•   Decouple APIs from command transport / IPC
•   Abstract command / response mechanism,
•   Dynamic loading / diopen API
•   No crypto, heap, file I/O
TPM Access Broker and Resource Manager (TAB/RM)
•   Potentially no file IO - depends on power mgmt.
•   Power management
TPM Device Driver
•   Pre-boot log handoff
•   Device interface (CRB / polling)
•   No crypto
•   Abstract Limitations of TPM Storage











Figure 4-22. Intel TPM2 software stack (TSS)50
50 https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2018/08/29/tpm2-software- 
stack-open-source
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address and protocol. Additionally, other commands can be executed when 
rules in the TCP Wrappers configuration are triggered, such as sending 
an alert email or adding an entry to the syslog. Configuration of the TCP 
Wrappers file can provide extensive filtering and can be set up so that normal 
traffic and operations easily get through without any overhead. Other options 
for firewalling include directly using the kernel netfilter or configuring the 
netfilter through ipchains. Significant material is available both on the Web 
and in Linux books, so that information will not be repeated here.
Finally, good logging for what is happening on the network and on a 
device is vital to reconstructing an attack or understanding an attempted 
intrusion. There are numerous programs for attack detection that operate 
on both Linux and Windows and can be compiled for other operating 
systems as well. TCPdump and snort51 are common programs for detecting 
network intrusions or malformed packets on a device. Snort can be turned 
into a full-scale network intrusion detection system where devices capture 
traffic and send dangerous looking packets to a central server for deeper 
analysis. Suricata is a similar robust open source solution for intrusion 
detection. These types of intrusion detection system are very useful for 
IoT system for early detection of attacks and fast response to prevent such 
attacks from bringing down the IoT system.
 Platform Monitoring
Security management includes monitoring a device and its workload for 
anomalies, in the event that a network attacker is able to circumvent the 
network defenses in place on the device. The monitoring functions are tied 
into the device management agent on the platform, allowing problems to 
be reported back to the management servers.
In the section on Zephyr, we discussed watchdog timers used to 
monitor for long running privileged threads. Remember the problem in 
Zephyr was a privileged thread that does not yield back to the operating 
51 https://www.snort.org/
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system which can then starve out the execution of other processes on 
the system. The operating system can prevent this by using a hardware 
timer started before releasing control to the high-privileged thread; if 
the thread does not yield back in a certain amount of time, the hardware 
timer causes a non-maskable interrupt (NMI) that stops execution of 
everything else and returns control back to an interrupt service routine 
(ISR) in the operating system. When the operating system regains control, 
it can terminate the offending thread and report the situation back to the 
management service. Sometimes this doesn’t work. It often fails because 
the attacked thread had enough privileges on the system, allowing the 
attacker to disable or continually reset the timer, effectively disabling the 
watchdog.
There are other unique options for performing platform monitoring 
that can identify side-channel attacks or threads that have potentially been 
corrupted by network attackers. Several techniques are published[52, 53] 
that utilize hardware performance counters in the CPU microarchitecture 
to characterize and monitor software and detect when attacks are likely 
present. This information can be used to shut down the attacking threads 
or reboot the system into a known good state.
 McAfee Embedded Control
There is one last software capability that deserves mention in security 
management that provides some unique system authorization 
capabilities. McAfee Embedded Control (MEC)54 is a software program 
52 A Survey of Cyber Security Countermeasures Using Hardware Performance 
Counters, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.10868.pdf
53 Cache-Based Side-Channel Attacks Detection through Intel Cache Monitoring 
Technology and Hardware Performance Counters, https://hal.inria.fr/
hal-01762803/document
54 https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/products/embedded-control.html
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that provides extended access control and integrity to IoT platforms. MEC 
protects both executable as well as data files on a platform, ensuring that 
those files are not accidentally or maliciously modified, even by a user with 
administrative rights. MEC creates a new privileged user on the platform 
that is only accessible through the MEC admin interface and manages 
a database of integrity checksums over directories and files specified by 
the MEC admin. MEC includes an augmented launcher that is integrated 
with the Windows or Linux operating system, allowing MEC to check the 
integrity of executable files before launch. The access control database 
allows MEC to also specify what services and devices an executable can 
access, providing even stricter control on running applications. This 
means that even if a program were maliciously corrupted at Runtime, the 
attacker would not be able to use unauthorized system resources, and ROP 
or JOP attacks would only be able to modify the use of authorized system 
resources, not fundamentally change the resources to which the program 
has access.
MEC creates a very powerful protection for IoT devices, and 
this system works extremely well when the platform’s software and 
configuration does not change regularly. MEC can be integrated easily 
in McAfee ePO device management suite as well (see the discussion in 
the “Device Management” section). In some versions of MEC, dynamic 
protection of memory is also provided, limiting the effect of buffer 
overflows. A limited version of MEC is included in Intel’s IoT Gateway 
Software Suite,55 and McAfee continues to add improvements and support 
for other operating systems in MEC. Upgrading to the fully featured 
McAfee Embedded Control Pro from the basic MEC version included in 
Intel’s IoT Gateway is a smooth transition, fully supported by the MEC 
admin interface.
55 https://shopiotmarketplace.com/iot/index.html#/details?pix=58
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 Network Stack and Security Summary
In this section we looked at various software components that can provide 
effective network defense and attack detection, and even be used to 
build comprehensive end-to-end security using the cryptographic library 
in the DPDK. Common IoT problems like platform integrity, device 
provisioning, and system authorization can be solved using specialized 
packages like the TSS, Intel SDO, and McAfee Embedded Control. While 
these problems cannot be solved for free, the cost in additional compute 
resources and Runtime RAM may likely provide the difference between 
a platform that is regularly being attacked and draining the maintenance 
and remediation budget and a platform with adequate tools and packages 
that is resilient to attack.
 Device Management
IoT systems are composed of thousands of devices, and with so many 
devices, manual management is prohibitive. In other cases, IoT devices are 
physically located in remote or difficult-to-reach locations, increasing the 
cost of sending out a repair person in a “truck roll.” Autonomous device 
management using a cloud-based management solution is essential to 












Figure 4-23. Notional cloud-based device management system
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Cloud-based device management systems include a few common 
elements, as shown in Figure 4-23. On the device, a management agent 
performs the actions requested by the management system and also 
provides data to the management system on the device’s health. How 
such an agent is installed on a device can sometimes be an issue; however 
device provisioning solutions like SDO covered in a prior section provide 
convenient solutions to this issue. A management console, normally 
implemented as a browser-based web application, retrieves data from the 
device management system and presents usable information to system 
administrators, allowing admins to schedule maintenance, perform 
actions on groups of devices, or even dive into details of a specific device 
to troubleshoot problems or investigate trouble tickets. The actual device 
management system in the Cloud is what separates different systems. 
Generally, each management system must have three elements:
• A Device Event Input queue allowing devices to provide 
status and report problems
• A Command Queue allowing administrators to push 
out commands to devices
• A Device Information Database containing information 
on each device in the system
The security services that device management system must provide 
include
• Authentication: Ensures that both devices and 
administrators on the device management system are 
who they claim to be. Cryptographic credentials issued 
to these parties are essential to maintaining proof of 
identity for all entities on the system.
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• Authorization: Commands to devices can be 
disruptive to the services provided by the IoT system, 
or even potentially destructive to the device itself. A 
reboot command to several devices might cause a 
temporary denial of service, but a forced operating 
system update with corrupt software could bring down 
a system for days or even months.
• Confidentiality and Integrity: Although data sent 
via device management systems do not typically 
include personally identifiable information (PII), 
the commands and device health data can contain 
sensitive information. Integrity of this data is vital to 
prevent tampering or accidental corruption of the data 
in transit, but confidentiality may also be warranted 
depending on the information contained in commands 
and data updates from devices.
• Nonrepudiation: Guaranteed proof of source 
attached to health data or even the collection of other 
environmental data around devices could be crucial to 
the IoT system. Guaranteeing data originated from a 
particular device is part of data provenance.
• Defense in Depth: Is a layering of defenses to protect 
system elements from hacking. This includes attacks 
on the devices, gateways, and on the cloud systems 
and management consoles. Because the device 
management system represents the most significant 
network attack surface, and many of the software 
elements attached to the device management 
agents require elevated privileges to perform their 
operations, the device management system itself 
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must be constructed to prevent attackers from gaining 
control over the IoT systems. Careful attention to the 
construction of both the device agent and the interfaces 
and APIs presented by the cloud system is necessary to 
prevent successful attacks.
This section reviews two different device management systems, one 
designed for small to medium deployments (Mesh Central) and one 
designed for large deployments (Helix Device Cloud).
 Mesh Central
Mesh Central is a device management solution appropriate for small- to 
medium-sized IoT deployments. Mesh is an agent technology, which 
means that each managed device must be running the Mesh Agent 
software component. Mesh allows a Mesh Administrator to gain remote 
access and control of their devices through a variety of means, including 
direct shell access, dashboards, and connection via custom web applets. 
Mesh also provides peer-to-peer (i.e., Machine-to-Machine [M2M]) 
interactions, allowing devices to communicate directly to each other, 
without a human administrator being involved; this enables the IoT M2M 
type actions for true IoT automation.
Mesh Central is an Intel open source project and has a wide array of 
services targeted for remote monitoring and management of computers 
and devices. Users can manage all their devices from a single web site, 
no matter the device location or the device position behind routers and 
proxies, and this is all possible without needing to know the device’s IP 
addresses. Mesh works by having each device generate a new unique RSA 
key pair, and the hash of the public key becomes the device’s identity. 
Mesh devices register to the Mesh Central Cloud by communicating 
to devices around them and finding a path to the Mesh servers. This 
information is found in a signed policy file that is shared among the 
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devices; however, this requires that devices be preprovisioned with a Mesh 
client and a policy file, otherwise, and IP address and a path to the device 
are needed for solutions like SDO to work properly.
The following is a partial list of the actions a Mesh Administrator can 
do to their connected devices:
• Opening a shell to run commands directly on the 
device
• Opening the device’s graphical desktop, displaying 
the device’s GUI, and providing mouse control on the 
device
• Installing, removing, and updating software on the 
device
• Activating a particular piece of software on the device 
or sending commands to that software (as if on a 
terminal on the device)
• Viewing files or logs on the device
The following is a brief list of Mesh Central architectural elements:
• Each device is referred to as a node and is identified by 
a secure, provable identifier based on a self-generated 
(device-generated) RSA public key.
• Nodes are organized into an overlay network, meaning 
routing of Mesh messages occur from the Mesh server 
to the device, but potentially hopping from one device 
in the Mesh to another device in the Mesh in order 
to reach the actual destination device; this path may 
traverse different communication networks connecting 
each device.
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• Agent and Server APIs are available for generic, secure 
messaging for Admin-to-Device and Device-to- Device 
messaging.
• Agent Software Update is provided over-the-air 
(network) using signed and verified updates.
• Direct Connection from an admin web browser (via 
web sockets) directly to devices for custom applications 
in the browser to interact with, query, or control 
devices.
• A Mesh Developer API to add custom actions into the 












Some Mesh Nodes have
direct access to the internet,
but others have access only
by hopping through another
device via Mesh
Mesh of loT devices
And access gateways
AJAX Server
Figure 4-24. Mesh Central device management system architecture
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As shown in Figure 4-24, Mesh Central is actually composed of four 
different servers:
• The AJAX Server: Provides the primary interface for 
Mesh administrators
• The Swarm Server: Provides the primary interface for 
devices into Mesh
• The Database: Usually Microsoft SQL Server, stores 
data about devices
• The MSMQ: Provides message delivery among servers
Mesh operates by having a bit of software, called the Mesh Agent 
Software, on every device. This agent runs under a privileged account on 
the device so that it is able to perform management on the device (e.g., run 
software, install applications and services, activate hardware, etc.). The 
Mesh Agent also has a configuration file, called the Mesh Agent Policy File, 
that controls what the agent is allowed to do and information about the 
Mesh control server.




Authentication C Mesh requires devices to generate their own 
identity keys in software and then registers 
devices to the Mesh Swarm server without any 
device attestation or proof from a hardware 
root of trust. this forces device administrators 
to know the hostnames of devices that should 
be registering and ignore or boot off devices 
they do not trust.
(continued)





Authorization C authorization of commands requires an 
additional key be shared from the Mesh 
administrator, because commands are not 
protected end to end, only hop to hop. without 
this additional layering of authorization (not 
natively provided by Mesh), commands could 
be forged by a rogue Mesh node.
Confidentiality and 
Integrity
a all messages traversing the Mesh are 
protected with strong integrity and 
confidentiality, and session keys are 
regenerated frequently. protections are only 
provided hop to hop, however, not end to end.
Repudiation d Mesh does not leverage a hardware root of 
trust, so all keys are software generated. while 
all the right actions (e.g., encrypted messages, 
rSa identity keys, verification by clients) are 
performed, there is no protection of credentials 
on the device if an attacker were able to 
compromise software on one of the systems.
Defense in Depth d Mesh runs the Mesh agent as root by default; 
significant rework of the client software is 
required to segment high privilege tasks to 
protected software agents.
Table 4-8. (continued)
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 Wind River Helix Device Cloud
Helix Device Cloud (HDC) is an IoT device management solution by Wind 
River. HDC is able to connect to IoT devices and gateways, manage device- 
generated data, automatically respond to device events, and perform 
remote (OTA) software updates. HDC includes a significant back-end 
system using Kafka that enables intelligent autonomous management of 
devices and provides easy and secure device onboarding and provisioning 
through Intel Secure Device Onboard (SDO). HDC adds an agent protocol 
called DXL (Data Exchange Layer) to each edge device that enables 
intelligent processing of data and secure end-to-end communication.
With Helix Device Cloud, administrators can
• Maintain secure two-way connectivity to gateways and 
devices
• Perform flexible data collection to the Cloud and even 
distribute that data across multiple edge nodes using 
DXL’s powerful edge capabilities
• Receive immediate notification of device issues and use 
HDC Agent tools for remote diagnosis and repair
• Securely onboard new devices using SDO and upgrade 
new devices when first activated in the field
• Push new updates out to connected devices
• Collect and import data from IoT devices directly to 
enterprise systems
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HDC focuses on the device management and edge aggregation 
services; HDC does not address applications and data analytics, but 
provides mechanisms for these services to reach devices through HDC 
using McAfee ePO plugins and call-outs to external services. For a more 



















































Figure 4-25. Wind River Helix Device Cloud device management 
architecture
Figure 4-25 shows the architecture of HDC. Devices connect to HDC 
Cloud using HTTP, DXL, or MQTT57 protocols, and enterprise services 
leverage the data in HDC through a set of REST APIs exposed by HDC 
on the back end. Within HDC, there are three primary components: 
the device connection protocols, the data bus that organizes and routes 
messages and events, and the database that holds structured and 
unstructured data, analytics, metadata, and compute workloads. A fourth 
56 https://software.intel.com/en-us/iot/cloud-analytics/cloud-helix
57 MQTT – Message Queuing Telemetry Transport is an ISO standard protocol 
based on the publish-subscribe design pattern. MQTT is described in more 
detail in “Message Orchestration” section.
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part of HDC provides an extension interface to add features to HDC using 
the same extension interface as McAfee ePO,58 allowing them to leverage 
each other’s extensions.
One of the most interesting elements of HDC is the data bus and real- 
time processing rules. HDC utilizes an open source topic organization 
server called Kafka. With Kafka, incoming messages from devices are 
filtered through a set of rules to determine appropriate actions. Actions 
can include storing the message data into a part of the database, passing 
the message off to an ePO plugin, generating an alert to an administrator, 
or even activating some compute element in the database to create an 
immediate response to the reporting device. In fact, with the Kafka rules, 
multiple actions can be executed as a result of receiving a single message.
HDC is a secure device management system due to its use of Intel 
Secure Device Onboard (SDO) to provision devices and the use of DXL 
for secure communication. As discussed in the section on security 
management, SDO leverages the device’s root of trust to authenticate 
the device during onboarding, ensuring the device is not being spoofed 
by an attacker. During onboarding, HDC leverages the secure channel 
authenticated with the device’s root-of-trust key to install a new device 
identity key. DXL uses this new key for authentication back to HDC 
during TLS session establishment, making all messages passed over TLS 
authenticated back to the device. SDO also installs a trust anchor key for 
the HDC server; a trust anchor key is a key that is inherently trusted for a 
particular purpose. The DXL client stores the HDC trust anchor key so that 
it can authenticate the HDC server over TLS. On platforms that support the 
SGX TEE (see the section on software containment), the DXL client uses 
SGX to protect its identity key and the trust anchor key from attack by any 
malware that is able to infiltrate the device.
58 McAfee ePO is an enterprise Policy Orchestration product that provides a unified 
and centralized management console for security management.
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Authentication a the device and hdC server are authenticated 
with rSa key pairs that were established 
over a secure channel through Sdo using a 
hardware root-of-trust key.
Authorization a all commands down to the device are 
verified as authentic through dXl using a 




a all data and commands are protected over 
tlS.
Repudiation a the strong identity keys established using 
Sdo validate the true device identity and link 
that to the rSa identity keys. any actions or 
data are tied to this identity key and cannot 
be repudiated.
Defense in Depth a dXl uses the SgX tee to ensure its 
operations and key material are not 
compromised, even if the platform is infected 
with malware.
 Device Management Summary
Managing the devices of an IoT system is critical to security. Since 
all the management services occur over the network, attacks such as 
device spoofing, message forgery, and data disclosure are all possible. 
Although basic security protections over messages are possible, in  
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IoT system, attacks on the devices themselves can compromise key 
material and lead to questions regarding the provenance of data 
collected in the Cloud. The use of hardware security capabilities, like 
hardware root-of-trust keys and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), 
drastically improves the security of device management systems and, 
due to the lower risk of attacks, reduces the total cost of ownership of  
IoT systems.
 System Firmware and Root-of-Trust Update 
Service
At the beginning of the chapter, in the “Operating Systems” section, 
we discussed the update problem. The Linux distributions reviewed in 
that section had different strategies for solving consistency among the 
packages and services being updated. However, the section identified 
a remaining problem regarding firmware updates which is how to gain 
the required access to firmware on the platform with the ability to 
perform updates.
Firmware is notoriously difficult to update. It typically resides in 
flash or other nonvolatile storage that is locked or inaccessible even 
to the operating system itself. The reason for this inaccessibility is 
security. Firmware is part of the most trusted parts of a system. The 
BIOS is the first part of the system that executes during power-on and 
represents the root of trust of the entire system. Other firmware may 
implement root-of-trust functions, such as system measurements, 
secure storage, or attestation reporting. Firmware in the security 
engines control cryptographic algorithms and keys. Firmware in 
network controllers (Ethernet, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, LoRa) have 
access to all traffic entering and exiting the device and may even have 
access to cryptographic keys for encrypted traffic.
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On personal computer-like systems using BIOS, the standard way 
to perform secure firmware updates is through the Capsule Update.59 A 
Capsule Update is a function in the BIOS that is activated by the operating 
system. The Capsule Update function is provided the addresses of capsules 
in memory containing updates for certain firmware, and then the system 
performs a soft reset. When BIOS takes control of the platform, it verifies 
the capsules in memory, and if they are authentic and appropriate for the 
platform, the capsules are used to update the appropriate firmware. For 
Capsule Update to work properly, the operating system must be capable of 
engaging the update service.
Not all devices support the BIOS Capsule Update. And of course for 
systems without BIOS, or for IoT systems that do not use standard BIOS, 
some other solution is required. In these cases, some type of custom 
update procedure is required; as an example, see the update procedure 




 Threats to Firmware and RoT Update
Firmware update for IoT systems is being addressed by an Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) working group named SUITS (Software 
Updates for Internet of Things). The SUITS working group60 compiled 
a detailed set of threats and requirements that systems implementing 




60 https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/suit/documents/ – At the time of this 
writing, all documents in SUIT are still in the draft stage, but should be approved 
as full RFCs by the time of publication.
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• Modified/Malicious Firmware Updates: The first 
threat considered when updating firmware is corrupted 
or maliciously modified firmware. If an attacker is 
able to modify the firmware in transit to the platform, 
or even during the process of updating the firmware, 
then the attacker is able to inject features into the 
device. Accidental corruption is just as dangerous since 
corruption of firmware during the update process can 
brick a system (cause the system to be permanently 
broken).
• Rollback to Old (Vulnerable) Firmware: The second 
common threat considered for firmware is rolling 
back the firmware to an older version. An attacker 
that is able to force a system to reload an older version 
of firmware may be able to force an old vulnerability 
back into the platform, allowing them to take over the 
system. This is especially dangerous since the platform 
owner erroneously believes they are protected from that 
vulnerability and may not be watching for indications of 
compromise for that particular attack. 
• Unauthorized Update Request: An often overlooked 
threat to firmware and RoT updates is the person or 
entity authorized to update firmware on the platform. 
Allowing a network attacker to force an upgrade 
of firmware is problematic. Obviously, an attacker 
successfully pushing corrupt or invalid firmware into 
a platform would create a problem, but even pushing 
a valid firmware update could create instability in 
the platform or a denial of service. Firmware update 
mechanisms should validate the entity requesting 
the update is authorized to do so, either because they 
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are acting under an administrator account or their 
request is cryptographically proven to originate from an 
authorized administrator.
• Unknown Source of Firmware: Even if an authorized 
entity issues the firmware update request, the actual 
source of the firmware (the firmware code itself) 
should come from a known and approved source. 
Firmware that is intended to update an Infineon TPM 
device should not be written by Broadcom; there are 
potential exceptions, most notably in cases where 
an OEM repackages an update for their device (i.e., 
HP repackaging a TPM update for the devices they 
manufacture). 
• Application of Incorrect Firmware: Finally, firmware 
must be matched to the system model and version 
of the hardware on which they execute. There can be 
many different revisions of hardware components, and 
firmware for one component may not operate properly 
on a different stepping or version.
 Turtle Creek System Update and Manageability 
Service
Turtle Creek is the code name for an Intel product that manages 
application and platform updates over the air for Intel® Atom, ARM, 
Core, and Xeon processors. Turtle Creek allows a system administrator 
to remotely schedule and deploy software updates and recover 
malfunctioning systems to ensure business continuity and system 
availability. It is a cloud-based system that interfaces to many other device 
management systems, including Helix Device Cloud and Mesh Central 
which were covered in a previous section.
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
326
Turtle Creek is a microservice cloud system where each feature of the 
system is implemented by a microservice in a container hosted on the 
Cloud. This allows customized deployment of Turtle Creek features, which 
include the following capabilities:
• Update of the OS, application, and system firmware on 
supported platforms
• Recovery of platform software and firmware to known 
good status (factory reset)
• Control of system restart and shutdown
• Device telemetry reception for device health, data logs, 
and management messages
• Device diagnostics to execute pre-install and  
post-install checks
• Rollback recovery for any update
• Device system performance monitoring (e.g., 
CPU utilization, memory utilization, container 
performance)
• Centralized configuration manager that stores 
and retrieves configuration for devices used by all 
microservices, supporting various formats including 
XML, Consul database, or name-value pairs
• Comprehensive security using cryptographic signature 
verification for all packages using the TPM 2.0 for 
key and secret management and secure MQTT 
for messaging using TLS with end-to-end mutual 
authentication based on X.509 certificates.
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Figure 4-26 shows the architecture of the Turtle Creek client software. 
Turtle Creek separates updates into three different categories based on 
the type of update and the repository from which the update packages 
are retrieved. These include Application Over-the-Air (AOTA), Software 
Over-the-Air (SOTA), and Firmware Over-the-Air (FOTA). AOTA supports 
update of application and individual software vendor’s services via an 
update mechanism based on packages and signed RPMs using SMART 
and Docker container update mechanisms. SOTA supports operating 
system updates from an OS vendor’s repository, which includes the use 
of the OS standard update mechanisms, like Ubuntu Update Manager 
and Mender61 (for Yocto Linux). FOTA supports device or component 
manufacturer’s ability to update custom firmware over the air and 
integrates firmware-specific functionality to update the device firmware 


































































Figure 4-26. Turtle Creek architecture
61 Mender is a client software embedded in Yocto that enables updates to the 
operating system to be installed. https://docs.mender.io/1.6/artifacts/
building-mender-yocto-image
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Turtle Creek’s contribution to the IoT platform is twofold. First it 
unifies multiple disparate platform and software update mechanisms 
under a single management tool, making the process of managing and 
distributing updates easier. Second, it incorporates significant security 
protections on the update process, overlaying them on top of existing 
capabilities where necessary. Turtle Creek creates a manifest format to 
convey update commands and requires this update to be signed with a 
key in the TPM. This satisfies the security requirement for authorization 
of updates and ensures that the versions and source (repository) for the 
updates are genuine. If update packages do not include an embedded 
signature or source authentication, Turtle Creek’s manifest can include 
a detached signature so the actual bits downloaded for the update can 
be verified that they have not been accidentally or maliciously modified. 
Table 4-10 outlines a more complete security analysis of Turtle Creek.












a turtle Creek maintains a database of configured 
version numbers and packages on each device 




a update requests are received over an 
authenticated MQtt channel and are contained in 
signed manifest file.
(continued)





Use only Authorized 
Update Sources
a Manifest file contains authorized source for 




a Manifest file contains attributes of the update that 
are checked on install to ensure invalid updates 
are not applied.
In the event of a failed update or problems during 
update, turtle Creek is able to restore the previous 
version of the software or firmware on the system 
reducing downtime.
Table 4-10. (continued)
 System Firmware and RoT Summary
One of the most difficult problems in IoT systems is updating the base 
system firmware or recovering from a security vulnerability in a root-of- trust 
component like a TPM. Oftentimes, these firmware elements are designed 
to require a trusted administrator to manually watch over an update or 
install process. IoT devices in remote environments or hard- to- reach places 
cannot afford to miss such updates, but also cannot be sustained if a skilled 
administrator must manually install such updates. Services such as Turtle 
Creek which enable remote update of all software and firmware on a device 
are vital to both the security posture and ROI of IoT systems.
 Application-Level Language Frameworks
The application-level language frameworks are the first topic in the 
application plane of our generic IoT architectural model from Figure 4-2. 
Although we are several software layers removed from the hardware of the 
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platform, hardware-based security still plays a role in providing best-in- 
class software and services. As we look at different options in this space, we 
want to focus on how an application developer might be able to leverage 
hardware-based security features.
Application developers tend to choose an application framework based 
on the programming language they have chosen, and not vice versa. And 
particular programming languages tend to have certain frameworks that are 
popular with a majority of programmers. In this section, we will examine 
the common security APIs available within some of these frameworks and 
evaluate the ease of use for developers to utilize hardware security features.
The hardware security features focused here are partly based on the 
hardware features we have discussed throughout the previous sections 
of this chapter, as well as security features advantageous to common use 
cases encountered by IoT developers. These features include
• Access to Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) 
to leverage highly secure containment features for 
sensitive data and operations
• Access to Secure Storage or Protected Keystores to 
protect credentials and application secrets
• Access to message and network security features to 
protect communication to other devices
• Access to cryptographic functions in hardware, 
including AES, SHA, and random number generation 
in order to build other security features not available 
from available services.
 JavaScript and Node.js or Sails
JavaScript is a common language used in IoT and web services today. It 
is an event-driven interpreted language with a rich set of frameworks. 
Node.js is one common framework, designed to build network 
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applications that handle events concurrently. Node.js is extremely 
flexible, so other frameworks are used to create more structure around 
Node.js. Sails is an example of such an extension framework.
As far as security goes, Node.js is far removed from most platform 
security features. However, the crypto API provided in Node.js is a wrapper 
around the latest OpenSSL library. This means that Node.js developers get 
access to the hardware implementations of AES-NI and SHA-NI through 
OpenSSL, as well as the hardware random number generator. Best of all, 
developers do not have to configure anything or worry about any platform 
settings – it is all handled inside OpenSSL.
One of the great advantages of Node.js is npm (node package 
manager). One of the great security problems with Node.js is also npm. 
The node package manager makes it extremely easy to add packages into 
your Node.js project. A simple install command issued on the command 
line and a require expression in the code add any package registered 
in the Node.js npm repository to your application. npm has over half 
a million packages and over three billion downloads every day.62 This 
makes using JavaScript widgets and gadgets built by others very easy (a 
great benefit!). But what are you really downloading? Are you getting the 
latest version with the latest bug fixes? Or are you installing the latest 
version that was corrupted with malware? Often developers set up their 
Node.js applications and never audit the npm repository again. This poor 
discipline proliferates security vulnerabilities.
 Java and Android
The Java programming language is the language used for Android devices, 
and because of this popularity has found its way into IoT devices as well. 
Google provides their Android Things operating system as a base OS and 
framework built on Java for small IoT devices and provides the same base 
62 https://nemethgergely.com/nodejs-security-overview/
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security for the smallest system on a module (SoM) devices as found on 
larger devices, including secure boot and a secure hardware keystore. 
Android Things is built from the base Android system, as shown in 
Figure 4-27, and uses the same kernel, hardware abstraction layer, native 
libraries, and Java API framework as the standard Android. Android Things 
is intended for smallest of devices.






Figure 4-27. Android Things architecture
Android itself is popular in many larger IoT devices, including in- 
vehicle infotainment (IVI) systems in autonomous and smart vehicles. And 
the security services available through Java and the Android framework are 
significant.63
As we discussed previously, Android supports the Trusty TEE, which 
can be used to hold sensitive applications for the platform. One of those 
applications is a hardware-backed secure keystore to protection keys. This 
prevents keys from being used by unauthorized applications or users and 
can prevent keys from being exfiltrated off the device. On Intel devices, 
the Trusty TEE can be used to provide this service, or the keystore can 
be implemented in the CSME (see Chapter 3). Android also supports a 
verified boot mechanism where the stages of boot verify each software 
component is signed with a valid cryptographic key (see Chapter 3 for 
secure boot details).
63 https://source.android.com/security/
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
333
 EdgeX Foundry
EdgeX Foundry is a new Internet of Things framework for industrial 
edge computing sponsored by the Linux Foundation.64 EdgeX Foundry 
is platform agnostic, flexible, and extensible framework providing 
capabilities for “intelligence at the edge” for data storage, aggregation, 
analysis, and action all organized into sets of microservices using Docker 
containers.
Figure 4-28 is the platform architecture for EdgeX Foundry, which 
includes four service layers and two system services. The service layers 
are the Export services, Supporting services, Core services, and Device 
services. The system services are security and device/system management.
The Export services allows data to be communicated to the Cloud 
and supports several protocols, including REST or message queue 
protocols (see the section “Message Orchestration”); Google IoT Core 
is also supported for sending telemetry and receiving configuration 
and commands. The Device services enables connections to sensors 
and actuators and supports multiple protocols for this purpose. Some 
of these protocols are wireless or wired communications protocols 
which are covered in more detail in Chapter 5; other protocols are 
message orchestration protocols, like MQTT, which is covered in the 
section “Message Orchestration.” The Supporting services handles edge 
intelligence and analytics capabilities. The Core services is the linkage 
between northbound communications to the Cloud and southbound 
communications to the sensors and actuators.
64 https://www.edgexfoundry.org/
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The Security system service includes a security store to maintain 
cryptographic keys and credentials and an access control service to 
manage REST resources and access keys using either OAuth2 or JWT 
tokens.
The interesting part of EdgeX is the ability to rewrite any part of 
the EdgeX Foundry by modifying the Docker container that supplies 
that service and not having to contend with changing other parts of 
the system. Security services for key storage can be extended to use a 
TPM or SGX enclave for enhanced security. Encryption routines in the 
Distribution container of the Export services can be upgraded to use 
hardware-based encryption without affecting other elements of the 
Supporting or Core services. This type of flexible framework makes it 
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Figure 4-28. EdgeX Foundry architecture65
65 https://docs.edgexfoundry.org/Ch-Intro.html
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 Application-Level Framework Summary
The application framework chosen for an IoT device can make a significant 
difference on the security provided to IoT applications. Frameworks like 
Node.js have few hardware security features built into the framework, but 
make it easy to add capabilities. However, access to hardware devices is 
rather difficult through JavaScript, limiting the options for developers.
Android takes an alternative approach and builds in many 
sophisticated security features into the operating system and framework 
itself. However, limitations, such as with the Trusty TEE which cannot 
dynamically add secured applications, make adding hardware-based 
security features difficult.
EdgeX Foundry takes a different approach, using containers to  
separate functionality into microservices. This framework expends effort to 
create the connections and APIs between components so that services can  
be shared. In this model, it is much easier to upgrade a service to make use 
of hardware security features on the platform, but allow platforms that 
do not have such services to use alternative implementations. Although 
EdgeX Foundry does not have many hardware security features built 
into the framework at present, the intention to encourage platform 
differentiation through service modifications is clearly stated.
 Message Orchestration
Message orchestration performs the orderly reception and delivery of 
data and commands on an IoT platform. As briefly mentioned in “EdgeX 
Foundry” section, message orchestration protocols enable data delivery 
and reception off the platform to devices and the Cloud, but can also be 
used to move data around within an IoT platform. Message orchestration 
implements the publish-subscribe design pattern, often referred to as pub-
sub. In this design pattern, entities with data (publishers) publish their data 
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
336
to a broker or message bus, and recipients subscribe to certain messages 
from the broker and are given only the messages for which they register. 
The beauty of this design pattern is that publishers do not need to know 
who or how many subscribers are out there, and subscribers do not have to 
be prepared to receive and parse messages that they are not interested in.
Several message orchestration protocols are common in IoT devices, 
including Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT), Constrained 
Application Protocol (CoAP), eXtensible Messaging and Presence Protocol 
(XMPP)66, and OPC Unified Architecture (OPC UA).
Message orchestration needs to deal with several security issues in 
order to be secure:
• Publishers must have an identity and must be 
authenticated against that identity so that the source of 
messages are attributable to an Authorized Publisher.
• Subscribers must have an identity and must be 
authenticated against that identity so that messages are 
delivered only to Authorized Subscribers.
• Authorized Publishers may assign access control lists to 
messages that restrict which subscribers are allowed to 
receive their messages.
• Administrators may assign access control lists to 
message types restricting Publishers from publishing 
certain message types and/or restricting Subscribers 
from receiving certain message types.
• Authorized Subscribers may register to receive message 
types that do not violate an access control list.
66 XMPP is not covered in this chapter due to space constraints, however details 
can be found in RFC 6102, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120
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• The message broker will accept a message only from an 
Authorized Publisher, and only if the message type sent 
by the Authorized Publisher does not violate an access 
control list.
• The message broker will deliver a message to an 
Authorized Subscriber only if that subscriber requested 
messages of that type, and if that subscriber is not 
prohibited from receiving that message type by a valid 
access control list.
• Messages shall be protected from unauthorized 
disclosure, tampering, unauthorized deletion, 
reordering, and message delay.
 Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is a commonly used 
message orchestration protocol that enables sending data between entities 
on a system. The protocol is based on topic names in data packets that 
define a title for the data. Subscribers subscribe to topics; subscribers 
may use wildcards within the topic names to which they subscribe. 
MQTT operates over TCP/IP and supports basic operations, such as 
CONNECT, PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE, UNSUBSCRIBE, and several types of 
acknowledgment packets.
The MQTT protocol published by OASIS67 supports some basic security 
services including password-based authentication of publishers and 
subscribers and recommends the use of TLS for data privacy and integrity.
Several open source implementations of MQTT are in common use 
including Mosquitto, RabbitMQ, and HiveMQ. Table 4-11 provides a 
security analysis of Mosquitto MQTT.
67 http://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v3.1.1/mqtt-v3.1.1.html
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B MQtt supports usernames and passwords 
natively. Mutually authenticated tlS is the 
best option for authentication over the network 
using public key certificates; using user ids 
and password is acceptable, but should be 
protected by tlS if the communication is over 
a network (broker protection of passwords 
should be addressed through secure storage).
a security vulnerability in Mosquitto up until 
1.4.12 allows a user with a specially formatted 
id to overcome the access permissions set 
by Mosquitto, allowing them to read or write 
topics they do not have permissions to access.
Access Controls on 
Message Topics
B Mosquitto provides a topic configuration 
file that allows topics to be restricted by 
anonymous users, by username, or by a 
pattern that uses the username or client name; 
access control is based on “read,” “write,” or 
“readwrite” actions. this file must be manually 
configured, and it is a bit difficult to get correct 
especially when there are many topics.
(continued)






Message Privacy and 
Integrity
d no special protections are provided for 
messages, and even using tlS does not 
protect messages while they wait in the queue 
for delivery, opening the possibility for malware 
on the broker device to modify messages.
Consider adding encryption and message 
integrity to MQtt messages at the application 
layer; this provides security end to end and can 




d no special protections are afforded to the 
broker’s queue. the broker should not be 
run as root, but run under a special service 
user id. In some installations of Mosquitto, 
the message queue is written to disk and 
susceptible to tampering. the configuration of 
your Mosquitto installation should be examined 
to ensure any files used for queuing are 
properly protected.
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Figure 4-29. OPC-UA notional object68
OPC-UA[69, 70] is a platform-independent service-oriented architecture 
targeted to the industrial segment of IoT and is based on the earlier OPC 
Classic protocols that used the Microsoft Component Object Model 
(COM) and Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM). OPC-UA 
is therefore an object-based technology, defining objects as notionally 
shown in Figure 4-29 and using the TCP/IP protocol for communication 
between objects, which provides a much richer set of services than 




69 OPC officially stands for Object Linking and Embedding (OLE) for Process 
Control, but since OPC-UA has moved away from strict COM and DCOM 
protocols, the full expansion of the acronym is no longer widely used.
70 https://opcfoundation.org/about/opc-technologies/opc-ua/
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OPC-UA provides communication between components (objects) 
on a device and between devices using the publisher-subscriber design 
pattern described earlier, the observer design pattern where objects notify 
other objects of events, and using direct method calls between objects 
(even across devices using a DCOM-like mechanism). OPC-UA includes 
a discovery service allowing objects and devices to find each other on a 
network.
OPC-UA defines a comprehensive security model71 based on security 
above the transport layer and uses certificate-based identities for 
applications and users. By default, all communication between devices 
is encrypted and signed, and the algorithms are negotiated at session 
establishment between the two parties, just like TLS. All applications 
are assigned a unique identity certificate, which is used to perform 
authentication during session establishment to other entities. The other 
devices/applications/servers a device is allowed to communicate with 
are defined in a trust list that contains those other applications’ identity 
certificates. Access control and rights can be managed in three different 
ways: username and passwords, Kerberos tickets, or certificates. Table 4-12 
provides a security analysis of OPC-UA.
71 www.dsinteroperability.com/OPCClassicVSUA.pdf and https://
opcfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/OPC-UA_Security_Model_
for_Administrators_V1.00.pdf
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a opC-ua includes multiple options for 
authentication, with public key certificates being 
included by default. Issuance of these keys can 
still be an issues that need to be dealt with, 
but from a security perspective, this is the best 
solution.
Access Controls on 
Message Topics
C rough access control is provided at the trust list 
level. opC-ua applications have to implement 
their own access control in order to implement 
anything greater than just this device/application-
level trust. access control functions can take 
advantage of other information (usernames, 
certificates, kerberos tokens), but this requires 
custom programming.
Message Privacy and 
Integrity
a Message encryption and message integrity is 
built into opC-ua above the transport layer and 
can be used to prevent repudiation attacks as 




d for store-and-forward or pub-sub broker type 
message delivery, the application is responsible 
for creating the behavior of the application. 
although patterns exist for good design, they 
are not provided by default for applications and 
require custom programming.
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 Constrained Application Protocol
The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) is a web transfer protocol 
specified in IETF RFC 725272 specifically designed for devices with limited 
computation and/or on a network with limited bandwidth. CoAP is a 
lightweight HTTP protocol and based on the same request-response REST 
interaction model, using commands GET, PUT, POST, and DELETE. CoAP 
requires DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security, which is TLS over the 
UDP protocol) for security, and much like HTTP/TLS combination, any 
additional access control or security on the messages themselves must be 
added to the applications. Table 4-13 provides a security analysis of CoAP.
Table 4-13. Security Analysis of CoAP






a Mutually authenticated dtlS is the best 
option for authentication over the network 
using public key certificates; many other 
authentication options are possible, but 
would need to be integrated into the 
applications (e.g., oauth, Jwt, kerberos).
Access Controls on 
Message Topics
d no special access control is provided above 
the rough authentication performed by 
dtlS. any additional access control must be 
provided by the application.
(continued)
72 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7252
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System Update Security 
Principles
Grade Comments
Message Privacy and 
Integrity
d no special protections are provided for 





C Messages may be transmitted with reliability 
(marked as Confirmable), and for those 
messages, deletion recovery is handled 
through the acknowledgment mechanism. 
every message has a unique 16-bit message 
id that allows detection of replay.
Table 4-13. (continued)
 Message Orchestration Summary
Message orchestration solutions vary widely in their offerings from simple 
(CoAP) to complex (OPC-UA). The security offerings for the simpler 
solutions leave much to the application to implement. One of the primary 
benefits for MQTT is the ease with which network security can be added 
with TLS, and the rich set of access controls that can be configured without 
having to add custom code. Other solutions require applications to 
implement access controls, which can result in harder to diagnose defects, 
and duplication of the access control code in many places.
 Applications
The applications are the components that give IoT devices their behaviors 
and consume and benefit from the security in the hardware and the software. 
There is much to explore in the application space, which we leave for  
Chapter 6, where we explore different vertical IoT applications in great detail.
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 Summary
Software in IoT is an enormous subject. In writing this chapter, there were 
many things that had to be left out or shortened in order to meet the page 
count and retain some semblance of a publishing deadline. If we have 
omitted your favorite IoT software component or feature, we assure you 
it is only due to the space limitations. However, we feel that the coverage 
we have provided of the software elements of an IoT stack is adequate to 
engage your design enthusiasm and get you thinking about how to expose 
useful security features in your IoT designs.
The goal of this chapter was to introduce how security could be 
provided in IoT systems, and we have shown, layer by layer, where 
platform security features can be exposed and built upon to add strong 
and effective security services to IoT devices. If the “S” for security is left 
out of our IoT devices, it is because we have not leveraged the software and 
capabilities that are available to us to make security a reality.
While it is true that the most constrained devices have less software 
and less hardware services, this should not be an excuse to remove 
security entirely. There are too many good options to solve this tough 
problem. When the constraints get tighter, it should mean that we focus 
back on the basics and jettison everything we do not need, but retain the 
most basic security capabilities. These basic security capabilities are the 
hardware features for the secure minimum viable platform enabled with 
the basic platform software – secure boot, secure identity, and secure 
storage. This is not impossible. In Chapter 6, we will show examples of 
exactly how to do this.
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Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits 
use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or 
format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if 
changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included 
in the chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise 
in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s 
Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by 
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain 
permission directly from the copyright holder.
Chapter 4  Iot Software SeCurIty BuIldIng BloCkS
347© The Author(s) 2020 





Internet of Things (IoT) is a set of technologies that are enabling new 
use cases and delivering services across a wide variety of markets 
and applications. When people think of IoT, they often think of home 
or personal IoT. However, IoT will play a role in many commercial 
applications such as smart manufacturing, smart cities, autonomous 
cars, building automation, and healthcare. How will an IoT-enabled 
device communicate what it knows to the Internet? Suitable connectivity 
solutions range from a multitude of wired connectivity technologies such 
as Ethernet to wireless technologies like Wi-Fi and even 5G cellular. Many 
solutions need a combination of multiple communication technologies. 
For example, a smart car system playing video or using GPS navigation 
might need 4G LTE in order to communicate with the outside world and 
Wi-Fi and Bluetooth to communicate with devices like phones and rear 
seat entertainment (RSE) used by the passengers. In this chapter, we will 
take a look at a selected set of connectivity technologies that enable these 
applications.
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 Ethernet Time-Sensitive Networking
Ethernet Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) is reshaping the industrial 
communication landscape and laying the foundation for the convergence 
of Information Technology (IT) and Industrial Operations Technology 
(OT). TSN essentially is a set of features that have been added to standard 
Ethernet. By bringing industrial-grade robustness and reliability to 
Ethernet, TSN offers an IEEE standard communication technology that 
can be used to enable deterministic communications for industrial 
applications. Being an IEEE standard, it enables interoperability between 
standard compliant industrial devices from different suppliers. TSN 
removes the need for physical separation of critical and noncritical 
communication networks, reducing the cost of the infrastructure needed 
to allow open data exchange between operations technology network and 
enterprise/information technology network – a concept that is at the heart 
of the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). At the network system level, TSN 
supports deterministic communication based on network schedules that 
are distributed to devices via standard configuration interfaces.
TSN standards address a wide range of functions, and their 
implementation can be similarly broad, encompassing various hardware 
elements such as endpoints and switches, embedded software, standard 
interfaces, routing algorithms, and configuration tools. To ensure the 
highest levels of TSN performance, a system-level solution is required 
that takes each element into account and provides a seamless interface 
between them. Seamless fault-tolerant communication and enhanced 
cybersecurity with robust network planning, configuration, and 
monitoring will be a necessity in the networks of the future.
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 Legacy Ethernet-Based Connectivity in Industrial 
Applications
Today, there are multiple variants of Industrial Ethernet protocols available 
on the market. In most cases, the Industrial Ethernet protocol selected for use 
in industrial devices differs from vendor to vendor or from Industry Alliance 
to Industry Alliance, which means that devices are only compatible with other 
equipment from the same vendor or an Industry Alliance using the same 
protocol. This is known as manufacturer lock-in. It forces customers to either 
buy all industrial equipment from one vendor or a limited set of vendors 
who are part of the same Alliance. This approach may not be the most cost- 
and performance-optimized way to implement the required solution. If a 
customer chooses not to do this, there is considerable challenge of integrating 
equipment from multiple vendors into a single network system or there needs 
to be a set of protocol conversion gateways implemented between the various 
Industrial Ethernet protocols. Both options will lead to unnecessary expense 
and limit innovation on the factory floor over many years. Thus industrial 
automation architectures become hierarchical, purpose-built, and inflexible.
This approach is currently undergoing a dramatic change with the advent 
of the IIoT and Industry 4.0, which demands for full automation and greater 
insights in manufacturing. These demands are pushing industrial automation 
architectures to become more flexible and seamless to interoperate. In 
these types of increasingly converged architectures, real-time connectivity 
is essential for controlling critical processes, as well as for collecting and 
analyzing data from machines, in a timely manner. TSN offers the real-time 
connectivity capabilities that match and sometimes exceed what current 
Industrial Ethernet protocols can provide, with the added flexibility of being 
based on IEEE standards. Similar to what is the norm in the enterprise world, 
TSN Ethernet can therefore be the common communication protocol that 
connects industrial equipment from different vendors, simultaneously 
delivering the very challenging functional requirements demanded by 
mission-critical embedded and industrial applications.
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 Key Benefits of TSN
The primary strength of TSN is its status as an open standard–based 
technology, unaffiliated to any Industry Alliance or company. For an 
industrial automation market that has struggled for many years with 
multiple incompatible proprietary communication protocols, TSN brings 
several key benefits.
TSN guarantees compatibility at the network level between devices 
from multiple suppliers. This gives customers much greater choice of 
devices for building their system, avoiding manufacturer lock-in and 
enabling seamless connectivity across various subsystems and systems.
As TSN is part of the Ethernet standard family, it naturally scales with 
Ethernet, which means that the technology will not be limited in terms of 
bandwidth/speeds, thus allowing more and more sensors and actuators 
that are needed for implementing complex automation applications to be 
connected to a network system.
TSN supports standards-based network configuration capabilities. 
This means that new nodes can be added to the network and discovered 
without the need for costly downtimes and manual configuration. New 
data streams can be added to the network without the risk of disturbing 
existing traffic and without the need to reconfigure the entire network.
TSN can be used for communication between machines as well as 
from machines to enterprise systems. Communication between mission-
critical TSN-based systems and existing noncritical Ethernet-based 
systems can be achieved over the same infrastructure. In other words, non-
TSN Ethernet nodes can work over a TSN network, without modification.
Overall system costs are significantly reduced when we adopt 
standards-based technology. Consumer choice and competition will result 
in lower device prices. Research, development, and maintenance costs 
are all driven down when solution providers and customers can focus on 
one standard technology rather than a number of different proprietary 
protocols and solutions.
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Breaking down communication barriers between critical and 
noncritical systems is a foundational concept of the IIoT and Industry 
4.0. TSN enables the convergence of networks and systems that were 
previously kept separate for reasons of operational integrity, real-time 
performance, safety, and security.
TSN allows time-critical messages to be sent over the same 
communication line as all other Ethernet traffic, without disturbance 
or increase in delay and with controlled delay variation. Different traffic 
classes can coexist on the network with no impact on higher criticality 
level traffic from traffic with lower priority.
End-to-end latency is guaranteed even under heavy traffic load, and 
standard mechanisms can be used to accelerate message transport for 
high-priority communications. Thus, the most challenging motion control 
and safety-critical applications can be converged with other Ethernet 
traffic on Ethernet networks using TSN.
Convergence makes accessing data from industrial systems easier. 
With more systems on the same network, the task of gathering data from 
a wide variety of sources is simplified. Data from industrial systems can 
be sent to enterprise systems over standard Ethernet without the need 
for protocol conversion gateways. Overall system costs are significantly 
reduced by the convergence of different traffic classes on a single network 
infrastructure. Hardware and maintenance costs are lower because we 
need fewer devices and cables to build the network infrastructure.
Higher layer protocols can be combined with TSN, as the technology 
is implemented primarily at the data link layer (OSI model layer 2).1 One 
example is the Open Platform Communications-Unified Architecture 
(OPC-UA) protocol.2 
1 ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994 - Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - 
Basic Reference Model: The Basic Model. 
2 More details on OPC-UA can be found at https://opcfoundation.org/about/
opc-technologies/opc-ua/
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 TSN Standards
Table 5-1 lists the TSN set of features that have been added to standard 
Ethernet. The features are defined and published in a number of IEEE 802.1 
standards that address topics such as timing, synchronization, forwarding, 
queuing, seamless redundancy, and stream reservation. These individual 
features extend the functionality and Quality of Service (QoS) of Ethernet 
to enable guaranteed message transmission through switched networks, 
providing the fundamental capabilities such as robustness, reliability, and 
determinism required for an industrial communication technology.
Table 5-1. List of Published IEEE Standards for TSN (March 2019)
Function Standard




• ieee std. 802.1QavtM-2009: Credit-based shaper
• ieee std. 802.1QbvtM-2015: transmission gate scheduling
•  ieee std. 802.1QbutM-2016 & ieee std. 802.3brtM-2016 : 
frame preemption
• ieee std. 802.1QchtM-2017 : Cyclic Queuing and forwarding
reliability • ieee std. 802.1QcatM-2015 : path Control and reservation
• ieee std. 802.1CBtM-2017 : frame replication & 
elimination
• ieee std. 802.1QcitM-2017 : per-stream filtering & policing
resource 
Management
• ieee std. 802.1QattM-2010 : stream reservation protocol
•  ieee std. 802.1QcctM-2018 : srp enhancements and 
performance improvements
• ieee std. 802.1QcptM-2018 : yang model
To address new use cases and make performance improvements, many 
more IEEE standards are being defined, as listed in Table 5-2.
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The key TSN features that provide guaranteed message delivery timing 
are time synchronization and traffic scheduling. They are addressed by the 
802.1AS and 802.1Qbv standards, respectively. All devices participating 
in the TSN network are synchronized to a global time and are aware of a 
network schedule that dictates when prioritized messages will be forwarded 
from each switch. TSN makes use of multiple queues per port at the egress 
of the switch, where messages are held until a gate opens (at a time slot 
Table 5-2. List of Upcoming IEEE Standards for TSN (March 2019)
time  
synchronization




• p802.1Qcr (Draft v0.5): asynchronous traffic shaping
• p802.1Qcz (par approved): Congestion isolation




• p802.1Cs (Draft v2.1): link-local registration protocol
•  p802.1Qcj (Draft v0.4): automatic attachment to provider 
Backbone Bridging (pBB) services
•  p802.1Qcw (Draft v0.2): yang Data Models for Qbv, Qbu, 
and Qci
• p802.1Qdd (par approved): resource allocation protocol
• p802.1aBcu (Draft v0.6): llDp yang Data Model
•  p802.1CBcv (par approved): frame replication & 
elimination yang Model and MiB Module
•  p802.1CBdb (par approved): frer extended stream 
identification functions
For latest Update, check https://1.ieee802.org/tsn/
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specified by the schedule) to release queued messages for transmission. 
The timed release of messages ensures that delays in the network can be 
deterministically predicted and managed. This allows for the convergence 
of critical traffic and noncritical traffic on the same network.
The preemption feature defined in the TSN 802.1Qbu standard can be 
used to increase the efficiency of bandwidth use for noncritical messages. 
In highly converged networks, it could be the case that large low-priority 
frames are delayed by higher-priority traffic on the network and dropped. 
Preemption enables the transmission of large frames to be interrupted, 
sent in smaller fragments and reassembled at the next link. This maximizes 
bandwidth utilization for all traffic types on the TSN network. Another 
important benefit of message preemption is the reduction of transmission 
latency for so-called Express traffic, which can preempt regular (lower-
priority) Ethernet packets. Especially on lower-speed networks (e.g., 10 or 
100 megabits per second (Mbps)) carrying large regular Ethernet packets 
up to 1,500 bytes and more, the latency reduction for Express traffic can be 
useful for building converged networks.
TSN provides a standard method for achieving seamless redundancy 
for industrial communication over Ethernet. The feature allows for the 
simultaneous transmission of duplicate message copies across different paths 
in the network. The first message copy to be received in time without error is 
processed, while the other copies are discarded. This adds another layer of 
determinism to the delivery of critical messages in converged networks.
A crucial feature of TSN is the support for open, vendor-independent 
network configuration. This is achieved through the standardization in 
IEEE of YANG models for various TSN standards. These can be configured 
over the NETCONF protocol using encoding formats such as XML or 
JSON. YANG models for bridging, traffic scheduling, frame preemption, 
seamless redundancy, and policing ensure that configuration of key TSN 
features is done according to standard methods. This allows TSN networks 
to be composed of any standard compliant device from any vendor and can 
be configured by any standard compliant network configuration software.
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 TSN Profiles
TSN is essentially a toolbox of features that address various needs such 
as reliability, bounded low latency, time synchronization, and resource 
management. These capabilities are realized through various TSN 
specifications (e.g., IEEE 802.1AS-Rev, IEEE 802.1Qbv, etc.), and customers 
can choose the relevant standards to implement based on their specific 
application needs. Profile standards are being specified for some of them 
to describe which TSN standards to use and how. A TSN profile selects 
features, options, configurations, and protocols to build a bridged network 
for the given TSN application. Table 5-3 shows a list of select TSN profiles 
that are currently being defined.









•  ieee std. 802.1BatM -2011 : audio video Bridging system 
[avB profile]
•  ieee std. 1722tM -2016: transport protocol for time-sensitive 
applications [+avtp Control format message types: flexray, 
lin, Can, Most, sensor, etc]
•  ieee std. 1722.1tM -2013: audio video Discovery, 
enumeration, Connection management and Control (avDeCC)




•  p802.1Df (par approved): tsn profile for service provider 
networks
(continued)
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Industry TSN Profile
Mobile fronthaul •  ieee std. 802.1CMtM -2018: tsn for fronthaul [Mobile 
fronthaul profile]
•  p802.1CMde (par approved): enhancements to fronthaul 
profiles to support new fronthaul interface, synchronization, 
and syntonization standards
Table 5-3. (continued)
The following sections provide an overview of the major TSN 
standards.
 802.1AS/AS-Rev
Enhanced Generic Precise Timing Protocol: Timing and synchronization 
are vital mechanisms for achieving deterministic communication. 802.1AS 
is a profile of the IEEE 1588 PTP (Precision Time Protocol) synchronization 
protocol that enables synchronization compatibility between different TSN 
devices (Figure 5-1). This lays the foundation for the scheduling of traffic 
through each participating network device. 802.1AS-Rev is being defined 
to add support for fault tolerance and multiple active synchronization 
masters (Figure 5-2). Multiple clock-masters for redundancy enable high 
availability of TSN networks – in cases when a grandmaster becomes 
faulty, system elements such as end nodes and bridges are still able 
to remain synchronized by obtaining the timing information from the 
redundant grandmasters. 802.1AS-Rev is also a profile of the IEEE 1588 
PTP synchronization protocol.

















Figure 5-2. 802.1AS-Rev operation4
3 Figure 5a: Single grand master transmitting 2 copies using separate paths. 
https://www.synopsys.com/designware-ip/technical-bulletin/ether-time-
sens-net-for-auto-adas-socs-2018q2.html
4 Figure 5b: Multiple grand masters transmitting 2 copies using separate paths. 
https://www.synopsys.com/designware-ip/technical-bulletin/ether-time-
sens-net-for-auto-adas-socs-2018q2.html
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 802.1Qbv
Time-Aware Shaper: Scheduling of traffic is a core concept in TSN. Based 
on the shared global time provided by 802.1AS, a schedule is created and 
distributed between participating network devices. 802.1Qbv defines the 
mechanisms for controlling the flow of queued traffic through gates at the 
egress of a TSN switch (Figure 5-3). Frames are assigned to queues based 
on Quality of Service (QoS) priority. The transmission of messages from 
these queues is executed during scheduled time windows. Other queues 
will typically be blocked from transmission during these time windows, 
therefore removing the chance of scheduled traffic being impeded by 
nonscheduled traffic. In other words, there is a gate in front of each queue 
which opens at a specific point of time which is reserved for that queue. This 
means that the delay through each switch is deterministic and that message 
latency through a network of TSN-enabled components can be guaranteed. 
The IEEE 802.1Qbv standard defines up to eight queues per port for 
forwarding traffic. The scheduler is designed to separate the communication 
on the Ethernet network into fixed length, repeating time cycles.
Figure 5-3 shows an example with four queues, with a cycle time of td 
and guard band of tg. At time t0, the time-critical data queue, Queue 3 is 
open. Once that frame is transmitted, the best effort Queues 0, 1, and 2 are 
opened. Before the end of the cycle, at time t0-tg, all the non-time-critical 
data is blocked, so that the port is free to transmit the time-critical data at 
the start of the next cycle. This is essentially a time-division multiple access 
(TDMA) scheme.
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= 0000 Block non-time critical data
= 1000 Time critical data queue is open
= 0111 Time critical data is done best
effort queues open
Figure 5-3. 802.1Qbv operation5
 802.1Qbu
Frame Preemption: While the 802.1Qbv mechanisms protect critical 
messages against interference from other network traffic, it does not 
necessarily result in optimal bandwidth usage or minimal communication 
latency. Where these factors are important, the preemption mechanism 
defined in 802.1Qbu can be used (Figure 5-4). 802.1Qbu allows the 
transmission of standard Ethernet or jumbo frames to be interrupted in 
order to allow the transmission of high-priority frames, and then resumed 
afterward without discarding the previously transmitted piece of the 
interrupted message. Frame preemption always operates on a link-by-link 
basis. A frame is only fragmented from one Ethernet switch to the next 
Ethernet switch, where it is reassembled.
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6 Preemption reduces latency of time-critical data streams. https://www.
synopsys.com/designware-ip/technical-bulletin/ether-time-sens-net-
for-auto-adas-socs-2018q2.html
Figure 5-4. 802.1Qbu frame preemption6
In Figure 5-4, without preemption as shown in the top, if a high-priority 
frame in Queue 3 arrives after a low-priority frame, the high-priority frame 
is delayed until the transmission of the low-priority frame is finished.  
In the case of an Ethernet port with preemption enabled, as shown in  
the bottom, the low-priority traffic passes through a preemptable MAC. 
The transmission of the low-priority frame is stopped, once a high-priority 
frame arrives and the high-priority frame from Queue 3 is allowed to 
go out. Once the transmission of the high-priority frame is completed, 
the rest of the low-priority frame is transmitted. Each partial frame is 
completed by a CRC32 for error detection. In contrast to the regular 
Ethernet CRC32, the last 16 bits are inverted to make a partial frame 
distinguishable from a standard Ethernet frame. Also the start frame 
delimiter (SFD) is changed.
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 802.1CB
Frame Replication and Elimination: Redundancy management 
implemented in 802.1CB follows similar approaches known from High-
Availability Seamless Redundancy (HSR) (IEC 62439-3 Clause 5) and 
Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) (IEC 62439-3 Clause 4). It supports 
zero switch over time when a link fails or frames are dropped. To increase 
availability, redundant copies of the same messages are communicated in 
parallel over disjoint paths through the network as shown in Figure  5-5.  
Time-critical frames are expanded to include a sequence number, and 
then they are replicated where each identical copy follows a separate path 
in the network. The redundancy management mechanism then combines 
these redundant messages to generate a single stream of information 
to the receiver(s). At any point in the network where the separate paths 
join again, duplicate frames can be eliminated from the stream as shown 
in Figure 5-5. The 802.1Qca standard for Path Control and Reservation 
defines how such paths can be set up. The standard also allows for auto 
configuration.
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7 Frame Replication & Elimination Page 16. https://bcourses.berkeley.edu/
files/66071146/download?download_frd=1
 802.1Qcc
Enhanced Stream Reservation Protocol: The enhancements to Stream 
Reservation Protocol (802.1Qat) include support for more streams, 
configurable stream reservation classes and streams, better description of 
stream characteristics, support for layer 3 streaming, deterministic stream 
reservation convergence, and User Network Interface (UNI) for routing 
and reservations. 802.1Qcc supports offline and/or online configuration 
of TSN network scheduling to provide network management for control 
plane. It supports a “Central Controller” or predefined “Engineered 

























Figure 5-5. 802.1CB frame replication and elimination7
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Per-Stream Filtering and Policing: This protects against faulty and/or 
malicious endpoints and switches and isolates faults to specific regions in the 
network. It works at the ingress of the switch (forwarding engine) in order to 
protect the outgoing queues from being flooded with frames. In this process, 
The fully centralized configuration model is depicted in Figure 5-6.  
It is composed of Centralized User Configuration (CUC) entity and a 
Centralized Network Configuration (CNC). Computing the configuration 
setting and enforcing it (e.g., setting up gate schedules, reserving 
resources, etc.) in bridges are done by CNC. Thus CNC will be in charge of 
configuring TSN features such as credit-based shaper, frame preemption, 
scheduled traffic, per-stream filtering and policing, and frame replication 







































ol End Station (“User”) Configuration Protocol
Stream
Data
Figure 5-6. 802.1Qcc centralized network configuration8
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the data packets are checked to ensure that they fit to a reserved data stream 
at the network input. If this is not the case, the packet will be filtered out and 
rejected and won’t be forwarded further. This can be leveraged to prevent 
attacks on level 2 of the OSI layer model. It utilizes well-known flow identifiers 
and policers used in the industry. Per-Stream Filtering and Policing (PSFP) 
allows filtering and policing decisions to be made on a per-stream basis. The 






Figure 5-7. 802.1Qci per-stream filtering and policing
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 802.1Qch
Cyclic Queuing and Forwarding: This defines cycles for forwarding 
traffic that is queued using 802.1Qci to assign buffers and 802.1Qbv 
to shape traffic. This cyclic enqueuing and queue draining procedure 
gives a defined (but not optimal) upper boundary for latency. Basically 
this is a simplified way to use TSN if controlled timing is desired, but 
reducing latency to absolute minimum is not highly important. The 
synchronized operations effectively allow bridges to synchronize their 
frame transmissions in a cyclic manner, achieving zero congestion loss and 
bounded latency, independently of the network topology.
In this scheme, time-sensitive streams are scheduled (enqueued and 
dequeued) at each time interval resulting in a worst-case deterministic 
delay of two times the cycle time between the sender (talker) and the next 
(intermediate) receiver (listener). As shown in Figure 5-8, each high-priority 
traffic frame scheduled on a cycle is scheduled to be received at the next 
bridge in the next cycle. A guard band before the start of the cycle prevents 
any interfering low-priority traffic from affecting the high-priority traffic. 
802.1Qch can be combined with frame preemption, to reduce the cycle 
time from the transmission time of a full size frame to the transmission 
time of a minimum size frame fragment. Thus, preemption can improve the 
performance for high-priority traffic. For this to work correctly, all frames 
must be kept to their allotted cycles, that is, all transmitted frames must be 
received during the expected cycle at the receiving bridge.
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To summarize, the network transit latency of a frame is completely 
characterized by the cycle time and the number of hops. Therefore, the 
frame latency is completely independent of the topology parameters and 
non-TSN traffic.
 802.1Qcr
Asynchronous Traffic Shaping: This provides bounded latency and 
jitter (relatively lower performance levels) without the need for time 
synchronization. It aims to smoothen traffic patterns by reshaping streams 
per hop, implementing per flow queues and prioritizing urgent traffic over 
lower-priority traffic. Previously described TSN standards such as Time-
Aware Shaper (802.1Qbv) and Cyclic Queuing and Forwarding (802.1Qch) 
depend on network-wide coordinated time and packet transmission at 
enforced periodic cycles, resulting in suboptimal utilization of available 













Even Cycle Odd Cycle
Preemption
Overhead
Figure 5-8. 802.1Qch operation with preemption (802.1Qbu)9
9 Illustration of CQF with preemption for a linear network. https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1803.07673.pdf
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for bridges and endpoints to synchronize in time. Therefore, it is expected 
that this technique can utilize available network bandwidth efficiently 
under heavy link utilization with mixed criticality traffic.
 TSN and Security
Since TSN is Ethernet based, the security mechanisms that are state of 
the art today can be employed to secure the TSN network. Traditional 
security solutions such as firewalls will be the key to this. Since firewalls 
need to inspect packets, the resulting computational overhead in firewalls 
can create an additional transmission delay. This delay should be taken 
into account while configuring the TSN network schedules. If security 
mechanisms introduce longer delays than that are tolerable by the TSN 
application, they can be implemented at the border or periphery of the 
TSN network, such as an Industrial Demilitarized Zone that connects the 
TSN industrial control network to the rest of the IT system.
 OPC-UA Over TSN
Of the many higher layer industrial communication protocols that could be 
combined with TSN, one of the prominent ones is OPC-UA. Much like TSN, 
OPC-UA is an open, standard technology that is vendor independent and 
useful for a wide range of industrial applications. The combination of OPC-
UA and TSN therefore provides a complete open, standard, and interoperable 
solution that fulfills a plurality of industrial communication requirements.
By representing data in a uniform way, OPC-UA enables interoperability 
between devices that could not previously share data and gives you new 
insight into a wealth of information. For this reason, it has been adopted 
and integrated into products by all of the major industrial automation 
vendors. OPC-UA was originally limited to a client or server architecture; 
however the recently released publish/subscribe (PubSub) extension now 
enables multicast communication. In combination with TSN, OPC-UA 
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PubSub allows data to be sent with precise timing and thus be used for real-
time industrial applications as illustrated in Figure 5-9. In the horizontal 
direction, OPC-UA-based controller-to-controller communication can 
be done over TSN. In the vertical direction, OPC-UA-based controller-to-
cloud communication can be done directly, via a gateway or broker. This 
enables IT (Information Technology) systems having less stringent timing 
requirements to interwork with OT (Operations Technology) systems that 
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Figure 5-9. Factory automation network with OPC-UA over TSN
OPC-UA also enables a standard method for configuring TSN networks 
online and in a dynamic way. This does not require you to input any 
system parameters for the scheduler as these are all taken from the  
OPC-UA application parameters within each device. A broker mechanism 
as defined by the OPC Foundation provides an interface between OPC-UA 
applications and TSN scheduling software.
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 Overview of Wireless Connectivity 
Technologies
The IoT will require several wireless technologies if it’s to meet its 
potential. For example, Bluetooth Low Energy and IEEE 802.15.4 are good 
choices for battery-powered sensors, but for devices that are constantly 
moving, or are not near a LAN (local area network), such relatively short-
range wireless technologies are not suitable for connecting to the Internet.
Even if a LAN is present, manufacturers might prefer longer-range wireless 
technology for its convenience and autonomy. For example, a white goods 
manufacturer could select cellular technology over Wi-Fi because it enables 
a refrigerator or washing machine to connect to the Cloud automatically, 
eliminating the need for a consumer to enter a password to add the appliance 
to a home’s LAN. In these situations, low-power wide area networks (LPWAN) 
or Narrowband IoT technologies could come to the rescue.
 Considerations for Choosing Wireless 
Technologies for IoT
There are many wireless networking technologies that are deployed in IoT 
today, each with a different set of capabilities. Here are some of the key 
considerations when choosing these different solutions.
 Spectrum
Wireless spectrum can be characterized as either licensed or unlicensed. 
Access to licensed spectrum is typically purchased from local government 
to provide an organization exclusive access to a particular channel in a 
particular location. Operation in that channel should be largely free of 
interference from competing radios. The drawback is that the spectrum 
of interest may be extremely scarce or expensive to access. In some other 
cases, radio connectivity bands allowed in one country may not be available 
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in other geographical area for same usage. For instance, mobile networks in 
India use the 900 MHz and 1800 MHz frequency bands, while GSM (Global 
System for Mobile communications) carriers in the United States operate in 
850 MHz and 1900 MHz frequency bands. To deploy an IoT device globally, 
then it may have to support multiple radio bands making the device costly 
as well as time-consuming to develop. Even when more easily accessible, 
it can take months to gain the approval to operate, so licensed bands are 
not well suited to rapid deployments. Unlicensed spectrum is generally 
open and available to anybody to use with no exclusive rights granted to 
any particular organization or individual. The downside is that competing 
systems may occupy the same channel at different power levels leading to 
interference. Manufacturers of radio systems operating in unlicensed bands 
include capabilities in these radios to adapt their operation for this potential 
interference. These techniques include adaptive modulation, automatic 
transmit power control and out-of-band filtering, and so on.
 Range and Capacity
Several factors impact the amount of data capacity that can be delivered at 
a particular distance. Those factors include spectrum, channel bandwidth, 
transmitter power, terrain, noise immunity, and antenna size. In general, 
the longer the distance to be covered, the lower the data capacity. The 
longest propagation distance can be achieved by using a low-frequency 
narrowband channel with a high-gain antenna, while higher capacities 
could be achieved by selecting wider channels, with limited range. For 
optimal performance for each application, we need to choose the best 
combination of channel size, antenna, and radio power and modulation 
schemes to achieve the desired capacity.
A radio link can be described as being line of sight when there is a 
direct optical path between the two radios making up the link. A link 
is called non-line of sight when there is some obstruction between the 
two radios. Near line of sight is simply a partial obstruction rather than a 
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complete obstruction. In general, lower-frequency solutions have better 
propagation characteristics than higher frequencies. Higher-frequency 
solutions that operate in multi-gigahertz range are typically line-of-sight 
or near line-of-sight systems. From 1 GHz to 6 GHz range, the propagation 
characteristics capabilities will vary depending on other factors, and 
typically below 1 GHz the propagation becomes much better, making those 
frequencies suitable for longer range. Figure 5-10 shows a landscape of 
data rates and ranges of common wireless technologies.































BAN     Body Area Network
PAN     Personal Area Network
LAN     Local Area Network
WAN   Wide Area Network
Figure 5-10. Range and data rate for various wireless technologies
 Network Topology
Network topology is the arrangement of the elements in a network, 
including its nodes and connections between them. Common network 
topologies used for wireless connectivity are depicted in Figure 5-11.
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Point-to-point topologies are best suited for delivering lots of capacity 
over long distances. Point-to-point connections cover longer distances that 
are less susceptible to interference as the antenna patterns are narrower  
so the energy can be focused in the direction of the desired transmission. 
PTP links are also used for short-range connections to the wireline 
backbone. Resiliency in a PTP link can be provided by deploying in 1+1 or 
other redundant configurations with parallel sets of radios.
Ring topologies are excellent for resilient operations of high-capacity 
links covering a large area. This configuration is typically used in the 
backhaul network.
Mesh networks can be built using multiple point-to-point links or 
with specialized meshing protocols to enable multiple paths from point 
A to point B. Mesh networks have the downside of each packet traversing 
Point to Point Star
MeshRing
Figure 5-11. Common network topologies
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multiple hops and so can lead to lower capacity and increased latency for a 
given infrastructure.
Point-to-multipoint (or star) networks provide scale and capacity over 
a geographic area. Point-to-multipoint networks are typically deployed to 
cover sectors or cells. The key differentiating capability to look for in point-
to-point networks is their ability to scale in the number of nodes per cell 
but also the ability to place cells next to each other without interference.
 Quality of Service
System builders and operators need to make the most efficient use of 
available spectrum by deploying multiple services on the same network 
and also making sure that mission-critical information is transmitted with 
highest priority. A network should support multiple Quality of Service (QoS) 
levels and the ability to sort traffic based on both layer 2 and layer 3 standard 
traffic classifiers. In this way, the transmitter of the data packet can mark the 
class of service or priority, and the end-to-end network will ensure that the 
packet is delivered with the desired level of low latency and availability.
 Network Management
The capability to manage a network has a direct impact on the total cost 
of ownership of the IoT system. Networking systems that allow centralized 
management of configuration, fault detection, performance tuning 
and continuous monitoring, and security validation minimize the cost 
and effort. They also reduce unplanned outages and increase system 
availability and reliability.
 Security
The security of wireless communications is growing in importance. 
Primary techniques to look for here is the ability to encrypt the over-
the-air link, using a network, mesh, or link key. Besides this we need to 
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secure management interfaces with HTTPS and SNMP. Systems should 
also provide the ability to create multiple user accounts with password 
complexity rules. Previously, many traditional automation and control 
solutions have not been exposed to security issues faced by the IT systems, 
but recently have become hacking targets as their solutions get connected to 
the Internet. Major security breaches could slow down the adoption of IoT.
As can be seen from Figure 5-12, several local area network (LAN) and 
wide area network (WAN) technologies with different levels of security and 
network management requirements need to work seamlessly to realize an 
end-to-end IoT system.
 Wi-Fi
Wi-Fi is a wireless connectivity technology based on the IEEE 802.11 
standards. Initially created for wireless local area network (WLAN) 
applications, Wi-Fi is also increasingly used for peer-to-peer and wireless 
personal area network connections (WPAN). It provides secure, reliable, 
and fast wireless connectivity. A Wi-Fi network can be used to connect 
electronic devices to each other, to the Internet, and to wired networks that 
use Ethernet technology. It can provide real-world performance similar to 
Things
Security Management
Local Area Network Connectivity



















Security Management API Libraries,
APIs, SDK
Network Cloud
Figure 5-12. End-to-end IoT systems need various connectivity 
technologies to work together
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that of basic wired networks. Wi-Fi networks operate in the 2.4 GHz and 
5 GHz radio bands, with some products that contain both bands (dual-
band). Wi-Fi is also pushing into a third band – the 60 GHz band – using 
ultra-wideband channels and the baseband solution originally developed 
by WiGig. The Wi-Fi Alliance is a wireless industry organization that 
promotes wireless technologies that are based on IEEE 802.11 and their 
interoperability. The Alliance also certifies products that comply with its 
specifications for Wi-Fi interoperability, security, and application-specific 
protocols.
Wi-Fi offers low power consumption and low cost relative to cellular. 
Unlike cellular, Wi-Fi operates in unlicensed spectrum, resulting also in 
lower data transmission costs. Range is limited by proximity to a wireless 
router or relays, and the quality of connection can be diminished by 
network congestion. There are several different Wi-Fi standards optimized 
for IoT applications. Next, we will take a brief look at them.
Wi-Fi Direct enables two or more devices to connect directly in the 
absence of a traditional Wi-Fi hotspot.
With the broad availability of the 802.11ac Wi-Fi standard, Wi-Fi 
operates in the 5 GHz band with wider channels (Note: 802.11n could also 
operate in 5 GHz but in smaller channels), thus enabling more capacity. 
Theoretical throughput of 11ac can exceed 1 Gbps.
Also known as Low-Power Wi-Fi, 802.11ah operates in the sub-1 GHz 
band. It is viewed as central to IoT, given support for extended range 
Wi-Fi and efficient power profile. 11ah extends Wi-Fi beyond 2.4 and 5 
GHz, enabling coverage in challenging environments such as in building, 
basements, and so on. It also supports low-cost sensors without a power 
amplifier, and minimum data rates result in short-term data bursts.
802.11p is an approved standard for vehicle-to-vehicle 
communications. It uses dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) 
for applications such as toll collection, interaction between cars, and safety 
and roadside communications.
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With the increased adoption of Wi-Fi networks for IoT applications 
arose the need for providing wireless network in places where connecting 
an access point (AP) to wired network infrastructure (e.g., a wired 
Ethernet switch) was not possible. A typical example would be the case 
of positioning an AP in the middle of a large warehouse, since the length 
of an Ethernet cable is limited to 100 meters. Some other use cases are 
the extension of an indoor wireless network to a parking lot or a campus, 
providing Wi-Fi coverage to outdoor industrial areas such as an oil refinery 
and others. Such a network can service applications like wireless security 
cameras, utility meters, flow and pressure sensors, vehicle tracking 
systems, and so on.
802.11s defines Wi-Fi mesh networking. As shown in Figure 5-13, 
mesh networks allow rapid deployment with lower-cost backhaul, and 
they make providing coverage in hard-to-wire areas easier. Inherently, 
mesh networks are self-healing, resilient, and extensible. Under the 
right conditions, they increase the range of the network due to multihop 
forwarding and provide higher bandwidth and better battery life due to the 
lower power transmissions caused by shorter hops between neighboring 
nodes.







































Figure 5-13. Comparison of classic and mesh wireless local area 
network topologies
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Wi-Fi uses TCP/IP stack for Internet connectivity. Wi-Fi technology 
is hugely popular for consumer electronics and enterprise applications 
due to its ubiquitous presence in laptops, tablets, smartphones, and home 
entertainment devices. Wi-Fi access points are deployed today in many 
public spaces such as stadiums, airports, bus and railway stations, coffee 
shops, and schools. They are also present in most homes and offices. The 
increasing demand for cost-effective and easy Internet access along with 
the interoperability and ecosystem programs run by Wi-Fi Alliance has 
contributed to the wide adoption of this technology across the world. This 
worldwide availability makes Wi-Fi a natural choice for IoT connectivity, 
for applications that can leverage existing infrastructure without the need 
for custom protocol translators or gateways.
Today, most Wi-Fi networks operate in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz ISM 
(industrial, scientific, and medical) band. With more channels being 
available in the 5 GHz spectrum, higher data rates are possible. Wi-Fi 
networks have a start topology, with the access point acting as an Internet 
gateway. The transmit power permitted by Wi-Fi standards are high 
enough to enable in-home coverage in many cases. In large buildings, 
multiple access points and range extenders are often deployed at different 
locations to ensure adequate coverage and to avoid dead zones. Some  
Wi-Fi products support multiple antennae and transmitter and receiver 
chains for diversity. This helps in overcoming dead zones as well as 
increases data throughput.
Wi-Fi and TCP/IP software stacks are fairly complex and big in size. 
In traditional applications like laptops, smartphones, and tablets with 
adequate processing power and memory footprint, this was not a major 
issue. IoT devices – or things – often come with very low processing power 
and memory size and are typically battery powered. Till recently, adding 
Wi-Fi connectivity to those devices was neither practical nor cost-effective. 
Today, many wireless modules with embedded microcontrollers that 
run the TCP/IP stack and Wi-Fi software are available, thus offloading 
the task of networking from the main microprocessor unit. Wi-Fi devices 
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targeted for low data rate IoT applications apply advanced sleep protocols 
and support fast on/off times to reduce the average power consumption 
dramatically. Since many IoT applications do not need the maximum 
data rates that Wi-Fi offers, intelligent power management techniques can 
efficiently draw bursts of current from the battery for very short intervals 
and keep products connected to the Internet for multiple years without 
battery replacement.
Wi-Fi modules for IoT applications typically integrate the RF frontend, 
thus eliminating the need for extensive radio design experience for the 
embedded system designer. They often come pre-certified for regulatory 
compliance such as FCC (Federal Communications Commission) in the 
United States, thus making the system certification process less time-
consuming. Wi-Fi is the most ubiquitous wireless Internet connectivity 
technology today. Its high power and complexity has been a major 
barrier for IoT developers, but new silicon devices and modules reduce 
many of these barriers and enable Wi-Fi integration into emerging IoT 
applications and battery-operated devices. On the other hand, latest Wi-Fi 
standards offer very high bandwidth and capacity where needed, such as 
in video surveillance, retail, and sports arena applications. Thus Wi-Fi can 
support a wide variety of applications. Table 5-4 summarizes the Wi-Fi 
technologies currently available in the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz spectrum.
Table 5-4. Wi-Fi Protocol Summary
Protocol Frequency Channel 
Width
MIMO Maximum data 
rate(theoretical)
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To increase the relatively short range of Wi-Fi – specifically for IoT 
sensors that don’t require high data rates – 802.11ah was introduced. It 
operates in the 900 MHz and uses target wake time to reduce the amount of 
energy a device needs to stay connected to the network. Devices wake up 
for very short times at defined intervals to accept messages. It penetrates 
through walls and obstructions better than high-frequency networks. It 
is well suited for smart building applications, like smart lighting, smart 
HVAC, and smart security systems. It would also work for smart city 
applications, like parking garages and parking meters. Since there is no 
global 900 MHz standard, the adoption rate of 802.11ah is currently very 
low. Table 5-5 summarizes the key characteristics of 802.11ah.
Protocol Frequency Channel 
Width
MIMO Maximum data 
rate(theoretical)
802.11n 2.4 or 5 ghz 20, 40Mhz single User 
(sU-MiMo)
450 Mbps2
802.11g 2.4 ghz 20 Mhz n/a 54 Mbps
802.11a 5 ghz 20 Mhz n/a 54 Mbps
802.11b 2.4 ghz 20 Mhz n/a 11 Mbps
legacy 802.11 2.4 ghz 20 Mhz n/a 2 Mbps
1 2 Spatial streams with 256-QAM modulation.
2 3 Spatial streams with 64-QAM modulation.
Table 5-4. (continued)
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802.11ax represents the next phase of Wi-Fi. The Wi-Fi Alliance 
coined the term “Wi-Fi 6” when referring to the IEEE 802.11ax standard, 
indicating the sixth generation of Wi-Fi. Continued growth in the number 
of Wi-Fi-enabled devices, increased per-user traffic demand, greater 
number of users per access point (AP), higher-density Wi-Fi deployments, 
growing use of outdoor Wi-Fi, heterogeneous device and traffic types, and 
a desire for more power and spectral efficiency are all major driving forces 
behind 802.11ax. There are many 802.11ax enhancements in the 2.4 GHz 
band that will help increase the viability of Wi-Fi for Internet of Things 
Table 5-5. 802.11ah Overview
Name of Standard IEEE P802.11ah (low power WiFi)
frequency Band license-exempt bands below 1 ghz,  
excluding the tv White spaces
Channel Width 1/2/4/8/16 Mhz
range Up to 1Km (outdoor)
end node transmit power Dependent on regional regulations  
(from 1mW to 1 W)
packet size Up to 7,991 Bytes (w/o aggregation), Up to 
65,535 Bytes (with aggregation)
Uplink Data rate 150 Kbps ~ 346.666 Mbps
Downlink Data rate 150 Kbps ~ 346.666 Mbps
Devices per access point 8191
topology star, tree
end node roaming allowed allowed by other ieee 802.11 amendments 
(e.g., ieee 802.11r)
governing Body ieee 802.11 working group
status targeting 2016 release
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(IoT) applications. These include target wake time (TWT), orthogonal 
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA), 2 MHz clients, and 
coexistence improvements with other IoT wireless technologies. With sub-
1 GHz Wi-Fi HaLow (802.11ah) having gained very little traction to date, 
there is still considerable potential for 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi in the IoT. If certain 
2.4 GHz 802.11ax implementations can offer comparable battery life to 
802.11n, or other short-range wireless IoT connectivity solutions, it may 
open new opportunities for Wi-Fi across several IoT vertical applications. 
The standard builds on the strengths of 802.11ac while adding efficiency, 
flexibility, and scalability. Table 5-6 shows the major technical differences 
between 802.11ac and 802.11ax standards.
Table 5-6. 802.11ac and 802.11ax Comparison
802.11ac 802.11ax
Bands 5 ghz 2.4 ghz and 5 ghz
Channel Bandwith 20 Mhz, 40 Mhz, 80 Mhz, 
80+80 Mhz, & 160 Mhz
20 Mhz, 40 Mhz, 80 Mhz, 
80+80 Mhz, &160 Mhz
fft sizes 64, 128, 256, 512 256, 512, 1024, 2048
subcarrier spacing 312.5 khz 78.125 khz
ofDM symbol 
Duration
3.2 us + 0.8/0.4 us Cp 12.8 us + 0.8/1.6/3.2 us Cp
highest Modulation 256-QaM 1024-QaM
Data rate: 1 spatial 
stream
433 Mbps (80 Mhz, 1 ss) 600.4 Mbps (80 Mhz, 1 ss)
Data rate: 8 spatial 
streams
6933 Mbps (160 Mhz, 8 ss) 9607.8 Mbps (160 Mhz, 8 
ss)
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For Wi-Fi connectivity technology, security has two aspects. First is 
controlling who can connect to and configure the network and equipment. 
Second aspect deals with securing the data travelling wirelessly across 
your Wi-Fi network from unauthorized access by using encryption. For the 
overall network to be secure, one should also consider measures to protect 
the gateways and the connections across the Internet using virtual private 
network (VPN), firewalls, and so on.
 Bluetooth
Bluetooth operates in the unlicensed industrial, scientific, and medical 
(ISM) band at 2.4 GHz using a spread spectrum, frequency hopping, and 
full-duplex signal at a nominal rate of 1600 hops/sec. The 2.4 GHz ISM 
band is available and unlicensed in most countries. Its range varies from 
1 m to 100 m depending on which class of radio is used. Class 2 is the most 
commonly used radio. It has a range of around 10 m and uses 2.5 mW of 
power.
Bluetooth provides a short distance wireless connection with low 
power consumption, even compared to Wi-Fi. Bluetooth Low Energy 
(also known as Bluetooth Smart or BLE) further reduces the power 
consumption profile of traditional Bluetooth. For example, Bluetooth 
devices can sustain battery life for weeks or months, while Wi-Fi can be 
hours or days. Data transfer rates are somewhat limited at about 1 Mbps 
(though theoretical throughput is up to 24 Mbps), though the range 
extends up to about 100 meters (300+ feet). Similar to Wi-Fi, Bluetooth 
can be used for machine-to-machine connections and device pairing. 
Bluetooth 4.1 was introduced in December 2013, which enables devices 
to communicate with each other before feeding that data back to a host 
and interoperates with LTE.
The Bluetooth SIG controls the Bluetooth standard. Bluetooth 
technology was originally proposed as a standard for communications 
between phones and computers. The main use case that made Bluetooth 
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initially popular was hands-free phone calls with headsets and in-vehicle 
infotainment systems in cars. With the advent of smartphones, high-
fidelity music streaming and health and fitness accessories have also 
become more popular.
Bluetooth is a PAN (personal area network) technology primarily 
used today as a cable replacement for short-range communication. It 
can be used in a point-to-point or star network topology. It supports data 
throughputs up to 2 Mbps, with up to eight connected devices.
Original Bluetooth standard is today commonly referred to as 
Bluetooth Classic, to distinguish it from Bluetooth Low Energy. Bluetooth 
Low Energy, sometimes known as Bluetooth Smart, is an addition to the 
Bluetooth specification. Bluetooth SIG adopted it in the Bluetooth 4.0 
standard in 2010 to enter the low-power IoT space.
Though Bluetooth Low Energy also uses the 2.4 GHz ISM band, it is 
not compatible with Bluetooth Classic. Bluetooth Low Energy uses 40 
2 MHz-wide channels, whereas Bluetooth Classic uses 79 1 MHz-wide 
channels. Compared to Bluetooth Classic, Bluetooth Low Energy greatly 
reduces the power consumption of Bluetooth devices by supporting lower 
data throughput and enables lengthy lives for battery-operated devices. 
Bluetooth Low Energy also offers a beaconing capability and location-
based services. Bluetooth Low Energy has proven to be very popular, 
triggering an explosion of new applications in spaces as diverse as fitness, 
toys, and automotive applications. It is now the main driving force behind 
many new Bluetooth standards.
Over the years, Bluetooth SIG has announced major revisions to the 
specifications to improve security, battery life, and easier interoperation 
with IP-based networks. For example, Bluetooth 4.2 specification added 
industrial strength security with elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based 
key management and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) counter with 
cipher block chaining message authentication code (CCM) cryptography 
for message encryption.
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Bluetooth 5 offers a choice of data rates and operating ranges – 2 Mbps, 
1 Mbps, 500 Kbps, and 125 Kbps. The lower the data rates, the longer the 
ranges. The increases in range and data rate capabilities make Bluetooth 
Low Energy increasingly attractive in nonconsumer segments such as 
industrial data loggers or smart energy meters. Along with these, Bluetooth 
Low Energy’s inherent advantage of built-in compatibility with mobile 
devices, it is an excellent choice for data display and retrieval, Internet 
connectivity, and initial provisioning and configuration of IoT devices in 
the field. Table 5-7 shows a comparison of Bluetooth Classic and Bluetooth 
Low Energy technologies.
In 2017, the Bluetooth SIG released the mesh profile and mesh 
model specifications. Mesh networking technology enables the use of 
Bluetooth Low Energy for many-to-many device communications in home 
automation applications such as smart lighting, low-power wireless sensor 
networks, and so on. It also enables extended range communication using 
intermediary nodes to relay the data across the network. These new mesh 
standards are compatible with both the Bluetooth 5 and Bluetooth 4.x 
standards.
Table 5-7. Bluetooth Low Energy and Bluetooth Classic Comparison
Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) Bluetooth Classic  
[Basic Rate/Enhanced 
Data Rate (BR/EDR)]
optimized for… short burst data transmission Continuous data streaming
frequency Band 2.4 ghz isM Band  
(2.402–2.480 ghz Utilized)
2.4ghz isM Band (2.402–
2.480 ghz Utilized)
Channels 40 channels with 2 Mhz spacing 
(3 advertising channels/37 data 
channels)
79 channels with 1 Mhz 
spacing
(continued)
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Bluetooth Low Energy (LE) Bluetooth Classic  
[Basic Rate/Enhanced 
Data Rate (BR/EDR)]




Modulation gfsK gfsK, π/4 DQpsK, 8DpsK
power  
Consumption
~0.01x to 0.5x of reference 
(depending on use case)
1 (reference value)
Data rate le 2M phy: 2 Mb/s
le 1M phy: 1 Mb/s
le Coded phy (s=2): 500 Kb/s
le Coded phy (s=8): 125 Kb/s
eDr phy (8DpsK): 3 Mb/s
eDr phy (π/4 DQpsK): 2 
Mb/s
Br phy (gfsK): 1 Mb/s
Max tx power* Class 1: 100 mW (+20 dBm)
Class 1.5: 10 mW (+10 dBm)
Class 2: 2.5 mW (+4 dBm)
Class 3: 1 mW (0 dBm)
Class 1: 100 mW (+20 
dBm)
Class 2: 2.5 mW (+4 dBm)
Class 3: 1 mW (0 dBm)





Security in Bluetooth mesh networking is concerned with the security 
of more than individual devices or connections between peer devices; it’s 
concerned with the security of an entire network of devices and of various 
groupings of devices in the network. Consequently, security in Bluetooth 
mesh networking is mandatory. This is achieved by implementing the 
following fundamental security measures:
• Encryption and authentication: All Bluetooth mesh 
messages are encrypted and authenticated.
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• Separation of concerns: Network security, application 
security, and device security are addressed 
independently.
• Area isolation: A Bluetooth mesh network can be 
divided into subnets, each cryptographically distinct 
and secure from the others.
• Key refresh: Security keys can be changed during the 
life of the Bluetooth mesh network via a key refresh 
procedure.
• Message obfuscation: Message obfuscation makes 
it difficult to track messages sent within the network 
and, as such, provides a privacy mechanism to make it 
difficult to track nodes.
• Replay attack protection: Bluetooth mesh security 
protects the network against replay attacks.
• Trashcan attack protection: Nodes can be removed 
from the network securely, in a way which prevents 
trashcan attacks.
• Secure device provisioning: The process by which 
devices are added to the Bluetooth mesh network to 
become nodes is a secure process.
 Zigbee
Zigbee is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 link layer and typically operates in 
the 2.4 GHz ISM band. Its networking layer has been designed with mesh 
topology operations in mind from the ground up. This provides the  
ability to scale the network geographically through multihop operations 
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(for applications such as smart meters), as well as increases fault tolerance 
and reliability as backup paths are created through the mesh between any 
two points.
Zigbee is designed, promoted, and maintained by the Zigbee Alliance. 
Zigbee 3.0, the latest specification, increases choice and flexibility for users 
and developers and delivers the confidence that products and services will 
all work together through standardization at all layers of the stack. Zigbee 
3.0 is built on the Zigbee PRO, which enhances the IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
by adding mesh network and security layers along with an application 
framework and to become a full stack, low-power certifiable, interoperable 
Zigbee solution. Zigbee provides a complete solution that enables true 
device interoperability between different manufacturers. The Zigbee 
protocol suite incorporates the Zigbee cluster library: a standard library 
of device types, data models, and behaviors built by original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs) operating in different vertical markets and proven 
in actual deployments for many years. A rigorous certification program 
managed by the Zigbee Alliance guarantees interoperability between 
Zigbee devices, verifying device type behavior and functionality from 
an end product perspective and ensuring that products from different 
manufacturers can operate together.
The Zigbee protocol suite includes standard commissioning, security, 
network, and device management procedures. Various device types 
can join and be authenticated in the network and be factory reset or 
decommissioned in an interoperable way, guaranteeing end-to-end 
device interoperability from the start of device operation and seamlessly 
integrating with data collectors or hubs.
Zigbee-based applications mostly target the smart home and smart 
building domains, with focus in lighting and home control and physical 
security segments. Many telecom, security, and Internet service providers 
have endorsed Zigbee as the protocol of choice when introducing 
their home automation services to consumers, and many lighting 
manufacturers have a series of smart bulbs supporting this protocol.
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Zigbee takes full advantage of IEEE 802.15.4 physical radio standard 
and operation in unlicensed bands worldwide at 2.4 GHz (global), 915 MHz 
(Americas), and 868 MHz (Europe). Raw data throughput rates of 250 
Kbps can be achieved at 2.4 GHz (16 channels), 10 Kbps at 915–921 MHz 
(27 channels), and 100 Kbps at 868 MHz (63 channels). Transmission 
distances range from 10 to 100 meters, depending on power output and 
environmental characteristics. Sub-1 GHz channel transmission ranges up 
to 1 km. Table 5-8 provides a quick overview of the Zigbee technology.
Zigbee effectively uses the allocated bandwidth to convey both 
application data to operate devices and network management procedures 
like mesh and routing management with a very small energy footprint. 
Zigbee’s addressing scheme is capable of supporting hundreds of nodes 
per network (up to 64K), and multiple network coordinators can be linked 
together to support extremely large networks. The logical size of a Zigbee 
network ultimately depends on which frequency band is selected, how 
often each device on the network needs to communicate, and how much 
data loss or retransmissions can be tolerated by the application.
Table 5-8. Overview of Zigbee Technical Specifications
Solution Description
network protocol Zigbee pro 2015 (or newer)
network topology self-forming, self-healing Mesh
network Device types Coordinator (routing capable), router, end 
Device, Zigbee green power Device
network size (# of nodes) Up to 65,000
radio technology ieee 802.15.4-2011
frequency Band/Channels 2.4 ghz (isM band)
16 channels (2 Mhz wide)
(continued)
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 NFC
Near field communications (NFC) is a short-range wireless 
communication technology designed to build on existing high-frequency 
(HF) (13.56 MHz) contactless and RFID technology. Using 13.56 MHz on 
the ISM band and with a typical operating distance of up to 4 cm, today 
NFC enables an exchange rate of between 106 Kbps and 848 Kbps. NFC 
creates a short-range wireless connection able to operate in three different 
modes of operation: card emulation, read/write, and peer-to-peer. NFC 
technology enables a wide range of use cases from keyless access to 
e-wallet in smartphone and smart tags for medical applications. This is 
due to ease of implementation and the ability to embed tags into credit 
cards, smartphones, and other wearable devices.
Solution Description
Data rate 250 Kbits/sec
security Models Centralized (with install Codes support)
Distributed
encryption support aes-128 at network layer
aes-128 available at application layer
Communication  
range (average)
Up to 300+ meters (line of sight)
Up to 75–100 meters indoor
low power support sleeping end Devices
Zigbee green power Devices (energy 
harvesting)
Table 5-8. (continued)
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 GPS/GNSS
GPS is a satellite-based radio navigation system that provides users with 
location, velocity, and time information. A GPS receiver acquires each 
visible satellite’s signal and measures the individual time delays. Applying 
these time delays to known radio wave propagation characteristics allows 
the distance to each satellite to be calculated. GPS accuracy correlates 
with the number of satellites successfully acquired by a GPS receiver. New 
systems are under development, such as Glonass, Galileo, and Compass, 
which, when used in conjunction with GPS, will improve global coverage, 
reduce time to fix location, and increase performance in challenging 
environments. Location data collected by onboard GPS trackers are 
vital to many applications in the transportation industry such as fleet 
management, asset tracking, and autonomous vehicles.
 Cellular
Cellular technologies provide “always-on” connectivity to the backbone 
network – to the Cloud. Similar to mobile phones for consumer 
applications, cellular data for IoT can be connected over 2G, 3G, or 4G 
networks. Benefits include broad coverage leveraging existing base station 
infrastructure as well as mobility (e.g., cars). Potential drawbacks include 
power consumption, fees associated with data transfer over licensed 
spectrum owned by carriers, and potential gaps in coverage.
As demand for ubiquitous connectivity for IoT devices gets ever 
stronger, cellular networks can deliver reliable and secure IoT services 
using existing network infrastructure. Massive investments have been 
made in spectrum allocations and network deployments to ensure good 
coverage for the entire population in most countries. The same networks 
that are used to connect people can now be leveraged to connect things.
Chapter 5  ConneCtivity teChnologies for iot
392
Traditional cellular options such as 2G, 3G, or higher category 4G 
modems consume a lot of power and don’t fit well with applications where 
only a small amount of data is transmitted infrequently, such as smart 
meters, asset trackers, healthcare equipment, agriculture sensors, parking 
spaces, and street lights. Cellular IoT is designed to meet the requirements 
of such low-power, long-range applications. It takes existing technology 
that we already use every day for our smartphones and scales it back to 
meet the needs of low-power devices.
When it comes to analyzing cost of a communication solution, the 
total cost of ownership includes spectrum costs, infrastructure costs, and 
operational expenses. As cellular networks are already in place, very little new 
infrastructure needs to be installed. The base stations, cell towers, buildings, 
and power supply are already in place, all around the world. The technology 
also has the potential to cover hundreds of thousands of IoT devices per 
square kilometer – many more than other communication options.
No single technology or solution is ideally suited to all the different 
potential massive IoT applications, market situations, and spectrum 
availability. As a result, the mobile industry is standardizing several 
technologies, including Long-Term Evolution for Machines (LTE-M) and 
Narrowband IoT (NB-IoT). NB-IoT is ideally suited for low bandwidth, 
infrequent communication from a relatively stationary device, while 
LTE-M suits higher bandwidth or mobile and roaming applications.
A good application for NB-IoT is the use of remote environmental 
sensors to measure temperature, wind, pressure, and so on. These devices 
can send regular updates from a fixed location while optimizing battery 
use. Such a device could last for up to 10 years, or longer if solar powered 
and in the right geographical position.
Similarly, an asset tracker with condition monitoring through 
several sensors, which is mobile and roaming from country to country, 
is well served by an LTE-M solution that offers highway speed mobility, 
international roaming between countries and operators, and efficient 
firmware updates.
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Advantages of cellular connectivity for IoT include
• The use of open standards based on existing 
infrastructure means coverage will reach virtually 
everywhere where people live.
• Many devices can operate simultaneously because 
of the advanced coexistence mechanisms in the LTE 
standard and licensed band operation, as is already 
proven today with the large number of cellphones used 
concurrently within a small area.
• No limiting regulatory regulations, so you can transmit 
up to 23 dBm and negotiate for as much airtime as you 
need.
• Standard TLS/DTLS security for end-to-end security 
is supported on top of the on-air encryption of the LTE 
network aided by the SIM credentials. This keeps data 
secure from the device to the cloud server.
• As cellular network coverage increases and technologies 
are available in low-complexity, low- power variants, 
cellular technology is a great choice for the world’s IoT 
needs.
 5G Cellular
The first-generation mobile network (1G) was all about voice and used 
analogy technology. 2G enabled voice and texting (short messaging 
service – SMS) using digital technology. 3G was about voice, texting, and 
data. 4G was everything in 3G but faster, and 5G will be even faster. 5G 
will be fast enough to download a full-length HD movie in seconds. The 
transition from 2G to 4G happened in a span of about 20 years as shown in 
Figure 5-14.
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The real performance of a cellular network will vary by provider, 
their configuration of the network, the number of active connections in a 
given cell, the radio environment in a specific location, the capability of 
the device in use, plus all the other factors that affect radio performance. 
It is safe to assume that the throughput will be much closer to the lower 
bound for data throughput, and the latency will be trending toward the 
higher bound for packet latency for a given generation. Table 5-9 provides 
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Figure 5-14. Evolution of cellular technologies
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5G is much more than just faster networks. It supports the unique 
combination of high-speed connectivity, very low latency, and ubiquitous 
coverage, making it natively suitable for supporting IoT use cases. 5G will 
enable us to control more devices remotely in applications where real- time 
network performance is critical, enabling new user experiences in many 
different verticals. For example, it can be used for remote control of heavy 
machinery in hazardous environments, thereby improving worker safety. With 
its low latency, it can improve access to healthcare by enabling remote surgery. 
5G connectivity will support smart vehicles and transport infrastructure such 
as connected cars, where the variation in delay could mean the difference 
between a smooth flow of traffic and an accident. It is evident that 5G will spur 
innovation across many industries and prove to be an enabling platform for 
IoT solutions to become an integral part of our economy.
Table 5-9. Comparison of Data Rates and Latencies of Different 
Generations of Cellular Technologies





1g no Data no Data no Data analog systems
2g 100s of Kbps 100–400 Kbps 300–1000 ms first digital systems 
as overlays or parallel 
to analog systems
3g 10s of Mbps 400 Kbps– 
5 Mbps
100–500 ms Dedicated digital 
networks deployed 
in parallel to analog 
systems
4g 100s of Mbps 1–50 Mbps <100 ms Digital and packet-
only networks
5g 10s of gbps tBD 1–20 ms Digital and packet-
only networks
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 Key Standards, Regulatory, and Industry Bodies 
Involved in 5G
There are multiple cellular standards and release versions, and the 
classification of any given network as 3G, 4G, or 5G is definitely too coarse. 
Here is a quick survey of the key players behind the evolution of various 
cellular technologies:
• ITU: (International Telecommunications Union) 
Agency of the UN, coordinating telecom operations 
and services globally. Their ITU-R sector is charged 
with developing future 5G standards and coordinating 
harmonized spectrum use.
• 3GPP: Collaboration between seven global 
telecommunications standards organizations engaged 
in research and development of 5G standards.
• ETSI: Organization in Europe producing globally 
applicable standards for Information and 
Communication Technologies.
• OCF: Comprised of technology suppliers for product, 
software, platform, and silicon dedicated to driving 
open standards for IoT solutions.
• IEEE: A technical professional organization dedicated 
to enabling the development of new use cases and 
standards to accelerate time to market of technologies 
developed on a consensus basis.
• 5G-ACIA: 5G Alliance for Connected Industries and 
Automation ensures the best possible applicability of 5G 
technology and 5G networks for the manufacturing and 
process industries by addressing, discussing, and evaluating 
relevant technical, regulatory, and business aspects.
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 New Use Cases Enabled by 5G
5G addresses existing, emerging, and future use cases. 3GPP (3rd Generation 
Partnership Project) has grouped the high-level use cases of 5G into three 
categories, based on the functionality and performance that 5G would need 
to enable these use cases. The three sets of use cases, primarily based on the 
5G performance attributes, are listed here and are shown in Figure 5-15:
• Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB): Use cases 
requiring high data rates across a wide coverage area, 
providing immersive experiences such as augmented 
reality and virtual reality. eMBB will initially be an 
extension to existing 4G services and will be among the 
first 5G services. The three main attributes of 5G that 
enable eMBB use cases are
Higher capacity: Which makes broadband access 
available in densely populated areas, both indoors 
and outdoors, like city centers, office buildings, and 
public venues like stadiums or conference centers.
Enhanced connectivity: Broadband access must 
be available, with adequate quality of service 
everywhere to provide a consistent user experience.
Higher user mobility: Will enable mobile broadband 
services in moving vehicles including cars, buses, 
trains, and even planes.
eMBB traffic is characterized by large payloads and 
by a device connection pattern that remains stable 
over an extended time interval. This allows the 
network to schedule wireless resources to the eMBB 
devices preventing the chance of two eMBB devices 
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accessing the same resource simultaneously. The 
objective of the eMBB service is to maximize the 
data rate while guaranteeing a moderate reliability.
• Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC): This 
addresses the need to support a very large number 
of devices in a small area, which may only send data 
sporadically. IoT use cases such as smart homes, smart 
cities, and weather and agricultural smart sensors 
are good examples. A large number of mMTC devices 
may be connected to a given cellular network, but at a 
given time only a subset of them could be active and 
attempt to communicate their data. The large number 
of potentially active mMTC devices makes it infeasible 
to preallocate resources to individual mMTC devices. 
Instead, it is necessary to provide resources that can 
be shared through random access. The objective in the 
design of mMTC is to maximize the arrival rate that can 
be supported in a given radio resource.
• Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communications (URLLC): 
These use cases impose strict requirements on latency 
and reliability for mission-critical communications, 
such as remote surgery, autonomous vehicles, or 
industrial control applications. The number of 
potential devices supported per unit area is considered 
to be smaller than mMTC. Supporting URLLC 
transmissions requires a combination of scheduling, 
so as to ensure a certain amount of predictability 
in the available resources and thus support high 
reliability. Random access is also required in order to 
ensure that too many resources do NOT idle due to the 
intermittent nature of scheduled traffic. Due to the low 
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latency requirements, a URLLC transmission should be 
localized in time. Diversity, which is critical to achieve 
high reliability, can be achieved by using multiple 
frequency or spatial resources. Compared to eMBB, the 
rate of a URLLC transmission is relatively low, and the 
main requirement is ensuring a high reliability level.
 Key Technology Enablers for 5G
• 5G NR: 5G New Radio is the new air interface 
technology being defined to support the features of 
5G. The air interface specifies the radio frequency (RF) 
section of the connection between a mobile device and 
the mobile network. OFDM (orthogonal frequency- 
division multiplexing) family of waveforms will be 
used for 5G. This allows wireless network providers to 
more easily scale carrier bandwidth needed for each 
application and support diverse spectrum. 5G New 
Radio will use new spectrum well beyond the range of 
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Figure 5-15. New use cases enabled by 5G
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availability and throughput. Massive MIMO (multiple 
input multiple output) technologies enable efficient 
use of large number of antennae and, along with 3D 
beamforming technologies, allow increase in capacity, 
coverage, and cell edge performance. The 5G NR self- 
contained slot structure delivers significantly lower 
latency than LTE thanks to support for fast uplink/
downlink turnaround and scalable slot durations.
• Network Function Virtualization (NFV): Today’s 
networks are dedicated, static, and hardware 
resource-based and can’t meet tomorrow’s demands. 
Decoupling and shifting network functions from 
proprietary hardware to software-based services on 
open servers “virtualizes” the network. To support the 
many new use cases for 5G, NFV provides significant 
capabilities for communication service providers that 
will lead to more innovation, fast service deployment, 
and reduced operating expenses.
• Software-Defined Networking (SDN): SDN is a 
framework for creating intelligent networks that are 
open, programmable, and application aware. It makes 
network programmable by separating the control 
plane (telling the network what goes where) from the 
data plane (sending packets to specific destinations) – 
centralizing and automating network engineering 
tasks and reducing the amount of manual intervention 
and coordination. This drives rapid service creation, 
reducing time to market for new offerings.
• Network Slicing: This can be employed to enable 
enhanced network flexibility. SDN and NFV create 
opportunity to “slice” networks, so that a single physical 
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network can be partitioned into many virtual networks. 
Each slice is self-contained with all necessary functions 
and is customized to match the level of delivery 
complexity required by the service-level agreement, 
as illustrated in Figure 5-16. Delivering customized 
connectivity and computing power for different types 
of segments, devices, and services opens new ways for 
communication service providers to monetize their 
offering. For example, they can provide third parties with 
access to operate their slices independently, creating 
new Network-as-a-Service (NaaS) business model.







































Figure 5-16. Network slicing concept
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• C-RAN: Cloud or Centralized Radio Access Network 
helps to optimize network architecture by virtualizing 
base station functions; mobile base stations are 
comprised of a baseband unit (BBU), handling data 
processing, and a radio unit (RU), sending/receiving 
radio waves and managing the radio resources. 
Separating the BBU from the mobile base station radio 
unit pools data processing functions into a centralized 
server as shown in Figure 5-17. This allows multiple 
radio units to be controlled from one server reducing 
CAPEX and OPEX for communication service providers. 
This also increases the ability to address interference 
issue in high-density area and improves network 









Figure 5-17. Cloud RAN concept
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 LPWAN – Low-Power Wide Area Networks
Low-power wide area network (LPWAN) technologies have low power 
draw and provide coverage to wide geographical areas. They provide 
connectivity for devices and applications that require low mobility and low 
speeds and infrequent data transfer, such as sensors. LPWAN technologies 
fill the gap between mobile cellular (3G, LTE) and short-range wireless 
(e.g., Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and Zigbee) networks and are designed for 
machine-to-machine communications. LPWAN devices have a long 
battery life because they transmit only small packets of data at infrequent 
intervals. LPWAN solutions provide a wide area of coverage that is not 
limited by distance between the access points (i.e., base stations or towers) 
using new modulation techniques and frequency choices. They also do 
not typically require line-of-sight communications. They therefore require 
far fewer access points per unit area than traditional cellular wireless 
technologies.
There is no single standard for LPWAN, and there are a number 
of competing technologies, providing different levels of coverage and 
capacity. We will take a look at three of them.
 LoRa
LoRa Alliance is an open, nonprofit association with over 500 members 
globally among telcos, system integrators, and manufacturers. 
LoRaWAN is an open standard with a certification program to guarantee 
interoperability that is governed by the LoRa Alliance. LoRaWAN 
network semiconductor technology is proprietary to California-based 
semiconductor manufacturer Semtech. See Table 5-10 for the summary of 
technical specifications of LoRa technology.
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 Sigfox
One of the most widely deployed proprietary LPWAN technologies is 
Sigfox, which was established in France in 2009 and deployed its first 
network in mid-2012. As of August 2018, there were networks in some 
50 countries globally with a target of 60 by the end of the year. Table 5-11 
captures the key features of Sigfox.
Table 5-10. LoRa Overview
Name of Standard LoRaWAN
frequency Band 433/868/780/915 Mhz isM
Channel Width eU: 8x125khz, Us 64x125khz/8x125khz
Modulation: Chirp spread spectrum
range 2-5k (urban), 15k (rural)
end node transmit power eU:<+14dBm
Us:<+27dBm
packet size Defined by User
Uplink Data rate eU: 300 bps to 50 kbps
Us:900-100kbps
Downlink Data rate eU: 300 bps to 50 kbps
Us:900-100kbps
Devices per access point Uplink:>1M
Downlink:<100k
topology star on star
end node roaming allowed yes
governing Body lora alliance
status spec released June 2015, in deployment
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 Weightless
Cambridge-based Weightless SIG (Special Interest Group) was founded 
in 2008 to develop standards for M2M communications in white space 
(unused TV spectrum). Weightless originally developed three standards 
for different use cases which employ different technologies and 
provide varying levels of packet size and data rates. Today it promotes 
Weightless-P, which is shown in Table 5-12 – an ultra-narrowband protocol 
for bidirectional communications now known simply as Weightless 
technology.
Table 5-11. Sigfox Overview
Name of Standard SigFox
frequency Band 868 Mhz/902 Mhz isM
Channel Width Ultra narrow band
range 30-50km (rural), 3-10km (urban), 
1000km los
end node transmit power -20 dBm to 20 dBm
packet size 12 bytes
Uplink Data rate 100 bps to 140 messages/day
Downlink Data rate to 4 messages of 8 bytes/day
Devices per access point 1M
topology star
end node roaming allowed yes
governing Body sigfox (proprietary)
status in deployment
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 Comparison of Low-Power LTE and Other LPWAN 
Technologies
There are several technologies upon which LPWANs can be based as seen 
earlier and can be classified into those based on proprietary systems and 
those based on open standards.
Low-power Long-Term Evolution (LTE) has taken off since the 3rd 
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) introduced a specification for 
two forms of the technology – LTE-M and Narrowband-IoT (NB-IoT) – 
in Release 13 of the standard. The new specification makes it easier for 
manufacturers to design and develop the inexpensive, compact, and low 
power consumption wireless LTE modems that LPWANs demand.
Table 5-12. Weightless Overview
Name of Standard Weightless
frequency Band sub-ghZ isM
Channel Width 12.5 khz
range 2km (urban)
end node transmit power 17 dBm
packet size 10 byte min
Uplink Data rate 200 bps to 100 kbps
Downlink Data rate same
Devices per access point Unlimited
topology star
end node roaming allowed yes
governing Body
status in deploymnet
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LTE is an open standard, operates in a licensed portion of the RF 
spectrum, leverages existing infrastructure for coverage, and has coexistence 
mechanisms that enable scaling to high node counts per base station.
Low-power LTE operates in up to 44 different licensed frequencies 
across the world, ranging from 450 MHz to 2.6 GHz. By using the licensed 
spectrum, the owners of the spectrum allocation (the carriers) can control 
and prioritize data, and the bands are immune from interference from 
other sources of RF radiation.
Because the spectrum allocation isn’t shared with other RF 
transmissions, the coexistence between connected devices is much easier 
to manage. LTE’s coexistence technology is based on proven frequency- 
and time-domain solutions and other mechanisms such as “autonomous 
denials” of conflicting RF signals. Consequently, LTE can support a node 
density of up to 200,000 active low-power modems per base station. 
Finally, data carried over LTE is safe from prying eyes because the standard 
has incorporated advanced security from its inception. These features 
ensure that carriers can offer reliability and high quality of service.
In contrast, proprietary technologies limit the participation in the 
vendor ecosystem and innovation in technology evolution over time. As 
they operate in unlicensed allocations of the RF spectrum (typically sub-1 
GHz), coexistence could also be a challenge. They must share RF spectrum 
with many other services. While basic interference avoidance techniques 
are employed, so many services are sharing the spectrum allocation that it is 
extremely to match the node density, reliability, and quality of service of LTE.
Proprietary LPWAN vendors are also faced with the major challenge 
of building infrastructure to support their networks. These are likely to be 
expensive and long-winded projects slowing adoption. In contrast, worldwide 
LTE infrastructure is largely in place comprising 480 networks in 157 
countries. Some upgrading (mainly of software) is required to support low-
power LTE, but this is relatively a less complex effort compared to building the 
infrastructure in the first place. Because the infrastructure is installed, support 
for low-power LTE is likely to be added rapidly, further encouraging its uptake. 
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Companies adopting low-power LTE for their IoT-connected products can 
leverage this infrastructure without bearing its build or maintenance costs, 
instead investing in their own services and business models.
 A Case Study – Smart Homes
A typical smart home gateway is illustrated in Figure 5-18.
In reality, many IoT endpoints and gateways will employ multiple 
communication technologies based on cost, improved flexibility, and 
interoperability. A primary example is connected thermostat which 
incorporates both Wi-Fi and ZigBee. Many smart meters support cellular, 
ZigBee, RF mesh, and Wi-Fi capabilities. A key advantage of Wi-Fi and 
Bluetooth is that they are already embedded in essentially all smartphones. 
This type of coexistence of multiple technologies in a single system is 
illustrated in the smart home IoT system example shown earlier. The 
gateway supports Wi-Fi and Ethernet for LAN connections that need higher 
bandwidth such as audio and video applications. PAN and mesh networks 
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Figure 5-18. Smart home system using multiple connectivity 
technologies
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sensors and controllers for lighting, security, and so on. The gateway provides 
WAN connectivity to Cloud using cellular technologies like LTE and 5G. Local 
analytics and intelligences provided by the gateway. The cloud service 
providers enable cloud-based applications to deliver the various services.
 Summary
There are many connectivity technologies that can be used for enabling 
IoT. Each one has its own benefits and shortcomings. One should choose 
a technology or a combination of technologies that is best suited for the 
application. Cost, ease of system integration, and security should also 
be considered along with features such as throughput, range, power 
consumption, network topology, and existing infrastructure.
The IEEE has already standardized dozens of use cases and applications 
for IoT protocols. In addition to the basic communications standards 
discussed earlier (layer 2 in the OSI stack), which handle the underlying 
communications, there is a need for standardization at higher layers of the 
stack as well. Working groups belonging to many industry alliances such 
as OPC Foundation, Industrial Internet Consortium, 5G-ACIA, and ZigBee 
Alliance and standardization bodies such as ETSI coordinate and establish 
the priorities and enabling technologies of the Industrial Internet in order to 
accelerate market adoption and drive down the barriers to entry.
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It is not the critic who counts; not the man who points out how 
the strong man stumbles, or where the doer of deeds could 
have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is 
actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat 
and blood.
—Theodore Roosevelt1
Throughout the previous chapters of this book, we have presented how 
different parts of an IoT system could be built and what components and 
frameworks are important and useful. In this chapter, we present what 
Intel is doing in the arena of IoT as complete vertical solutions. IoT spans a 
broad range of different markets, and therefore solutions must be tailored 
to the specific purposes of those markets and the specific security threats 
1 www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/44567.Theodore_Roosevelt
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encountered or expected in those environments. There are similarities, to 
be sure. Each industry has different security demands due to the nature 
of the information handled and the mandate to conform to particular 
regulatory and industry standard bodies’ requirements. This chapter 
will provide an overview of the different verticals, associated security 
requirements, threats, and mitigations.
The IoT ecosystem is fragmented by nature with multiple verticals, but 
at the end of the day, we strive to leverage a common set of hardware and 
software building blocks, augmented with accelerators, to meet domain 
unique requirements. Security is a horizontal capability, as we have 
shown in Chapters 3 and 4. However, because of the differences within 
each vertical market, frequently different verticals expand and enhance 
the common set of security capabilities in order to achieve what their 
particular market demands. This perspective is shown in Figure 6-1 which 
articulates unique vertical security and regulatory requirements built from 
a common set of security minimal viable platform features. Successfully 
accomplishing this customization necessitates a system of systems 
perspective, which is an understanding that no system exists in a vacuum 
but must interact with other systems – human, technological, and process. 
As we delve into each vertical market in this section, common themes from 
the security MVP will stand out to the reader, but these will be adapted 
by each domain to address security and privacy by design, security-
performance trade-offs at the system level, and integration into existing 
systems and processes – the system of systems perspective.
Before diving deeply into each vertical domain, we present a 
brief overview of each domain and point out the commonalities, and 
differences, between them.
Chapter 6  Iot VertICal applICatIons and assoCIated seCurIty requIrements
415
The Transportation Solutions domain is focused on safety and 
leverages the foundational security MVP, augmenting HW/FW/SW 
capabilities to meet the prevalent standards and regulations including SAE 
J-3101, EVITA, HIS, AutoSAR, and autonomous driving standard (levels 
L1–L5). Anti-tampering which is related to preventing and/or detecting 
an attempt to alter or modify the platform for stealing secrets is critical to 
achieving transportation safety. Anti-cloning is related to preventing and/
or detecting an attempt to copy or clone the platform including the HW/
FW/SW. Some of these capabilities may align with other verticals. The 
Transportation Solutions domain also has some unique requirements 
such as memory zeroization where the state of the memory is initialized 
to a known value (zero) to eliminate the secrets from DRAM and to meet 
safety requirements for known state of software structures and variables. 
Virtualization support in hardware is mandatory for the transportation 
domain in order to maximize hardware utilization while minimizing 
cost without compromising security – this usually involves VTd and VTx 
technologies as we saw in the ACRN hypervisor in Chapter 4.
When a capability is aligned across more than two verticals, it makes 
sense to move this capability into the security MVP foundation. This then 
implies that some verticals do not make use of every security MVP feature. 
However, as we have found at Intel, as features move into the security 
Transportation
Security MVP – {TEE: SGX, VM} {Secure Boot} {Secure Storage: PTT/TPM} {PKI Device ID}
{Crypto: HW accelerated} {FIPS 140-2}
Standard Compliance
•    Security + Functional
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Hardened Virtualization
•    Anti-tampering +
memory zeroization
•    Anti-cloning
•    SAEJ3101
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Retail Solutions
Remote Manageability
•    vPro Active Management
Technology
•    AMT 5G WWAN
•    Provisioning
•    Recovery
•    Predictive analytics
•    Hardened Virtualization
•    Future Manageability
Industrial
Intrinsic Security to IIoT Gateways
•    Provisioning & Life Cycle
Management
•    Network Protection &
Attestation
•    SW Orchestration, Software
Defined Industrial Systems
(SDIS)
•    Hardened Virtualization
Military/Aero/Govt
Ruggedized & Robust
•    Memory encryption
•    Configurable RoT
•    Offline attestation
•    FIPS Certification
•    Physical Tamper
Detection/Prevention
•    Configurability:
Debug Disable,
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•    Provisioning
•    Video watermarking
•    Multiple RoT with
FPGA and Movidius
•    Encrypted/Authenticated
Video streams
Consistency
Figure 6-1. IoT vertical framework: enhance the foundation with 
value-added features to enable verticals
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MVP, other vertical domains begin to leverage that capability as well. An 
example of this is FIPS 140 Level 2 which is now a common requirement 
across all the verticals.
The Retail Solution domain’s security is focused on protecting the 
credit card payment information and the data in financial transactions. 
The identity of the users at the POS terminals is also of significance, 
leading to unique protections to handle personally identifiable 
information (PII). A new retail segment known as responsive retail 
addresses targeted marketing for the brick-and-mortar retailer while 
improving the shopping experience for consumers using advertisements 
customized according to the age, gender (using facial and body imaging), 
and other characteristics of the consumer. The retail domain in general 
is also heavily invested in remote manageable devices (upgradable and 
recoverable) over wired and wireless networks (in-band and out-of-
band). Provisioning devices with the proper software loads and unique 
credentials to facilitate transactions to financial institutions and suppliers 
is an important, though not unique, characteristic of retail IoT systems.
In the in-band recovery scenario, a corrupt application can be 
recovered with the help of the operating system, and a corrupt operating 
system can be recovered with the help of the BIOS/UEFI/boot loader. We 
discussed some of these capabilities in Chapter 4, where we introduced the 
difficult problem of upgrading the platform firmware, such as the BIOS/
UEFI/boot loader itself. For these situations, an out-of-band capability 
or physical access is required to recover the platform from corrupted 
firmware.
The Industrial Solutions domain covers the convergence of IT 
(information technology) with OT (operational technology), along with 
the related issues of incorporating existing systems and infrastructure 
(brownfield deployments) with new systems, capabilities, and 
infrastructure (greenfield deployments). Traditionally OT dealt with the 
factory and manufacturing floor tasks, and IT infrastructure managed 
Chapter 6  Iot VertICal applICatIons and assoCIated seCurIty requIrements
417
the office and back-end tasks. Creating a smart factory requires the 
convergence of IT and OT, allowing the data to flow seamlessly between IT 
and OT for effective decision making and factory process execution. In a 
brownfield scenario, industries have long been deploying the devices and 
equipment with legacy bus interfaces and little to no network connectivity. 
The greenfield scenario is where the equipment and devices can all be 
true IoT with maximum high (or higher) bandwidth connectivity. Bridging 
the gap between brownfield and greenfield requires the use of proxy 
gateways with network protections and network admission technologies 
using device attestation. Software orchestration is essential in Industrial 
IoT (IIOT) where standards compliant architecture such as ISA-95 and 
Software-Defined Industrial Systems (SDIS) are federated for service 
orchestration, allowing all devices to both consume and provide services. 
Security services center around integrity and availability, and device 
recovery and reprovisioning for new services or changeovers to new tasks 
must be done quickly and efficiently or the loss on revenue can be steep.
The Military, Aerospace, and Government domain has the highest 
and most robust security requirements, and the need for performant 
crypto features, including encryption/decryption, digital signature/
verification, and random number generation, has high-throughput 
requirements. This domain also demands a configurable Root of Trust 
(RoT), augmenting the Intel RoT with a particular custom hardware Root 
of Trust private to the domain with higher robustness requirements. The 
alternative roots of trust include customized RoT in an Intel SoC/PCH 
or an FPGA. Physical tamper prevention, detection, and recovery are 
key features which are also tied to the secure debug ports, protections 
from side-channel attacks on clock, and prevention/detection of power 
glitching, among a host of other hardware-specific attacks. When attesting 
the IoT devices in this domain, in addition to remote attestation, a local 
or offline attestation feature is a mandatory requirement. Many advanced 
security requirements appear first in the Government domain and then 
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slowly begin to appear in other domains. Side-channel resistance is a 
recent example; protection from covert and side channels has been a long-
standing requirement in the military domain, but not until the appearance 
of the Spectre and Meltdown attacks the side-channel protections are 
included in commercial RFPs. However, since these attacks were disclosed, 
side-channel protections are the new baseline and part of the common 
security MVP.
The Digital Surveillance System (DSS) domain is focused on network 
video recorders, networked Internet Protocol (IP) cameras, and computer 
vision accelerators. In a DSS system of systems, there is a need for multiple 
roots of trust including Intel SoC, FPGA, and Movidius. Provisioning the 
DSS cameras and video recorders is critical to prevent the IP camera–
related attacks, including the Mirai botnet attacks which used default and 
brute-force login credentials2 and the Persirai botnet which took over 
cameras using a recent zero-day vulnerability.3 DSS systems also require 
performant crypto features, since the video stream must be encrypted 
and watermarked at line rate speeds. Another critical requirement for the 
DSS segment is data provenance, authenticated and integrity-protected 
metadata and attributes attached to the video and photographic data to 
prove the data, time, location, and device used for collection.
The DSS domain encounters some unique data protection and privacy 
regulations such as EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and 
the California data privacy regulations which impact every type of business 
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 Common Domain Requirements 
and the Security MVP
The IoT Base Platform MVP is defined with foundational building blocks 
and the realization that the security requirements are achieved, up to 
nearly 90% in many cases, through common silicon used across all the 
domains. System design is dynamic, and decision vectors usually include 
security, privacy, resiliency, availability, and safety. The MVP is a triad 
of HW, FW, and SW capabilities that enables dynamic design where the 
domain features from HW, FW, and SW are selected diligently to reflect the 
trade-offs and optimize for the relevant decision vector. The NIST Cyber-
Physical Systems Framework4 for HW and SW co-design articulates trade-
offs between the cyber and physical components of the IoT system.
Matthew Rosenquist articulated in a blog post5 that although security 
is valuable, it comes at a cost – the cost for new equipment, the cost for 
training personnel on new technology, and the cost to develop new 
processes to utilize the technology. But just because we do not pay the cost 
to build security into our systems does not mean the cost goes away. We 
still incur costs due to the risks we inherently adopt by rejecting certain 
security features and the potential (and actual costs) to clean up after a 
security incident. These choices leading to costs of failure determine the 
risk management process as shown in Figure 6-2. A potential future cost of 
a security incident must be weighed against the actual cost to add security 
and the soft cost incurred by productivity impacts due to additional 
security. Good security design involves teaming up with customers and 
end users to understand these costs and balance the overall system to 
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and most likely threats while providing a useful and useable system. 
Often ignored are the external costs where unrelated third-party entities 
suffer the consequences of attacks, and one specific example is the DNS-
administrating company Dyn. For almost an entire day, Mirai botnet took 
down the sites including Twitter, CNN, Guardian, Netflix, and so on whose 
DNS services were being administered by Dyn.6 The optimal security is 
a balance of cost, user experience, and risk. Since the IoT domains are 
different, and the threats are ever evolving, and the user interface and 
experience paradigms change, this balancing act becomes a dynamic 
living act. The security MVP is only the start of that act. Engagement in the 
domain and balancing domain-specific requirements is the process. The 
detailed sections that follow articulate Intel’s perspective and engagement 








Figure 6-2. Balancing security against cost, risk, and productivity
One additional comment is warranted to the reader at this point. It has 
become a norm to employ complementary technologies such as FPGA 
accelerators, Movidius Computer Vision IP, and ASIC accelerators to meet 
the requirements from applications in various domain solutions. These 
complementary technologies augment the base platform for increased 
6 www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/26/ddos-attack-dyn-mirai-botnet
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performance, HSM7 needs, functional safety, and real-time latency 
workloads. These technologies are outside the scope of this book, but 
details on these technologies can be found on the Intel web site.8 Finally, 
although we provide a reasonable overview of the use cases, threats, and 
security objectives for the domains, the following coverage is not meant 
to be comprehensive, and to do so would require a much more exhaustive 
threat modeling exercise, with subsequent peer reviews, to refine the 
threat model and design for specific products.
 Some Common Threats
Just as the domains share a common hardware and software security MVP, 
the domains have threats that are common across all vertical domains as 
well. These common threats are discussed in this section.
Device masquerading: A device employed or modified by a 
hacker is tricked to identify as a legitimate system on the IoT network. 
This sometimes can be extremely difficult to detect and rectify. The 
consequences and methods employed to launch such an attack depend 
upon the particular use case, and these idiosyncrasies are discussed next.
Boot integrity compromise: The pre-OS FW such as BIOS or 
other boot loaders can be tampered with by modifying or replacing/
reprogramming the image on flash device. This can have serious 
consequences since all other layers in the stack are on the top of this layer 
in the bootstrapping sequence.
Offline storage–related attacks: Mass storage or any removable 
storage media can be attacked offline by copying the media or stealing the 
physical media device, and then sifting through the data to find secrets, or 
using brute force techniques on keys or passwords to reveal sensitive data.
7 Hardware security module (HSM) for key storage and trusted cryptographic 
operations
8 www.intel.com
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 Retail Solutions
The retail POS devices are becoming a part of the IoT domain, and 
increasingly these devices such as the POS terminals, mobile payments, 
and so on are connected to the Internet and accessed by cashiers and staff 
using tablets and other mobile devices. In this section, we’ll discuss what is 
required to be Payment Card Industry (PCI) compliant on Intel platforms 
and a way to get there.
According to the PCI specification, the hackers are mainly interested in 
stealing the cardholder data. “By obtaining the Primary Account Number 
(PAN) and sensitive authentication data, a thief can impersonate the 
cardholder, use the card, and steal the cardholder’s identity.”
Sensitive cardholder data can be stolen from many places including a 
compromised card reader or data in a payment system database, snooping 
the store’s wireless or wired networks. Each of these is a trust boundary, 
and the assets need to be protected as they traverse each boundary.
Securing the cardholder data starts where it is captured at the point 
of sale and as it flows into the payment system. The ideal approach is 
refraining from storing any cardholder data. The protection should span 
card readers, POS systems, networks and wireless access routers, payment 
card data storage and transmission, and online payment applications and 
shopping carts.
Not complying with PCI and the associated security objectives will 
result in potential liabilities including the following: customer base 
loses confidence and goes to other merchants resulting in decreased 
sales, additional cost of reissuing new payment cards, losses from fraud 
claims, higher incremental costs of compliance, legal costs, settlements 
and judgments, fines and penalties due to financial regulation violation, 
termination of ability to accept payment cards, lost jobs (C-suite security 
and other positions), and in the worst case going out of business.
Chapter 6  Iot VertICal applICatIons and assoCIated seCurIty requIrements
423
The PCI Data Security Standard (DSS)9 version 3.2.1 high-level 
overview is reproduced in Figure 6-3, and the Intel security assets that 
enable building a PCI compliant device are discussed.
9 www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/
PCI Data Security Standard – High Level Overview
Build and Maintain a Secure
Network and Systems
1. Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data
Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other
security parameters
2.
Protect stored cardholder data
Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks
3.
4.
Protect all systems against malware and regularly update anti-virus
software or programs
Develop and maintain secure systems and applications
5.
6.
Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data
Regularly test security systems and processes
10.
11.
Maintain a policy that addresses information security for all personnel12.
Restrict access to cardholder data by business need to know
Restrict physical access to cardholder data













Figure 6-3. High-level overview of PCI Data Security Standard
 Security Objectives and Requirements
Assets in a retail IoT device include the following:
• Data at rest and in transit: Cardholders’ data and 
transactional information.
• Identity of the consumer: Personally identifiable 
information (PII) should be stored under strict access 
control, preferably using encryption for data-at-rest.
• Identity of the POS device: Device’s credentials are 
essential to mitigate the remote hacker attacks and 
to have a robust connection to the device cloud 
infrastructure.
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• The hardware components: The HW BOM list in the 
platform must always be protected via a transparent 
supply chain during production and deployment and 
guarded in the field as appropriate.
• The FW including pre-OS boot loader: The FW on the 
platform is a critical asset.
• Kernel and user mode SW components: The OS kernel 
and user mode SW components including applications 
are all important assets.
 Threats
The PCI DSS standard has outlined high-level threat groups. Figure 6-4 takes 
those groups and extends it to include responsive retail. System compromise 
or theft can be realized by masquerading the retail POS device. Data at rest or 
data in transit can be stolen by leveraging offline data and network sniffers/
monitors for traffic analysis. The provisioning step can be compromised or 
missed/blocked updates can be leveraged to compromise the system. Identity 
theft and credit card disclosure of payment information are equally important 
concerns. The retail advertisement terminals can be compromised to display 
graffiti or distorted images on digital bulletin boards. The runtime environment 
of a retail POS or another device can be infected with malware to do extensive 
persistent damage to the assets on the device and on the Cloud. The following 
bills from California State Legislature mandate provisioning a unique password 
and a device certificate for unique authentication before first use:
• California Senate Bill10 No. 327, CHAPTER 886 TITLE 
1.81.26. SECURITY OF CONNECTED DEVICES, 
1798.91.04. (b) (1) and (2).
10 http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.
xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327
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• California Assembly Bill11 No. 1906, CHAPTER 860 
TITLE 1.81.26. SECURITY OF CONNECTED DEVICES, 








Figure 6-4. Threat groups of retail segment including responsive 
retail
The same threats can be mapped to a typical platform stack shown in 
Figure 6-5, and the mitigations using Intel technologies are also included. 
The HW layer includes all the relevant HW components including the 
System on Chip, storage, SRAM, scanner, communications modules, and 
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Threat #1: Allows hacker to easily break the integrity of the boot 
firmware and OS image. Hacker infiltrates the system by subverting 
execution flow. The mitigation is to implement Boot Guard as explained in 
Chapter 3 to establish a chain of trust based on a HW Root of Trust. When 
a FW is tampered and an attempt is made to boot with this unsigned FW, 
the Boot Guard will detect and will hold the device in reset to prevent 
further compromises of the sensitive assets.
Threat #2: Unauthorized actors could provision devices to their 
preferences including usernames, passwords, password reminders, and 
so on. The Intel Secure Device Onboarding technology could be leveraged 
to provision the device persona and force to change the default passwords 
with stricter ones and strong password reminders plus a dual factor 
authentication. Refer to Chapter 4 for details on SDO.
Threats #3, #7: Transaction data, logging to POS server. This is a critical 
threat for which an exploit could violate the P2PE requirements of PCI DSS 
where the cardholder’s data could be obtained by hackers on the network. 
Intel AES technology in the CPU can be used to encrypt the cardholder’s 
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Figure 6-5. Threats to Retail POS devices with mitigation using Intel 
HW security building blocks
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information to enforce confidentiality. To increase the robustness of this 
part of the solution, the encryption process can be done inside an SGX 
enclave to protect from ring 0 or rootkit attacks.
Threat #4: Leaves the cryptographic keys used to protect platform 
and owner secrets easily recovered or potentially retained in storage. This 
is once again a critical task to protect the keys used for encrypting the 
cardholders’ data by storing the keys in a PTT/TPM so that these keys are 
never exposed to hackers.
Threats #5, #6: Weakness may grant remote hacker access to the 
device and in turn local network from any remote location. This is a 
powerful exploit, and mitigation requires strong device credentials such 
as the Endorsement Key in PTT/TPM to be authenticated by device cloud 
infrastructure without much manual intervention (to eliminate potential 
and expensive human errors). All the POS devices should have the firewall 
and intrusion detection systems implemented. The network routers both 
wired and wireless must have firewall and intrusion detection SW actively 
monitoring the network traffic for logging anomalies in real time and store 
the data for analytics SW. It is important to have analytics SW to mine 
these logs for patterns for zero-day or known vulnerabilities. A complete 
platform security stack built pertinent to retail Solutions with Intel security 





























Intel® Software Guard Extensions
(SGX)
PLATFORM PROTECTION
INTEL® PLATFORM TRUST TECHNOLOGY
INTEL® SOFTWARE GUARD EXTENSIONS (SGX)
Figure 6-6. Platform security stack built pertinent to Retail Solutions
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At the HW layer, the manageability with Intel Active Management 
Technology (AMT), secure boot with attestation, encryption, secure key, 
PTT/TPM, and platform protection are required to be implemented.  
UEFI/BIOS layer leverages the HW root of trust from Boot Guard and 
extends the chain of trust (transitive) to the upper layers in the stack. The 
hypervisor or VMM is optional; if present, it authenticates the VM pre-OS 
FW and the OS VMs while leveraging the VT HW capabilities to provide the 
necessary isolation between VMs. The OS is expected to be hardened by 
leveraging the Intel HW security features such as OS Guard for preventing 
ring 0 privilege escalation attacks, PTT for secure key storage, and AES 
and SHA New Instructions for performant crypto operations. The OS can 
also leverage the SGX for TEE applications and all the while enabling 
the in-band manageability features via Intel AMT. The application layer 
implements app whitelisting, virus/malware scanning, and so on.
The end-to-end data flow in a retail POS architecture is shown 
in Figure 6-7. The entities involved include the payment terminals, 
peripherals, the POS software inside an Intel-based platform, secure 















Figure 6-7. The end-to-end data flow in a Retail POS architecture
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 1. Native devices pair (cryptographically) directly 
with the applet for private/secure communications 
which involves mutual authentication via digital 
signatures and confidentiality through encryption/
decryption and integrity through sign/verify. 
Establish secure channels from peripherals and 
servers to process data through the TEE applet. The 
TEE applet could be an SGX application enclave 
running inside the TEE to protect the sensitive 
and valuable code and the data. This will prevent 
the exposure of credit card or other PII during 
processing in the memory since the memory 
contents are encrypted inline.
 2. Legacy devices should encrypt the data to the applet 
using the Derived Unique Key Per Transaction 
(DUKPT) with AES-256. DUKPT is a method to 
manage the key between two endpoints; this key has 
properties: unique per transaction, symmetric, is a 
derived key from Base Derivation Key (BDK) known 
to both endpoints. This key is used in the AES 
algorithm for encryption and decryption. Currently 
Triple DES (TDES) is being used, but according to 
the guidance from NIST on Transitioning the Use of 
Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths, two-key 
TDES is deprecated and three-key TDES should be 
used only for 220 (64-bit) blocks and should not be 
used after 2023.12 
12 https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/sp/800-131a/rev-2/
draft/documents/sp800-131Ar2-draft.pdf
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 3. The Dock protects legacy insecure devices to 
the applet; sample devices include magnetic ink 
character recognition, keyboards, and barcode 
scanner. This Dock performs as a proxy for the legacy 
devices which inherently may be insecure and 
abstracts the devices by consuming the data in the 
clear and protecting it before sending to TEE applet.
 4. Data can be encrypted for transmission to bank 
gateways or store servers. Use TEE applet to create a 
safe place to process transactions and enact policies.
 5. Management servers manage policies and behavior 
of the system. Through a secure channel from a 
console to the applet, the provisioning of keys, 
credentials, and policies is performed. This helps 
in managing peripheral crypto keys and telemetry 
data remotely and enables pull requests to access 
transactions at the request of the retailer. 
Design trade-offs: Considering the PCI standard and vectors, 
functional safety is not a primary factor, but security and privacy are the 
critical factors. As outlined in PCI DSS standard, the resiliency in terms of 
mitigating physical attack threats is also applicable where a card reader 
could be stolen and replace legitimate devices with fraudulent devices to 
steal the card data.
 Standards – Regulatory and Industry
The PCI Digital Security Standard (PCI DSS) is one of the main standards 
that mandate most of the preceding security objectives. The PCI DSS also 
mandates FIPS 140-2 for secure storage of keys via a PTT/TPM.13
13 www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/
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 Transportation Solutions14
The solutions in a vehicle can be grouped into Software-Defined Cockpit 
(SDC) as shown in Figure 6-8. Intel Silicon and solutions enable building 
SDC applications for the next generation of advanced automotive 
electronics. The SDC itself can be subdivided into rear seat entertainment, 
digital instrument cluster, in-vehicle infotainment, and advanced driver-
assistance system (ADAS). The rear seat entertainment solutions include a 
DVD/Blu-ray player, virtual office, and connection to IVI front system and 
mobile devices with Cloud connectivity.
The digital instrument cluster unit includes display for speed, fuel 
level, odometer, trips, and so on. This cluster may also be able to project 
images on the windshield (heads-up display) with alerts for low fuel or low 
tire pressure via tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS).
The in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) unit includes the GPS-based 
navigation system, audio/video entertainment systems, and connection 
to mobile devices for phone communication and music with voice 
recognition features. This unit also includes a backup camera and cameras 
for parking assist. The unit may include gesture or touch inputs.
The advanced driver-assistance system (ADAS) is a complex system 
of systems with features including blind spot monitoring, adaptive cruise 
control, lane departure warning, cross traffic warning, brake assist and 
collision avoidance, self-parking, and driver monitoring for fatigue or 
undesirable distractions.
14 Credit: David Zage, Platform Solutions Architect from TSD for domain expertise 
and the content.
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 Connected Vehicle Infrastructure
As the vehicles start communicating with the external environment 
spanning more than just the Cloud, many IoT-related threats become 
pertinent. In Figure 6-9, the vehicle communicates with many clusters 
including GPS systems, Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) network, local repair shop 
or dealership network, roadside assistance network, mobile devices, Radio 
Data Systems, and Internet backbone via Internet service provider (ISP) 
through 4G/5G wireless. Some of these network clusters such as repair shops 
and roadside assistance may also connect to the Internet backbone.
The devices in a car communicate with different external entities in 
regular and autonomous driving applications:
• Vehicle to vehicle (V2V): These communications are 
occurring in real time between vehicles on the roads.
• Vehicle to infrastructure (V2I): These communications 
are occurring between the vehicle and the 
infrastructure such as dealership or an auto body shop 
or a traffic management system.
In Vehicle Experience Solutions
Rear Seat Entertainment







Brake assist and collision avoidance
Self-parking systems
Driver Monitoring
Connection to IVI front system and mobile
devices (cloud connectivity)
Digital Instrument Cluster
Display speed, fuel level, trip miles and
more
Project images on the windshield, with
alerts for low fuel or tire pressure (HUD)
In-vehicle Infotainment (IVI)
Navigation systems, radios and
Entertainment systems
Multiple cameras for surround-view
parking assist
Gesture Recognition / Touch (HMI)
Back-up camera
Connection to mobile devices for calls,
music and applications via voice
recognition
Figure 6-8. Software-Defined Cockpit – in-vehicle experience solutions
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• Vehicle to device (V2D): These communications 
are occurring between a vehicle and a device such 
as smartphone over Bluetooth, remote control key, 
wireless diagnostics device, and so on.
• Vehicle to Cloud (V2C): These communications are 
occurring between a vehicle and a private or a public 
cloud to retrieve or upload the recent traffic/weather 

























External systems and networks support new











Connectivity Is More than Just Devices and the Cloud
Figure 6-9. Connected vehicle infrastructure – more than just devices 
and Cloud
 Security Objectives and Requirements
• Each electronic control unit (ECU) in the connected 
vehicle is expected to have the following security attributes:
• A unique, hardware-based ID that’s immutable and 
standards compliant
• Capability for mutual authentication
• A HW root of trust
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• Protected Boot (verified and measured)
• Secure storage for key material
• Tamper detection, prevention, and policy 
enforcement
• A Trusted Execution Environment
• All intra-car information has the option of integrity 
(hash, HMAC), confidentiality (encryption), 
authentication (digital signatures), and nonrepudiation 
(digital signatures).
• All data pertaining to users/occupants is encrypted 
to maintain privacy.
• All inter-car information is authenticated and 
has integrity (hash, HMAC) and confidentiality 
(encryption).
• Near real-time, secure over-the-air updates for SW 
and FW.
• All safety-critical operations are partitioned; other 
services are virtualized for both efficiency and security.
• Car network
• Runs Anomaly Detection SW on the device and 
the gateway within the vehicle for detecting known 
and zero-day vulnerabilities. This SW could also 
connect to a Threat Intelligence database on the 
Cloud for cross-referencing the signatures for 
quantifying and classifying against known viruses 
and malware signatures/patterns.
• Provides whitelisting for identities allowed to 
authenticate and send data externally
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 Threats
With the preceding security objectives in the context, let’s discuss the 
attacker profiles, threat surfaces, and specific threats. Figure 6-10 depicts 
five attacker profiles with diverse technical knowledge, access levels, and 
goals. A car thief possesses varied technical knowledge with wireless and/
or physical access with a goal of stealing the car which may entail disabling 
the alarm and jumping the wires to start the car and drive off. A car thief 
may employ remote attacks through Telematics Control Unit (TCU)/IVI 
and On-Board Diagnostics (e.g., On-Board Diagnostics (OBD-II) routinely 
accessed during service or tuning in the clear).
A hacker may possess medium to high technical knowledge with a 
remote/wireless access and may operate with goals to either get fame 
or steal any PII including passwords to music, credit card payment 
information, and so on. A hacker may employ device masquerading 
and launch remote attacks through Telematics Control Unit (TCU)/IVI.  
A hacker may also go after information disclosure of third-party 
algorithm/IP.
A criminal may possess medium to very high technical knowledge with 
wireless and/or physical access with an intent to harm the passengers and 
the bystanders. A criminal may employ remote attacks through Telematics 
Control Unit (TCU)/IVI and On-Board Diagnostics (e.g., OBD-II).
A workshop technician may possess medium to very high technical 
knowledge with physical access and will operate with a goal to modify the 
settings such as rewinding the odometer, fuel usage/statistics, and so on 
by leveraging the On-Board Diagnostics (e.g., OBD-II). A similar attack 
profile is where a persistent vehicle alteration is done by a legitimate 
user to modify the original design by either increasing the performance, 
jailbreaking, customizing the user interface, adding new regions into DVD/
Blu-ray player, and so on.
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A counterfeiter or a competitor may possess high to very high technical 
knowledge with physical access and may wish to study the design/
architecture to reverse engineer and steal Intellectual Property or clone 
the device. This attacker has physical access to the device in a laboratory 
environment with access to sophisticated tools/logic analyzers, IR/ 
thermal scanning, differential power analysis, and so on to monitor the 
vehicle networking bus traffic using On-Board Diagnostics (e.g., OBD-II)  
interfaces. The potential assets to be recovered could be intellectual 
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Figure 6-10. Attacker profiles in the Transportation Solutions domain
Automotive Threat Surfaces: Refer to Figure 6-11 for distinct hackable 
areas in a vehicle. These areas can be organized into three groups, 
physical access, in-vehicle network structure, and wireless/remote access 
to the vehicle.
Physical access
• On-Board Diagnostics (e.g., OBD-II routinely accessed 
during service or tuning in the clear)
• Entertainment media (e.g., DVD, USB, etc.)
• Access to ECUs
• External sensors (vision, acoustic, radar, LIDAR, etc.)
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In-vehicle network structure
• Connections to OBD-II
• Vehicle networking bus (CAN, KLINE, MOST, Ethernet 
AVB, etc.) connections to various ECUs
Wireless access to vehicle
• Keyless entry
• Bluetooth and Bluetooth-connected devices
• TPMS
• Cellular, Internet, and applications (V2X)
• Radio/audio system(s)
• Remote telematics













Remote Link Type App
Vehicle Access System ECU
Steering & Breaking ECU
Engine & Transmission ECU
Smartphone
Figure 6-11. Distinct hackable areas in a vehicle
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 Mitigations
Mitigating the preceding threats would require a defense in depth 
approach as shown in Figure 6-12, beginning with securing the vehicle 
systems and followed by securing the communications:
Securing the vehicle systems includes the following assets:
• Sensors and actuators: All the sensors and actuators 
must be authenticated (digital signatures) before 
communicating and protect the integrity (sign/verify 
using SHA3) and confidentiality (using AES-256) of the 
valuable data on the bus interfaces.
• Computer vision and AI (path planning): The machine 
learning or deep learning assets such as the weights, 
training data, test/validation data, models, and so 
on must be protected by encrypting the assets on the 
storage and decrypting into the memory in a TEE. The 
details for this architecture are outside the scope of this 
book.
• Networks and ECUs: The networks and any gateways 
must have firewalls and intrusion detection systems, 
and the ECUs must be securely booted and deploy the 
HW security building blocks as listed here.
Securing communications:
• Vehicle to everything (V2X): All the devices on the 
V2X interfaces must be mutually authenticated 
(using digital signatures) before communicating and 
protect the integrity (sign/verify using SHA3) and 
confidentiality (using AES-256) of the valuable data on 
the bus interfaces.
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• Maps, code, and data to/from the Cloud: The maps 
database and access to online databases must be 
authenticated and authorized via digital signatures and 
login credentials. Any data exchange with the Cloud 
must also be subjected to the same protections.
• Infotainment, mobile devices, wearables: 
The infotainment devices and mobile devices 
including wearables/smartphones/others must be 
mutually authenticated (digital signatures) before 
communicating and protect the integrity (sign/verify 
using SHA3) and confidentiality (using AES-256) of the 
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Figure 6-12. Defense in depth architecture
The threats explained earlier can be effectively mitigated by leveraging 
the Intel HW security building blocks shown in Figure 6-13. The boot 
integrity of the automotive systems can be secured with protected 
boot (verified and measured boot). The protected storage feature can 
be leveraged to store the keys securely and perform low bandwidth 
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encryption/decryption and sign/verify of the message data. For higher 
robustness and high bandwidth use cases, the authentication of data 
whether it is messages or others can be achieved in the TEE such as SGX 
by invoking SHA-NI in the CPU instruction set.
Hardware security building blocks:
 1. Unique Device ID using PKI compliant keys/
certificates via PTT/TPM.
 2. True RNG using the RNG instructions in the 
CPU. With reasonably good entropy to be used as a 
nonce or a seed for subsequent key generation.
 3. Verified boot using Boot Guard to ensure a HW Root 
of Trust and a robust transient chain of trust.
 4. Secure storage using PTT/TPM for both data and 
keys.
 5. Trusted Execution Environment using SGX.
 6. Cryptographic acceleration using AES and SHA new 
instructions.
 7. Key generation using PTT/TPM for application keys.
 8. Secure clock using tamper-resistant HW supplied 
timers for precise logging of retail transactions.
 9. Monotonic counters – HW supplied and tamper-
resistant counters that are guaranteed to 
increment only.
 10. Secure debug for locking/disabling the debug 
ports at the factory and ability to unlock/enable to 
securely debug.
 11. Physical tamper detection and protection against 
side-channel attacks.
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Design trade-offs: For the Transportation Solutions domain, 
functional safety, security, privacy, and resiliency are all pertinent. The 
automobiles have a long life and are safety/life critical by design; it is 
essential to integrate safety and security to prevent false positives and false 
negatives from functional safety infrastructure. There is also a need for 
the automobiles to detect the physical tamper and send a “kill pill” to the 
platform to trigger a lockdown of the security engine and vault the secrets 
to avoid unauthorized disclosure. This is critical so that Break Once Run 
Everywhere (BORE) attacks to retrieve the universal keys are mitigated.
 Standards – Regulatory and Industry
The SAE J3101 is one of the main government regulations that mandate 
most of the preceding security objectives. FIPS 140-2 L2/3 and NHTSA are 
also considered vital for the US markets.
Defense in Depth
Hardware security building blocks
Platform boot integrity and chain of trust
Secure storage (keys and data)
Secure communication
Secure debug
Tamper detection and protection from
side channel attacks
Figure 6-13. HW security building blocks for defense in depth
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 Industrial Control System (ICS) 
and Industrial IoT (IIoT)
As the manufacturers and producers seek to respond to greater pressures 
for higher production rates, lower production costs, and the ability to 
compete in a global marketplace, they continue to embrace the efficiencies 
created by a transition to Industry 4.0 and the Industrial IoT (IIoT). These 
are broad terms that encompass the concept of a combined information 
technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) and include flexible 
automation of OT processes, application of artificial intelligence to OT 
problems, automated device and process orchestration, and higher 
resiliency in the presence of system failures, to name a few of the more 
prevalent topics. In Figure 6-14, a notional diagram of an IIoT architecture 
is portrayed for the purpose of identifying security concerns and 



































































































Figure 6-14. Notional Industrial IoT architecture
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This architecture in Figure 6-14 is notional because it is not created 
from any actual deployment nor is it intended to portray a particular type 
of industrial plant. Instead it depicts different types of components in an 
industrial setting that are typical of the devices Intel produces or contributes 
components for in the IIoT. The notional diagram depicts an Edge-to-
Cloud and a SCADA-to-Edge-to-Cloud architecture. On the left side of the 
diagram are various gateways that control devices. Simple devices such 
as meters, tank levels, temperature sensors, and vibration sensors can be 
controlled using a simple gateway. These gateways may control many such 
devices simultaneously. More complex devices such as industrial robots 
or CNC machines require more advanced smart gateways. These devices 
have the ability to load different types of control programs and workloads 
and may include real-time control loops that encompass line and human 
safety protocols. Finally, existing systems also need connectivity to the 
back-end IIoT systems and are connected through a service gateway that 
supports existing protocols and may translate those data elements into 
different forms to be carried in newer protocols and reformatted messages. 
All three types of gateways may be connected by various communications 
technologies including wired and wireless technology.
The back-end systems are still logically segmented into OT and IT 
concerns, though in the IIoT they may share some physical computing 
devices and servers. OT control is focused on orchestration and workload 
management and providing clear visibility of the systems and operations 
to OT engineers.
 Security Objectives and Requirements
Assets in the IIoT gateways are included in the following security 
objectives, where sub-bullets are security objectives derived from top-level 
security objectives. These objectives are aligned with the IIC.15
15 Industrial Internet Consortium. Industrial Internet of Things Volume G4: Security 
Framework. September 2016. www.iiconsortium.org/white-papers.htm
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• Data at rest and in transit: All commands received by 
the gateway from the OT/IT control centers must be 
protected from modification (integrity), duplication 
(replay), and optionally disclosure (confidentiality).
• Identity of the device: All devices shall maintain at 
least one identity public and private key pair used to 
uniquely identify the device to other entities.
• Identity of the control authority: All commands 
received by the gateway from the OT/IT control centers 
must be verified as authentic by comparing the signing 
public key with authorized trust anchor keys. This 
security objective and the previous one imply the 
following derived security objective to address trust 
anchors and identity keys.
• Protection of trust anchors and identity keys: 
All identity keys and trust anchors must be 
securely stored in the gateway to prevent use by 
unauthorized software processes/users. A trust 
anchor key is a public key of an entity (like the OT 
control center) that is inherently trusted by the 
device; an identity key is a public and private key 
pair that is used to prove the device’s identity to 
other entities. Protection of identity keys should 
include limiting the use of the identity key to a RoT 
(see Chapter 3).
• Integrity of the boot system and operating system: 
Verification of boot firmware and software, with secure 
storage of trusted measurements collected during boot, 
shall be enforced at every soft and hard boot event.
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• Trusted reporting of device health: Devices shall be 
capable of reporting their current health including 
measurements from their last boot cycle and any 
software or firmware updates performed since their 
last boot. This reporting must include a proof of origin 
signature that unambiguously attests to the source 
of the report (Root of Trust for Reporting) and all 
claimants producing data for the report (Root of Trust 
for Measurement).
• Verification of software updates, configuration, 
and workloads: All updates to the device shall come 
from an authorized source verified against one of the 
device’s trust anchors; updates shall be protected from 
modification (integrity) and verified by the device prior 
to first use that the update has not been corrupted. 
Updates include new or updated software and 
firmware, configuration files, and workloads.
• Whitelisting of applications and network endpoints: 
Devices shall maintain a whitelist of authorized 
software and the identity and address of network 
endpoints that are authorized to communicate with the 
device, and the device shall prevent the execution of 
any software not on the whitelist and ignore/terminate 
any communication streams from network endpoints 
not on the whitelist.
• Management of connected peripherals: Devices shall 
maintain a whitelist and authorized configuration of 
all connected peripherals, whether wired or wirelessly 
connected to the device, and ignore or disconnect any 
peripherals not authorized to be connected with the 
device.
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• Storage integrity: Devices shall maintain the integrity 
of stored elements including software, configuration 
files, workloads, data measurements, and processing 
logs; devices shall prevent unauthorized access to 
stored elements.
Design trade-offs: Industrial systems are designed specifically for 
harsh environments and for interoperability with existing systems and 
devices. Requirements around these constraints dominate the design 
decisions. Oftentimes, this means removing security protections, like 
encryption, because end systems cannot perform those security functions 
or intermediary systems are dependent on receiving this data unencrypted 
and do not have the capability to add this layer of protection. In addition, 
industrial type systems tend to require low power profiles, either because 
they are deployed in a remote location (oil pumping station) with limited 
power capabilities or crowded together in a small space where heat from 
power dissipation is considered a problem. In both cases, lower powered 
devices tend to have fewer security capabilities. The important trade-off 
in these cases is to support security features that address the most critical 
threat – identification of proper control authorities using protected trust 
anchors for authentication of commands, configuration, and software 
update.
 Threats
The threats to IIoT systems are composed of both external threat actors 
and insiders. Both groups can mount destructive attacks on IIoT systems, 
though most threat analysis focuses on external attackers. Figure 6-15 
identifies the primary threats and consequences.
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Threat #1: Device hijacking – An attacker uses vulnerabilities in the 
device software to inject their own software or firmware on the device and 
corrupt data, stop executing processes, falsify health or data reporting, or 
disrupt the industrial operations flow.
• Mitigation: Use of advanced containment techniques 
to isolate software, including virtualization, containers, 
and TEEs. Ability to restart workloads or execute 
workloads as microservices limits the attack surface 
and time an attack can be active.
Threat #2: Device masquerading – An attacker creates a digital twin 
of the real device and intercepts or copies data to discover proprietary 





































































An attacker gains control of the robotic arm
and alters the original programmed
manufacturing flow.
Attacker gains control of the active robot
to spoof the status, setting the machine
to “offline” and allowing safety doors to
open, even though the robot is
still in operation.
Station 2
Figure 6-15. Primary IIoT threats and consequences16
16 Diagram from www.rambus.com/iot/industrial-iot/
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• Mitigation: Device identity and mutual authentication 
for all communications flows from the OT/IT center 
are vital to prevent these attacks. Physical and logical 
protection of the device’s identity credentials prevents 
an adversary from stealing credentials. Storage of 
a device’s unique identity credentials within a TEE 
is required to prevent the use of a digital twin to 
masquerade as the real device.
Threat #3: Application-level data tampering and denial of service – 
An attacker uses metadata spoofing or replay, SQL injection attacks, or 
resource exhaustion attacks to trick a device into performing an improper 
action or creating a temporary DoS attack on the device.
• Mitigation: End-to-end authentication of all command 
flows and proper whitelisting of network endpoints are 
critical to preventing such attacks. Recognizing and 
responding to DoS and DDoS network attacks requires 
network infrastructure and the ability to reconfigure 
network components to isolate and quarantine 
misbehaving devices.
Threat #4: Permanent denial of service (PDoS) attacks – An attacker is 
able to inject a firmware update or critical operating system update that 
damages the hardware of the device or takes the device offline requiring 
depot-level service to repair the device.
• Mitigation: All updates and changes to the device 
require an authorized command from the OT that 
is cryptographically verified from a secured trust 
anchor on the device. Device management agents with 
privileged capabilities on the device must not also have 
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direct network capability, in order to reduce network 
attacks that also give attackers elevated privileges on 
the device, because such elevated privileges allow an 
attacker to perform actions that can modify the base 
firmware and software on the device.
Threat #5: Tampering and information disclosure of OT data – An 
attacker modifies or collects data flowing between the OT center and a 
device, exposing proprietary data.
• Mitigation: All data between the OT/IT centers and the 
device should include confidentiality protection (end-
to-end security), but minimally must include integrity 
protections.
 Standards – Regulatory and Industry
There is not one standard that defines the Industrial IoT (IIoT), and 
within different segments of the industrial industry there are different 
regulatory or standards groups provide specific guidance and direction. 
It is not possible to cover all of these groups here. Generally, standards 
and industry groups attempt to create a set of interoperable frameworks 
and middleware, along with connectivity and data or protocol standards 
that enable the creation of heterogeneous system of systems to enable the 
IIoT. Figure 6-16 provides an overview of the major standards influencing 
Intel designs.
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 Digital Surveillance System
Information security in digital surveillance systems (DSS) became a public 
problem in 2015 and 2016, culminating in the Mirai DDoS attacks, the largest 
botnet-based distributed denial of service attacks ever at that time in which 
two separate attacks took Akamai and Dyn (and all their customers) offline 
for hours. Because surveillance devices often need to be accessible over the 
Internet, not to mention that the industry moved only recently from analog 
interconnections to digital IP interconnections, information security is a 
new problem for the DSS segment. What can compound this problem is the 
industry is a physical security–driven industry (as opposed to IT driven), and 
the industry’s expertise in cybersecurity for surveillance systems has lagged 
the general Internet cybersecurity awareness.
IIOT System Standards
IIOT Middleware Standards
ISA-95 Enterprise Control System Integration
ISA-62443 Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems
IIC Industrial IOT Standards
OMG Data Distribution Service
OMG Unified Component Model
IIOT Protocol Standards
IIOT Connectivity Standards













The Open Group – Open Process Automation (OPAF)
Figure 6-16. Common IIoT standards, middleware, protocols, and 
connectivity standards
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The DSS segment spans more than just traditional building 
surveillance and closed-circuit TV (CCTV) systems. DSS includes mobile 
surveillance around vehicles and human beings, including vehicular 
cameras and emergency response body camera systems. And extending 
beyond simple surveillance, DSS includes the use of camera systems in 
smart cities for intelligent traffic control and smart toll collection systems. 
As briefly discussed in the last section, the use of camera systems in retail 
can aid a business in understanding customer experiences in brick-and- 
mortar retail establishments, adding extending information to the business 
intelligence systems that improve customer experience, inform decisions 
on product placement, and aid the design of store layout. As usage of 
these DSS systems increase, the opportunity for a repeat of the attacks like 
Mirai, Persirai,17 Devil’s Ivy,18 and Peekaboo19 can become more of a threat. 
Intel®’s robust hardware-based integrated security provides a capability 
stack which improves system security.
17 Trend Micro. May 9, 2017. Persirai: New Internet of Things (IoT) Botnet Targets IP 
Cameras. https://blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-security-intelligence/
persirai-new-internet-things-iot-botnet-targets-ip-cameras/
18 Senrio. July 18, 2017. Devil’s Ivy: Flaw in Widely Used Third-Party Code Impacts  
Millions. https://blog.senr.io/blog/devils-ivy-flaw-in-widely-used- 
third-party-code-impacts-millions
19 Threatpost. September 17, 2018. Zero-Day Bug Allows Hackers to Access CCTV 
Surveillance Cameras. https://threatpost.com/zero-day-bug-allows-
hackers-to-access-cctv-surveillance-cameras/137499/
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In Figure 6-17, the network architecture of a typical DSS system is 
portrayed. Video flows from the camera to a managed switch where 
many devices may actually be connected, including other servers and 
individual laptops. The video data is typically separated from other traffic 
on the managed switch via a protected VLAN. This does not encrypt or 
otherwise protect the traffic or video streams, it merely creates a different 
logical segment on the network reserved only for video traffic. Depending 
on the type of managed switch, this may not present much difficulty for 
an attacker to overcome. Besides the cameras, a network video recorder 
(NVR) video management system (VMS) is also connected to the managed 
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Figure 6-17. Digital Surveillance System (DSS) typical network 
architecture
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a storage array. There is typically a local storage array also connected 
to the managed switch on the VLAN, but a remote storage array in the 
Cloud provides long-term storage. This means that the NVR VMS and 
the local storage device are involved in uploading the video streams to 
the Cloud. Viewing of the video streams may be done locally, off the NVR 
VMS system, or remotely. Remote access may be enabled to the NVR VMS 
system, or more may be provided only from the Cloud, depending on the 
network security at the local installation and the security features enabled 
on the NVR VMS.20
From the network architecture in Figure 6-17, it is also seen that 
input to the NVR VMS may come from devices other than video cameras. 
Multifunction print devices are capable of capturing scanned images 
and using the NVR VMS to store those images for the user. Additionally, 
a phone can be used to pipe in multimedia including audio only, audio 
and video, or other encoded streams as a download service (where 
the phone is acting as a modem) and supply those inputs to the NVR 
VMS. These input streams are important to understand in the overall DSS 
segment, since maintaining security for devices other than IP cameras 
needs to be incorporated into the network security, monitoring, and 
patch update systems.
The Cloud segment of the DSS system includes analytics and advanced 
artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms used to process media files (audio, 
video, and still image) and collect data or file/index media according to 
criteria. This section does not address cloud security concerns, which must 
be properly accounted for in any DSS system. Cloud security is adequately 
addressed by other resources.
20 Credit: Jody Booth, Platform Solutions Architect, DSS team, IOTG, Intel – source 
of DSS Network Architecture diagram
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 Security Objectives and Requirements
Using Figure 6-17 as the target for security analysis, the DSS segment 
includes the following security objectives, which focus on the primary 
video and audio assets in the system:
• Data at rest and in transit: All incoming data streams 
received by the NVR VMS from the managed switch 
must be protected from modification (integrity), 
duplication (replay), and disclosure (confidentiality).
• Identity of the device: All devices attached to the 
managed switch should be uniquely identified; the 
use of MAC addresses is not considered secure as 
these can be spoofed by a network adversary. Devices 
should maintain at least one identity public and 
private key pair used to uniquely identify the device to 
other entities and used to set up protected (integrity 
protected) streams to the NVR VMS.
• Integrity of the boot system and operating system: 
Verification of boot firmware and software, with secure 
storage of trusted measurements collected during boot, 
shall be enforced at every soft and hard boot event 
for all elements of the system, including peripherals 
connected to the managed switch, the NVR VMS, and 
the local storage array.
• Trusted reporting of device health: Devices shall be 
capable of reporting their current health including 
measurements from their last boot cycle and any 
software or firmware updates performed since their 
last boot. This reporting must include a proof of origin 
signature that unambiguously attests to the source 
of the report (Root of Trust for Reporting) and all 
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claimants producing data for the report (Root of Trust 
for Measurement). This reporting should be collected 
by the NVR VMS system when devices connect to 
record/store their multimedia streams.
• Verification of software updates, configuration, 
and workloads: All updates to the device shall come 
from an authorized source verified against one of the 
device’s trust anchors; updates shall be protected from 
modification (integrity) and verified by the device prior 
to first use that the update has not been corrupted. 
Updates include new or updated software, firmware, 
and configuration files.
• Whitelisting of network endpoints: Devices shall 
maintain a whitelist of authorized network endpoints 
that are authorized to communicate with the device, and 
the device shall ignore/terminate any communication 
streams from network endpoints not on the whitelist.
• Management of connected peripherals: The managed 
switch shall maintain a whitelist of all connected 
peripherals, whether wired or wirelessly connected to 
the switch, and ignore or disconnect any peripherals 
not authorized to be connected with the device. 
Authentication of connected devices should be 
performed via cryptographic credentials, not merely 
MAC or IP addresses which can be spoofed.
• Storage integrity: Devices shall maintain the integrity 
of stored elements including media streams, media 
metadata, software, configuration files, and processing 
logs; devices shall prevent unauthorized access 
to stored elements. Particular care must be taken 
to protect private keys and symmetric encryption 
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keys that are used for signatures, in transit data 
confidentiality and integrity or storage confidentiality 
and integrity. Many systems are required to 
produce evidence (surveillance videos, body cams, 
vehicle cams) and this evidence must provide 
cryptographically assured provenance of the media 
files and the media file’s metadata which ensures those 
data items are free from tampering. This protection 
is paramount to support legally binding evidentiary 
claims for authenticity and originating source.
Design trade-offs: DSS systems, especially the end collection devices 
(cameras and audio recorders), are extremely cost sensitive, yet must 
compete on the ability to collect data in various formats and transmit that 
data over the network. Those two primary goals translate to specialized 
hardware capabilities. But the end devices must also operate on very 
limited power budgets, not unlike the industrial systems, and therefore 
design trade-offs tend to remove the majority of the security features. 
Based on the history of attacks these systems have encountered, protection 
of the software running on these devices are most important. Protected 
trust anchors that authenticate control authorities and authorize firmware 
and software updates have the most effect on maintaining security for 
these devices. Back-end infrastructure, such as the video recorders, 
control systems, and storage arrays, are normally standard off-the-shelf 
server class devices that can utilize the full suite of hardware and software 
protections available on the commercial market. 
 Threats
Threats to DSS systems are primarily from outside network adversaries. 
However, from some systems, privileged insiders may need to be included in 
the threat analysis, especially when such DSS systems are used for building 
or other surveillance, and a privileged insider can be coerced, bribed, 
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or forced to delete or modify evidence captured by the NVR VMS. Stolen 
credentials can also make a network outsider appear to be an authorized 
insider. The following threats should be considered in any DSS system:
Threat #1: Device hijacking – An attacker uses weak authentication 
credentials (Mirai attack) to take control of a peripheral device on the DSS 
system; or an attacker uses vulnerabilities in the peripheral device software 
(Devil’s Ivy or Perisai attacks) to inject their own software or firmware on 
the device and stop media capture, falsify metadata, or misuse the device 
computing power to perform other actions (mine for Bitcoin, perform a 
DDoS attack).
• Mitigation #1: Device credentials must be changed prior 
to installation and fielding of devices. Intel’s Secure 
Device Onboarding protocol provides a fast and secure 
mechanism to provision devices with new credentials 
and configuration without requiring specialized or highly 
skilled system installation crews. Devices must never 
have default credentials or default management logins. 
Inspection of open ports and SNMP capabilities are 
required to ensure no unauthenticated or easily guessable 
password credentials are available to an attacker.
• Mitigation #2: Although this threat is virtually the same 
as seen in other segments, the mitigation requirements 
due to power limitations and smaller compute often 
prevent using TEEs or software containers to prevent 
or limit the impact of compromised software. Frequent 
health checks on the device firmware are required to 
monitor for any potential zero-day attacks, and response 
to firmware corruption requires signed updates using a 
hardware root-of-trust (RoT) that cannot be modified by 
an attacker, even one that replaces the firmware through 
physical attack. Careful thought and study of recent 
attacks (Devil’s Ivy and Perisai) must be done.
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Threat #2: Device masquerading – An attacker creates a digital twin 
of the real device and jams or blocks transmission from the real device to 
inject false media streams into the system.
• Mitigation: Device identity must be used to set up mutually 
authenticated streams from the collection peripherals to the 
NVR VMS system; additionally the managed switch should 
perform access control on all connected devices. Physical 
and logical protection of the device’s identity credentials 
prevents an adversary from stealing credentials and 
creating an evil digital twin. Storage of a device’s unique 
identity credentials within a TEE is required to prevent the 
use of a digital twin to masquerade as the real device.
Threat #3: Permanent denial of service (PDoS) attacks – An attacker is 
able to inject a firmware update or critical operating system update that 
damages the hardware of the device or takes the device offline requiring 
depot-level service to repair the device.
• Mitigation: All updates and changes to the device 
require a signed update package that cryptographically 
verifies against a secured trust anchor on the device. No 
changes to the software, and especially the firmware, 
can be made without a signed package update 
command that comes from a trusted, authenticated 
source. Additionally, software and firmware updates 
must be protected against rollback attacks, where an 
adversary installs validly signed but older software 
versions that install an old security vulnerability onto 
the device. Rollback attacks must be prevented by using 
a protected value to store the software version number 
for the currently installed software/firmware, and this 
must be verified against the integrity-protected software 
version found in the signed software update package.
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Threat #4: Unauthorized access to surveillance data – An attacker 
gains access to surveillance footage that includes private or confidential 
information to which that attacker should not have access.
• Mitigation: Proper access control for all surveillance 
footage is required. Best practice is to encrypt 
such footage and provide access control on the 
cryptographic keys. This ensures that all copies of 
the footage are equally protected, including backups. 
This of course shifts the burden of access control 
to the keys themselves. Proper key storage should 
include hardware-based protection with two-factor 
authentication to access the keys. Since backups are 
encrypted, the backup storage of keys becomes an 
issue. Having cold or warm sites with hardware security 
modules (HSM) that are unlocked with smartcards or 
other hardware tokens is best practice.
 Standards – Regulatory and Industry
There are two primary industry standards organized around IP cameras 
and DSS: ONVIF and PSIA.21 ONVIF (Open Network Video Interface 
Forum) was formed in 2008 as a nonprofit industry organization to 
define an interoperable interface standard for IP cameras allowing better 
interoperability between different manufacturers. ONVIF was originally 
formed by Axis Communications, Bosch Security Systems, and Sony Corp, 
but now has over 480 members. ONVIF has defined four profiles for video 
cameras (Profiles S, G, Q, and T)22; however, as shown in Figure 6-18, 
necessary security features are not yet mandatory in many profiles.
21 IFSEC Global. 2014, November 23. ONVIF and PSIA: Guide to Standards 
in Video Surveillance. www.ifsecglobal.com/video-surveillance/
guide-to-standards-in-video-surveillance-onvif-v-psia/
22 Profile categories C and A are reserved for access control devices, like door locks.
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PSIA (Physical Security Interoperability Alliance) is another industry 
consortium formed in 2008 covering the interoperability of IP media 
devices, recording and content management for recorders and video 
analytics.24 PSIA was founded by 20 member companies including 
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Figure 6-18. ONVIF general requirements by profile category23
23 ONVIF. (2018). ONVIF Overview. www.onvif.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/10/ONVIF_Profile_Feature_overview_v2-2.pdf
24 Honeywell. (2014). IP Video Standards. www.security.honeywell.com/-/
media//Security/Resources/PDF/News%20and%20events/White%20papers/
IP_Video_Standards%20pdf
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has stalled with the last publication from this body in 2010. Although 
there are still many cameras and devices on the market carrying PSIA 
compliance, PSIA is not considered a leading force in the industry.
Of all the driving forces for security in IP cameras, GDPR and the 
California Data Privacy Law in the United States are the main concerns. 
According to the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS),25 
surveillance footage can be used to identify people directly or indirectly 
and therefore falls within the GDPR regulations. The EDPS provides 
guidelines26 to maintain compliance in digital surveillance systems, 
and much of this guidance focuses on policy, proper notifications 
through signage, and careful site planning and configuration. EDPS 
recommended protections cover data in transit (prevent transmissions 
from interception), data at rest (restriction on access to stored media, 
including backups), and access control, but these controls must follow 
the recommendations resulting from a threat analysis. Of all these 
issues, access control becomes the most difficult and requires good 
key management that is based in hardware-protected key storage 
and roots-of-trust. Compliance with the California law should follow 
similar guidance.
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) may also 
be applicable in the medical field, relating to building surveillance systems 
used in hospitals and medical facilities, which must comply with the added 
burden of inference correlation between a person captured in a video feed 
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 Summary
IoT security in the current fragmented ecosystem requires a completely 
different mindset. This includes leveraging the common Intel security 
building blocks and accelerators such as Movidius and Intel (Altera) FPGA 
solutions. It is feasible to maintain a baseline of security capabilities and 
add the domain-specific features on the top to make the security solution 
complete for deployment. In some cases, the solution may include a 
heterogeneous architecture with assets from Intel SoC and accelerators 
such as FPGA/Movidius. We have seen how the retail Solution domain 
is influenced by the PCI DSS standard and how this standard can be met 
with compliance on Intel product–based devices. We have also seen how 
the Transportation Solutions domain is changing with the connected 
vehicle concept and the plethora of threats looming over this domain. The 
specific requirements of TSD can be met using Intel security technologies. 
Industrial and Digital Surveillance System have their unique robustness 
and mandatory standards for compliance. Only a subset of IoT verticals 
are covered in this chapter, but most of these concepts apply readily to the 
medical field, gaming, print imaging, and so on.
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The world’s most massive living organism1 is named Pando, Latin for  
“I spread out.” It is a quaking aspen clonal colony in south-central Utah 
in the United States located at the western edge of the Colorado Plateau 
in the Fishlake National Forest. It has a shared root system that is an 
estimated 80,000 years old,2 making it one of the oldest living organisms 
as well as being the most massive. The colony of individual male trees has 
identical genetic markers due to one of its reproductive strategies, sending 
up stems cloned from its massive underground root system. The frequent 
intense forest fires that sweep through the colony trigger radicle stem 
growth that become saplings and eventually replacement trees for those 
consumed by forest fires.
Pando might very well be a reasonable metaphor for understanding 
security in the context of the Internet of Things. Even though malware, 
like forest fires, may compromise individual devices and services, 
hardware-roots-of-trust remain insulated from the effects of attack. Root-
of-trust building blocks focus on securely restarting devices and services 
that allow automated resumption and continued operation of the Internet 
of Things colony.
1 Grant, Michael C. (October 1993). “The Trembling Giant.” Discover. Vol. 14 no. 10. 
Chicago. pp. 82–89. Retrieved 8 May 2008.
2 “Quaking Aspen.” Bryce Canyon National Park. U.S. National Park Service. 
February 24, 2015. Retrieved 17 November 2018.
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In the era of personal computing, the computer virus was the 
predominant term borrowed from biology. It seemed to adequately 
characterize computer security challenges. The antivirus scan and 
computer emergency response processes that counter viral attacks follow 
a strategy summarized as detect, contain, and correct. Detection improves 
with constant profile updates used by antivirus scanners. Containment is 
achieved through various techniques to quarantine software, services, and 
devices. Vulnerabilities are corrected by installing patches and software 
updates that also resist future attacks. Detect-contain-correct has been a 
major focus for security practitioners since the first PCs were connected 
to the Internet. However, these response processes required significant 
manual intervention that insufficiently scale when billions of new nodes 
are added to the Internet of Things.
In the era of IoT, Pando may be the more appropriate security 
paradigm where the focus turns to hardware-roots-of-trust that become 
the building blocks for resilient security. Automated recovery and  
re- instantiation of trustworthy IoT endpoints and services follows an 
outbreak. Pando-style security mechanisms are still in their infancy as IoT 
evolution transitions from its first phase of massive connectivity growth to 
its second and third phases of smarter autonomous systems.
In this book, we looked at the economics of constrained devices and its 
impact on security, the role of IoT frameworks in enabling interoperability, 
improved developer experiences, and complexity hiding; we reviewed 
currently available hardware security capabilities and their role as 
hardware-roots-of-trust. We also described some of the challenges facing 
system software, virtualization, and software frameworks when trying to 
use hardware security capabilities and expose those security services to 
the various software layers above them. Attestation was highlighted as a 
way for peer nodes to evaluate trustworthiness characteristics of hardware 
security capabilities. We saw how an increase in connectivity options leads 
to increased complexity in gateways, hubs, routers, and other networking 
infrastructure as constrained endpoints continue to implement narrow 
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slices of connection technology. We also saw how system design objectives 
can lead to security, safety, availability, and usability trade-offs and how 
vertically aligned components, software, and operations rely on the 
continued preservation of vertical boundaries in light of technology that 
breaks through many of the historical technological and physical barriers.
In particular, we want to highlight several core security concepts and 
ideas that contradict conventional thinking when taken in light of very 
large-scale IoT deployments.
 Economics of Constrained Roots-of-Trust
In Chapter 1 we described the economics and impact of scaling security 
down to constrained devices which constitute the vast majority of connected 
devices in the IoT ecosystem. The traditional expectation that approximately 
5–10% of device resources being security-related becomes inverted where, in 
many cases, a majority of resources are security functionality focused. This is 
motivated by root-of-trust security capabilities that anticipate interoperable 
trusted behaviors designed to initialize, boot, discover, provision, configure, 
and decommission IoT devices without human involvement. Devices 
lacking these capabilities simply will not be allowed to connect.
 IoT Frameworks – Necessary Complexity
In Chapter 2 we observed how IoT frameworks achieve the multifaceted 
goal of enabling broad connectivity, improving device manageability, 
simplifying distributed application development and operation while 
promising increased interoperability. Unfortunately, interoperability ethos 
isn’t universally shared among framework providers as some vendors 
pursue proprietary IoT strategies and others are overeager to create a 
multitude of similar but different framework standards that further dilute 
the promise of interoperability. We further observed that IoT framework 
standards almost universally ignore specifying secure binding of security 
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functionality that incorporates hardware-roots-of-trust technology to 
framework layers that would ensure framework layers are not easily 
overtaken by malware interposers.
 Hardware Security – More Than a Toolbox
In Chapter 3 we walked through an array of hardware security technologies 
available for integration into IoT solutions. We explained essential 
protections for identity, initialization, storage, and execution require 
hardware-roots-of-trust that are secure by design. This principle should be 
common to all secure IoT platforms. We also characterized attacks on IoT 
platforms observing that attack pathology often follows a transition from 
applications to user mode, user mode to kernel mode, kernel mode to pre- 
OS boot loader, and pre-OS to hardware. Ultimately, hardware is the last 
line of defense. Hardware is also the first point of recovery when rebuilding 
a clean system. Consequently, hardware security should be where the 
most care should be applied to ensure robust predictable behavior. 
We showed how HW security elements can be used by upper layers to 
implement defense-in-depth strategies that enable layered approach to 
attack mitigation and resilient recovery.
 IOT Software – Building Blocks with Glue
In Chapter 4 we considered the role software plays in securing IoT 
solutions and showed some of the ways popular system software and 
applications approach implementation of security features. We also 
motivated the need for hardware security integration and observed that 
integration is often nontrivial requiring adaptation and rework on behalf 
of firmware and software developers. For example, a Trusted Execution 
Environment (TEE) such as Intel SGX anticipates modularizing application 
software so that security relevant operations are performed within a secure 
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enclave. System software may require modification to remove unnecessary 
features that add exploit risk and prohibit operation inside of a more secure 
virtual machine. We took a tour through multiple OSs and how they expose 
HW security features and described criteria for securely implementing and 
enabling solutions that build on top of hardware security mechanisms that 
act like security glue that holds the software layers together.
 Ethernet TSN – Everybody’s Common 
Choice?
In Chapter 5 we described a host of communications technologies that 
will be employed to one extent or another in the broad IoT landscape. 
The reality is many IoT endpoints will employ multiple communications 
technologies based on cost, improved flexibility, and interoperability 
all the while realizing the diverse security implications. The IEEE 
has standardized dozens of use cases and applications involving 
interoperation between disparate IoT protocols. Nevertheless, complexity 
for complexity’s sake isn’t justifiable as the IoT industry will inevitably 
select a few connectivity technologies that broadly satisfy requirements 
unique to IoT; in other words, the industry will find everybody’s second 
choice technology. Before the Internet Protocol (IP),3 every major 
computer vendor had a local area network solution, most of which 
didn’t interoperate. IP became everybody’s second choice option 
since supporting every possible combination of vendor proprietary 
solutions was intractable. We anticipate a second convergence phase of 
connectivity technologies will occur for the Internet of Things. Our focus 
on Ethernet TSN plus IPv6 as our first choice to replace fieldbus-based  
3 Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern California, “Internet 




solutions is in anticipation of the eventual consolidation of the 
fragmented state of brownfield IoT. We think brownfield IoT will regard 
TSN as a popular second choice.
 Security MVP – The Champion Within 
a Fractured IoT Ecosystem
In Chapter 6 we broadened the view of vertical applications addressed by 
IoT to include any industry informed by “smart” devices. Each of these 
industries has different security requirements due to the nature of the 
information handled and to meet regulatory and industry standard bodies’ 
requirements. An overview was provided of the different verticals and 
associated security requirements. IoT ecosystem is fragmented by nature 
with multiple verticals, but at the end of the day, we need a common set of 
HW/SW building blocks and augmenting accelerators to meet the domain 
unique requirements. We discussed technology layering characteristics 
where layered security functionality needs to be rooted in hardware where 
a security minimum viable platform (MVP) defines a core set of security 
ingredients that are by and large common across all nodes participating 
in the larger IoT system. Systems architects stand a better chance at 
designing secure IoT systems when the MVP set of hardware security 
capabilities is available for implementation of security enforcement points 
rather than relying on a mix of options that span the continuum of cyber 
and physical ingredients.
 The Way Forward
The journey to demystify IoT Security doesn’t end with this book. We 
anticipate there remains a huge scaling problem where the key to realizing 
secure IoT operation is anchored in autonomous response and recovery 
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in the face of attacks. A “pragmatic” security-minded industry recognizes 
that heterogeneous networks constructed using devices having different 
HW and SW architectures, components, and capabilities are likely to 
coexist for the foreseeable future as some devices are expected to remain 
in deployment for nearly 30 years. Nevertheless, all devices need to be 
reachable and serviceable or reliably disabled and excluded. Given the 
IoT continues to be a target for attack and compromise, defense-in-depth 
layering supported by robust hardware security capabilities is essential. 
The security community refers to this as hardware-roots-of-trust, we think 
of it as a Pando security layer that isn’t easily compromised and resiliently 
restarts in the face of attack.
We’ve presented a perspective to trusted computing that is intrinsic 
to a device and is recognizable to other IoT devices; looking ahead we 
anticipate distributed trust will become commonplace where trust may be 
distributed across millions of devices. Blockchain4 technology might be a 
good example, where a consensus of participant devices may determine 
whether an individual device is configured with minimum viable root- 
of- trust capabilities. For more information about blockchain, see the 
Hyperledger Project,5 a Linux Foundation open source effort, and these 
additional references.[6, 7, 8 ]
4 Wikipedia, “blockchain” (as of this publication date). https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Blockchain
5 www.hyperledger.org
6 Khwaja Shaik, “Why blockchain and IoT are best friends”, 
January 12, 2018. www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2018/01/
why-blockchain-and-iot-are-best-friends/
7 Postscapes – A list of projects and companies, “Blockchains and the IoT,” January 
5, 2019. www.postscapes.com/blockchains-and-the-internet-of-things/
8 Phillip J. Windley, Ph.D., Chair Sovrin Foundation, “Identity, Sovrin, 




Security combined with artificial intelligence (AI)[9, 10, 11] and machine 
learning (ML)[12, 13] is another area ripe for innovation where Intel is 
conducting research.14 Post-quantum cryptography15 and resilient 
computing16 are additional areas of technical exploration that are out of 
scope for this book that nevertheless promise impactful Pando security 
advances.
9 Intel Artificial Intelligence Overview. www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/
analytics/artificial-intelligence/overview.html
10 Torsten George, Security Week, “The Role of Artificial Intelligence 
in Cyber Security,” January 11, 2017. www.securityweek.com/
role-artificial-intelligence-cyber-security
11 Justin Jett, Threat Post, “Security and Artificial Intelligence: 
Hype vs. Reality,” August 23, 2018. https://threatpost.com/
security-and-artificial-intelligence-hype-vs-reality/136837/
12 Jason Knight, Intel AI Products Group blog, “The Importance of 
Systems in Machine Learning,” February 15, 2018. www.intel.ai/
systems-machine-learning/#gs.4FOjLznH
13 MIT Technology Review Insights/Research, “Machine Learning-driven 
analytics: Key to digital transformation,” 2018. www.intel.com/content/www/
us/en/analytics/mit-machine-learning-advanced-analytics-key-to-
transformation.html
14 Georgia Tech Institute for Information Security & Privacy, 
“Georgia Tech Launches New Research on the Security of 
Machine-Learning Systems,” Oct 31, 2016. www.iisp.gatech.edu/
georgia-tech-launches-new-research-security-machine-learning-systems
15 Simona Samardjiska, Digital Security Group Radbound University, RIOT Summit 
2017, “Post Quantum Cryptography for the IoT.” https://riot-os.org/files/
RIOT-Summit-2017-slides/3-4-Security-session-Simona.pdf
16 Kemal A. Delic, Ubiquity, Publications of the ACM, “On Resilience of IoT 
Systems” The Internet of Things Symposium, February 2016. https://ubiquity.
acm.org/article.cfm?id=2822885
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